‘Neo-logicist‘ logic is not epistemically innocent

Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):160--189 (2000)
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Abstract

The neo-logicist argues tliat standard mathematics can be derived by purely logical means from abstraction principles—such as Hume's Principle— which are held to lie 'epistcmically innocent'. We show that the second-order axiom of comprehension applied to non-instantiated properties and the standard first-order existential instantiation and universal elimination principles are essential for the derivation of key results, specifically a theorem of infinity, but have not been shown to be epistemically innocent. We conclude that the epistemic innocence of mathematics has not been established by the neo-logicist.

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Author Profiles

Stewart Shapiro
Ohio State University
Alan Weir
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo‐Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
Neo-Fregeanism: An Embarrassment of Riches.Alan Weir - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):13-48.
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Frege meets Belnap: Basic Law V in a Relevant Logic.Shay Logan & Francesca Boccuni - forthcoming - In Andrew Tedder, Shawn Standefer & Igor Sedlar (eds.), New Directions in Relevant Logic. Springer. pp. 381-404.

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References found in this work

The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
Frege's conception of numbers as objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - [Aberdeen]: Aberdeen University Press.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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