Watsuji's Rinrigaku (literally, the principles that allow us to live in friendly community) has been regarded as the definitive study of Japanese ethics for half a century.

Fudo , publié en 1935, est l’ouvrage le plus célèbre de Watsuji Tetsuro , au-delà même de son oeuvre majeure, Éthique . Il a été reçu en effet principalement comme un essai sur l’identité japonaise. Mais définir l’identité japonaise n’était pas pour Watsuji l’objectif principal de ce livre. Fudo a été conçu en réponse à Sein und Zeit de Heidegger. À l’accent mis sur la temporalité par le maître livre, il répond en mettant l’accent sur la spatialité; et (...) à l’historialité heideggérienne , il répond par le concept de fudosei, qu’il définit comme «le moment structurel de l’existence humaine», c’est-à-dire la dynamique de la spatialité concrète où chaque être humain est engagé de par sa relation existentielle avec autrui et avec les choses de son milieu. Ce concept central, créé par Watsuji, est ici rendu par le néologisme médiance , qui exprime la dualité de l’humain concrètement replacé dans son milieu : une dimension individuelle et une dimension relationnelle , le couplage de ces deux «moitiés» de l’être s’incarnant dans l’être humain concret . La traduction porte sur le préambule et sur le premier chapitre de Fudo, où Watsuji présente puis expose sa théorie générale des milieux humains et de la médiance, ainsi que, à titre d’exemple, sur deux extraits où il interprète le milieu désertique et le milieu bucolique. (shrink)

Dans la section de Rinrigaku intitulée «L’État», Watsuji Tetsuro définit l’État en tant que «communauté éthique des communautés éthiques». Ce qu’il entend par là, c’est que l’État, pour lui, est la communauté la plus englobante, celle qui n’a pas d’égoïsme et qui place chacune des communautés de rang inférieur dans une structure totalement éthique. Watsuji voit donc l’État comme la forme la plus achevée de communauté. Il considère aussi que l’État, en tant que communauté englobante, peut moralement utiliser (...) la violence pour imposer le respect des lois qu’il édicte, parce que cette violence vient de l’autorité morale de l’État. Enfin, pour Watsuji, l’État possède de lui-même un caractère sacré, qui lui vient de la prédominance de la communauté étatique sur les individus et sur les autres communautés. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the Japanese philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji’s phenomenology of aidagara (“betweenness”) and use his analysis in the contemporary context of online space. We argue that Watsuji develops a prescient analysis anticipating modern technologically-mediated forms of expression and engagement. More precisely, we show that instead of adopting a traditional phenomenological focus on face-to-face interaction, Watsuji argues that communication technologies — which now include Internet-enabled technologies and spaces — are expressive vehicles enabling new forms of emotional (...) expression, shared experiences, and modes of betweenness that would be otherwise inaccessible. Using Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis, we argue that the Internet is not simply a sophisticated form of communication technology that expresses our subjective spatiality (although it is), but that it actually gives rise to new forms of subjective spatiality itself. We conclude with an exploration of how certain aspects of our online interconnections are hidden from lay users in ways that have significant political and ethical implications. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to situate the thought of Tetsurō Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. I argue for Watsuji’s current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, as I will show, Watsuji can potentially offer a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. (...) This is because Watsuji challenges the internalist and cognitivist presuppositions informing the currently dominant “Theory of Mind” paradigm that is driving much social cognition research. Additionally, I show that Watsuji’s alternative model is not merely confined to the realm of phenomenological description but that it also receives robust empirical support from a number of different sources. I thus hope to open up aspects of Watsuji’s thinking that have yet to be fully appreciated. (shrink)

This paper situates Watsuji Tetsurō’s philosophical conception of “climate” within the context of both its historical development and its critical reception by Watsuji’s Kyoto School peers. Part one moves across lecture notes, articles, and book editions to historicize and contextualize climate within its four aspects of development: cultural history, hermeneutic phenomenology, “relational in-betweenness,” and socio-historical development. Part two develops critical responses to each of these four aspects by Watsuji’s Kyoto School peers: Nishida Kitarō, Miki Kiyoshi, Hayashi Tatsuo, (...) Tosaka Jun, and Nakai Masakazu. It ends by briefly considering how these historical and critical considerations might serve as guideposts for contemporary philosophical reconstructions of climate. (shrink)

Watsuji proposes a conception of the self as embodied and dynamic in constant cyclic relationship with the historical milieu. I argue that the concept of a relational individual can provide some solutions to the problem in environmental ethics of the spatial distance between an agent and the consequences of her actions. Indeed, by becoming aware of the interdependent relation between the self and the local shared milieu, one develops and recognizes feelings of care and belonging, which promote more environmentally (...) sensitive lifestyles. Furthermore, this care and awareness of interdependence can be expanded to a global level, including distant human beings and natural environments. Ethics thus emerges from the constant dynamic relation between the relational individual and the historical milieu. keywords: Watsuji Tetsurō—environmental ethics—sustainability— self—relational self— milieu— Japanese philosophy— historicity— spatial distance— Augustin Berque. (shrink)

Despite increasing interest in the work of Tetsuro Watsuji, his discussion of intentionality remains underexplored. I here develop an interpretation and application of his view. First, I unpack Watsuji’s arguments for the inherently social character of intentionality, consider how they connect with his more general discussion of embodiment and betweenness, and then situate his view alongside phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Next, I argue that Watsuji’s characterization of the social character of intentionality is relevant to current (...) discussions in phenomenological psychopathology. I consider how it can help illuminate the character and structure of some anomalous experiences in schizophrenia. I argue further that this application can enrich existing attempts to connect Watsuji and psychopathology, such as those found in the work of the psychiatrist Bin Kimura. (shrink)

The translation of honraisei as “authenticity” has caused scholars to compare Watsuji with Heideggerian and Taylorian accounts of authenticity. In this article, it will be demonstrated that this translation of “authenticity” is misleading insofar as it suggests a sense of subjective individuality as prevalent within Western philosophical thought. However, rather than rejecting a Watsujian account of authenticity, it will be argued that we can salvage this understanding by rethinking honraisei as a distinctly Japanese approach to authenticity and one which (...) is underpinned by the Buddhist concept of emptiness. (shrink)

"In the first study of its kind, David W. Johnson's "Watsuji on Nature" reconstructs the astonishing philosophy of nature of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), situating it in relation both to his reception of the thought of Heidegger and to his renewal of core ontological positions in classical Confucian and Buddhist philosophy. Johnson shows that for Watsuji we have our being in the lived experience of nature, one in which nature and culture compose a tightly interwoven texture called "fūdo". (...) By fully unfolding Watsuji's novel and radical claim that this is a setting that is neither fully external to human subjectivity nor merely a product of it, this book also sets out what still remains unthought in this concept, as well as in the relational structure that underwrites it. Johnson argues that what remains unarticulated is nothing less than the recovery of a reenchanted conception of nature and an elucidation of the wide-ranging implications of a relational conception of the self for questions about the disclosive character of experience, the distinction between fact and value, and the possibility of a place-based ecological ethics. In an engagingly lucid and deft analysis, "Watsuji on Nature" radically expands our appreciation of twentieth-century Japanese philosophy and shows what it has to offer to a global philosophical conversation"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

「第1回法政ミュージアム企画展示」『和辻哲郎の書き込みを見よ!―和辻倫理学の今日的意義』(法政大学図書館主催)の『解説・図録』の増補・改訂版。生誕120周年を迎えた2009年に、「和辻哲郎の書き込み」 を手がかりにして、和辻思想の再検討・再評価とともに、彼の遺した「書き込み」の意義を明らかにした。.

I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational (...) role it plays in organizing our experience of self and world in everyday life. Additionally, I suggest the notion can, in this context of application, potentially enhance our understanding of and empathy for those living with schizophrenic disorders. (shrink)

Cet article est une contribution à la lecture de Fûdo, le milieu humain, ouvrage du philosophe japonais Watsuji Testurô qui aborde le thème du rapport de l’être humain au monde. Cette réflexion veut en éclairer certaines thèses, les comparer aux catégories de la philosophie occidentale et déterminer si Fûdo peut se comprendre comme une pensée de la finitude.

This paper investigates the history of systems of thought different from those of the West. A closer look at Japan’s long philosophical tradition draws attention to the presence of uniquely designed acculturation and training techniques designed as kata or shikata, shedding light on kata as a generic technique of self-perfection and self-transformation. By seeing kata as foundational to the Japanese mind and comparing it to Michel Foucault’s research on technologies of the self, the groundwork is laid for a comparative analysis (...) in terms of the principle of ἐπιμελείσθαι σαυτού, an ethical and aesthetic paradigm dating back to European antiquity. Not only does this bring to light their similarities as techniques of individuation, it also reinforces the importance of Watsuji’s relational understanding of human being. (shrink)

The concept of humans as relational individuals living in a milieu can provide some solutions to various obstacles of theorization that are standing in the way of an ethics of sustainability. The idea of a milieu was developed by Tetsuro Watsuji as a web of signification and symbols. It refers to the environment as lived by a subjective relational human being and not as artificially objectified. The milieu can neither be separated from its temporal—or historical—dimension as it is directly (...) related to the “now” of perceptions and actions in the world. In other words, elements of the natural milieu can be said to have a constitutive value as they contribute to our well-being by helping us make sense of our life and our world. In their temporal and relational dimensions, Watsuji’s notions of the milieu and human being are thus directly related to the notion of sustainability. This concept offers some convincing solutions to overcoming the problem of temporal distance, by shifting the center of argumentation from unknown, passive, and biologically dependent not-yet- born people to the transmission of a meaningful historical milieu. The turning point here is that if what matters is the survival of ideal and material projects that people live for, then future generations have tremendous power over them, as the actions of those future people will determine the success or failure of the projects started by present generations. (shrink)

This essay critically develops Watsuji’s nondual ontology of the self. Watsuji shows that the self is constituted by its relational contact with others and by its immersion in a wider geo-cultural environment. Yet Watsuji himself had difficulty in smoothly bringing together and integrating these notions. By showing how these domains work together to constitute the self, I bring into view the unity at the ground of Watsuji’s thought and the implications of this account for key ideas (...) in Heidegger’s philosophy and for environmental ethics. (shrink)

There is a certain irony in Japan's foremost secular philosopher grounding his ontology and ethics in a term so infamously unclear as fūdo 風土, given that the Japanese word for philosophy itself denotes "clear thinking." One might make the case that Watsuji's concept of fūdo cannot but be unclear, since he is responding to Heidegger's Being and Time, which is hardly the model of lucid philosophy. That said, it is the philosopher's responsibility to clarify the unclear, and that is (...) the task David W. Johnson has appointed himself in Watsuji on Nature: Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger. It is a daunting charge, and Johnson does an admirable job of what those outside academic philosophy might... (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to consider Watsuji Tetsuro's (1889?1960) concept of climate (fudo), and consider whether it contributes anything to the relationship between climate change and ethics. I will argue that superficially it seems that fudo tells us little about the ethics of climate change, but if considered more carefully, and through the lens of thinkers such as Deleuze and Heidegger, there is ethical insight in Watsuji's approach. Watsuji's major work in ethics, Rinrigaku, provides concepts such (...) as between-ness and trust that enable his philosophy of climate to move from a theory of national characters (as Fudo is often seen to be) to an approach to living well within one's milieu. (shrink)

I develop Tetsurō Watsuji’s relational model of the self as “betweenness”. I argue that Watsuji’s view receives support from two case studies: solitary confinement and dementia. Both clarify the constitutive interdependence between the self and the social and material contexts of “betweenness” that define its lifeworld. They do so by providing powerful examples of what happens when the support and regulative grounding of this lifeworld is restricted or taken away. I argue further that Watsuji’s view helps see (...) the other side of this deprivation, how reconstructing aspects of betweenness is, at the same time, a reconstruction of the self. I conclude by briefly indicating further consequences of this view. (shrink)

The following translation is an extract from the third chapter of Watsuji Tetsurō’s Hidden Japan [埋もれた日本] 1951. The translation is composed of two sections: “Until I met Sōseki” [漱石に逢うまで], and “Sōseki’s Character” [漱石の人物]. The former section discusses Watsuji’s indirect encounters with Natsume, namely, reading Natsume’s work as it was serialized in literary magazines during the Meiji era (1868–1912) and the impression Watsuji formed of Natsume as a teacher at Tokyo First Higher School (Ichikō). The latter section discusses (...) Natsume as Watsuji’s personal acquaintance. Here the focus is on how Watsuji came to know Natsume through participating in the famous Thursday Club [木曜会], which was held at Natsume’s home, Sōseki Sanbō [漱石山房]. The contributions of this translation to the literature are threefold: it i) provides a multidimensional account of Natsume, ii) offers insight into the legendary Thursday Club, and iii) also tells us about Watsuji himself. (shrink)

Watsuji Tetsurô is famous for having constructed a systematic socio-political ethics on the basis of the idea of emptiness. This essay examines his 1938 essay “The Concept of ‘Dharma’ and the Dialectics of Emptiness in Buddhist Philosophy” and the posthumously published The History of Buddhist Ethical Thought, in order to clarify the Buddhist roots of his ethics. It aims to answer two main questions which are fundamentally linked: “Which way does Watsuji's legacy turn: toward totalitarianism or toward a (...) balanced theory of selflessness?” and “Is Watsuji's systematic ethics Buddhist?” In order to answer these questions, this essay discusses Watsuji's view of dharma, dependent arising, and morality in Hīnayāna Buddhism. It then proceeds to Watsuji's fine-tuning of the concept of emptiness in Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism. Finally, this essay shows how Watsuji's modernist Buddhist theory connects to his own systematic ethical theory. These two theories share a focus on non-duality, negation, and emptiness. But they differ in their accounts of the relations between the individual and the community, between the “is” and the “ought,” and between hermeneutics and transcendence. These findings give us hints as to Watsuji's origins, pitfalls, and possibilities. (shrink)

Watsuji is recognised as one Japan’s foremost philosophers. His work on ethics, Rinrigaku, is cosmopolitan in engaging the Western philosophical tradition, and in presupposing an international audience. Yet Watsuji’s ethical thought is largely of niche interest outside Japan, and it is critiqued on the ground that it ratifies totalitarianism, demanding individuals’ unquestioning subordination to communal demands. We offer a reading of Rinrigaku that, in attempting to trace the text’s intention, disputes these arguments. We argue that Rinrigaku makes individual (...) autonomy central to ethical action, despite the fact that its treatment of coercion may lead one to think otherwise; that it does not reduce ethical obligations to whatever demands any given society imposes on its members; that it draws a distinction between socio-ethical orders that are genuinely ethical and those that are not; and that, in insisting on the grounding of individuals in the Absolute, it makes adequate room for individuals’ resistance to unjustifiable socio-ethical demands. (shrink)

: Watsuji Tetsurō defined ethics as being generated by a double negation: the individual's negation of the community and the self-negation of the individual who returns to the community. Thus, ethics for him is based on the individual's sacrifice for the collectivity. This position results in the conception of the community as an absolute. I contend that there is a congruence between Watsuji's conception of ethics as self-sacrifice and the way he perceived the Japanese political system. To him, (...) the imperial system in Japan is based on the organic unity of the Japanese people, represented by the emperor, who embodies the general will of, and is therefore coterminous with, the Japanese nation. (shrink)

唐招提寺、薬師寺、法隆寺から、世界の名建築を経めぐり、そして桂離宮へ――。知られざる和辻倫理学のもうひとつの思想的源泉!

『古寺巡礼』の成功で確固たる地位を築いた和辻は、ハイデッガーや西田幾多郎など、同時代の哲学にも相対しつつ、独自の思考を展開する。仏教研究、日本思想史研究、倫理学と、多様かつ豊饒なその思想の本質とは、ど のようなものなのか。「人格」と「間柄」、そして「もの」と「こと」を解明の鍵として、「和辻倫理学」形成の現場を跡づけた力作!