English translation by Kneller and Losonsky of Klaus Reich, Die Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel -/- "This classic of Kant scholarship, whose first edition appeared in 1932, deals with one of the most controversial and difficult topics in the Critique of Pure Reason: Kant's table of judgments and their connection to the table of categories. Kant's attempt to derive the latter from the former is called the "Metaphysical Deduction," and it paves the way for the Transcendental Deduction that is (...) universally recognized as the heart of the Critique." "Many commentators have passed over the Metaphysical Deduction in silence, as if embarrassed by Kant's fatuity, and his critics are almost unanimous in finding its premise ungrounded, its argument incorrect, and its conclusion false. At the heart of the failure of the Metaphysical Deduction, it is alleged, is Kant's inability to justify the table of the forms of judgment. Critics argue that Kant simply took these forms of judgment from the logic textbooks of his day and doctored them so as to yield the required categories. Such objections were current even in Kant's time; they were repeated by Hegel, and are commonplaces of Kant criticism today." "This book is the fullest and most systematic evaluation ever made of the Metaphysical Deduction. Reich argues that its principal conclusion is correct even though Kant failed to establish it in the Metaphysical Deduction proper, and he defends the conclusion by using Kant material far removed from the text of the Metaphysical Deduction, notes by Kant that only became available in the 1920's and that remain even now untranslated into English. With the publication of this translation for English-speaking Kant scholars, a neglected and impugned part of the Critique of Pure Reason can finally receive the attention it deserves."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

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Der frühe Dialog (ca. 399 v. Chr.) gibt eine erste Einführung in die Anfangsgründe der "Ideenlehre" Platons; und zwar durch den Aufweis, daß moralische Urteile und alle Praxis erst daraus Geltung erlangen, daß sie auf wirkliches, allgemeinverbindliches Wissen gegründet sind.

7 Klaus Hansen Feindberiihrungen mit versohnlichem Ausgang Carl Schmitt und der Liberalismus Das Ende des "Dritten Reiches" liegt iiber 40 Jahre zuruck. Noch immer hiilt sich eine ganze Gesellschaft, die es "nicht fertiggebracht hat, eine andere Geschichte hervorzubringen" (Jean Baudrillard), durch die nachgetragene Kritik und Schuldfeststellung ihrer Meisterdenker schadlos. Der "Nazi-Philosoph" Martin Heidegger beherrscht die feuilletonistische Hermeneutik der Jahreswende 1987 / 88; der "Nazi-Jurist" Carl Schmitt war von 1945 bis zu seinem Tode, 40 Jahre spiiter, immer wieder Gegenstand poli­ (...) tologischer und politi scher Verdammungsverdikte. Wer sich auf Carl Schmitt einliillt, begibt sich in einen Irrgarten, der emp­ fanglichen Gemiitern ein Faszinosum fUr sich ist. Die Beitriige von Sombart, Altmann und Thcker im vorliegenden Buch versuchen, dieser Schmitt'schen Attraktion auf die Spur zu kommen - und stellen dabei mehr Forschungsdesi­ derate als gesicherte Erkenntnisse fest. Vor allem aber geht es in dies em Buch darum, Carl Schmitt die Gerechtig­ keit einer angemessenen Auseinandersetzung widerfahren zu lassen. Freilich nicht dem "ganzen" Carl Schmitt, aber doch jenen Aspekten seines Werkes, die sich mit der Kritik des Liberalismus befassen. Carl Schmitt kritisiert den Liberalismus aus der Position eines Anti-Libera­ len, die sich in vierfacher Umschreibung skizzieren liillt. Der Anti-Liberalismus Schmitts ruhrt 1. von der anthropologischen Grundauffassung her. In der Tradition von Ma­ chiavelli und Hobbes stehend, sieht Schmitt den Menschen als "bose" und "gefahrlich" an. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungBei der Durchsicht des Nachlasses von Rudolf Tomaschek fand ich ein 30 Seiten umfassendes Typoskript seines damaligen Assistenten Hugo Watzlawek aus dem Jahr 1944 mit dem Titel „Interatomare Energie“. Heute würde man eher von „inneratomarer Energie“, oder von „Kernenergie“ sprechen, da der Inhalt des Typoskripts „technische Kernphysik“ einschließlich ihrer potentiellen militärischen Anwendungen betrifft. Der Text bietet einen ungefilterten, erstaunlich kenntnisreichen, aber in vielem auch erschreckenden Einblick in die technokratische Gedankenwelt sowie den Wissensstand und Anwendungshorizont eines „technischen Kernphysikers“ im „Dritten (...) class='Hi'>Reich“, der unter Verweis auf konkurrierende amerikanische Forschungen 1944 nachdrücklich um weitere Mittel für kernphysikalische und -technische Forschung sowie für die Entwicklung von Kernwaffen bittet. Der vorliegende Aufsatz kommentiert und kontextualisiert das Typoskript; meine ebenfalls online gestellte annotierte Transkription des Typoskriptes bietet ungekürzten Zugang zum Originaltext samt knapper, für dessen Verständnis notwendiger historischer und technischer Erläuterungen.Among the papers of Rudolf Tomaschek I discovered a 30-page typescript from 1944 by his then assistant Hugo Watzlawek entitled “Interatomare Energie”. Nowadays one would rather say ‘inneratomic energy’ or ‘nuclear energy’ since the typescript treats issues of nuclear engineering including its potential military uses. It presents an unfiltered, surprisingly informed view into the technocratic mindset, state of knowledge and application horizon of a “technical nuclear physicist” in the Third Reich. Watzlawek in 1944 urgently petitions for more funding for research in nuclear physics and technology, citing analogous research underway in America. The present paper places the typescript within its historical and technical context. My succinctly annotated transcription of the original text—also made freely available online—provides full accessibility to this document. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungBei der Durchsicht des Nachlasses von Rudolf Tomaschek (1895–1966) fand ich ein 30 Seiten umfassendes Typoskript seines damaligen Assistenten Hugo Watzlawek (1912–1995) aus dem Jahr 1944 mit dem Titel „Interatomare Energie“. Heute würde man eher von „inneratomarer Energie“, oder von „Kernenergie“ sprechen, da der Inhalt des Typoskripts „technische Kernphysik“ einschließlich ihrer potentiellen militärischen Anwendungen betrifft. Der Text bietet einen ungefilterten, erstaunlich kenntnisreichen, aber in vielem auch erschreckenden Einblick in die technokratische Gedankenwelt sowie den Wissensstand und Anwendungshorizont eines „technischen Kernphysikers“ im (...) „Dritten Reich“, der unter Verweis auf konkurrierende amerikanische Forschungen 1944 nachdrücklich um weitere Mittel für kernphysikalische und -technische Forschung sowie für die Entwicklung von Kernwaffen bittet. Der vorliegende Aufsatz kommentiert und kontextualisiert das Typoskript; meine ebenfalls online gestellte annotierte Transkription des Typoskriptes bietet ungekürzten Zugang zum Originaltext samt knapper, für dessen Verständnis notwendiger historischer und technischer Erläuterungen. (shrink)

Dieser abschliessende Band der Bockmühl-Werkausgabe präsentiert 16 Aufsätze zur Grundlegung evangelischer Ethik: Von der Frage der biblischen Grundlage evangelischer Ethik, der theologischen Bewertung der Situationsethik bis hin zum Verhältnis von Reich Gottes und Humanismaus und der Auseinandersetzung mit der Ethik des Marxismus. Die Aufsätze bauen auf den biblischen und reformatorischen Grundlagen auf, versuchen aber auch, in ökumenischer Offenheit den Herausforderungen der nachchristlichen Gegenwart gerecht zu werden. Der Band veranschaulicht eindrucksvoll Bockmühls lebenslanges Bemühen, eine konsequent biblische Ethik darzulegen, auch wenn (...) diese dem Mainstream der zeitgenössischen protestantischen Ethik widerspricht oder sogar zur Modifikation und Korrektur reformatorischer Ethik nötigt. (shrink)

Mit den „Bruchstücken“ legt der Nestor der deutschen Politikwissenschaft seine Erinnerungen an ein „vergleichsweise undramatisches“ Leben vor, das dennoch reich an Geschichte, Begegnungen und Erfahrungen ist. Kindheit in Schlesien, Vertreibung und Flucht in den Westen, nach dem Krieg Buchhändlerlehre sind die ersten Schritte auf einem Weg, der rasch in die Wissenschaft führt. Die Stationen seines wissenschaftlichen Werdegangs markieren exemplarisch den Aufstieg der noch jungen Politikwissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik. Der Leser lernt in diesem Buch einen weltoffenen, weltklugen und vielseitig interessierten (...) Wissenschaftler kennen und wird beschenkt mit einem reichen Schatz an Anekdoten aus unzähligen Reisen, Politik und Wissenschaft. (shrink)

This is a précis of a forthcoming book which expounds and defends Kant's claim to the derivation of the categories from the principle of apperception in the vein of Klaus Reich.

: In the first edition of his book on the completeness of Kant’s table of judgments, Klaus Reich shortly indicates that the B-version of the metaphysical exposition of space in the Critique of pure reason is structured following the inverse order of the table of categories. In this paper, I develop Reich’s claim and provide further evidence for it. My argumentation is as follows: Through analysis of our actually given representation of space as some kind of object, (...) the metaphysical exposition will show that this representation is secondary to space considered as an original, undetermined and as such unrepresentable intuitive manifold. Now, following Kant, the representation of any kind of object involves diversity, synthesis and unity. In the case of our representation of space as formal intuition, this involves, firstly, a manifold a priori, i.e. space as pure form, delivered by the transcendental Aesthetic, secondly, a figurative, productive synthesis of that manifold, and, thirdly, the unity provided by the categories. Analysing our given representation of space – the task of the metaphysical exposition – amounts to dismantling its unity and determine its characteristics with respect to the categories. (shrink)

Klaus Mann (1906–1949) belonged to generation influenced by the two World Wars, burgeoning communism, and rising nationalism. Political component in his work is very strongly articulated not only in novels and essays, but also in autobiographical work. This emphasises his fascination in times he lived, but most of all it expresses his own involvement in fighting the evil which in his eyes were represented by Hitler and Nazism. In Mann’s eyes communism was not solely represented as a political system, (...) but rather an ally in his personal crusade. In the literature there is often a question asked whether Klaus Mann was a communist or an ideologist whose majority of opinions were in line with ideological assumptions and values of the communist system. Despite clear declarations of the author himself, it is worth to look into his inner development: from fascination through growing distance and eventually disappointment which resulted in detaching himself from the communist ideas. (shrink)

In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph “The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments” made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. -/- Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean (...) to derive the functions of judgement, and accordingly the categories, from the principle of apperception. Schulting challenges this standard view and aims to resuscitate the main motivation behind Reich’s project. He argues, in agreement with Reich’s main thesis about the derivability of the functions of judgement, that Kant indeed does mean to derive, in full a priori fashion, the categories from the principle of apperception. -/- Schulting also shows that, given the general assumptions of the Critical philosophy, Kant's derivation is successful and that absent an account of the derivation of the categories from apperception, the B-Deduction cannot really be understood. -/- New edition. First published 2012 as „Kant’s Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories" (Palgrave Macmillan). (shrink)

Dieser Band versammelt (in vielen Fällen schwer zugängliche oder gänzlich unveröffentlichte) Vorträge, Aufsätze und Artikel von Manfred Baum zur theoretischen Philosophie Kants und zu ihrer Rezeption. Es handelt sich um historische und systematisch orientierte Studien zur kritischen Philosophie Kants, die die Forschungen von Julius Ebbinghaus und Klaus Reich fortführen.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Concepts, Judgments, and Unity in Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the Relational Categories CHARLES NUSSBAUM 1. INTRODUCTION TO ANY ATTENTIVEREADERof the section of the Critique of Pure Reason' known as the "Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories" (A67/B92-A83/B to9), one paragraph in that section stands out particularly by virtue of its special importance for Kant's developing argument: The same function Which gives unity to the various representations in ajudgment also gives (...) unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general.... (CPR A79/B loS) The importance of this paragraph is, however, more than equaled by its difficulties, which center on the question of how the function which operates by means of analytical unity can be the same as one that operates by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general. Put shortly, the problem is this. If the functions are really the same, then how do we distinguish at all between analytic and synthetic operations? But if they are different, then how can these forms of judgment serve as a clue for the discovery of the categories? ' Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason, trans. Norman KempSmith (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1963).Hereafter CPR. [89] 9~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 1990 The results of this dilemma which can be observed in the literature are not surprising: commentators tend to grasp one horn or the other. They either emphasize the difference between analysis and synthesis, and reject or dilute the claims as to sameness of function; or they take seriously Kant's argument concerning sameness of functions, and try to minimize the difference between analysis and synthesis. The major twentieth-century representant of the former approach is Kemp Smith," and of the latter, Paton. 3 This latter approach has found a formidable contemporary champion in the person of Henry Allison. By Allison's own admission,4 however, his position on this controversial topic was suggested (in part) by arguments first put forward over fifty years ago by Klaus Reich in a most remarkable book entitled Die Volls~ndigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel, 5 a book, by the way, also greatly admired by Paton. 6 In the first section of this paper I will try to show that Reich's arguments are rather more subtle than Allison apparently takes them to be, and that Reich is one commentator who attempts to go between the horns of the dilemma described above, and who essays an interpretation of our crucial paragraph that unifies its seemingly divergent tendencies. In the second section of the paper I will introduce some interpretive elements of my own. 2. Let us begin by reacquainting ourselves with Kant's notion of analytical unity, one aspect of this debate which is not particularly controversial and is largely agreed upon by all parties. For Kant, analytical unity is the sort of unity achieved by all general concepts (conceptus communes) insofar as they abstract from all differences that subsist between the objects under them, or the lower concepts subordinated to them. 7 A general concept unifies these objects or concepts by means of a common mark or set of marks. Thus Kant's example at CPR A69/B94 of the unification of bodies under the concepts 'body' and 'divisible' is a perfectly representative instance of unification via analytical unity, as the function upon which such concepts "rest." Let us note that the " Norman KempSmith,A CommentarytoKant's "Cr/t~rueofPureReason"(NewYork:HumanitiesPress, 196~). 3 H.J. Paton, Kant's MetaphysicofExperience, 2 vols.(London:George Allenand Unwin,Ltd., 1936). 4 Henry Allison,Kant's TranscendentalIdealum (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress, 1983), 144 n. 3o. Hereafter KTI. 5 KlausReich,Die Vollst~ndigkeitderKantischenUrteilstafel,3rd. ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986). Hereafter VKU. 6 Paton, Kant's Metaphysic, 1:302. Kant, we should note, does not makethis important logicaldistinctionbetweensubordination... (shrink)

This book is a printed dissertation directed by Norbert Hinske and defended at Trier in 1996. It deals with the relationship between formal and transcendental logic from the standpoint of the history of Kant’s development, of Kant’s sources, and, more generally, of the history of concepts. In 1932, Klaus Reich summarized the status quaestionis thus, “Observing the destiny of Kant’s sketch on pure general or formal logic, which lies at the foundation of both the edifice and the realization (...) of the Critique of Pure Reason, one cannot help to marvel at the discrepancy of the opinions of the interpreters and of Kant himself”. Vázquez Lobeiras mentions three main Kant interpretations in the twentieth century: one based on the theory of knowledge, the second based on metaphysics, and the third based on the history of logic. She declares to follow the logical-historical interpretation. The first chapter is dedicated to a detailed reconstruction of the status quaestionis, beginning with Kant’s contemporaries, going through the famous controversy between Norman Kemp-Smith and Herbert Paton, the former maintaining the primacy of transcendental against formal logic, the latter the opposite, and ending with Gerold Prauss and Giorgio Tonelli. The second chapter explores the fate of the distinction between transcendental and formal logic in the history of Kant’s development. Vázquez Lobeiras concentrates her attention on a famous section of the Critique of Pure Reason, the “Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic”. Her intention is to interpret it by relating it with pertinent passages from Kant’s Lectures on Logic, Lectures on Metaphysics, the program on the False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures, and the dissertation, De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis. “Form” is the concept she focuses on, on the basis of an impressive list of parallels she has found that connect the distinction between formal and transcendental logic with the distinction between usus logicus and usus realis of the dissertatio. She points to a telling argument Kant makes in Reflection 1599, that namely the subject of formal logic is “the usage of the understanding in general,” while that of metaphysics are “the objects of pure reason.” But what would these “objects of pure reason” be? Vázquez Lobeiras refers them to the rationis purae objecta of the dissertatio, which are free from sensible determinations while remaining subject to the laws on the intellectual world. In this reflection she sees the stage that immediately precedes the “Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The third chapter concludes by investigating the progressive establishment of new boundaries set by Kant to metaphysics. (shrink)