What produces emotions? Why do we have emotions? How do we have emotions? Why do emotional states feel like something? This book considers these questions, going beyond examining brain mechanisms of emotion, by proposing a theory of what emotions are, and an evolutionary, Darwinian, theory of the adaptive value of emotion.

The topics treated in The brain and emotion include the definition, nature, and functions of emotion (Ch. 3); the neural bases of emotion (Ch. 4); reward, punishment, and emotion in brain design (Ch. 10); a theory of consciousness and its application to understanding emotion and pleasure (Ch. 9); and neural networks and emotion-related learning (Appendix). The approach is that emotions can be considered as states elicited by reinforcers (rewards and punishers). This approach helps with understanding the functions of emotion, with (...) classifying different emotions, and in understanding what information-processing systems in the brain are involved in emotion, and how they are involved. The hypothesis is developed that brains are designed around reward-and punishment-evaluation systems, because this is the way that genes can build a complex system that will produce appropriate but flexible behavior to increase fitness (Ch. 10). By specifying goals rather than particular behavioral patterns of responses, genes leave much more open the possible behavioral strategies that might be required to increase fitness. The importance of reward and punishment systems in brain design also provides a basis for understanding the brain mechanisms of motivation, as described in Chapters 2 for appetite and feeding, 5 for brain-stimulation reward, 6 for addiction, 7 for thirst, and 8 for sexual behavior. Key Words: amygdala; brain evolution; consciousness; dopamine; emotion; hunger; orbitofrontal cortex; punishment; reward; taste. (shrink)

There are many advantages to defining emotions as states elicited by reinforcers, with the states having a set of different functions. This approach leads towards an understanding of the nature of emotion, of its evolutionary adaptive value, and of many principles of brain design. It also leads towards a foundation for many of the processes that underlie evolutionary psychology and behavioral ecology. It is shown that recent as well as previous evidence implicates the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex in positive as (...) well as negative emotions. The issue of why emotional states feel like something is part of the much larger problem of phenomenal consciousness. It is argued that thinking about one's own thoughts would have adaptive value by enabling first order linguistic thoughts to be corrected. It is suggested that reflecting on and correcting one's own thoughts and plans would feel like something, and that phenomenal consciousness may occur when this type of monitoring process is taking place. (shrink)

Why do we have emotions? What is the relationship between mind and brain? Why do we appreciate art? How do we make decisions? Why do so many people follow religions? Neuroculture considers the implications of our modern understanding of how the brain works, and how it can help us understand many mental issues central to everyday life.

What produces emotions? Why do we have emotions? How do we have emotions? Why do emotional states feel like something? The Brain, Emotion, and Depression addresses these issues and more, providing a unified approach to emotion, reward value, economic value, decision-making, and their brain mechanisms.

A neuroscience-based approach has recently been proposed for the relation between the mind and the brain. The proposal is that events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality (...) can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. Here, some implications are developed. It is proposed that causality, at least as it applies to the brain, should satisfy three conditions. First, interventionist tests for causality must be satisfied. Second, the causally related events should be at the same level of explanation. Third, a temporal order condition must be satisfied, with a suitable time scale in the order of 10 ms. Next, although it may be useful for different purposes to describe causality involving the mind and brain at the mental level, or at the brain level, it is argued that the brain level may sometimes be more accurate, for sometimes causal accounts at the mental level may arise from confabulation by the mentalee, whereas understanding exactly what computations have occurred in the brain that result in a choice or action will provide the correct causal account for why a choice or action was made. Next, it is argued that possible cases of “downward causation” can be accounted for by a within-levels-of-explanation account of causality. This computational neuroscience approach provides an opportunity to proceed beyond Cartesian dualism and physical reductionism in considering the relations between the mind and the brain. (shrink)

An approach to emotion is described in which emotions are defined as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers, that is, by stimuli that are the goals for action. This leads to a theory of the evolutionary adaptive value of emotions, which is that different genes specify different goals in their own self-interest, and any actions can then be learned and performed by instrumental learning to obtain the goals. The brain mechanisms for emotion in brain regions such as the orbitofrontal and anterior (...) cingulate cortex provide a foundation for understanding the neural basis of emotion. Classically conditioned effects may modulate the actions initiated by this system. In addition to this instrumental learning system, some stimuli may elicit responses, for example approach, withdrawal, or fixed action patterns, but intervening states are not required for this type of adaptive response. In addition, a rational thought system involved in multistep planning can allow gene-specified goals to be deferred or avoided in order to achieve longer-term types of goals that may be more advantageous to the individual than to the genes. (shrink)

Memory, attention, and decision-making are three major areas of cognitive neuroscience. They are however frequently studied in isolation, using a range of models to understand them. This book brings a unified approach to understanding these three processes, showing how these fundamental functions can be understood in a common and unifying framework.

Problems are raised with the global workspace hypothesis of consciousness, for example about exactly how global the workspace needs to be for consciousness to suddenly be present. Problems are also raised with Carruthers's version that excludes conceptual representations, and in which phenomenal consciousness can be reduced to physical processes, with instead a different levels of explanation approach to the relation between the brain and the mind advocated. A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described, in which there is a particular (...) computational system involved in which Higher Order Syntactic Thoughts are used to perform credit assignment on first order thoughts of multiple step plans to correct them by manipulating symbols in a syntactic type of working memory. This provides a good evolutionary reason for the evolution of this kind of computational module, with which, it is proposed, phenomenal consciousness is associated. Some advantages of this HOST approach to phenomenal consciousness are then described with reference not only to the global workspace approach, but also to Higher Order Thought theories. It is hypothesized that the HOST system which requires the ability to manipulate first order symbols in working memory might utilize parts of the prefrontal cortex implicated in working memory, and especially the left inferior frontal gyrus, which is involved in language and probably syntactical processing. Overall, the approach advocated is to identify the computations that are linked to consciousness, and to analyze the neural bases of those computations. [copyright: Copyright © 2020 Rolls.]. (shrink)

The representation of objects and faces by neurons in the temporal lobe visual cortical areas of primates has the property that the neurons encode relatively independent information in their firing rates. This means that the number of stimuli that can be encoded increases exponentially with the number of neurons in an ensemble. Moreover, the information can be read by receiving neurons that perform just a synaptically weighted sum of the firing rates being received. Some ways in which these representations become (...) grounded in the world are described. The issue of syntactic binding in representations, and of its value for a higher order thought system, is discussed. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je montre que les neurosciences computationnelles fournissent une nouvelle approche pertinente à des problèmes traditionnels en philosophie tels que la relation entre les états mentaux et cérébraux (le problème esprit–corps ou corps–esprit), le déterminisme et le libre arbitre, et peut nous aider à traiter le problème « difficile » des aspects phénoménaux de la conscience. Un des thèmes de cet article et de mon livre Neuroculture: on the Implications of Brain Science ([Rolls 2012c]) est qu’en comprenant les (...) calculs effectués par les neurones et les réseaux neuronaux, et les effets du bruit dans le cerveau sur ceux-ci, nous gagnerons une vraie compréhension des mécanismes qui sous-tendent le fonctionnement du cerveau. Une partie de notre solution au problème esprit–corps est que l’esprit et le cerveau sont différents niveaux d’explication du traitement de l’information, leur relation pouvant être appréhendée par la compréhension des mécanismes en jeu à l’aide de l’approche fournie par les neurosciences computationnelles. Mais cette solution ne traite pas certains problèmes « difficiles » tels que le problème de la conscience phénoménale, et, même si j’ai fourni de nouvelles suggestions sur ce point dans cet article, il faut reconnaître qu’il y a toujours une brèche dans notre compréhension entre les événements dans le cerveau et les expériences subjectives qui peuvent les accompagner. L’explication que je propose est que, lorsque cela « fait quelque chose », il ne s’agit que d’une propriété d’un processus computationnel qui a des pensées sur ses propres pensées (pensées d’ordre supérieur), les pensées étant ancrées dans le monde. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je montre que les neurosciences computationnelles fournissent une nouvelle approche pertinente à des problèmes traditionnels en philosophie tels que la relation entre les états mentaux et cérébraux (le problème esprit–corps ou corps–esprit), le déterminisme et le libre arbitre, et peut nous aider à traiter le problème « difficile » des aspects phénoménaux de la conscience. Un des thèmes de cet article et de mon livre Neuroculture: on the Implications of Brain Science ([Rolls 2012c]) est qu’en comprenant les (...) calculs effectués par les neurones et les réseaux neuronaux, et les effets du bruit dans le cerveau sur ceux-ci, nous gagnerons une vraie compréhension des mécanismes qui sous-tendent le fonctionnement du cerveau. Une partie de notre solution au problème esprit–corps est que l’esprit et le cerveau sont différents niveaux d’explication du traitement de l’information, leur relation pouvant être appréhendée par la compréhension des mécanismes en jeu à l’aide de l’approche fournie par les neurosciences computationnelles. Mais cette solution ne traite pas certains problèmes « difficiles » tels que le problème de la conscience phénoménale, et, même si j’ai fourni de nouvelles suggestions sur ce point dans cet article, il faut reconnaître qu’il y a toujours une brèche dans notre compréhension entre les événements dans le cerveau et les expériences subjectives qui peuvent les accompagner. L’explication que je propose est que, lorsque cela « fait quelque chose », il ne s’agit que d’une propriété d’un processus computationnel qui a des pensées sur ses propres pensées (pensées d’ordre supérieur), les pensées étant ancrées dans le monde. (shrink)

A neuroscience-based approach has recently been proposed for the relation between the mind and the brain. The proposal is that events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality (...) can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. Here, some implications are developed. It is proposed that causality, at least as it applies to the brain, should satisfy three conditions. First, interventionist tests for causality must be satisfied. Second, the causally related events should be at the same level of explanation. Third, a temporal order condition must be satisfied, with a suitable time scale in the order of 10 ms (to exclude application to quantum physics; and a cause cannot follow an effect). Next, although it may be useful for different purposes to describe causality involving the mind and brain at the mental level, or at the brain level, it is argued that the brain level may sometimes be more accurate, for sometimes causal accounts at the mental level may arise from confabulation by the mentalee, whereas understanding exactly what computations have occurred in the brain that result in a choice or action will provide the correct causal account for why a choice or action was made. Next, it is argued that possible cases of “downward causation” can be accounted for by a within-levels-of-explanation account of causality. This computational neuroscience approach provides an opportunity to proceed beyond Cartesian dualism and physical reductionism in considering the relations between the mind and the brain. (shrink)

The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content (...) about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient properties to be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a mental state, with content (...) about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient (e.g., mental) properties to be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

Understanding consciousness is a truly multidisciplinary project, attracting intense interest from researchers and theorists from diverse backgrounds. Thus, we now have computational scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers all engaged in the same effort. This book draws together the work of leading researchers around the world, providing insights from these three general perspectives. The work is highlighted by a rare look at work being conducted by Japanese researchers.

Edmund D. Pellegrino, John Collins Harvey, Kevin T. Fitzgerald, SJ; Must the Church be Mute Lest Its Truths be Distorted? A Response to Engelhardt, Christian bi.

Memory, attention, and decision-making are three major areas of psychology. They are frequently studied in isolation, and using a range of models to understand them. This book brings a unified approach to understanding these three processes. It shows how these fundamental functions for cognitive neuroscience can be understood in a common and unifying computational neuroscience framework. This framework links empirical research on brain function from neurophysiology, functional neuroimaging, and the effects of brain damage, to a description of how neural networks (...) in the brain implement these functions using a set of common principles. The book describes the principles of operation of these networks, and how they could implement such important functions as memory, attention, and decision-making.The topics covered includeThe hippocampus and memoryReward and punishment related learning: emotion and motivationVisual object recognition learningShort term memoryAttention, short term memory, and biased competitionProbabilistic decision-makingAction selectionDecision-makingAlso included are tutorial appendices onNeural networks in the brainNeural encoding in the brain'Memory, Attention and Decision-Making' will be valuable for those in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience from advanced undergraduate level upwards. It will also be of interest to those interested in neuroeconomics, animal behaviour, zoology, evolutionary biology, psychiatry, medicine, and philosophy. The book has been written with modular chapters and sections, making it possible to select particular Chapters for course work. (shrink)

In this paper we open up the topic of ethical corporate identity: what we believe to be a new, as well as highly salient, field of inquiry for scholarship in ethics and corporate social responsibility. Taking as our starting point Balmer’s (in Balmer and Greyser, 2002) AC2ID test model of corporate identity – a pragmatic tool of identity management – we explore the specificities of an ethical form of corporate identity. We draw key insights from conceptualizations of corporate social responsibility (...) and stakeholder theory. We argue ethical identity potentially takes us beyond the personification of the corporation. Instead, ethical identity is seen to be formed relationally, between parties, within a community of business and social exchange. Extending the AC2ID test model, we suggest the management of ethical identity requires a more socially, dialogically embedded kind of corporate practice and greater levels of critical reflexivity. (shrink)

This volume examines some of the most contentious social justice issues present in the corpus of Augustine's writings. Whether one is concerned with human trafficking and the contemporary slave trade, the global economy, or endless wars, these essays further the conversation on social justice as informed by the writings of Augustine of Hippo.

Husserls Briefwechsel is von entscheidender Bedeutung für das Verständnis seiner philosophischen Entwicklung, seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit und Publikationsvorhaben. Er nimmt darin Stellung zu den politischen Entwicklungen in Deutschland und spricht sich aus über weltanschaulich-religiöse Fragen. Außerdem bestimmt er sein Verhältnis zu anderen Philosophen und Schulen. Die vorliegende, textkritisch konstituierte und reich kommentierte Gesamtausgabe ist nicht nur für Philosophen, Wissenschaftshistoriker und Zeitgeschichtlicher von hohem Interesse. Die Ausgabe umfaßt in sachlicher Gliederung Husserls Korrespondenz (ca. 1300 Einzelstücke) mit über 250 Personen und Instanzen, wobei (...) neben den Briefen Husserls - und, in großzügiger Auswahl, seiner Frau Malvine - auch alle erhaltenen Briefe an Husserl aufgenommen sind (ca. 700 Einzelstücke). Die Bände I--IV orientieren sich an der chronologischen Entwicklung der Husserlschen Philosophie, die Bände V--IX an der sachlichen Nähe der Korrespondenzpartner zu Husserls Philosophie. Band X enthält neben der Einführung in die Ausgabe verschiedene Register zur differenzierten Aufschlüsselung der Ausgabe. Edmund Husserl's correspondence is of eminent importance for a clear understanding of his philosophical development, his scientific work, and his publications. In his letters, he reacts on the political developments in Germany and ponders on the philosophy of life and on religious questions. He also clearly defines his relationships with other philosophers and schools of philosophy. This annotated and richly commented correspondence edition is of vital interest to philosophers, researchers and historians. The ten volumes consist of Husserl's correspondence (about 1300 letters) with more than 250 institutes and persons, and in addition to his letters, the letters of his wife Malvine and those received by both (about 700) are also included. Volumes I--IV present a chronological development of Husserl's philosophical system, Volumes V--IX are devoted to the correspondence partners in philosophy. The last volume consists of an extensive Introduction and a variety of indexes to all volumes in the set. (shrink)

While the logical reconstruction of empirical theories is, in principle, no longer a matter of dispute, the possibility and, furthermore, the procedure of constructingab initio such theories are hardly debated upon, although this might be conductive to the advancement, above all, of sciences of a pre-paradigmatic status. Eight steps are here proposed for the constructive development of an explanatory empirical theory in a strictly scientific sense, the development starting with a construction of the theory's set of partial potential models Mpp (...) and ending up in a characterization of its range of intended applications I. The set of partial potential models is gained by way of genetic reduction of present-day practical, i. e. pre-theoretical, notions, which denote observable facts to be explained, to some possible notion of an elementary historical practice. This elementary practical notion, which must be conceived as a general notion of a formerly given elementary social practice, has afterwards to be developed into some general notion for all the phenomena to be presently explained, by way of reconstructing the historical emergence of the present field of research. The elementary practical notion also forms the basis for the generation of theexplaining so-called t-theoretical terms of the theory. Their development, however, presupposes a ‘political’ decision of the scientist to work in favour of the perfection of certain practically relevant capacities, which decision also determines the domain of discourse for the set of partial potential models of the theory and links its explaining terms to the terms denoting the facts to be explained. A set Io of successful applications of the as yet not completed theory and respective special laws, making up the success of such applications, render possible the full axiomatization of the theory as well as the characterization of the range of its intended applications. (shrink)