During spring of 2020, environmental ethics students at a medium sized metropolitan university in the Southeastern United States were asked to read and comment on classic essays from Robert Heilbroner and Garrett Hardin, essays regarding our responsibilities towards future generations. In general, students seemed to hold more with Heilbroner’s stance, which left room for compassion, while condemning Hardin’s harshness. Students were then asked to provide written responses stating whether they would personally sacrifice their eventual retirement in order to stop COVID-19 (...) and the reasons for their views. Responses were analyzed and categorized to detect inconsistencies between students’ described views and their willingness to personally sacrifice for the sake of others. Almost 72% of respondents asserted that they would be willing to intervene to stop the novel coronavirus by sacrificing their retirement. A fair number of respondents that stated they would sacrifice said that they would do so because they would benefit personally from the avoidance of guilt and/or from the opportunity to feel good about themselves, suggesting that even seemingly selfless behaviors are sometimes driven by egoistic motivations. Forty percent of all respondents held inconsistent views. Most notably, a number of students condemned Hardin for his lack of compassion, yet were not willing to act compassionately themselves. (shrink)

When a debate is misplaced, new problems are cast in the distorting language of the settled problems of the past while, at the same time, the participants in the debate are assimilated into communities of thought with which they have little in common. The result is that their work, and our response to it, is distorted. This article contends that the polemical debate between James Gustafson (and his followers) and Stanley Hauerwas (and his followers) is just such a misplaced debate. (...) In fact, both can be shown to be Troeltschian historicists, and it is only when this commonality is recognized that their very real and deep differences can be rightly appreciated as emblematic of the true sources of disagreement at the growing edge of the discipline. (shrink)

The issue of genetic inheritance, and particularly the contradictory rights of donors, recipients and donor offspring as to the disclosure of donor identities, is ethically complicated. Donors, donor offspring and parents of donor offspring may appeal to individual rights for confidentiality or disclosure within legal systems based on liberal rights discourse. This paper explores the ethical issues of non-disclosure of genetic inheritance by contrasting two principle models used to articulate the problem—liberal and communitarian ethical models. It argues that whilst the (...) latter provides a more constructive avenue to providing an ethics for donation than the competing and contradictory positions represented in a liberal rights approach, it raises issues of ethical judgement and authority that remain problematic. This ethical discussion is supported by a field study, funded by the Wellcome Trust, exploring the perceptions and experiences of recipients of donor sperm and their partners towards donor anonymity. The field study provides the empirical basis of an argument for making ethical judgements on the grounds of the community good rather than individual rights, that nevertheless recognises that both are inherently problematic. (shrink)

This article is currently available as a free download on ingentaconnect.

This collection investigates the current state of play in studies informed by Marxism. It includes a magisterial essay on state theory by Bob Jessop, a discussion of fundamental socialist values using analytical Marxism by Alan Carling, an introduction to Fromm's humanist Marxism by Lawrence Wilde, and provocative pieces on Marxism and ecology, Marxism and feminism, the debate between Marxists and post-Marxists, the democratic Marxism of Hal Draper, the confrontation between Marxism and Liberalism, and Marxism's place in the history of political (...) thought. (shrink)

Although Thomas Aquinas assumes that all knowledge begins in the senses, he maintains that substantial forms and the essences of material things are not apparent to the senses. Clearly, the noetic of abstraction per se cannot account for our knowledge of them. Thomas often says that they are “unknown in themselves” but “become known” through their accidents. The author argues that properties, or proper accidents — namely, accidents that are interconvertible with a subject — play a crucial role in this (...) obscure area of Thomas’s thought. Beginning with an examination of the property in logic , the author goes on to examine Thomas’s accounts of heat as a property of fire, and the powers of the soul as properties of its essence. Thomas maintains that such properties flow from the essence by a causal relation that he calls resultatio, but that their coexistence with the essence is absolutely necessary in a quasi-logical manner . Finally, the author suggests that in Thomas’s view, accidents really do make the hidden quiddities of their subjects known: knowing created things through their accidents is not at all like knowing God through creatures. (shrink)

To better illuminate aspects of stress that are relevant to the moral domain, we present a definition and theoretical model of “moral stress.” Our definition posits that moral stress is a psychological state born of an individual’s uncertainty about his or her ability to fulfill relevant moral obligations. This definition assumes a self-and-others relational basis for moral stress. Accordingly, our model draws from a theory of the self (identity theory) and a theory of others (stakeholder theory) to suggest that this (...) uncertainty arises as a manager faces competing claims for limited resources from multiple stakeholders and/or across multiple role identities. We further propose that the extent to which the manager is attentive to the moral aspects of the claims (i.e., moral attentiveness) moderates these effects. We identify several consequences of managerial moral stress and discuss theoretical, empirical, and practical implications of our approach. Most importantly, we argue that this work paves an important path for considering stress through the lens of morality. (shrink)

This book taps the best American thinkers to answer the essential American question: How do we sustain our experiment in government of, by, and for the people? Authored by an extraordinary and politically diverse roster of public officials, scholars, and educators, these chapters describe our nation's civic education problem, assess its causes, offer an agenda for reform, and explain the high stakes at risk if we fail.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States housed 2.3 million inmates in 7,147 incarceration structures that, because of age, overcrowding, and poor ventilation, exacerbated the spread of airborne infections. The flow of individuals into and out of correctional facilities compounded the challenges in keeping them COVID-free. This article focuses on the work of the health and administrative leadership, in partnership with judicial and police personnel, to prevent COVID-19 inside the Albemarle-Charlottesville Regional Jail and to mitigate its spread when the (...) jail population and/or its staff became infected. From the onset, implementing science-based policies and upholding the human right to health and healthcare for all were priorities. (shrink)

We present a Hilbert style axiomatisation for the set of formulas in the temporal language with F and P which are valid over non-transitive cyclical flows of time. We also give a simpler axiomatisation using the slightly controversial 'irreflexivity rule' and go on to prove the decidability of any temporal logic over cyclical time provided it uses only connectives with first-order tables.

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p , or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p . However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make (...) it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action. (shrink)

La première édition de cet impressionnant ouvrage (885 pages) est parue en 1997 : Mathilde Dubesset en a fait le compte-rendu pour Clio (n° 7, 1998, p. 254-256). Sa réussite a provoqué des versions américaine et espagnole, et la nouvelle édition en a tenu compte pour réaliser une réactualisation profonde. Une nouvelle génération de chercheurs/ses et d’étudiant(e)s va donc découvrir ce recueil déjà très riche mais qui a été élargi et remis à jour. Ne sous-estimons pas l’énorme travail qui con...

This paper discusses Plato’s question from the Meno : Why should we prefer knowledge that p over mere true belief that p? I find I just do prefer knowledge, and not for any further benefit that I am aware of in the particular case. But I should have that preference, because given our practice of approving of testimony only if uttered with knowledge, I could fail to prefer knowledge, when other things seem to me to be equal, only by having (...) the sorts of serious social or psychological defects that would make me unresponsive to the approval of others. Finally, the social practice that produces this particular preference is good for all of us because it improves the average quality of the testimony we receive, which results in greater success in our projects. (shrink)

BackgroundThere is increasing need for peer reviewers as the scientific literature grows. Formal education in biostatistics and research methodology during residency training is lacking. In this pilot study, we addressed these issues by evaluating a novel method of teaching residents about biostatistics and research methodology using peer review of standardized manuscripts. We hypothesized that mentored peer review would improve resident knowledge and perception of these concepts more than non-mentored peer review, while improving review quality.MethodsA partially blinded, randomized, controlled multi-center study (...) was performed. Seventy-eight neurology residents from nine US neurology programs were randomized to receive mentoring from a local faculty member or not. Within a year, residents reviewed a baseline manuscript and four subsequent manuscripts, all with introduced errors designed to teach fundamental review concepts. In the mentored group, mentors discussed completed reviews with residents. Primary outcome measure was change in knowledge score between pre- and post-tests, measuring epidemiology and biostatistics knowledge. Secondary outcome measures included level of confidence in the use and interpretation of statistical concepts before and after intervention, and RQI score for baseline and final manuscripts.ResultsSixty-four residents (82%) completed initial review with gradual decline in completion on subsequent reviews. Change in primary outcome, the difference between pre- and post-test knowledge scores, did not differ between mentored (−8.5%) and non-mentored (−13.9%) residents (p = 0.48). Significant differences in secondary outcomes (using 5-point Likert scale, 5 = strongly agree) included mentored residents reporting enhanced understanding of research methodology (3.69 vs 2.61; p = 0.001), understanding of manuscripts (3.73 vs 2.87; p = 0.006), and application of study results to clinical practice (3.65 vs 2.78; p = 0.005) compared to non-mentored residents. There was no difference between groups in level of interest in peer review (3.00 vs 3.09; p = 0.72) or the quality of manuscript review assessed by the Review Quality Instrument (RQI) (3.25 vs 3.06; p = 0.50).ConclusionsWe used mentored peer review of standardized manuscripts to teach biostatistics and research methodology and introduce the peer review process to residents. Though knowledge level did not change, mentored residents had enhanced perception in their abilities to understand research methodology and manuscripts and apply study results to clinical practice. (shrink)

ObjectiveAre people with a characteristically large physiological sway rendered particularly unstable when standing on a moving surface? Is postural sway in standing individuals idiosyncratic? In this study, we examine postural sway in individuals standing normally, and when subtle continuous sinusoidal disturbances are applied to their support platform. We calculate consistency between conditions to verify if sway can be considered characteristic of each individual. We also correlate two different aspects of participants’ responses to disturbance; their sway velocity and their regulation of (...) body orientation.MethodsNineteen healthy adults (age 29.2 ± 3.2 years) stood freely on footplates coaxially aligned with their ankles and attached to a motorized platform. They had their eyes closed, and hips and knees locked with a light wooden board attached to their body. Participants either stood quietly on a fixed platform or on a slowly tilting platform (0.1 Hz sinusoid; 0.2 and 0.4 deg). Postural sway size was separated into two entities: (1) the spontaneous sway velocity component (natural random relatively rapid postural adjustments, RMS body angular velocity) and (2) the evoked tilt gain component (much slower 0.1 Hz synchronous tilt induced by the movement of the platform, measured as peak-to-peak (p-p) gain, ratio of body angle to applied footplate rotation).ResultsThere was no correlation between the velocity of an individual’s sway and their evoked tilt gain (r= 0.34,p= 0.15 andr= 0.30,p= 0.22). However, when considered separately, each of the two measurements showed fair to good absolute agreement within conditions. Spontaneous sway velocity consistently increased as participants were subjected to increasing disturbance. Participants who swayed more (or less) did so across all conditions [ICC(3,k)= 0.95]. Evoked tilt gain also showed consistency between conditions [ICC(3,k)= 0.79], but decreased from least to most disturbed conditions.ConclusionThe two measurements remain consistent between conditions. Consistency between conditions of two very distinct unrelated measurements reflects the idiosyncratic nature of postural sway. However, sway velocity and tilt gain are not related, which supports the idea that the short-term regulation of stability and the longer-term regulation of orientation are controlled by different processes. (shrink)

This article considers two of the methodological steps in a Community of Philosophical Enquiry: developing the questions and voting on the questions. Both of these practices are enacted by the 8-9 year old children who are the participants in a philosophical enquiry, which I facilitated at a government primary school in South Africa. Matthews (1994) reminds us that children as philosophical thinkers/doers have been left out of the dominant narratives about children and childhood. A question that guides this research is (...) where is the place for philosophical questions (developed by children) and the kind of philosophical thinking/drawing/creating/being for child (and adults) in schools? How do we make space for such questioning–so that the richness of these pedagogical encounters can really matter and make a difference to the teaching and learning taking place? Gandorfer in an interview with Barad (2021), suggests that critical thought “is to encounter what is unrecognizable and imperceptible, yet sensible and constructive of sense without separating it from the physical world” (p. 20). I would agree and apply this to the critical thoughts of child. This thinking is not located in the child, in their mind and does not emerge only through the thoughts, child verbalises. A critical posthumanism theory/practice analysis ensures that as researcher, I do not stand outside of the research peering in at a distance. Similarly the children, the questions, the voting and the enquiries are not separate from the world, they are all already entangled with the world. When the children are voting on the questions, this performs as a pedagogy of interruption (Michaud, 2020). As the facilitator, I do not know which question will receive the largest number of votes for the philosophical enquiry. This makes possible an emergent curriculum in its be(com)ing. Toby Rollo’s (2016) formulations about child as political agent and not just moral agent and the implications for more democratic and just schooling are theorised in this paper through the act of the children voting on the questions. I argue that children are not just excluded from participating in decisions about what and even how they are learning at school but from most pedagogical practices in classrooms and schools. I show how the children creating the questions and voting on the questions can be democratic practices with political and moral implications in a community of philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

« Premier achat de notre nouveau couple : un tandem rouge, magnifique. Je l’ai encore. » Il n’est pas étonnant que Louis-Pascal Jacquemond ait reproduit (p. 305) ce témoignage d’une femme ayant vécu 1936, ni que Michelle Zancarini-Fournel l’ait mis en exergue de sa préface à ce « panorama » sur la question des femmes à l’époque du Front populaire. Cela correspond si bien aux images de « l’embellie » célébrée par Léon Blum, ou de « l’euphorie » citée par (...) ce témoin, Marie-Françoise Spannente :... (shrink)

Margaret Reynolds: The Child in Poetry Ken Binmore: The Origins of Fair Play James Simpson: Bonjour Paresse: Waste and Recycling in Book 4 of Gower's Confessio Amantis Ian Hacking: Kinds of People: Moving Targets Adam Smith: Nation and Covenant: The Contribution of Ancient Israel to Modern Nationalism Louise Daston: The Marquis de Condorcet and the Meaning of Enlightenment R J Evans: Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany Robert Douglas-Fairhurst: A E Housman's Rejected Addresses Bernard Bailyn: The Search for Perfection: (...) Atlantic Dimensions John Stachel: Einstein; Ian Donaldson, Shakespeare, Jonson and the Invention of the Author Neil MacCormick: Judicial Independence: Who Cares? Norman Hammond: Recovering Maya Civilisation Roy Foster: 'Now Shall I Make My Soul': Approaching Death in Yeats's Life and Work Robert Darnton: The Devil in the Holy Water: Political Libel in Eighteenth-Century France. (shrink)

Over the past 50 years, academic-industrial collaborations and technology transfer have played an increasingly prominent role in the biomedical sciences. These relationships can speed the delivery of innovative drugs and medical technologies to clinical practice, creating important public health benefits as well as income for universities and their faculty. At the same time, they raise ethical concerns, particularly when research involves human subjects in clinical trials. Lapses in oversight of industry sponsored clinical trials at universities, and especially patient deaths in (...) a number of trials, have brought these issues into the public spotlight and have led the federal government to intensify its oversight of clinical research. The leadership of Harvard Medical School convened a group of leaders in academic medicine to formulate guidelines on individual financial conflicts of interest. They and other groups are working to formulate a national consensus on this issue. (shrink)

In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic, those that are given are also strangely implausible. They usually assert one of two things: that the War had little or no philosophical significance because most of the major developments had already begun, or—at the opposite extreme—they maintain that nothing was ever the (...) same in philosophy (as elsewhere). On the latter view, the creation of the so-called analytic-continental ‘divide’ is but one notable philosophical consequence of the Great War. I want here to steer a middle-way between these positions, both having a grain of truth but over-playing their respective hands. (shrink)

This paper examines voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting as a form of moral discourse. It explores how alternative stakeholder perspectives lead to differing perceptions of the process and content of responsible reporting. We contrast traditional stakeholder theory, which views stakeholders as external parties having a social contract with corporations, with an emerging perspective, which views interaction among corporations and constituents as relational in nature. This moves the stakeholder from an external entity to one that is integral to corporate activity. (...) We explore how these alternative stakeholder perspectives give rise to different normative demands for stakeholder engagement, managerial processes, and communication. We discuss models of CSR reporting and accountability: EMAS, the ISO 14000 series, SA8000, AA1000, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Copenhagen Charter. We explore how these models relate to the stakeholder philosophies and find that they are largely consistent with the traditional atomistic view but fall far short of the demands for moral engagement prescribed by a relational stakeholder perspective. Adopting a relational view requires stakeholder engagement not only in prescribing reporting requirements, but also in discourse relating to core aspects of the corporation such as mission, values, and management systems. Habermas’ theory of communicative action provides guidelines for engaging stakeholders in this moral discourse. (shrink)

"The book as a whole seeks to reinvigorate an academic discipline (philosophy of religion) which has fallen on hard times, and to do so by building a bridge between philosophy and empirical-historical studies of religion. The topic is both significant and timely. Too long the empiricists have been inadequately sophisticated philosophically and too long the philosophers have ignored historical data both in its breadth and depth. In not only calling for bridges between these disciplines, but actually building some, the work (...) makes a significant contribution to both." -- Alan Miller "This book is useful because it provides some insights both into the ways scholars think about various aspects of religious behavior, and also information about important features of such behavior. Both myth and philosophy are topics of great significance, and have been discussed by many philosophers and historians of religions and some anthropologists. An interesting set of questions about the nature of religion, and nature of philosophy and their relationships (and also about the nature of myth and its relationship to philosophy) is emerging at the forefront of academic discussions in departments of religion, departments of philosophy, and departments of anthropology. It contains some well-written and conceptually interesting essays." -- E. Thomas Lawson. (shrink)

We give a sound and complete axiomatization for the full computation tree logic, CTL*, of R-generable models. This solves a long standing open problem in branching time temporal logic.

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.