There has been a growing debate about the ethics of management buy-outs (MBOs). One possible criticism of the MBO is that it serves the interests of incumbent management at the expense of shareholders. In this paper we develop the general arguments concerning the ethical aspects of the MBO to include other forms of buy-out beyond going privates and apply the analysis to MBOs as a mode of privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). MBOs are justified in this context postperestroika (...) as a means of incentivising economic activity by giving managers an ownership stake in former state enterprises. The actual mode of privatisation, though, raises issues of social justice and the criticism that MBOs are at the expense of the broader social good. The ethical problem for the CEE is to balance the economic gains of a move to markets with the ethical risks to the agents of these markets. (shrink)

This book explores the revolutionary intersection of Generative AI (GenAI) and cybersecurity. It presents a comprehensive guide that intertwines theories and practices, aiming to equip cybersecurity professionals, CISOs, AI researchers, developers, architects and college students with an understanding of GenAI’s profound impacts on cybersecurity. The scope of the book ranges from the foundations of GenAI, including underlying principles, advanced architectures, and cutting-edge research, to specific aspects of GenAI security such as data security, model security, application-level security, and the emerging fields (...) of LLMOps and DevSecOps. It explores AI regulations around the globe, ethical considerations, the threat landscape, and privacy preservation. Further, it assesses the transformative potential of GenAI in reshaping the cybersecurity landscape, the ethical implications of using advanced models, and the innovative strategies required to secure GenAI applications. Lastly, the book presents an in-depth analysis of the security challenges and potential solutions specific to GenAI, and a forward-looking view of how it can redefine cybersecurity practices. By addressing these topics, it provides answers to questions on how to secure GenAI applications, as well as vital support with understanding and navigating the complex and ever-evolving regulatory environments, and how to build a resilient GenAI security program. The book offers actionable insights and hands-on resources for anyone engaged in the rapidly evolving world of GenAI and cybersecurity. (shrink)

Wright, Ken Review(s) of: A more perfect heaven: How copernicus revolutionised the cosmos, by Dava Sobel, Bloomsbury, London, 2011; 274 pp.; hardback $35.00.

Wright, Ken Review of: Atmosphere of hope: Searching for solutions to the climate crisis, by Tim Flannery, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 2015, pp. 245 +ix.

Wright, Ken Review of: Against the spirit of the age, by Brian J. Coman, Connor Court Publishing, Ballarat, Vic, 2015, pp., xiii + 181.

Wright, Ken Review of: Born bad: Original sin and the making of the western world, by James Boyce, Black Inc., Collingwood, Vic., 2014, pp. 260, $34.99.

Wright, Ken Review(s) of: Blind spots: Why We Fail to Do What's Right And What to Do about It, by Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel Princeton University Press 2011, x, 191pp.

Wright, Ken France's state school system has a long tradition of freedom from religion. It owes a great debt to Jules Ferry who was Minister for Public Instruction from 1879 to 1885, and to Ferdinand Buisson, his Director of Primary Education. A law of 28 March 1882 removed the teaching of religion from all primary schools, to be replaced by ethics and civics.

Wright, Ken Review of: Hope, by Stan Van Hooft, Acumen Publishing, Durham, 2011, pp. viii + 152.

Wright, Ken Review of: Humanism for inquiring minds, by Barbara Smoker, Conway Hall Ethical Society, London, 6th ed., 2013, 80 pp. 6.50 pounds.

Wright, Ken Review of: How much is Enough?: Money and the good life, by Robert and Edward Skidelsky, Other Press, New York, 2012, x + 241 pp., $20.07.

Wright, Ken Review of: Matter and what matters: Some science for the religious and some religion for scientists, Lionel Sharman, Steele Roberts, Wellington, 2013, 116 pp., NZD 24.99.

Wright, Ken Review of: Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them, by Joshua Greene, Atlantic Books, London, 2014, pp.422.

Wright, Ken Review of: Not for profit: Why democracy needs the humanities, by Martha C. Nussbaum, Princeton University Press, 2012, xv + 168 pp. $27.95.

Wright, Ken Review of: Taking god to school: The end of Australia's egalitarian education?, by Marion Maddox, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2014, pp. xxiii + 248, $29.99.

Wright, Ken Review(s) of: Universe from nothing: Why there is something rather than nothing, by Lawrence M. Krauss, Free Press, New York 2012; xix + 202 pp.; hardback, $29.99.

Wright, Ken Review(s) of: What money can't buy: The moral limits of markets, by Michael J. Sandel, Allen Lane, London, 20012, 244 pp., hardback $24.90.

The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...) 'Wright & Sudbury Argument,' and the 'Epistemic Blindspot Argument.' The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick. (shrink)

There is an epistemological skepticism that I might be dreaming now, or I might be a brain in a vat (BIV). There is also a demonstration that derives the skeptical conclusion about knowledge of the external world from the premise C1, i.e., I do not know “I am not dreaming (not a BIV) now.” Pessimistic critics (e.g., F. Strawson, B. Stroud) consider that the refutation of C1 is impossible, whereas others have attempted the direct refutation of C1 (e.g., G. E. (...) Moore, H. Putnam, C. Wright), and some (e.g., F. Dretske, R. Nozick) have attempted to refute the closure principle of knowledge used in the demonstration while permitting the validity of C1. Another scholar, M. Williams, maintains that the skeptical demonstration is true only if we presuppose the epistemological premise that we choose to accept or reject at will. It seems that most critics tend to adopt a strategy that allows them to effectively avoid the skeptical consequence, thereby conceding the validity of C1. However, it is difficult to say whether their attempts succeeded, and in my opinion, they are indeed unsuccessful. This is because their concession to Descartes’ argument is insufficient. Their lack of success could also stem from the incompletion of Descartes’ own methodological doubt. The somewhat paradoxical‐sounding aim of this thesis is to show that the skeptical paradox about knowledge can be dissolved only if the Cartesian skepticism is extended far beyond the endpoint of his attempt. The argument of this thesis is based on the important arguments of Wittgenstein's On Certainty （OC）. (shrink)

The goal of an "integral psychology" is to honor and embrace every legitimate aspect of human consciousness under one roof. This book presents one of the first truly integrative models of consciousness, psychology, and therapy.

Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the (...) fundamental questions concerning the nature of intrinsic value are treated in depth and from a variety of viewpoints. These questions include how to understand the concept of intrinsic value, what sorts of things can have intrinsic value, and how to compute intrinsic value. The editors have added an introduction that ties these questions together and places the contributions in context, and they have also provided an extensive bibliography. The result is a comprehensive, balanced, and detailed picture of current thinking about intrinsic value, one that provides an indispensable backdrop against which future writings on the topic may be assessed. (shrink)

: Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, the problem of selective confirmation: Precise formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'. It is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play: H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down (...) in the attempt to give it a precise formulation. Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of confirmation theory. Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse: H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition. The bulk of this paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of H-D and displaying some recent versions that can handle these problems. It then briefly explains why the basic intuition behind H-D is itself unsound, namely, because H-D involves a tacit assumption of inductive scepticism. Finally, the historical relation between H-D and the positivists' quest for a criterion of empirical significance will be reconsidered with the surprising result that having glossed H-D as fundamentally unsound it is concluded that a sound version of the criterion of empirical significance is now available. The demarcation criterion, the positivists' philosopher's stone that serves to separate claims with empirical significance from claims lacking empirical significance having finally been found, it is argued that we should regard empirical significance as just one among a variety of virtues and not follow the positivists in taking it to be a sin qua non for all meaningful statements. (shrink)

At the time of this writing, a widely publicized, waived-consent trial is underway. Sponsored by Northfield Laboratories, Inc. (Evanston, IL) the trial is intended to evaluate the emergency use of PolyHeme®, an oxygen-carrying resuscitative fluid that might prevent deaths from uncontrolled bleeding. The protocol allows patients in hemorrhagic shock to be randomized between PolyHeme® and saline in the field and, still without consent, randomized between PolyHeme® and blood after arrival at an emergency department. The Federal regulations that govern the waiver (...) of consent restrict its applicability to circumstances where proven, satisfactory treatments are unavailable. Blood - the standard treatment for hemorrhagic shock - is not available in ambulances but is available in hospitals. The authors argue that the in-hospital stage of the study fails to meet ethical and regulatory standards. (shrink)

It's hard to say exactly when modern science began. Many scholars would date it at roughly 1600, when both Kepler and Galileo started using precision measurement to map the universe. But one thing is certain: starting from whatever date we choose, modern science was, in many important ways and right from the start, deeply antagonistic to established religion.

An extensive data search among various types of developmental and evolutionary sequences yielded a ‘four quadrant’ model of consciousness and its development . Each of these dimensions was found to unfold in a sequence of at least a dozen major stages or levels. Combining the four quadrants with the dozen or so major levels in each quadrant yields an integral theory of consciousness that is quite comprehensive in its nature and scope. This model is used to indicate how a general (...) synthesis and integration of twelve of the most influential schools of consciousness studies can be effected, and to highlight some of the most significant areas of future research. The conclusion is that an ‘all-quadrant, all-level’ approach is the minimum degree of sophistication that we need into order to secure anything resembling a genuinely integral theory of consciousness. (shrink)

We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare (...) our results to the case of an unstructured population and to the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finally, we point to some implications our findings have for three distinct ideas: Ken Binmore’s group selection argument in favor of the evolution of efficient social contracts, Sewall Wright’s Shifting Balance theory, and the equilibrium selection problem of game theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 173 WITTGENSTEIN’S PRIMORDIAL WORK James Connelly Philosophy / Trent U. Peterborough, on, Canada k9j 7b8 [email protected] Michael Potter. Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford U. P., 2009. Pp. [xii], 310. isbn 978-0-19-921583-6. £37.00; us$70.00. April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd 174 Reviews Michael Potter’s Wittgenstein’s (...) Notes on Logic is a painstakingly detailed scholarly study which blends philosophical insight with biographical and historical context to yield a deeper appreciation of the key themes informing Wittgenstein’s philosophical development over his initial period of residence at Cambridge in 1911–13. Notingasurprising gap in the literature on Wittgenstein’s philosophy (p. 3), Potter sets out to treat Wittgenstein’s 1913 “Notes on Logic” (which consists of a succinct summary of the conclusions reached over this initial period) as an independent and primordial philosophical work. While it has been common for serious scholars of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to “mine” (p. 1) his pre-Tractarian writings in search of “remarks to support their interpretations ” (p. 1) of that text, what sets Potter’s study of the “Notes” apart from previous attempts at exegesis is a methodological determination to approach the “Notes” as “if not quite … a terminus in Wittgenstein’s work then at least as worthy of study in their own right” (p. 1). An important advantage of this approach, according to Potter, is that it facilitates a clearer appreciation of Wittgenstein’s lasting insights “into the central themes of philosophical logic” (p. 262), many of which Wittgenstein himself had already grasped by 1913 and which survive subsequent rejection of some of the less plausible aspects of the Tractatus (such as logical atomism and the picture theory of propositions). By presenting these key insights as consequences of central, but only subsequently adopted, Tractarian doctrines such as the picture theory, however, traditional Wittgenstein scholarship has missed an opportunity, uniquely important in the case of his philosophy (p. 1), to elucidate them against the background of the actual historical landscape of problems, strategies, motivations, and inXuences, within the context in which they were originally formulated. According to Potter, then, looking at the “Notes” as a Wnished work in its own right, as opposed to a mere collection of preparatory notes, will help us to understand better both the more thorough reasoning Wittgenstein worked through in developing these various insights (subsequently either suppressed or highly compressed in the Wnal draft of the Tractatus itselfy), and just what further logical work that subsequently added elements, such as the picture theory, were supposed to contribute. Likewise, such an approach will help us to understand better the relevant inXuences upon Wittgenstein’s philosophical development, such as those, obviously and respectively, of Frege and Russell. Integral to distilling these various insights and inXuences from the “Notes”, according to Potter, is the process of “disentangling” (p. 3) various extant versions of the text from one another, the distinct versions themselves arising from the “rather complicated circumstances” (p. 3) in which the “Notesz” were composed. Following upon a lengthy explication of both the content and philosophical context of the “Notes”, Potter therefore attempts to “reconstruct the circumstances of composition of Wittgenstein’s Wrst surviving philosophical work” (p. 263). This is achieved by engaging in some “historical detective work” April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 175 1 Reprinted in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916, ed. G.yH. von Wright and G.yE.yM. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961) pp. 93–107. The second edition (1979) has the so-called “Russell” version of the “Notes on Logic”, which Potter prints in a diTerent arrangement. (p. 3), aimed at identifying and clarifying various crucial aspects of the “Notes”z’ historical and biographical context. Along with an Appendix B containing two diTerent versions of the “Notes” themselves (the “Cambridge” and “Birmingham... (shrink)

Although the path-integral formalism is known to be equivalent to conventional quantum mechanics, it is not generally obvious how to implement path-based calculations for multi-qubit entangled states. Whether one takes the formal view of entangled states as entities in a high-dimensional Hilbert space, or the intuitive view of these states as a connection between distant spatial configurations, it may not even be obvious that a path-based calculation can be achieved using only paths in ordinary space and time. Previous work has (...) shown how to do this for certain special states; this paper extends those results to all pure two-qubit states, where each qubit can be measured in an arbitrary basis. Certain three-qubit states are also developed, and path integrals again reproduce the usual correlations. These results should allow for a substantial amount of conventional quantum analysis to be translated over into a path-integral perspective, simplifying certain calculations, and more generally informing research in quantum foundations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:176 Reviews c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM THE GRUNDGESETZE Nicholas Griffin Russell Research Centre / McMaster U. Hamilton, on, Canada l8s 4l6 [email protected] Gottlob Frege. Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Derived Using Concept-script. Volumes i and ii. Translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg with Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2013. Pp. xxxix + xxxii + 253 + xv + 285 + A–42 (...) + i–11. isbn 978-0-19-928174-9. £60; us$110. iven the steadily rising interest in Frege’s work since the 1950s, it is surprising that his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, the work he thought would be the crowning achievement of his career, has not previously been fully translated into English. Other Frege works have long been available in English. The earlier Grundlagen der Arithmetik was nicely, if not always entirely accurately, translated by J. L. Austin and published in 1950.1 Translations of Frege’s other philosophical writings began to appear in influential editions about the same time,2 initially a small corpus that has been gradually added to over the years to include works from his Nachlass and letters from his correspondence.3 Somewhat later, the Begriffsschrift, Frege’s momentous first 1 The Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1950; 2nd edn. 1953). The later translation under the same title by Dale Jacquette (London: Longman, 2007) is much less satisfactory. 2 The first importance source for these was Peter Geach and Max Black’s Translations from the Philosophical Writing of Gottlob Frege (1952; 2nd edn. 1960; 3rd edn. 1980), though it included reprints of some much earlier translations. 3 The two most comprehensive English sources for the shorter writings are now Brian d= Reviews 177 c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM contribution to modern logic, the work which Quine 4 said had made logic a great subject, was translated in full despite the difficulties of Fregean notation.5 But through all this the Grundgesetze remained largely (though not entirely ) untranslated. The view seems, for a long time, to have been that Frege’s contributions to logic were to be found in the Begriffsschrift and his contributions to philosophy in the Grundlagen and a small number of seminal articles. The Grundgesetze, on the other hand, was widely thought not to have added much to these magni ficent achievements, but to have employed them in a project that was doomed by the discovery of Russell’s paradox; namely, the attempt to show that arithmetic could be rigorously derived from purely logical principles. In the bleak aftermath of Russell’s paradox it came to seem as if whatever was of value in the Grundgesetze had already been published elsewhere, while what was new in it was mistaken.6 That assessment of the book’s value, combined with the huge difficulties of typesetting Frege’s idiosyncratic two-dimensional notation, and the sheer scale of the work (even without the anticipated third volume, which was abandoned in the face of Russell’s paradox, it was, by far, Frege’s largest work) made it seem as though a translation of the whole Grundgesetze was not only a prohibitively large undertaking, but also one which was not really necessary. And so, through much of the twentieth century, the Grundgesetze vied with Principia Mathematica as the world’s bestknown but least-read philosophical book. But this understanding of the Grundgesetze’s importance could not withstand the development of neo-logicism, brought to prominence by Crispin Wright’s Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.7 The key insight of neoMcGuinness, ed., Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (1984); and Michael Beaney, ed., The Frege Reader (1997). 4 At least in early editions of Mathematical Logic. The remark was removed in later ones in deference to Boole. 5 By Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg in Jean van Heijenoort, ed., From Frege to Gödel (1967), pp. 5–82. 6 Not surprisingly the one part of the Grundgesetze which has appeared most frequently in translation is the “Nachwort” responding to Russell’s paradox which Frege added as the book was in press. Geach... (shrink)

Although D. Petrovich’s recent book The World’s Oldest Alphabet: Hebrew as the Language of the Proto-Consonantal Script advances several claims about the origin of the alphabet and biblical history, its main arguments are linguistic. In particular, Petrovich identifies the language of the early alphabetic inscriptions as Hebrew as part of a larger argument for the historicity of the biblical Exodus tradition. In this review essay, I will summarize and critique Petrovich’s linguistic arguments. Along the way, I will consider two important (...) questions in the classification of the Canaanite languages. (shrink)

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the ‘mind’ side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be (...) considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self . A ‘master template’ of these various phenomena, culled from over one-hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the ‘mind’ side of the brain-mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the ‘hard problem', or how the mind-side can be integrated with the brain-side to result a more integral theory of consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Michael Fried’s recent contribution to the debate around the experience of video art, made in relation to the work of Douglas Gordon. Fried speculates that issues of antitheatricality may in fact be key to specifying the medium of video installation. While Fried’s position offers a useful way of framing the relation with the beholder in video art, in a way that pointedly moves beyond tautological notions of activating spectatorship, I question how theatricality is to be (...) thus defined. Referencing the beholding of painting, I distinguish the implicit beholder from the literal spectator, and claim that the distinction has relevance for video art. However, I welcome what seems to be an explicit acknowledgment from Fried that the position of the spectator is a contributory factor in what he terms empathic projection. I argue that video art as a spatial practice offers a distinct mode of reception by positioning the spectator in relation to two-dimensional figurative space to which she is excluded. (shrink)

This paper investigates how the reader of prose fiction fills in the blanks regarding a fictional character’s membership category, action, and reason for the action. Aligning with an ethnomethodological approach to texts and appropriating membership categorization analysis (MCA), we analyze how the readers of J. D. Salinger, an author whose works are well known for their ambiguity and ambivalence, would grasp the unwritten identities of characters and the meanings of their actions. Our analysis specifies two types of methods deployed for (...) the reader to understand the fictional texts. First, in an at-a-glance way, the reader can supply the missing categories and sequence of actions by turning to the commonsense knowledge and social norms regarding the association between the category and the activity. Second, the reader can construct various interpretations regarding the recognizably ambiguous scenes of the text by turning to the conceptual knowledge of the relevant social phenomena, the maxims specific to the act of storytelling, and the writer’s techniques peculiar to the fictional texts. The findings demonstrate the vast applicability of an MCA approach to the analysis of the work of reading prose fiction and shed light on the detailed operations of the author’s maxims and techniques in the textual configuration of prose fiction, thereby indicating the possibility of ethnomethodological analysis including the interwoven consideration of the reader’s activity and the textual organization. (shrink)

I interpret Mill?s view on logic as the instrumentalist view that logical inferences, complex statements, and logical operators are not necessary for reasoning itself, but are useful only for our remembering and communicating the results of the reasoning. To defend this view, I first show that we can transform all the complex statements in the language of classical first-order logic into what I call material inference rules and reduce logical inferences to inferences which involve only atomic statements and the material (...) inference rules. Then I explain why we introduce logical operators and logical inference rules into a system of the latter kind. In the end I determine what kind of negation is justified from this point of view. (shrink)