Expanded and up-to-date-the ultimate guide that explores meaning and philosophy of all six seasons of Lost Lost is more than just a popular television show; it's a complex examination of meaningful philosophical questions. What does good versus evil mean on the island? Is it a coincidence that characters John Locke and Desmond David Hume are named after actual philosophers? What is the ethics of responsibility for Jack? An action-adventure story with more than a touch of the metaphysical, Lost forces viewers (...) to ask difficult questions of themselves just as the story asks difficult questions of its characters. Ultimate Lost and Philosophy helps you explore the deeper meaning and philosophical questions hidden within every complex twist and turn in the historic show's entire six-season run. Includes every season of Lost, including 2010's final, highly anticipated season Connects events on the show to core philosophical issues such as truth, identity, and morality Explores a host of intriguing topics such as time travel, freedom, love, and loss For fans of Lost who are interested in what the show reveals about ourselves and the human condition, Ultimate Lost and Philosophy is an entertaining, informative, and enlightening resource. (shrink)

This dissertation has involved exploration of the forest as image and symbol of transformation, insight, and creative inspiration through multi-disciplinary inquiry and work in the creative arts. Using literature from the fields of depth psychology, mythological studies, and the philosophy of imagination as a foundation, I have taken a literal and figurative journey into the forest. In this dissertation, I have used a self-generated method that includes an imaginal process, stages of critical and self reflection, and image amplification, interwoven with (...) creative work as spiritual practice. I have depicted images and experiences from the stages of the forest journey , through journaling, narrative writing, painting, and poetry. A shared development of images, a synergy, took place, with themes and images interweaving through painting and the various forms of writing, transforming with each move. This dissertation is an attempt to use a combination of creative work, an imaginal process, academic sources, and an actual journey-focused on a single image-as a catalyst for deeper understanding of the Self and personal transformation. (shrink)

Learning disabilities are highly prevalent on college campuses, yet students with learning disabilities graduate at lower rates than those without disabilities. Academic and psychosocial supports are essential for overcoming challenges and for improving postsecondary educational opportunities for students with learning disabilities. A holistic, multi-level model of campus-based supports was established to facilitate culture and practice changes at the institutional level, while concurrently bolstering mentors’ abilities to provide learning disability-knowledgeable support, and simultaneously creating opportunities for students’ personal and interpersonal development. Mixed (...) methods were used to investigate implementation of coordinated personal, interpersonal, and institutional level supports for undergraduate science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) students with learning disabilities. A one-group pre-test post-test strategy was used to examine undergraduate outcomes. Participants included 52 STEM undergraduates with learning disabilities, 57 STEM graduate student mentors, 34 STEM faculty mentors, and 34 university administrators and personnel as members of a university-wide council. Enrolled for two years, undergraduates were engaged in group meetings involving psychoeducation and reflective discussions, development of self-advocacy projects, and individual mentorship. Undergraduates reported improved self efficacy (p =.001), campus connection (p <.001), professional development (p ≤.002), and self advocacy (p <.001) after two academic years. Graduate student mentors increased their understanding about learning disabilities and used their understanding to support both their mentees and other students they worked with. Council members identified and created opportunities for delivering learning disability-related trainings to faculty, mentors and advisors on campus, and for enhancing coordination of student services related to learning and related disorders. Disability-focused activities became integrated in broader campus activities regarding diversity. This research explicates a role that college campuses can play in fostering the wellbeing and the academic and career development of its students with developmental learning and related disorders. It offers an empirically tested campus-based model that is multilevel, holistic, and strengths-based for supporting positive outcomes of young people with learning disabilities in STEM. Moreover, findings advance the knowledge of supports and skills that are important for self-regulating and navigating complex and multi-faceted disability-related challenges within both the post-secondary educational environment and the young adults’ sociocultural context. (shrink)

Michael A. PetersBeijing Normal University, Beijing, PR China;There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds– Gregory Bateson (1972, p. 492)While there are classical anteced...

Ethics & Behavior, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 261-262, May-June 2011.

The Declaration of Independence states that all men are created equal in the United States, but that statement does not hold true for words. Some words carry more weight than others--they seem to work harder, get more done, and demand more respect. Political Keywords: Using Language that Uses Us looks at eight dominant words that are crucial to American political discourse, and how they have been employed during the last fifty years. Based on an analysis of eleven separate studies of (...) political language, Political Keywords helps readers to understand what these terms mean and how they are used. For example, the book tracks what politics now means to modern commentators, how schoolteacher impress certain values upon the nation's children by invoking the office of the president, and why an innocent word like government sometimes makes people so upset. It details how the people are referenced in political talk and how the media portray themselves. The book also considers the work done by political parties, political promises, and political consultants because, together, they shed special light on modern elections. Combining social science with subtle forms of cultural interpretation, Political Keywords: Using Language that Uses Us provides a fresh look at both American politics and American language. It is an ideal text for undergraduate and graduate courses in political communication, political language, political campaigns, media and politics, political psychology, public opinion, rhetorical criticism, contemporary public address, and presidential rhetoric. (shrink)

The return of genetic research results after death in the pediatric setting comes with unique complexities. Researchers must determine which results and through which processes results are returned. This paper discusses the experience over 15 years in pediatric cancer genetics research of returning research results after the death of a child and proposes a preventive ethics approach to protocol development in order to improve the quality of return of results in pediatric genomic settings.

William of Ockham was tried for heresy due to his assertion that certain qualities can exist independently of substances. Scholars have assumed he made thisstrange assertion in order to account for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. I argue, however, that the assertion was philosophically rather than theologically motivated. Ockham develops a nominalist substance ontology, according to which most changes can be explained as the result of local motion. Knowledge and virtue are changes in human beings that cannot be so explained, (...) however, because they are not entirely passive processes. In fact, knowledge and virtue require free will, which could not be considered truly free if it were not an independently existing quality. In this paper, I explain Ockham’s nominalist substance ontology and show how it functions as the sine qua non foundation for his uncompromising commitment to metaphysical libertarianism. (shrink)

William of Ockham was tried for heresy due to his assertion that certain qualities can exist independently of substances. Scholars have assumed he made thisstrange assertion in order to account for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. I argue, however, that the assertion was philosophically rather than theologically motivated. Ockham develops a nominalist substance ontology, according to which most changes can be explained as the result of local motion. Knowledge and virtue are changes in human beings that cannot be so explained, (...) however, because they are not entirely passive processes. In fact, knowledge and virtue require free will, which could not be considered truly free if it were not an independently existing quality. In this paper, I explain Ockham’s nominalist substance ontology and show how it functions as the sine qua non foundation for his uncompromising commitment to metaphysical libertarianism. (shrink)

Sharon M. Kaye - Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 330-332 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Sharon Kaye John Carroll University Vesa Hirvonen. Passions in William Ockham's Philosophical Psychology. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Mind, 2. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004. Pp. ix + 212. Cloth, €96.30. This volume is the second in a series aiming to produce monographs that "are (...) historically reliable as well as congenial to the contemporary reader" by providing "original insights into central contemporary problems" . The aim of this series is ambitious, yet sorely needed in scholarship today. As modern technology catapults our understanding of ourselves and the world into the future, history seems.. (shrink)

This work is designed to show that there is an implicit connection between Ockham's academic and political careers in his theory of conscience. ;Thomas Aquinas offers a theory of moral responsibility according to which the conscientious individual has knowledge of the rightness of her act which does not preclude her doing otherwise. His account of the will, however, proves that this state of affairs never obtains. Ockham's alternative presupposes that we freely choose our own ends. He is therefore entitled to (...) assert that conscience is the knowledge of one's own acts as right or wrong. ;The libertarian metaphysics underlying Ockham's ethics is tested by the problem of unfulfilled prophecy. Thomas Bradwardine argues that the Antichrist is free not to come because it is possible for God to undo the past. Thomas Buckingham argues for the possibility that the prophecy never meant that the Antichrist was going to come. Meanwhile, Ockham is left with the possibility that God lied. Ockhamist John of Mirecourt shows why this 'heretical' solution is the only way to save the faith. Ockham's theory of conscience provides a sound basis for interpreting his treatise on heresy. Heresy is disobedience, not to authority, but to the truth. Since the condemnation of heresy is itself a paradigm instance of this kind of perversity, freedom of speech prevails by default. Ockham's conception of a community united by this realization provides an answer to twentieth-century speech-regulation advocates. ;Ockham thought that it is through our obedience to the truth that Jesus's promise to be with his disciples 'always, to the end of the age' will be fulfilled. According to Walter Burley, 'I promise you a Christian' converts with 'A Christian is promised to you by me.' According to Ockham, in contrast, it is an opaque construction. This account of the logic of indefinite promises implies that no individual can claim to be one of the disciples to whom Jesus was referring. ;I hope to leave the reader in a better position to appreciate the sense in which the claim that Ockham's two careers are united by his nominalism may be considered correct. (shrink)

Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism as (...) developed by Russell and Strawson. Then, I will present the nominalist alternative as developed by William of Ockham. (shrink)

Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism — in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism (...) as developed by Russell and Strawson. Then, I will present the nominalist alternative as developed by William of Ockham. (shrink)

(2006). Was there no evolutionary thought in the middle ages? The case of William of Ockham. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 225-244.

Why do good things happen to bad people? Can we prove whether God exists? What is the difference between right and wrong? Medieval Philosophers were centrally concerned with such questions: questions which are as relevant today as a thousand years ago when the likes of Anselm and Aquinas sought to resolve them. In this fast-paced, enlightening guide, Sharon M. Kaye takes us on a whistle-stop tour of medieval philosophy, revealing the debt it owes to Aristotle and Plato, and showing (...) how medieval thought is still inspiring philosophers and thinkers today. With new translations of numerous key extracts, Kaye directly introduces the reader to the philosophers' writings and the criticisms levied against them. Including helpful textboxes throughout the book detailing key thinkers, this is an entertaining and comprehensive primer for students and general readers alike. (shrink)

This brief text assists students in understanding Ockham's philosophy and thinking so they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the Wadsworth Notes Series, (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), ON OCKHAM is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this concise book offers (...) sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher, better enabling students to engage in reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper. (shrink)

This paper discusses Buridan’s Ass as a thought experiment that has been misunderstood. First, the thought experiment is presented in its traditional form and typical objections to it are discussed. Then the author argues that William of Ockham supplies the background necessary for a more meaningful formulation. Buridan’s Ass is designed to show that each individual must choose how to value the value we discover in the world and that, in so doing, we create individual preferences.

John Dewey was the greatest American philosopher of the twentieth century, and this novel traces a fictionalized version of his intellectual development. Although the plot is invented, the concepts and ideas that the story explores are the ones that Dewey was primarily concerned with, and the novel brings together the thinkers who most influenced him. -/- John Dewey was raised by a strict, puritanical mother who believed that he was his deceased brother reincarnated. The first John Dewey inexplicably threw himself (...) into a fire and died. Now John is burdened with his mother's declaration that he was brought back to do something special with his life; he just doesn't know what that is. When he discovers an opportunity to meet William James, the foremost philosopher of the nineteenth century, he jumps at the chance. He wants to ask James about his mother's theory of his life, and he ultimately finds himself at a philosophers' camp of sorts, having meaningful conversations with not just James but also Josiah Royce, Felix Adler, Henry Bergh, Charles Saunders Peirce, and Victoria Woodhull. Along the way, Dewey examines the philosophy of Pragmatism, as well as ideas about democracy and its impact on issues of social justice, including those concerning the rights of women, the poor, people of color, and even animals, but also, most notably for Dewey, of children. Dewey's ideas about what education should be were radically different from those that were accepted at the time, and he revolutionized the American educational system. -/- But that was all to come. This story examines the forces that set Dewey's course for the future—his awakening to the concepts and beliefs that would propel him to eminence later in his life. And in this story, Dewey gets to feel the first stirrings of love and to solve a murder mystery. The novel offers a fascinating look at the theories and beliefs of several important intellectual figures at the turn of the twentieth century while engaging readers in a compelling tale of curiosity and discovery. (shrink)

Nobody understands TJ, so when he finds an abandoned cabin in the woods, it feels to him like a haven from society. But that night, TJ starts having unusually vivid dreams that take him back to the middle of the nineteenth century, where he learns about the American philosophical movement known as Transcendentalism and where he is introduced to a man living in an identical cabin, this one on the shore of Walden Pond: Henry David Thoreau. TJ soon learns that (...) his classmate Ivy is sharing the dream with him; she enters it as Louisa May Alcott, and he is a teen who is spending the summer with the Alcott family. Together they must solve the mystery of a murdered woman in the woods near Thoreau's cabin, and along the way, they meet such eminent and influential figures as Ralph Waldo Emerson, Amos Bronson Alcott, Margaret Fuller, William Ellery Channing—and of course Thoreau. -/- Solving the murder mystery in the dream requires TJ and Ivy to learn about the beliefs and principles of the Transcendentalists, which reveal to them the foremost social struggle of the day: the abolition of slavery. They also discover the philosophers' views on women's rights and the relationship of humans to the natural world and to one another—and, in a fundamental way, to the idea of God. This information provides just what TJ and Ivy need to solve a mystery back in their waking lives of a missing painting related to the strange cabin in the woods. As he works through the mysteries, TJ finds himself embracing Transcendentalism, and it gives him a new perspective on his real life and how he ultimately wants to live it. (shrink)

Because playing along involves pretence, it is liable to be seen as an objectionable form of deception. In this paper, however, I argue that it is a virtue based on its role in creating and sustaining valuable relationships. According to William of Ockham and Michelle de Montaigne, to love another as a true friend is to will as he or she wills. Given that even the most like-minded individuals often will different things, there is need for a meta-level, at which (...) one can validate the will of the other without actually willing it oneself. This is what it is to play along. (shrink)

Because playing along involves pretence, it is liable to be seen as an objectionable form of deception. In this paper, however, I argue that it is a virtue based on its role in creating and sustaining valuable relationships. According to William of Ockham and Michelle de Montaigne, to love another as a true friend is to will as he or she wills. Given that even the most like-minded individuals often will different things, there is need for a meta-level, at which (...) one can validate the will of the other without actually willing it oneself. This is what it is to play along. (shrink)

This article argues that, of the leading Continental feminist theorists who have expressed an interest in women's mysticism, most have inadvertently or otherwise taken up the theoretical model of William James, the early-twentieth-century scholar of religion. In particular, Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray have accepted the view that mysticism operates on an epistemological plane divorced from the categories of rationality and intelligibility. Both thinkers hold that the mystic is typically hysterical, although Irigaray takes a more positive view of the (...) hysteric as a subject position from which the feminine voice is first heard. Through a brief examination of the mystical and political careers of Hildegard of Bingen, we conclude that the theoretical perspective of Julia Kristeva provides a more useful theoretical perspective from which to analyse women's mystical texts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Seven Poems NICOLAS CALAS (Translated by Avi Sharon) hellenizing surrealism: a greek door to europe Nicolas calas (Kalamares) may be considered merely a minor Greek poet, but he had a major global persona and influence. In the middle of the last century he played a catalyzing role in the international avant garde: He was a Zelig-like polemicist in three languages (Greek, French, and English) and across three (...) cultural capitals (Athens, Paris, and New York). But he always fought on a singular front: surrealism. Born in Lausanne in 1907, he grew up in Athens and by the later 1920s began to stand out in literary circles (he was over 6' 4") for his modernist if not revolutionary views. Starting from an interest in Freud and Marx, the subconscious and the revolutionary, Calas soon arrived at their natural synthesis—surrealism. Around the time when a distinctly Greek form of surrealist poetry emerged, with the 1935 publication of “Blast Furnace” by Andreas Embiricos, Calas was on his way to becoming its unofficial spokesman. He moved to the epicenter of the movement in Paris and with the 1938 publication of Foyers d’Incendie became the “most lucid and audacious” of founder André Breton’s acolytes, both prophet and demagogue of the group. Carried along in the current of European artists and thinkers leaving Europe for New York, he would continue the fight on the western wing of the faction (literally, coming to blows at a cocktail party with Clement Greenberg, representing the opposing Abstract Expressionist side). In 1942 he published another clarion pamphlet, Confound the Wise, giving the movement voice in English and befriending its most visible local supporters and practitioners, from Peggy Guggenheim to Marcel Duchamp. arion 27.1 spring/summer 2019 The Wyndham Lewis of the operation, Calas was a cross-border catalyst, evangelizing the role of surrealism as a liberating and generative force in modern literature and art. For him and other writers and poets, the weapon that would most effectively derange the reader’s habitual conformism into revelatory and revolutionary perception was the surrealist image, poetry’s lingua franca. For Greek practitioners it was completely natural for that magical representation to arise out of their god-infested, sun-filled landscape. Here they had a force that was both blinding and enlightening, penetrating and transformative, local and universal. For Calas, the primary echo or reflection of that essential image was the island of Santorini, referenced in several of the translations here (and reminiscent of his fellow national Nikos Gatsos’s use of the island of Amorgos in a similar context). It stood as the very symbol of fiery transformation, an image monstrous enough to shock the reader into a super-rational embrace of its own form of logic. This Hellenization of surrealism, like the Hellenization of modernism itself, was to become an important, transformative power in its own right. For many, the origin (and likewise, for many, the enclosing border ) of surrealism was France. “But it is French. It is their invention,” was how William Carlos Williams saw it, to his chagrin. Williams was convinced that the objective concentration on the image itself (“no ideas but in things”) could offer a salutary corrective to American poetry of his time. “It is the surrealists who have invented the living defense of literature,” he wrote in a 1929 essay. But for a poet so at one with the American Grain to be reconciled with surrealism’s ‘Francite’ he needed some way to cross the divide. His admiration for Calas’s work in clarifying and promoting the group’s ideas enabled the Greek poet to serve as a mediator, to allow the creative transference of its rebellious wisdom into Williams’s poetry. To borrow the title of one of his early American essays, Calas provided Williams a “Greek door to Europe.” In translating four of Calas’s French poems into English, published in 1941 with a frontispiece by the surrealist painter and magician Kurt Seligman, Williams leveraged Calas as the vehicle through which the “enabling foreignness” of surrealism could be grafted into the grain of his American modernist work, just as he set out on his magnum opus, Paterson. In a similar way... (shrink)

This paper traces the evolution of the international concept of a human right to culture from a general and individual right of participation in the public life of a state (1966, Article 27 of the IC of Civil and Political Rights), to a group right to a cultural identity (1992 Declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities). I argue that the original generic formulation of the human right to culture reflected the nineteenth-century (...) ideal of one-nation, one culture which had proved inadequate from the beginning even in Europe and wrecked havoc upon newly evolving nations in previously colonized territories. International Human Rights doctrine has had to evolve in response to the confl icts that have erupted within multi-ethnic states. In this paper I will consider and defend the argument of William Kymlicka that culture is a necessary context for the exercise of meaningful choices and therefore, within limits, deserves protection within liberal regimes. I argue that providing political support for cultural identities in the form of group rights need not imply a right of secession and can support a robust conception of multicultural citizenship. I analyze the philosophical significance of cultural identity for human dignity and democratic participation in multicultural contexts and conclude that group rights are neither “collectivist” nor “individualist” but a necessary and significant byproduct of the fundamental human right to free association. (shrink)

This paper traces the evolution of the international concept of a human right to culture from a general and individual right of participation in the public life of a state (1966, Article 27 of the IC of Civil and Political Rights), to a group right to a cultural identity (1992 Declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities). I argue that the original generic formulation of the human right to culture reflected the nineteenth-century (...) ideal of one-nation, one culture which had proved inadequate from the beginning even in Europe and wrecked havoc upon newly evolving nations in previously colonized territories. International Human Rights doctrine has had to evolve in response to the confl icts that have erupted within multi-ethnic states. In this paper I will consider and defend the argument of William Kymlicka that culture is a necessary context for the exercise of meaningful choices and therefore, within limits, deserves protection within liberal regimes. I argue that providing political support for cultural identities in the form of group rights need not imply a right of secession and can support a robust conception of multicultural citizenship. I analyze the philosophical significance of cultural identity for human dignity and democratic participation in multicultural contexts and conclude that group rights are neither “collectivist” nor “individualist” but a necessary and significant byproduct of the fundamental human right to free association. (shrink)

The evolutionist challenge to moral realism is the skeptical challenge that, if evolution is true, it would only be by chance, a “happy coincidence” as Sharon Street puts it, if human moral beliefs were true. The author formulates Street’s “happy coincidence” argument more precisely using a distinction between probabilistic sensitivity and insensitivity introduced by Elliott Sober. The author then considers whether it could be rational for us to believe that human moral judgments about particular cases are probabilistically sensitive to (...) strongly universal fundamental moral standards of cooperation and fair division. The author provides an explanation of why there would be a benign correlation between human moral judgments in particular cases and the requirements of strongly universal fundamental moral standards. The explanation of the benign correlation is based on group selection for groups of individuals with an egalitarian satisficing psychology and egalitarian norms, because of the ability of such groups to more efficiently solve gene-propagation collective action problems. (shrink)

The author identifies the structure of Sharon Street's skeptical challenge to non-naturalist, normative epistemic realism as an argument that NNER is liable to reliability defeat and then argues that Street's argument fails, because it itself is subject to reliability defeat. As the author reconstructs Street's argument, it is an argument that the normative epistemic judgments of the realist could only be probabilistically sensitive to normative epistemic truths by sheer chance. The author then recaps Street's own naturalist translation of normative (...) epistemic judgments into purely descriptive, contingent probability statements, and argues that, on her own terms, the reasoning that leads her to rationally believe in evolutionary theory could only be probabilistically sensitive to the relevant purely descriptive, contingent probabilities by sheer chance. The author's argument is addressed to Street, but it applies to all evolutionary naturalist accounts of epistemic rationality. The author explains how his argument differs from Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and shows how it avoids the objections to Plantinga's EAAN. The author closes with the outline of an explanation of how evolution could have made human reasoning probabilistically sensitive to metaphysically necessary normative epistemic standards, even though those standards did not exert and, indeed, could not have exerted any kind of causal influence on the evolutionary process. (shrink)

An increasingly common form of naturalism associated with the study of morality is what might be called “scientific naturalism,” which takes as its subject matter various empirical phenomena associated with talk of “morality” and aims to subject them to scientific inquiry, just like any other empirical phenomena. This is unproblematic when it comes to scientific investigations into the origins of the human capacity for normative guidance or moral emotions, or the neurophysiology associated with moral feeling and behavior, but things get (...) much more complicated when it comes to the project of explaining our moral beliefs. It is, of course, an empirical phenomenon that we hold the moral beliefs we do, so it may seem obvious that this too can be causally explained using scientific tools. But, while there is room for scientific inquiry into causal factors, such as evolutionary influences, that have plausibly helped to shape many moral beliefs to some degree, it is a mistake to assume that our moral beliefs across the board can best be explained through appeal exclusively to scientifically accessible causes. This scientific naturalist exclusivity assumption is in fact deeply problematic, overlooking (or prematurely dismissing) the possibility that at least many of our moral beliefs are best explained through our grasping of good reasons for them – considerations we correctly understand as justifying them, though this is not something that shows up in scientific causal explanations. It is easy to miss this point about the potential role of the appreciation of justification by the believing mind when considering moral judgments simply from the external perspective of an amoral anthropologist, but it becomes clear when taking up the internal perspective of the committed moral agent, as when thinking about why we ourselves believe that human trafficking is wrong. This matters because, while science is invoked by those who purport to provide “debunking explanations” of our moral beliefs across the board (showing them to result simply from causal factors insensitive to any objective moral facts), they are actually relying on the scientific naturalist exclusivity assumption, thus begging the question against their opponents, who hold that we have knowledge of objective morality as a result of grasping good reasons for it. I explore these complexities surrounding the explanation of our moral beliefs and argue that while the picture advocated by debunkers remains a possibility, it is certainly not established by science, and recent arguments purporting to debunk the idea of knowable, objective morality fail. (shrink)

Stanley Fish opens the collection with a persuasive argument for the role of intention and biography. Michael McKeon, Gordon Turnbull, and Jerome Christensen are concerned with the late eighteenth--and early nineteenth-century English cultural discourse that gave rise to the nearly simultaneous emergence of literary biography, Romantic sensibility, and reflexive human consciousness. The essays by Alison Booth, Cheryl Walker, and Sharon O'Brien reveal that the recognition or lack thereof the biographical subject has received and remains both a problem and an (...) opportunity for women writers and readers. The essays by Valerie Ross, Rob Wilson, Steven Weiland, and William Epstein pursue the question of difference and cultural reification in the theory and practice of a specifically American biography and biographical criticism. (shrink)

Sharon Street vertritt einen Humeanischen Konstruktivismus in der Metaethik, nach dem die normativen Gründe einer Akteurin von dem System ihrer eigenen normativen Urteile abhängen. Ein normatives Urteil ist nach Street genau dann wahr, wenn es zu der ideal kohärenten Menge der normativen Urteile gehört, die die Akteurin im Überlegungsgleichgewicht hätte. In diesem Aufsatz wird die Frage diskutiert, wie diese Konzeption von Normativität mit einer Konzeption von Moral verbunden werden kann. Eine Möglichkeit hierfür besteht darin, an einer engen Verbindung von (...) Normativität und Moral festzuhalten. In diesem Fall muss die Wahrheit moralischer Sätze jedoch auf eine ähnliche Art als akteursrelativ verstanden werden, wie Street die Wahrheit normativer Sätze versteht. Eine zweite Möglichkeit besteht darin, an einem absolutistischen Verständnis moralischer Sätze festzuhalten. Dann wären nach Streets Konzeption von Normativität jedoch Fälle denkbar, in denen eine Akteurin keinen normativen Grund hat, moralisch zu handeln. Beide theoretische Optionen scheinen kontraintuitive Implikationen zu haben, die z.B. mit der Möglichkeit moralischen Tadels oder der Vorstellung der Kategorizität moralischer Sätze zusammenhängen. Aufbauend auf Überlegungen von Street, Bernard Williams und David Lewis wird jedoch dafür argumentiert, dass insbesondere die zweite der genannten Optionen nicht so sehr von einem herkömmlichen Moralverständnis abweicht, wie es zunächst erscheint. (shrink)

There are individual and cultural differences in how memories of our emotions are cognitively represented. This article examines the cognitive representation of emotions in different cultures, as a result of emotional (in)consistency in different cultures. Using a continuous semantic priming task, we showed in two studies that individuals who were less emotionally consistent across relationships have stronger associations of their emotions within those relationships. Further, we found (in Study 2) that in a culture characterised by higher levels of emotional inconsistency (...) across relationships (Singapore), stronger associations between emotions within relationships were found than in a culture characterised by emotional consistency (USA). This cultural difference in cognitive representation was fully mediated by individual differences in cross-situational consistency levels. (shrink)