In the 20th century, genetic explanatory approaches became dominant in both developmental and evolutionary biological research. By contrast, physical approaches, which appeal to properties such as mechanical forces, were largely relegated to the margins, despite important advances in modeling. Recently, there have been renewed attempts to find balanced viewpoints that integrate both biological physics and molecular genetics into explanations of developmental and evolutionary phenomena. Here we introduce the 2017 SICB symposium “Physical and Genetic Mechanisms for Evolutionary Novelty” that was dedicated (...) to exploring empirical cases where both biological physics and developmental genetic considerations are crucial. To further contextualize these case studies, we offer two theoretical frameworks for integrating genetic and physical explanations: combining complementary perspectives and comprehensive unification. We conclude by arguing that intentional reflection on conceptual questions about investigation, explanation, and integration is critical to achieving significant empirical and theoretical advances in our understanding of how novel forms originate across the tree of life. (shrink)

We examine George Boolos's proposed abstraction principle for extensions based on the limitation-of-size conception, New V, from several perspectives. Crispin Wright once suggested that New V could serve as part of a neo-logicist development of real analysis. We show that it fails both of the conservativeness criteria for abstraction principles that Wright proposes. Thus, we support Boolos against Wright. We also show that, when combined with the axioms for Boolos's iterative notion of set, New V yields a system equivalent to (...) full Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with a principle of global choice. This advances Boolos's longstanding interest in the foundations of set theory. (shrink)

Alan Stewart - Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 542-543 Book Review Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy Stephen Gaukroger. Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 249. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $21.95. In Stephen Gaukroger's new study, Francis Bacon is lauded all too familiarly as the inaugurator of "the transformation (...) of philosophy into science, and philosophers into scientists" . But it's far from the old story: Gaukroger sees Bacon not as progenitor of the Scientific Revolution or revered Father of Modern Science, but as launching "the first systematic, comprehensive attempt to transform the early-modern.. (shrink)

If C.S. Lewis' A Grief Observed can be considered an account of a lost human relationship, then Cunsolo and Landman's Mourning Nature forms a posthuman, but nonetheless personal, examination of the losses of relationships with plants, animals, and even entire ecosystems—an ecological grief observed. In this regard, one of the motivations for this book was Cunsolo's interviews with Inuit residents who experienced profound sadness and despair at the changes in the landscape brought by climate change. Beyond this, each of the (...) contributors to Mourning Nature brought a variety of written, auditory, visual, and meaning-making experiences to their acts of mourning wild nature. The parallels to Lewis' book end here... (shrink)

The statesman, scientist, and philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) lived a divided life. Was he a noble scholar, or a conniving political crook? Was he a homosexual? Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart draw upon previously untapped sources to create a controversial nuanced portrait of the quintessential "Renaissance man", one whose achievements, while enormous, were nonetheless sadly circumscribed by his class and station.

The neo-logicist argues tliat standard mathematics can be derived by purely logical means from abstraction principles—such as Hume's Principle— which are held to lie 'epistcmically innocent'. We show that the second-order axiom of comprehension applied to non-instantiated properties and the standard first-order existential instantiation and universal elimination principles are essential for the derivation of key results, specifically a theorem of infinity, but have not been shown to be epistemically innocent. We conclude that the epistemic innocence of mathematics has not been (...) established by the neo-logicist. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to a dialogue on contructivist ideas in qualitative research in which collaborative inquiry is a central feature. By this I mean a process of finding out how both 'researchers' and 'subjects' have come to conceive an issue through sharing of their perceptions. Collaborative or participatory action research is an example of this approach. I propose that a constructivist methodology or epistemology for collaborative inquiry can be developed from primary theoretical concepts such as Structural Determinism of (...) Maturana, second order cybernetics of von Foerster and van Glasersfeld and of Personal Construct Theory of Kelly. I further propose that secondary interpretations of these seminal ideas by family therapists helps to show how to use this epistemology in collaborative inquiry. (shrink)

This paper is about a particular kind of relating between people engaged in processes of change, such as in therapy, primary medical care practice or participatory action research. My thesis is that if a therapist, practitioner or facilitator of research engages with individuals or groups on a basis of relational equality the outcomes can be unanticipated new knowledge which leads to new actions. This 'new' knowledge can be thought of as 'knowing of the third kind' and its expression is a (...) greater sense of connectedness to diverse entities. (shrink)

This volume contains Bacon's earliest known writings, dating from 1584 to 1596. It includes position papers, commentaries on printed works, legal readings and opinions, and discourses of advice, usually written in response to specific events or demands and circulated in manuscript. There are detailed introductions, commentaries, and glossaries.

We suggest that the emerging field of the conservation humanities can play a valuable role in biodiversity protection in Papua New Guinea (PNG), where most land remains under collective customary clan ownership. As a first step to mobilising this scholarly field in PNG and to support capacity development for PNG humanities academics, we conducted a landscape review of PNG humanities teaching and research relating to biodiversity conservation and customary land rights. We conducted a systematic literature review, a PNG teaching programme (...) review, and a series of online workshops between the authors (10 PNG-based, 7 UK-based). We found a small but notable amount of PNG research and teaching focused on biodiversity conservation or customary land rights. This included explicit discussion of these topics in 8 of 156 PNG-authored humanities texts published 2010-2020 and related teaching content in the curricula of several different humanities-based programmes. We discuss current barriers to PNG academic development. The growth of fully fledged in-country conservation humanities will require a joint collaborative effort by PNG researchers, who are best placed to carry out such work, and researchers from abroad who can access resources to support the process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 (2002) 542-543 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy Stephen Gaukroger. Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 249. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $21.95. In Stephen Gaukroger's new study, Francis Bacon is lauded all too familiarly as the inaugurator of "the transformation of philosophy into science, (...) and philosophers into scientists" (221). But it's far from the old story: Gaukroger sees Bacon not as progenitor of the Scientific Revolution or revered Father of Modern Science, but as launching "the first systematic, comprehensive attempt to transform the early-modern philosopher from someone whose primary concern is with how to live morally into someone whose primary concern is with the understanding of and reshaping of natural processes" (5).In Gaukroger's account, Bacon had a definite objective: to draw certain knowledge away from its status as esoteric and arcane (held by, say, the trade guilds or the universities), and to bring it into the public realm, an agenda that raised the question not of knowledge per se, but of "the aims of knowledge" (16). Pointing to Bacon's education in statecraft and his almost lifelong immersion in law and politics, Gaukroger argues—here following the work of Julian Martin—that the law was of intellectual interest because "the law was really as close as one got to a model for inquiry and argument" (59); and, moreover, that legal reasoning, like Bacon's conception of natural philosophy, "has a very practical imperative": to discover the truth (60). Although the features of the legal model could be applied to natural philosophy—"the reliability of testimony, what should be concluded from particular testimonies, and how one decided the relevance of particular laws to the case" (61)—Gaukroger wisely registers the caveat that one model cannot simply be mapped onto another, since natural philosophy "needs to be legitimated as an area of activity that it is proper and fruitful to pursue" (67). This project occupies chapter 3. In his famous announcement that he was taking "all knowledge to be my province," Bacon wrote of his need to purge that province "of two sorts of rovers." Gaukroger identifies these as the Scholastic tradition and the "natural magic" practiced by John Dee and Edward Kelley, and plots the genealogy of Bacon's efforts to separate natural philosophy from what he calls "the blind and immoderate zeal of religion." Thus, even though Bacon undertakes "a quite conservative classification" of knowledge in Advancement of Learning and De augmentis, Gaukroger claims that he "incorporates a radical claim for the autonomy of natural philosophy" (94). Chapter 4 moves on to the man himself, "the shaping of the natural philosopher," and includes convincing readings of two under-read but important texts, the polemical Temporis partus masculus (1602) and Redargutio philosophiarum (1608), which between them demonstrate "a novel and powerful doctrine" being advocated by Bacon (110), founded in an appreciation of the historicization of knowledge. Gaukroger also airs an intriguing but too brief speculative comparison between Bacon's famous academic community in "Solomon's House" and an actual educated, motivated elite society of the period—Loyola's Society of Jesus.The final two chapters are more demanding. Chapter 5 interrogates the complex relationship between Bacon's substantive natural philosophy and his method. Gaukroger takes issue with Antonio Pérez-Ramos's influential notion that Bacon tacitly employs a "maker's knowledge conception," where knowing something and being able to make that thing "are effectively the same," arguing instead that "what is at stake" in Bacon "seems quite different." Whereas the maker's knowledge principle is concerned with "the degree of certainty of results in natural philosophy," Bacon is more interested "in making natural philosophy informative and productive" (159). Despite Bacon's call for large-scale communal intellectual endeavour, Gaukroger concludes that Bacon never approached any of the men included on his 1608 wishlist for collaborators (162). Here he is too pessimistic; recent research is showing... (shrink)

The Australian Aborigines' environmental culture and the "double bind" approach used in the program of Alcoholics Anonymous are considered as a source for the generation of a new strategy for dealing with the ecological problems of our day. The strategy aims at achieving a negotiated outcome in issues of high societal risk related to waste management in the Hawkesbury region of Sydney, Australia.

I don't want your agreement! I think I would prefer your understanding. Your agreement would be useful in a workplace to achieve a task. But that is not a social system. We want to live together in mutual respect. Your agreement would take hold of me and threaten to devour my own being - just as my agreement would do to you. For we each bring forth our own world in our every present moment. No matter how convenient it may (...) seem to be, I cannot truly stand still - with you or anyone. (shrink)

My occupation is applied research and - funding arrangements being the force which drives such work - I am working with feedlot cattle at the moment. I have to find out whether they are unduly stressed and, if so, how to relieve it; also how much and what type of shade they require, and what are acceptable criteria of animal welfare. Like most research scientists, I also have a personal hobbyhorse which I can weave into my work. It is that (...) stress affects the competence of an animal's immune system in subtle ways that have to do with its cognition. Alas, the plot thickens! (shrink)

Insulin is stored within the pancreas in an inactive Zn2+‐bound hexameric form prior to release. Similarly, clinical insulins contain Zn2+ and form multimeric complexes. Upon release from the pancreas or upon injection, insulin only becomes active once Zn2+ disengages from the complex. In plasma and other extracellular fluids, the majority of Zn2+ is bound to human serum albumin (HSA), which plays a vital role in controlling insulin pharmacodynamics by enabling removal of Zn2+. The Zn2+‐binding properties of HSA are attenuated by (...) non‐esterified fatty acids (NEFAs) also transported by HSA. Elevated NEFA concentrations are associated with obesity and type 2 diabetes. Here we present the hypothesis that higher NEFA levels in obese and/or diabetic individuals may contribute to insulin resistance and affect therapeutic insulin dose‐response profiles, through modulation of HSA/Zn2+ dynamics. We envisage this novel concept to have important implications for personalized treatments and management of diabetes‐related conditions in the future. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of which number is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of notation. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between (...) the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

Saul Kripke once noted that there is a tight connection between computation and de re knowledge of whatever the computation acts upon. For example, the Euclidean algorithm can produce knowledge of _which number_ is the greatest common divisor of two numbers. Arguably, algorithms operate directly on syntactic items, such as strings, and on numbers and the like only via how the numbers are represented. So we broach matters of _notation_. The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between (...) the notations acceptable for computation, the usual idealizations involved in theories of computability, flowing from Alan Turing’s monumental work, and de re propositional attitudes toward numbers and other mathematical objects. (shrink)

Stewart Shapiro and Alan Weir have argued that a crucial part of the demonstration of Frege's Theorem (specifically, that Hume's Principle implies that there are infinitely many objects) fails if the Neo-logicist cannot assume the existence of the empty property, i.e., is restricted to so-called Aristotelian Logic. Nevertheless, even in the context of Aristotelian Logic, Hume's Principle implies much of the content of Peano Arithmetic. In addition, their results do not constitute an objection to Neo-logicism so much as (...) a clarification regarding the view of logic that the Neo-logicist must take. (shrink)

I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...) the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?". (shrink)

I argue that epistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led to serious confusion in the discussion of epistemological issues. The source of the problem is that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined technical term. I show how this confusion has infected discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and knowledge norms for assertion and belief.

Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that figures in (...) Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation. (shrink)

The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and (...) the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we allow for basic knowledge, we can come to know our faculties are reliable in ways that intuitively are too easy. This raises a serious doubt about whether we had the basic knowledge in the first place. In “Easy Knowledge”, Peter Markie argues that BKS theories do not face any problem concerning easy knowledge.3 I argued that the problem arises in two forms, and Markie takes issue with both. I will argue that Markie's defense of BKS theories fails. (shrink)

This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without refuting the deductive closure argument. In this respect, the deductive closure argument is the (...) stronger of the two. (shrink)

Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework which we use to understand each other. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action, the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons, the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people, and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional (...) attitudes. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...) order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc. (shrink)

Alan Miller offers a focused account of perceptual knowledge, the knowledge that we gain by means of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting. He explains perceptual knowledge in terms of general recognitional abilities, then situates that account within a broader perspective on epistemology and philosophical method more generally.

This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt. It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to (...) philosophy of science in the 1930s was largely an attempt to dissolve the tension in his early epistemology. This book fills a significant gap in the literature on the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It will be of particular importance to historians of analytic philosophy, philosophers of science, and historians of science. (shrink)