Rips et al.'s proposition cannot account for the facts that (1) a historical look at the word number systems suggests that the concept of natural numbers has been progressively elaborated; (2) people from cultures without an elaborate counting system do not master the concept of natural numbers; (3) children take time to master natural numbers; and (4) the competing advantage of the postulated math schema in the natural selection process is not obvious.

Humphreys & Forde concentrate on the living/nonliving dissociation. However, further dissociations have been reported, including selective loss or preservation in recognizing body parts and numbers. This commentary outlines the relevance of the number category for understanding the organising principles of semantic memory.

En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.

Como é possível ter experiências de memória presente de coisas que, sendo passadas, não são mais experimentadas no presente? Uma resposta possível a esta pergunta filosófica de longa data é o que eu chamo de "visão da idealidade do tempo", ou seja, a visão de que a sucessão temporal é irreal. Neste artigo, esboço a ideia por trás da versão de Brentano da visão da idealidade do tempo. Além disso, eu a contrasto com a versão de Hume, sugerindo que, apesar (...) das diferenças significativas, ela pode, no entanto, ser interpretada como humeana em sentido amplo. (shrink)

En un diálogo continuo con la tradición filosófica, Zubiri va página a página describiendo el acto de la intelección humana y desmontando el cúmulo de hipótesis y teorías que subyacen al llamado «problema del conocimiento». Zubiri consigue descubrir, mediante el recurso a un procedimiento puramente descriptivo, en qué consiste el acto humano por excelencia, la intelección. La intelección humana, dice Zubiri, no es una síntesis trascendental, sino algo más simple a la vez que más radical, la mera actualización de lo (...) real en la inteligencia sentiente. (shrink)

RESUMENLa duración ha sido una de las nociones que ha hecho célebre la filosofía bergsoniana y es, sin duda, su noción central. La encontramos presente ya en el Ensayo referida a la vida psicológica. Más tarde, en La evolución creadora, Bergson la extiende a los seres vivos, a la evolución de las especies y, posteriormente, a todo el universo. Es pues, el tejido mismo de lo real. centrándonos en la duración "psicológica", este trabajo pretende mostrar la concepción bergsoniana del acto (...) libre y la libertad que de ella se desprende. PALABRAS CLAVEDURACION-ACTO LIBRE-TIEMPO FISICO-CONSCIENCIAABSTRACTThe duration has been one of the concepts wich has made Bergson's philosophhy famous and it is undoubtly its key concept. We already find it present in Essai concerning psychological life, and later on, in L'evolution creatrice. Bergson extends it to living beings, to the evolution of the species and still to whole universe. Therefore, it is the very "stuff" of reality. being imposible to deal with this concept under these aspects, in this paper, we will focus on the "psychological" duration, in order to demonstrate that this notion means a conception of the free act and the freedom concerned. KEYWORDSDURATION-FREE ACT-PHYSICAL TIMES-CONCIOUSNESS. (shrink)

RESUMENAunque Bergson no ignoró las tesis de Freud ni el psicoanálisis, sin embargo las divergencias entre los dos pensadores respecto al inconsciente resultan, en gran medida, irreconciliables. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que sus intereses en este ámbito fueron dispares: mientras Freud se interesó por el funcionamiento de los procesos inconscientes atendiendo a un punto de vista experimental más que especulativo, a Bergson le preocupa su existencia y naturaleza.PALABRAS CLAVEINCONSCIENTE – PSICOLOGÍA – BERGSON – FREUD ABSTRACTAlthough Bergson did not ignore (...) Freud’s theses nor phychoanalysis, their divergencies concerning the unconcious are, to a great extent, irrenconciliable. The present article intentds to demostrate that ther interests were completely different : whereas Freud was interested in the unconcious processes from an experimental rather than a spectualtive point of view, Bergson was concerned with their existence and nature.KEYWORDSUNCONSCIOUS – PSYCHOLOGY – BEGSON – FREUD. (shrink)

RESUMENLos progresos tecnológicos y teóricos alcanzados por las neurociencias en estos últimos veinticinco añis, y sus implicaciones para la filosofía, han renovado las posibilidades de aproximación entre ambas, propiciando el desarrollo de un nuevo ámbito de estudio dentro de la filosofía: la neurofilosofía. El presente trabajo se propone sugerir cómo este campo emergente podría ser concebido como un punto de encuentro para la reflexión conjunta y la interacción entre filosofía y neurociencias, no marcado necesariamente por la absorción de la primera (...) por la segunda.PALABRAS CLAVENEUROFILOSOFÍA, FILOSOFÍA, NEUROCIENCIAS, CIENCIAS COGNITIVASABSTRACTThe technological and theoretical advances in neurosciencies in the past twenty-five years, as well as their implications for philosophy have opened promising perspectives for the renewal of approache between both, thus encouraging the development of a arising field within philosophy: neurophilosophy. The purpose of this paper is to suggest how this new field study could be considered to be a point of union for the joint reflection and interaction between philosophy and neurosciencies, without the first being absorbed by the second.KEYWORDSNEUROPHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY, NEUROSCIENCES, COGNITIVE SCIENCES. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of (...) first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. (shrink)

The Statesman is a difficult and puzzling Platonic dialogue. In A Stranger's Knowledge Marquez argues that Plato abandons here the classic idea, prominent in the Republic, that the philosopher, qua philosopher, is qualified to rule. Instead, the dialogue presents the statesman as different from the philosopher, the possessor of a specialist expertise that cannot be reduced to philosophy. The expertise is of how to make a city resilient against internal and external conflict in light of the imperfect sociality of human (...) beings and the poverty of their reason. This expertise, however, cannot be produced on demand: one cannot train statesmen like one might train carpenters. Worse, it cannot be made acceptable to the citizens, or operate in ways that are not deeply destructive to the city's stability. Even as the political community requires his knowledge for its preservation, the genuine statesman must remain a stranger to the city. Marquez shows how this impasse is the key to understanding the ambiguous reevaluation of the rule of law that is the most striking feature of the political philosophy of the Statesman. The law appears here as a mere approximation of the expertise of the inevitably absent statesman, dim images and static snapshots of the clear and dynamic expertise required to steer the ship of state across the storms of the political world. Yet such laws, even when they are not created by genuine statesmen, can often provide the city with a limited form of cognitive capital that enables it to preserve itself in the long run, so long as citizens, and especially leaders, retain a “philosophical” attitude towards them. It is only when rulers know that they do not know better than the laws what is just or good (and yet want to know what is just and good) that the city can be preserved. The dialogue is thus, in a sense, the vindication of the philosopher-king in the absence of genuine political knowledge. (shrink)

Cuerpo físico y cuerpo vivido no deben interpretarse como dos realidades separadas, sino que representan dos aspectos distintos de la misma experiencia corporal descrita en términos fenomenológicos. La experiencia de la corporalidad puede seguir dos direcciones: a) la primera es una dirección ascendente, que implica el desarrollo de las posibilidades de movimiento, acción y expresión del cuerpo en toda su plenitud; b) el otro camino o dirección, en contraste con el anterior, toma una senda descendente, y se halla estrechamente relacionado (...) con la experiencia del dolor, de la limitación, de la resistencia corporal que es experimentada como oposición a la propia voluntad: es el cuerpo vulnerable. Aquí reaparece un nuevo dualismo: el cuerpo poético de la expresión frente al cuerpo vulnerable de la enfermedad y el dolor. Mi contribución trata de cuestionar la idea de que el cuerpo poético de la expresión artística y el cuerpo vulnerable de la vejez, de la discapacidad o de la enfermedad, pertenezcan a esferas completamente separadas. Con este propósito, se intenta poner de relieve los múltiples puntos de intersección entre ambas perspectivas, al tiempo que se sostiene que tales intersecciones pueden llegar a ser interesantes puntos de partida de la investigación interdisciplinar. (shrink)

On sait que sur la question des pensées imperceptibles, Nicole, bientôt suivi par le bénédictin François Lamy, heurte l’opinion d’Arnauld. L’opposition d’Arnauld à Nicole touchant la question de la grâce est bien connue. C’est plutôt de l’originalité philosophique de Nicole qu’il s’agira dans ce travail. En tirant Nicole de « l’ombre d’Arnauld et de Pascal » et en lui faisant crédit d’une consistance spéculative propre, on retrouvera la finesse de sa psychologie, mais on découvrira également l’esquisse d’une subtile anthropologie.

Cogito, ergo sum. Ce n’est pas tiré de la plume de Descartes que cet énoncé apparaît pour la première fois dans les œuvres du philosophe. C’est en effet Caterus qui, dans la première série d’Objectiones aux Meditationes l’écrit, telle que la postérité scolaire va le considérer, comme un objet textuel autonome et digne par soi-même d’intérêt. Le fait est anecdotique, mais il est révélateur. D’abord parce que ce n’est pas Descartes qui a constitué...

Pourquoi Empédocle a-t-il recouru à la forme poétique pour exposer sa pensée? Empédocle réinterprète la langue, les techniques et la visée sociale des grands poèmes épiques et didactiques de la Grèce archaïque pour adapter les ressources à un projet dans lequel poésie et philosophie sont indissociables.

This paper examines the logic of conditional obligation, which originates from the works of Hansson, Lewis, and others. Some weakened forms of transitivity of the betterness relation are studied. These are quasi-transitivity, Suzumura consistency, acyclicity and the interval order condition. The first three do not change the logic. The axiomatic system is the same whether or not they are introduced. This holds true under a rule of interpretation in terms of maximality and strong maximality. The interval order condition gives rise (...) to a new axiom. Depending on the rule of interpretation, this one changes. With the rule of maximality, one obtains the principle known as disjunctive rationality. With the rule of strong maximality, one obtains the Spohn axiom (also known as the principle of rational monotony, or Lewis’ axiom CV). A completeness theorem further substantiates these observations. For interval order, this yields the finite model property and decidability of the calculus. (shrink)

Replying to Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke, this article shows how Political Marxism offers powerful conceptual tools to understand modes of production that structure historical processes as fundamentally constituted by exploitative social and political relations. I explain how structure, or rules of reproduction, should be understood as alienated social relations, which are inherent to all class societies. Understanding structure this way leaves ample space for – and makes inevitable – the consideration of agency.

Scientific journals may incur scientific error if articles are tainted by research misconduct. While some journals’ ethical policies, especially those on conflicts of interest, have improved over recent years, with some adopting a uniform approach, only around half of biomedical journals, principally those with higher impact factors, currently have formal misconduct policies, mainly for handling allegations. Worryingly, since a response to allegations would reasonably require an a priori definition, far fewer journals have publicly available definitions of misconduct. While some journals (...) and editors’ associations have taken significant steps to prevent and detect misconduct and respond to allegations, the content, visibility of and access to these policies varies considerably. In addition, while the lack of misconduct policies may prompt and maintain a de novo approach for journals, potentially causing stress, publication delays and even legal disputes, the lack of uniformity may be a matter of contention for research stakeholders such as editors, authors and their institutions, and publishers. Although each case may need an individual approach, I argue that posting highly visible, readily accessible, comprehensive, consistent misconduct policies could prevent the publication of fraudulent papers, increase the number of retractions of already published papers and, perhaps, reduce research misconduct. Although legally problematic, a concerted approach, with sharing of information between editors, which is clearly explained in journal websites, could also help. Ideally, journals, editors’ associations, and publishers should seek consistency and homogenise misconduct policies to maintain public confidence in the integrity of biomedical research publications. (shrink)

There has been significant debate about whether the moral norms of medical practice arise from some feature or set of features internal to the discipline of medicine. In this article, I analyze Edmund Pellegrino’s conception of the internal morality of medicine, and situate it in the context of Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential account of “practice.” Building upon MacIntyre, Pellegrino argued that medicine is a social practice with its own unique goals—namely, the medical, human, and spiritual good of the patient—and that the (...) moral norms that govern medical practice are derived from these goals. After providing an overview of Pellegrino’s work, I discuss some forceful objections to his theory—specifically, that it is too rigid and incapable of entering into dialogue with contemporary values systems; that it is dependent on an external conception of human flourishing; and that it is incompatible with the rapidly changing nature of modern medicine. In the final section of this article, I consider how theorists working in the Hippocratic tradition might respond to these objections against ethical essentialism by drawing upon MacIntyre’s historico-cultural method as well as what he calls Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology.”. (shrink)

Insurance is pervasive in many social settings. As a cooperative device based on risk pooling, it serves to attenuate the adverse consequences of various risks by offering policyholders coverage against the losses implied by adverse events in exchange for the payment of premiums. In the insurance industry, the concept of actuarial fairness serves to establish what could be adequate, fair premiums. Accordingly, premiums paid by policyholders should match as closely as possible their risk exposure. Such premiums are the product of (...) the probabilities of losses and the expected losses. This article presents a discussion of the fairness of actuarial fairness through three steps: defining the concept based on its formulation within the insurance industry; determining in which sense it may be about fairness; and raising some objections to the actual fairness of actuarial fairness. The necessity of a normative evaluation of actuarial fairness is justified by the influence of the concept on the current reforms of public insurance systems and the fact that it highlights the question of the repartition of the gains and burdens of social cooperation. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in health care. Specifically, several commentators have discussed the implications that conscientious objection has for the delivery of timely, efficient, and nondiscriminatory medical care. In this paper, I discuss the main argument put forward by the most prominent critics of conscientious objection—what I call the Professional Duty Argument or PDA. According to proponents of PDA, doctors should place patients’ well-being and rights at the center of their professional (...) practice. Doctors should be prepared to set their personal moral or religious beliefs aside where these beliefs conflict with what is legal and considered good medical practice by relevant professional associations. Conscientious objection, on this account, should be heavily restricted, if even allowed at all. I discuss two powerful objections against PDA. The first objection, which I call the fallibility objection, notes that law and professional codes of conduct are fallible guides for ethical conduct and that conscientious objection has in the past and continues today to provide a check on aberrations in law and professional convention. The second, which I call the professional discretion objection, states that restrictions on conscientious objection undermine one of the cornerstones of good medical practice, namely, a practitioner’s right to independent professional judgment. I argue that these two objections give us reason to retain conscience clauses in professional codes of conduct. (shrink)

Cet article expose les grandes forces économiques qui sous-tendent et organisent le processus de déréglementation caractérisant aujourd’hui les économies développées. Il montre comment, au sein de ce processus, la réglementation change de forme et de nature plus qu’elle ne disparaît réellement. À un contrôle direct par l’autorité publique se substitue progressivement un contrôle indirect par une concurrence encadrée. Les enjeux éthiques de la déréglementation sont abordés à la lumière de cette analyse économique.

Several ethicists have defended the use of responsibility-based criteria in healthcare rationing. Yet in this article we outline two challenges to the implementation of responsibility-based healthcare rationing policies. These two challenges are, namely, that responsibility for past behavior can diminish as an agent changes, and that blame can come apart from responsibility. These challenges suggest that it is more difficult to hold someone responsible for health related actions than proponents of responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies suggest. We close by discussing public health (...) policies that could function as an alternative to contentious, responsibility-sensitive rationing policies. (shrink)

Many if not most sperm donors in the early years of IVF donated under conditions of anonymity. There is, however, a growing awareness of the ethical cost of withholding identifying parental information from donor children. Today, anonymous donation is illegal in many jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have gone as far as retrospectively invalidating contracts whereby donors were guaranteed anonymity. This article provides a critical evaluation of the ethics and legality of anonymous donation. We defend Australian and British legislation that has (...) outlawed donor anonymity, and we argue for the establishment of a central registry that provides donor children with the ability to easily and reliably access identifying information about their donor parents. (shrink)

Nous nous attribuons naturellement une vie mentale, au sens minimal où il nous semble intuitivement que quelque chose se passe dans notre esprit. Mais que veut dire « quelque chose se passe dans notre esprit »?La formule est singulièrement obscure, et les philosophes y consacrent depuis toujours de patientes recherches. Au sens le plus naturel et immédiat, elle semble signifier quelque chose de ce...

In this paper, we present a prenex form theorem for a version of Independence Friendly logic, a logic with imperfect information. Lifting classical results to such logics turns out not to be straightforward, because independence conditions make the formulas sensitive to signalling phenomena. In particular, nested quantification over the same variable is shown to cause problems. For instance, renaming of bound variables may change the interpretations of a formula, there are only restricted quantifier extraction theorems, and slashed connectives cannot be (...) so easily removed. Thus we correct some claims from Hintikka [8], Caicedo & Krynicki [3] and Hodges [11]. We refine definitions, in particular the notion of equivalence, and sharpen preconditions, allowing us to restore those claims, including the prenex form theorem of Caicedo & Krynicki [3], and, as a side result, we obtain an application to Skolem forms of classical formulas. It is a known fact that a complete calculus for IF-logic is impossible, but with our results we establish several quantifier rules that form a partial calculus of equivalence for a general version of IF-logic reflecting general properties of information flow in games. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show how the development of a phenomenology of the lived body is of special interest for a philosophical elucidation of the illness that takes charge of the patient's perspective in its specific theoretical relevance. Starting from a critique of the Cartesian paradigm of the body-machine and the consequent de-emphasis of the personal experience of the disease, it will be shown how the phenomenological perspective allows us to account for the constituent elements of the (...) illness experienced in the first person, such as alteration or disintegration of the link I-body-world-others. Finally, the question of the physical, emotional, and cognitive response to the disease and the way in which phenomenological reflections on the disease converge in a reflection on identity, vulnerability, and recognition will be addressed. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)