The evolution of human language, and the kind of thought the communication of which requires it, raises considerable explanatory challenges. These systems of representation constitute a radical discontinuity in the natural world. Even species closely related to our own appear incapable of either thought or talk with the recursive structure, generalized systematicity, and task-domain neutrality that characterize human talk and the thought it expresses. W. Tecumseh Fitch’s proposal (2004, in press) that human language is descended from a sexually selected, prosodic (...) proto-language that approximated its syntactic complexity, and later acquired semantics thanks to kin selection for its use as a means of pedagogical transmission, has the promise of meeting these explanatory challenges. However, Fitch’s theory raises two problems of its own: (1) according to Boyd and Richerson (1996, Proc. Br. Acad. 88: 77–93), circumstances in which pedagogy is adaptive are inevitably rare in nature, and (2) it is unlikely that our non-discursive precursors had generally systematic, task-domain neutral thoughts to communicate to their offspring. I propose solutions to these problems. Pedagogy would be favored in a population where complex rituals dominated diverse aspects of life. Prosodic proto-language could emerge as the medium of pedagogic transmission. As this medium was used to teach a greater variety of tasks, it would become increasingly general and domain neutral. The presence and importance of such a system of communication in hominid populations could then drive, via Baldwinian mechanisms, the evolution of a kind of ‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin 1991, Pragmatics 1: 7–25) characterized by recursive structure, generalized systematicity, and task-domain neutrality. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...) rationally/informationally-constrained means of achieving them; however, it does not require the attribution of unobservable mental states, like beliefs, that are causally responsible for behavior. (shrink)

Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: (1) the standard evolutionary psychology model (Carruthers), (2) the individualist empiricist (...) model (Wellman, Gopnik), (3) the cultural empiricist model (Heyes), and (4) the radical socio-cultural constructivist model, which we favor. We motivate model (4) by arguing that many forms of mental state ascription do not serve the function of simply describing inner states causally responsible for the behavior of a cognitive agent; rather, they relate the agent to her environment by characterizing her practical commitments. Making these practical commitments explicit has an important regulatory function in that it supports action coordination and alignment on joint goals. We propose a model of how the ascription of mental states may have evolved as a linguistic device to perform exactly this function of making agents’ practical commitments explicit. (shrink)

Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through cultural rather than biological evolution. Although these accounts describe the role of culture in the ontogenetic development of mindreading, they neglect the question of the cultural origins of mindreading in human prehistory. We discuss four possible models of this, distinguished by the role they posit for culture: the standard evolutionary psychology model, the individualist empiricist model, the cultural (...) empiricist model, and the radical socio-cultural constructivist model, which we favor. We motivate model by arguing that many forms of mental state ascription do not serve the function of simply describing inner states causally responsible for the behavior of a cognitive agent; rather, they relate the agent to her environment by characterizing her practical commitments. Making these practical commitments explicit has an important regulatory function in that it supports action coordination and alignment on joint goals. We propose a model of how the ascription of mental states may have evolved as a linguistic device to perform exactly this function of making agents’ practical commitments explicit. (shrink)

We address recent interpretations of infant performance on spontaneous false belief tasks. According to most views, these experiments show that human infants attribute mental states from a very young age. Focusing on one of the most clearly worked out, minimalist versions of this idea, Butterfill and Apperly's "minimal theory of mind" framework, we defend an alternative characterization: the minimal theory of rational agency. On this view, rather than conceiving of social situations in terms of states of an enduring mental substance (...) animating agents, infant interpreters parse observed bouts of behavior and their contexts into goals, rational means to those goals, and available information. In other words, the social ontology of infant interpreters consists in goal-directed, informed bouts of behavior, by non-enduring agents, rather than agents animated by states of enduring, unobservable minds. We discuss a number of experiments that support this interpretation of infant socio-cognitive competence. (shrink)

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is (...) not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology. (shrink)

I criticize Herbert Simon 's argument for the claim that complex natural systems must constitute decomposable, mereological or functional hierarchies. The argument depends on certain assumptions about the requirements for the successful evolution of complex systems, most importantly, the existence of stable, intermediate stages in evolution. Simon offers an abstract model of any process that succeeds in meeting these requirements. This model necessarily involves construction through a decomposable hierarchy, and thus suggests that any complex, natural, i.e., evolved, system is constituted (...) by a decomposable hierarchy. I argue that Stuart Kauffman's recent models of genetic regulatory networks succeed in specifying processes that could meet Simon 's requirements for evolvability without requiring construction through a decomposable hierarchy. Since Kauffman's models are at least as plausible as Simon 's model, Simon 's argument that complex natural systems must constitute decomposable, mereological or functional hierarchies does not succeed. (shrink)

I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...) proposal that intentionality comes in two distinct kinds. (shrink)

This paper presents a naturalist skill-based alternative to traditional function-based naturalist theories of mental health and disorder. According to the novel skill view outlined here, mental health is a skilled action of individuals, rather than a question of the functioning of mental mechanisms. Mental disorder is the failure or breakdown of this skill. This skill view of mental health is motivated by focusing on the process of mental healing. This paper argues that, when we start with a focus on how (...) and why individuals heal from mental disorders, we gain a better understanding of what mental health is: the exercise of self-regulatory metacognitive skill. (shrink)

Most theories of semantic competence in natural language implicitly assume the Language of Thought Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, all human cognition consists in the deployment of a language of thought. This language of thought is supposed to be independent of natural language, yet at the same time, it is supposed to be semantically isomorphic with natural language. Given this assumption, it is easy to answer basic questions regarding semantic competence in natural language. What are semantic properties of natural language, (...) and how did they originate? Natural language inherits the semantic properties of the language of thought it is used to express. What does semantic competence consist in? It consists in knowing how to translate items in one's language of thought into a public medium. ;The starting point of this dissertation is the rejection, by some prominent paradigms in cognitive science, of the view that human cognition consists in the deployment of a language of thought that is, at the same time, independent of natural language, yet semantically isomorphic with it. The dissertation constitutes a fledgling attempt to explore an alternative approach to explaining semantic competence in natural language, an approach that is compatible with this rejection of the Language of Thought Hypothesis. ;Rather than conceive of natural language as a tool for expressing items in a pre-existing, semantically isomorphic, language of thought, I urge that language be conceived of as a norm-governed social practice. On this view, the semantic properties of natural language are determined by the inferential norms governing linguistic performances. In order to explain the origin of its semantic properties, one must explain the origin of the inferential norms that govern language. In order to explain what semantic competence consists in, one must explain how individuals learn to abide by these inferential norms. The bulk of the dissertation is devoted to showing that neither of these explanatory projects requires endorsing the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I do this by sketching the form that such explanations might take, and showing that they are consistent with much current research in ethology, comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...) study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We claim that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals towards the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences. (shrink)

H. sapiens stands out from other primates along many social dimensions; however, none seems as prominent and important as the capacity of our species for cumulative cultural evolution or, as Tomasello calls it, “the ratchet.” Although other primate species show evidence of cultural variation, there is little evidence of cumulative cultural evolution, i.e., the gradual accumulation, modification, and refinement of traditions and skills over historical time, in any primate species other than our own. This is clearly an extremely significant component (...) of the human phenotype, responsible for our unparalleled cultural, social, political, and technological achievements. However, it remains extremely controversial what sorts of cognitive capacities are necessary to trigger cumulative cultural evolution and whether any currently proposed candidates are really distinctive of humans. Furthermore, the ratchet raises a bootstrapping problem: before complex skills and technologies are present and necessary for biological success, there appear to be few advantages to high-fidelity social learning; however, without such high-fidelity social learning, it is unclear how traditions capable of generating complex skills and technologies could arise in the first place. In this chapter, we survey relevant empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, integrating it with a novel theoretical analysis of the bootstrapping problem to defend a hypothesis about the minimal cognitive preconditions on the ratchet. (shrink)

Cet article aborde le rôle du personnage du diable dans le roman de Jerzy Krzysztoń Obłęd. Jusqu'à présent ce rôle n'est pas suffisamment apprécié, malgré qu’il soit de très grande importance. La raison d’être du diable dans ce roman e’est la personnification des états psychiques du heros et du narrateur en commun. Dans Obłęd le diable a été présenté, avant tout, du point de vue médical et il a enrichi la description de la maladie du héros principal. Comme la figure (...) du mal, le personnage du diable facilite à contempler la réalité du mal et de la souffrance. (shrink)

Lesio to piąta powieść kryminalna Joanny Chmielewskiej, która stanowi w jej pisarstwie pozycję wyjątkową. Podjęta w artykule interpretacja ma ukazać zarówno sposoby przekształcenia modelu powieści kryminalnej, jak i wydobyć jej humorystyczna dominantę. W analizie tekstu stosowano metody badań strukturalnych połączone z elementami socjologii literatury. Powieść odbiega od ukształtowanego wcześniej wzorca zmianą struktury narracyjnej z pierwszoosobowej na trzecio-osobową oraz mocniejszym wyeksponowaniem ludycznego obrazu świata. Autorka akcentowała aspekt humorystyczny, wysuwając go przed kryminalną intrygę i skupiając się na kreacji bohatera oraz na wywołanych (...) jego działaniami komicznych zdarzeniach. Twórczość Chmielewskiej wyodrębniał stosowany przez nią typ komizmu, który odróżniał jej utwory od „klasycznego” kryminału. W Lesiu nastąpiła zmiana konwencji – kryminał „serio” zastąpiła zabawa w kryminał. Autorka konwencjom powieści kryminalnej, nadawała nowe znaczenia i odwołując się do obiegowych motywów gatunku (zbrodnia (nie)doskonała, napad na pociąg), banalizuje je i ośmiesza. Kolejne części artykułu skupiają się na: charakterystyce bohatera; aspektach komediowych; parodii i stylizacjach językowych, których tłem są stosunki społeczno-kulturowe w PRL w latach siedemdziesiątych XX wieku. Istotną przyczyną zwrotu pisarzy i czytelników w stronę „zabawnej sensacji” zdaje się rodzaj oswajania negatywnie kojarzonej przez wielu Polaków niezbyt odległej przeszłości. Kpina z aparatu sprawiedliwości, pokazywanie nieudolnych policjantów, opieszałość organów ścigania łączą się z apologią zwykłego obywatela, który „domowymi sposobami” radzi sobie w tej rzeczywistości. Powieść Chmielewskiej znalazła licznych naśladowców i kontynuatorów po roku 1989 w nurcie groteskowym powieści kryminalnej. Lesio stanowi ważny przykład rozmaitości gatunkowej powieści kryminalnej, zmienności form i funkcji aspektu ludycznego w jej strukturze. (shrink)

Artykuł omawia postać Jerzego Grobickiego, który służył jako oficer armii cesarsko-królewskiej i został pułkownikiem Wojska Polskiego w II RP. Brał udział w I i II wojnie światowej, a po wojnie wyemigrował do Kanady.

Dnia 2 czerwca zmarł w Warszawie Jerzy Pelc, założyciel oraz wieloletni redaktor „Studiów Semiotycznych”. Przez prawie pół wieku troszczył się On o to, aby na ich łamach ukazywały się wspomnienia pozgonne upamiętniające polskich i zagranicznych uczonych semiotyków. Wspomnienia te albo pisał sam, albo prosił o ich napisanie osoby najlepiej znające dorobek i działalność naukową zmarłego. Jego odejście postawiło nas wszystkich w sytuacji niemożliwej: sam nie może być autorem wspomnienia, a tylko On mógłby kompetentnie napisać kilka słów o swoim ogromnym dorobku (...) naukowym [...]. (shrink)

The Tarnowski family was one of the most distinguished families in the history of the Polish Commonwealth. The times of their glory date back to the reign of Ladislaus the Short, when their progenitor, Spycimir, became one of the most important figures in the country. At the beginning of the 16th century, after losing their native Tarnów, they established a new family estate in Dzików, where they resided continuously until 1944. The story of the Tarnowski Family from Dzików is also (...) the account of their service to the motherland. The aim of this article is to present this service over the centuries, with a particular emphasis laid on their contribution to the defence of freedom of the Republic of Poland. This service resulted from the knightly ethos which was being kept alive in the family, the model for which was the figure of Hetman Jan Amor Tarnowski. The attitude of the Tarnowski family, both during the 19th century national uprisings, as well as during the wars of 1920 and 1939–45 are the examples of faithfulness to this ethos and to their own past. The article was based on the published literature about the Tarnowski family and the concept of ethos. The latter was only used as a basis for defining the phenomenon. The archives were also consulted, with a particular stress on the family resources, as they show the most fully and precisely the attitude of the subsequent generations of Tarnowski towards their great ancestor. By means of critical analysis of these sources and the available literature, the author put forward the thesis that the peculiar “cult” of Hetman Jan Tarnowski, cultivated by successive family representatives, was an imperative for subsequent generations of the Tarnowski family to maintain their patriotic attitudes. An important conclusion that emerges from this article is that it shows once again how important the knightly ethos, the faith and other imponderables are in the lives of individuals and communities. (shrink)