In European philosophies of history, the linear paradigm that has prevailed for centuries as a derivative of Christian salvation history (Heilsgeschichte), ultimately lost its monopoly with the arrival of the “post-age.” The result of this has been that ideas that have survived on the margins, even the cyclical interpretation of time attached to religious traditions, now seem capable of outliving the short-lived belief in continuous progress. According to the cyclical view of history, those who came last will leave first, with (...) those who came first leaving as the last adherents of the driving force of Western rationalization. Thus, within a century, beginning with World War 2, a major turning point has been crossed: Socialism was the first to disappear, and it looks like Secular Liberalism will be the next; then Protestantism, followed by Islam, and so forth. As seductive as these images may appear, they only mirror an auto-destructive thread at the very center of Europe’s troubled Geist. But can anything be done to save the most important European values, and specifically, the ethical drive to say “no” to power, which is perhaps the most important legacy of monotheism? Either as a self-limitation from within powerful institutions or as a mode of resistance on the margins of powerful developments—there is a strong adherence to the good (often named God) that helps people and communities survive their diasporic state. I will present this kernel of ethical monotheism by two relatively unknown twentieth-century examples of “diasporic knowledge”: Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (1941), in which she recorded her observations of the devastating effects of empires on Yugoslavia, and two poems by Rosario Castellanos, who decades before the debate on postcolonialism voiced the concerns of displaced indigenous cultures in her Mexican homeland. I suggest that, paradoxically, attention to diasporic voices is one way of realizing the spirit of European self-limitation that is so much needed today to prevent further damage to our societies and environment wrought by the excessive drive for progress fostered by an unethical monorationalism. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEthische Aspekte von Biobanken-basierter Forschung werden zunehmend kontrovers diskutiert. In diesem Artikel wird die Debatte um ethisch angemessene Formen der Einwilligung in Biobanken-basierte Forschung nachgezeichnet. Nach einer Einführung in etablierte Einwilligungsmodelle skizziert der Beitrag kurz die Entwicklung alternativer Ansätze und diskutiert die damit verbundenen ethischen und regulatorischen Herausforderungen. Dabei wird dargestellt, welche ethischen Prinzipien in diesen Diskussionen eine Rolle spielen. Der Beitrag schließt mit einem Ausblick für Deutschland.

The target article “Bounded Justice, Inclusion and the Hyper/Invisibility of Race in Precision Medicine” (Ferryman 2023) raises critical questions about the development of genuinely inclusive, fair...

Through advances in production and treatment technologies, transparent glass has become an increasingly versatile material and a global hallmark of modern architecture. In the shape of invisible barriers, it defines spaces while simultaneously shaping their lighting, noise, and climate conditions. Despite these unique architectural qualities, little is known regarding the human experience with glass barriers. Is a material that has been described as being simultaneously there and not there from an architectural perspective, actually there and/or not there from perceptual, behavioral, (...) and social points of view? In this article, we review systematic observations and experimental studies that explore the impact of transparent barriers on human cognition and action. In doing so, the importance of empirical and multidisciplinary approaches to inform the use of glass in contemporary architecture is highlighted and key questions for future inquiry are identified. (shrink)

It is natural to think that there is a tight connection between whether someone is responsible for some outcome and whether it is appropriate to hold her accountable for that outcome. And this natural thought naturally extends to health: if someone is responsible for her health, then, all else being equal, she is accountable for it. Given this, some have thought that responsibility for health has an important role to play in distributing the benefits and burdens of healthcare. But there (...) is a reason for caution. That health is influenced by social, economic, and environmental factors is a matter of consensus. And some have argued that in light of these social determinants of health, individuals are not typically responsible for their health, rendering inappropriate policies that employ a responsibility‐for‐health criterion. This debate implicates a number of overlapping concepts and questions that are often difficult to pull apart. And I worry that those who maintain that social determinants undermine responsibility for health have latched on to the wrong target. The social determinants of health are relevant to such policies, but, I argue, not by globally undermining responsibility. Rather, social determinants are sometimes responsibility‐undermining, sometimes responsibility‐preserving, and often relevant to whether we should hold individuals accountable for their health regardless of their responsibility. This calls for a more nuanced appraisal of the ways in which the social determinants of health are relevant to such policies. And here I attempt to provide one. (shrink)

Decision-making Capacity matters to whether a patient’s decision should determine her treatment. But why it matters in this way isn’t clear. The standard story is that dmc matters because autonomy matters. And this is thought to justify dmc as a gatekeeper for autonomy – whereby autonomy concerns arise if but only if a patient has dmc. But appeals to autonomy invoke two distinct concerns: concern for authenticity – concern that a choice is consistent with an individual’s commitments; and concern for (...) sovereignty – concern that an individual exercises control over that which is hers to control. Here, I argue, neither concern can alone explain why dmc matters. Instead, dmc matters because it indicates a harmony between the two concerns – the demands of each concern are more likely to agree if a patient has dmc. This vindicates the standard story, but also makes clear that dmc is an inappropriate gatekeeper for autonomy. (shrink)

Legal mobilization in the courts and in political discourse has emerged as an increasingly important strategy of social movements that complements other political approaches. This is true also for women’s movements in post-socialist countries, but most research on strategic litigation has focused so far on common law countries and on supranational litigation in Europe. Using the case of Poland as an example, this article asks why references to the law are so attractive in post-socialist contexts and what can be gained (...) by this with respect to actual rights, justice and social change. It focuses thereby on strategic litigation as the most sophisticated strategy that results from other sustained movement activities connected with the law. It draws on field research, interviews with activists and analyses of primary as well as secondary sources. The article explores the reasons for using the law as the ‘master frame’ by analysing the traditions of gender and law in state socialism and during democratic consolidation. Two examples of strategic litigation, the Tysiąc case for reproductive rights and the ‘Biedronka’ cases for employment rights, are analysed and situated in the context of other legal mobilization activities. These cases set the agenda for crucial social problems and resulted in binding decisions by the courts. A broad and predominantly supportive media discourse was conducive to cultivating public opinion. These analyses support the conclusion that legal mobilization tends to directly influence law and legal practices. It has a socializing effect on the population and their legal consciousness. In aiming at both state and society, these legal strategies of the women’s movement are a modest but crucial success for democratic consolidation. (shrink)

The role and importance of empathy in clinical practice has been widely discussed. This paper focuses on the ideal of clinical empathy, as involving both cognitive understanding and affective resonance. I argue that this account is subject to a number of objections. Affective resonance may serve more as a liability than as a benefit in clinical settings, and utilizing this capacity is not clearly supported by the relevant empirical literature. Instead, I argue that the ideal account of empathy in medicine (...) remains cognitive, though there is a central role for expressing empathic concern toward patients. (shrink)

Decision-making capacity (DMC) plays an important role in clinical practice—determining, on the basis of a patient’s decisional abilities, whether they are entitled to make their own medical decisions or whether a surrogate must be secured to participate in decisions on their behalf. As a result, it’s critical that we get things right—that our conceptual framework be well-suited to the task of helping practitioners systematically sort through the relevant ethical considerations in a way that reliably and transparently delivers correct verdicts about (...) who should and should not have the authority to make their own medical decisions. Unfortunately, however, the standard approach to DMC does not get things right. It is of virtually no help in identifying and clarifying the relevant ethical considerations. And, embedded in the prevailing anti-paternalist paradigm, DMC assessments obfuscate and distort the underlying ethical justification for granting or withholding decisional authority. Here, we describe the core commitments of the standard approach to DMC and then highlight three problems with it. We then argue that these problems are significant enough that they call for more than merely tinkering and fine tuning—variations of the standard approach cannot adequately address them. Instead, we should ditch DMC. (shrink)

There are cases of ineffable learning — i. e., cases where an agent learns something, but becomes certain of nothing that she can express — where it is rational to update by Jeffrey conditionalization. But there are likewise cases of ineffable learning where updating by Jeffrey conditionalization is irrational. In this paper, we first characterize a novel class of cases where it is irrational to update by Jeffrey conditionalization. Then we use the d-separation criterion to develop a causal understanding of (...) when and when not to Jeffrey conditionalize that bars updating by Jeffrey conditionalization in these cases. Finally, we reflect on how the possibility of so-called “unfaithful” causal systems bears on the normative force of the causal updating norm that we advocate. (shrink)

Current national and international guidelines for the ethical design and development of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics emphasize ethical theory. Various governing and advisory bodies have generated sets of broad ethical principles, which institutional decisionmakers are encouraged to apply to particular practical decisions. Although much of this literature examines the ethics of designing and developing AI and robotics, medical institutions typically must make purchase and deployment decisions about technologies that have already been designed and developed. The primary problem facing medical (...) institutions is not one of ethical design but of ethical deployment. The purpose of this paper is to develop a practical model by which medical institutions may make ethical deployment decisions about ready-made advanced technologies. Our slogan is “more process, less principles.” Ethically sound decisionmaking requires that the process by which medical institutions make such decisions include participatory, deliberative, and conservative elements. We argue that our model preserves the strengths of existing frameworks, avoids their shortcomings, and delivers its own moral, practical, and epistemic advantages. (shrink)

Bei Schiller bedeutet Spielen ein Handeln frei von Notwendigkeit und Pflicht und bedeutet dementsprechend das Genießen der Befreiung von der Notwendigkeit. Es ist diese Erfahrung der Freiheit, die das Spiel mit dem ästhetischen Phänomen der Schönheit verbindet und seinen großen erzieherischen Wert ausmacht. Die Eigenschaft, die wir als Schönheit bezeichnen, setzt dieselbe Leichtigkeit des Geistes voraus wie das Spiel. In einem schönen Kunstwerk herrscht weder die Form über den Stoff noch umgekehrt. Ein Kunstwerk ist ein freies Zusammenspiel von Form und (...) Inhalt, von Schönheit und Notwendigkeit, so dass es die höchste Erscheinungsform des Spiels darstellt. Spiele sind Stufen auf dem Weg zur Schönheit, weil sie die Spieler zum Genuss der freien Kreativität erziehen. Im Unterschied zu Schiller verwirft Montessori das Spiel als Erziehungsmittel. Sie behauptet, dass die Kinder arbeiten sollen, um sich ihren eigenen Weg durch die Schwierigkeiten der Realität zu bahnen. Allerdings lassen sich beim näheren Hinsehen in ihren Methoden viele Elemente der Freiheit erkennen, welche Schiller dem Spiel zuschreibt. Beispielsweise können sich die Kinder die Gegenstände aussuchen, mit denen sie „arbeiten” wollen. Sie brauchen sie auch nicht zwingend auf die Art einzusetzen, wie es ihnen die ErzieherInnen vormachen. Und vor allem genießen die Kinder ihre „Arbeit” voll und ganz. In der folgenden Abhandlung erläutert die Autorin zunächst Schillers Gedanken zur Erziehung durch Spiel, insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Phänomen der Phantasie. Im zweiten Teil setzt sich die Autorin mit der Frage auseinander, ob es richtig ist zu behaupten, dass Montessori die Phantasie als Erziehungsmittel ablehnt. (shrink)

Selon Schiller, jouer, c’est agir en étant dégagé de toute contrainte et de toute obligation, et donc tirer grand plaisir de sa liberté par rapport aux nécessités. C’est ce sentiment de liberté rattachant le jeu au phénomčne esthétique de beauté qui fait sa grande valeur éducationnelle. La qualité que nous appelons beauté procure le męme plaisir que le jeu. Dans une belle śuvre d’art, la matičre n’est pas dominée par la forme ou vice-versa. Une śuvre d’art est un jeu libre (...) entre forme et substance, entre beauté et contrainte, et représente de ce fait le summum de l’activité ludique. Les jeux sont des pas sur la voie de la beauté, car ils éduquent ceux qui jouent au plaisir de la liberté de création. Contrairement ŕ la position de Schiller, Maria Montessori rejette le jeu comme moyen d’éducation. Elle pense que les enfants doivent travailler pour trouver leur voie ŕ travers les difficultés de la réalité. Or, l’analyse de ses méthodes révčle la présence de nombreux éléments de la liberté que Schiller attribue au jeu. Les enfants peuvent choisir les choses avec lesquelles ils « travaillent ». Ils ne sont pas obligés de les utiliser exactement de la maničre que l’éducateur leur montre. Et, ce qui est le plus important, les enfants prennent un grand plaisir ŕ exécuter leur « travail ». Dans cet article, l’auteur interprčte d’abord les réflexions de Schiller sur l’éducation ŕ travers le jeu, oů l’accent est mis sur l’imagination. Dans la seconde partie, l’auteur discute la question de savoir s’il est justifié de prétendre que Maria Montessori rejette l’imagination comme moyen d’éducation. (shrink)

In Schiller’s opinion, to play means to act free from the force of need as well as of duty and thus to enjoy liberation from necessity. It is this experience of freedom that links play with the aesthetical phenomenon of beauty and causes its high educational value. The quality that we call beauty represents the same lightness of spirit as the game does. In the beautiful work of art, the material is not dominated by the form or vice versa. The (...) work of art shows a free play between form and matter, between beauty and necessity, and thus represents the highest kind of play. Games are steps on the way to beauty, because they educate the player to enjoy the freedom of creativity. Contrary to Schiller’s position, Montessori refuses play as a means of education. She holds that children have to work in order to find their way in the difficulties of reality. But in studying her methods one realizes that there are many elements of that freedom which Schiller attributes to play. Children can chose the things with which they “work”. They are not forced to use them in exactly the same way that the nurse has shown them. And most important: the children enjoy their “work” thoroughly. In my paper I will first explain Schiller’s thoughts on education by play with special emphasis on the phenomenon of fantasy. In the second part of my paper I will discuss the question whether it is true to say that Montessori refuses fantasy as a means of education. (shrink)

The question of how to treat an incapacitated patient is vexed, both normatively and practically—normatively, because it is not obvious what the relevant objectives are; practically, because even once the relevant objectives are set, it is often difficult to determine which treatment option is best given those objectives. But despite these complications, here is one consideration that is clearly relevant: what a patient prefers. And so any device that could reliably identify a patient’s preferences would be a promising tool for (...) guiding the treatment of incapacitated patients. The patient preference predictor is just such a tool—an algorithm that takes as inputs a patient’s sociodemographic characteristics, and outputs a reliable prediction about that patient’s treatment preferences.1 But some have worried that the use of such a tool would violate or fail to appropriately respect patients’ autonomy. There are, I think, two ways to understand this kind of criticism. First, globally—as a worry that any systematic implementation of the PPP would be problematic on the grounds that it would result in significant or pervasive autonomy violations. Second, locally—as a worry that in some important range of cases, certain uses of the PPP would be problematic on autonomy grounds. Jardas et al, as I read them, address global autonomy-based criticisms, arguing—convincingly, in my view—that there’s no reason to suspect the autonomy concerns raised by the PPP would be so significant and pervasive as to render any implementation of it generally problematic.1 But even with the global criticisms rebuffed, there remains work to be done. Any ethically acceptable implementation of the PPP must be sensitive to the more local autonomy-based criticisms, with restrictions and safeguards in place to ensure respect for autonomy in the kinds of cases in which the use of the PPP might otherwise threaten …. (shrink)

One natural way to argue for the existence of some subjective constraint on agents’ obligations is to maintain that without that particular constraint, agents will sometimes be obligated to do that which they lack the ability to do. In this paper, I maintain that while such a strategy appears promising, it is fraught with pitfalls. Specifically, I argue that because the truth of an ability ascription depends on an (almost always implicit) characterization of the relevant possibility space, different metaethical accounts (...) take obligation to be constrained by different senses of ability. As a result, what initially looks to be a point of consensus—that ability constrains obligation—turns out to be a point of contention, and arguments with this at the foundation are much more likely to obscure, rather than resolve, metaethical disputes. Despite this, appeals to ability in metaethics aren’t doomed to be fruitless. On the contrary, if we can independently establish a particular sense of ability as the normatively relevant one, then we have good grounds for ruling out metaethical accounts that are inconsistent with it. In the final section, I make just such an argument. What seems right about the thought that ability constrains obligation is that an agent cannot be obligated to do that which her circumstances prevent her from doing. I argue that only a sense of ability that is both epistemically and motivationally restricted adequately respects the limits of agential control. (shrink)

Affective empathy has been variously characterized. First, I argue that we have reasons to prefer a narrower account of affective empathy, which requires the cognitive mechanisms of perspective-taking. Second, I mount a challenge to the standard account of affective matching thought to be required for affective empathy. On one widely held view, affective empathy requires an actual affective match between the subject and the target of empathy. I reject this view. While empathy often involves an actual match, we also count (...) as empathizing with the target if we share the fitting state in their situation. This wider account better captures a number of plausible cases of empathy, and it also better explains why we care about affective empathy. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 2 Seiten: 773-777.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 357-360.

Marshall et al. (2024) persuasively argue that some patients with opiate use disorder (OUD), who refuse observation after naloxone resuscitation in the emergency department (ED), “may be making non...

The German-Jewish philosophers Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig, have - both in their own ways - produced systems of philosophy at a time that was supposed to be the time after systems. With their respective systems they - both in their own ways - transcended the apologetic stance of Jewish thought by placing the Jewishness of their thinking at a methodologically central point for?general philosophy.? However, the link between Cohen?s system and the Star of Redemption, is hard to find. Looking (...) back from the perspective of a?return of religion? in late twentieth century, the essay proposes to see the link between both systems in Cohen?s notion of compassion. Nemacko-jevrejski filozofi Herman Koen i Franc Rozencvajg su - svaki na svoj nacin - produkovali sisteme filozofije u vremenu koje je trebalo da vazi kao vreme posle sistema. Svojim sistemima su - takodje svaki na svoj nacin, prevazilazili apologetsko stanoviste jevrejske misli uspostavljajuci jevrejstvo svoje misli kao centralnu metodsku tacku?opste filozofije?. Medjutim, tesko je naci vezu izmedju Koenovog sistema i Zvezde iskupljenja. Gledajuci unazad, iz perspektive?povratka religije? u kasnom dvadesetom veku, rad pokusava da nedje vezu izmedju pomenuta dva sistema u Koenovom pojmu saosecanja. (shrink)

English summary: The messianic has always been a problem between the monotheistic religions. Not only did it divide Jews and Christians, it also caused divisions among Jews and among Christians as well. In the 20th century, philosophers and political leaders attached increasing importance to it in a more secular form. The authors of the articles collected in this volume deal with the subject of messianism in the 20th century in various contexts. The articles are written from the standpoint of different (...) disciplines and provide a multifaceted perspective of a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon that deserves further research. German description: Die Verhaltnisse von religiosen und sakularen Ordnungen stehen neu zur Debatte. Sah es lange so aus, als wurden die sakularen Ordnungen sich nach und nach gegen die religiosen durchsetzen, so hat sich dieses Bild entschieden verkehrt: Die neue Hinwendung zu Religionen ist ein politisch relevantes Thema geworden. Das Phanomen des Messianismus hat in allen Umbruchzeiten eine schillernde Zwischenstellung gehalten. So konnten einerseits die christlichen Theologien von aussen als der Versuch beschrieben werden, einen durch seinen Tod den meisten als afalsch erwiesenen Messias zum richtigen Messias umzudeuten. Die rabbinische Bewegung kann demgegenuber in ihrer Weigerung, diese Umdeutung mitzuvollziehen, als die Kraft bezeichnet werden, die einen anderen Begriff vom Messias in Kontradistinktion zum christlichen entwickelte. Drittens spielt das Messianische innerhalb der Religionen in den Gegenbewegungen zu den grossen religiosen Instituten eine wieder andere Rolle: In dem Masse, in dem die aufgeklarte Welt nicht mehr gegen eine starke Kirche opponieren musste, sondern selbst ihr astahlernes Gehause errichtet hatte, wurde adas Messianische gerade fur Philosophen zu einer Kraft, die als Garant fur das Unbestimmbare der Zukunft mehr oder weniger deutlich bestimmt wurde. Die Autoren der hier gesammelten Beitrage befassen sich in verschiedenen Kontexten mit dem Thema Messianismus im 20. Jahrhundert. (shrink)

Over the past few years, even before the Brexit campaign and the outcome of the 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom, Europe has been haunted by the spectre of an impending split and disintegration of the Union. Self-appointed “kings” and “philosophers” of greater Europe seem to have been competing for the “unity award,” with more and more of them failing dramatically. One indicator of the public alarm at the prospect of the Union’s split is the exaggerated use of the word (...) “unity” and its cognates. But can the rhetoric of unity act as a cure for the disease? This essay suggests that, ironically, the constant use of organic metaphors and invocations of European unity seems to be paving the way for—rather than preventing—the rise of neo-authoritarian forces. (shrink)

In this paper, we raise and discuss a puzzle about the relationships among goods, reasons, and deontic status. Suppose you have it within your power to give someone something they would enjoy. The following claims seem platitudinous: you can use this power to reward whatever kind of option you want, thereby making that option better and generating a reason for that person to perform it; this reason is then weighed alongside and against the other reasons at play; and altogether, the (...) reasons determine the deontic statuses of that person’s options. We show, however, that in a certain class of cases at least one of these apparent platitudes must be false. In particular, we show that in a certain kind of case wrongfulness cannot be rewarded. In some cases, if one tries to reward wrongfulness, something surprising must go awry: either what you attempt to give as a reward would not, in fact, be good, or it would not generate a reason, or it would have a surprising effect on the deontic status of the relevant options. The upshot is that the relationships among goods, reasons, and deontic status are complicated in ways that have not previously been remarked. (shrink)

As costs decline and technology inevitably improves, current trends suggest that artificial intelligence (AI) and a variety of "carebots" will increasingly be adopted in medical care. Medical ethicists have long expressed concerns that such technologies remove the human element from medicine, resulting in dehumanization and depersonalized care. However, we argue that where shame presents a barrier to medical care, it is sometimes ethically permissible and even desirable to deploy AI/carebots because (i) dehumanization in medicine is not always morally wrong, and (...) (ii) dehumanization can sometimes better promote and protect important medical values. Shame is often a consequence of the human-to-human element of medical care and can prevent patients from seeking treatment and from disclosing important information to their healthcare provider. Conditions and treatments that are shame-inducing offer opportunities for introducing AI/carebots in a manner that removes the human element of medicine but does so ethically. We outline numerous examples of shame-inducing interactions and how they are overcome by implementing existing and expected developments of AI/carebot technology that remove the human element from care. (shrink)

This article addresses ethical concerns with the use of electronic health records (EHRs) by physicians in clinical practice. It presents arguments for two claims. First, requiring physicians to maintain patient EHRs for medically unnecessary tasks is likely contributing to increased burnout, decreased quality of care, and potential risks to patient safety. Second, medical institutions have ethical reasons to employ medical scribes to maintain patient EHRs. Finally, this article reviews central objections to employing medical scribes and provides responses to each.

Navin, Brummett, and Wasserman (2022) argue—successfully, we think—that the standard “comparative” account of decision-making capacity (DMC) fails to capture an important range of cases in which a...