El análisis de las revoluciones americana y francesa, en el pensamiento de Acton, se sitúa en un contexto más amplio de reflexiones sobre la historia entendida como una _lex continui_. Ahora, mientras la Revolución al otro lado del océano sigue un itinerario de continuidad hasta el punto de que podría definirse una especie de “superación- mantenimiento”, la francesa se presenta como un elemento de discontinuidad, una categoría que responde a una “superación-aniquilamiento” que pretende refundar _ex novo_ toda la sociedad y (...) dar vida a un nuevo modelo de ciudadano. Es precisamente esta pretensión la que se encuentra en la raíz de su fracaso. Esta consideración sitúa a Acton en la línea de los liberal-demócratas que desde Edmund Burke llega hasta Tocqueville. Todos se preguntarán por qué la Revolución francesa, al menos en el primer instante, no surtió los mismos efectos que la americana. (shrink)

Western man has long lost his way in his quest for constructivist models, largely because of his infatuation with utopian ideals. These models have represented a complete negation of the Open Society. In the latter part of the twentieth century there has been a dramatic reawakening from these dreams. The time has now come to reappraise the thinking of the past, which simply described possible systems for social organization on behalf of the common good and not models for perfect societies. (...) Rocco Pezzimenti retraces and analyses paths towards a true balance between "laws" and "rights" in society, something often neglected in recent western thought. First formulated in ancient Rome, the concept of rights is to be found - not by chance - at the heart of the speculations of thinkers such as Montesquieu, Vico, Hume, and others who set forth the premises for the liberal systems in which, despite many problems, we have the fortune to live. Essential to this analysis is a division of the Greco-Latin binomial, considered indivisible for far too long. These two cultures of the ancient world remain relevant and very close to us as the roots and bases of our contemporary western civilization. However, the author shows that it is a reclaiming of the Latin culture that can pave the way to the Open Society in which, even today, few people can claim to live. He looks at western political thought from Cicero to William of Ockham, re-examining as well much of the best thought of the intervening centuries. He traces progress towards a liberal and truly federated society - the Open Society, which we may regard not as an imposed Utopia but the fruit of history. (shrink)

This study takes up where the previous volume in this series, on open societies in the ancient and medieval periods, left off. Setting out from that point, it analyzes the difficult, often dramatic and highly conflicted, relationship between theoreticians of the open society and those who have actually pursued Utopian ideals and various other chimeras. The thread uniting the two studies passes through the political institutions of the Roman Republic and English parliamentarianism, the bulwarks of truly free societies (however imperfect, (...) and thus subject to improvement, they may be). it is certainly no accident that all the great figures in this field, such as Vico, Montesquieu, Hume and the like, refer to these two models: the departure points for modern liberalism. Rocco Pezzimenti charts the difficult progress towards the achievement of rights, and reviewing modern political thought and the approach of contemporary analysis, offers a critique of a number of platitudes and demonstrates how even in the most recent centuries the complete negation of the open society has come about, often due to thinkers who have long been considered amongst the most enlightened. This has happened not only explicitly, due to those readily identified as the enemies of freedom, but also surreptitiously, occasioned by various Utopian visionaries. The analysis of those elements called the paradoxes of modernity has, under the cover of apparently innovative ideas, exalted methods and principles which have nothing to do with liberty and its history. The purpose of these pages is to provide an historical profile of the problem and alert each of us as to how delicate the balances of the open society are; societies which must be defended with the greatest possible lucidity and determination, a defence on a par with that of freedom itself. (shrink)

PARTI The Problem of Method 1.1 Any discussion of order in past centuries was based on the conviction that the various real phenomena studied could be ...

After a first part, which is critical of a philosophical vision and which leads from the search for a provisional morality to a morality provisional by nature, this work analyzes the problem of moral and social values in an attempt to arrive at a social morality shared by all. A series of premises is discovered, and they are inalienable - such as work, the person, responsibility, pluralism, the ethics of conflict, the right to truth, a sense of limits, faith in (...) society, citizenship, brotherhood, and their corollaries: freedom, dignity, equality, justice, solidarity, and others, as well - which are the cornerstones of a social life in which all people can fulfil their own, most legitimate aspirations. These social values, in a climate of growing security, make the development of intelligence and growth of culture possible. These aspirations are what characterize human nature. The book concludes with a very brief itinerary for an historical analysis, a draft to enable further research, with the intention of bringing out the fact that despite some recurring pessimistic views, the pathway of humanity is accompanied by a constant effort to improve, even though at times it is strewn with frustrations and dangerous phases of political abnormality. (shrink)

Physics and metaphysics (with a letter from K.R. Popper) -- Relation between cause and effect (with a letter from V. Tonini) -- Chance or finality? (with two letters from L. Pauling and two from J. Eccles) -- The individual and metaphysics : life existentalism and the mystery of life (with a letter from H. Von Balthasar) -- The hidden roots of pain (with a letter from P. Pavan).

1) What should be understood by "liberal Catholicism "? Lord Acton is not easy to define as a historical figure. This is not only due to the rich variety of ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits by Rocco PezzimentiAdam CarringtonPEZZIMENTI, Rocco. The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits. Herefordshire, U.K.: Gracewing, 2021. 207 pp. Paper, $22.00Rocco Pezzimenti's The Anchors of Democracy: A New Division of Powers, Representation, Sense of Limits is an ambitious book. A professor at LUMSA, Rome, he seeks to (...) consider anew the nature, structure, and purposes of democracy as well as the society in which this form of government best operates. He sees this task as needed because, he argues, contemporary democracies face new challenges that threaten their legitimacy and their capacity to fulfill their just and needed purposes. He notes that democracies are not "infallible," either morally or in their ability to maintain themselves, and thus need conscious understanding and prudent maintenance.The subtitle establishes the three main themes by which he diagnoses and addresses democracy's trials. Pezzimenti orders his argument most through the lens of limits. While present in all spheres and regimes, popular government in particular partakes of limitation, since "mutual limitation... is the basis of our democracies." Limits for Pezzimenti stem from distinct elements of a society competing for finite power ordered toward action. Many of our political and social problems, both past and present, stem from denying limitations or misordering their interactions. The presentism that tempts democracy must be tempered by the limits the past places on it. Institutions are one helpful means for this interaction, which helps guard against a "utopianism which wants to solve everything immediately, deceiving itself that it can perform miracles." Law itself involves limits, placing boundaries on the action of private persons and public entities. So does pluralism and "polyarchy," whereby we recognize the limits particular persons and communities place on politics' universalism as well as how politics restrains these other elements from descending into intolerant, selfish particularity. Important to this point is Pezzimenti's discussion of sovereignty, which must not be reduced to a mere question of who rules and where but to the question of rightly pursuing a common good respectful of individual rights. True freedom inheres in the proper cohering of these elements.Pezzimenti turns to the distribution of powers within a community as part of the discussion of limits. He argues that "the traditional tripartition, theorized by Polybius and on to Montesquieu, today appears certainly insufficient." To define all political power as legislative, executive, and judicial, then to distribute them among competing institutions, does not fully account for the contemporary political landscape. Moreover, those [End Page 361] "classic" powers themselves need to be rethought to meet today's concerns. Legislative power must account for claims that its representative systems either are oligarchic in practice or lead to crass populism, and that they fail to account for group identities as opposed to class ones. The executive must evolve in pursuit of a better "efficiency and efficacy"—including speed of response to problems—that requires a better relationship with the modern bureaucracy, which he describes as "the other face of the executive." The judicial power must focus on a renewed impartiality, especially in relation to the additional powers Pezzimenti thinks need to be named and then tamed. The new powers that he says we must recognize include the press, mass media, technology, and more. Here, Pezzimenti categorizes as powers the functions of government (making, enforcing, and adjudication of the law) alongside avenues or means for exercising political influence, if not outright control. These other forces have distorted democracy's needed limits partly because law and custom have not adequately accounted for their evolving role in power.These issues lead to the last challenge, that of representation. The problem of representation threatens democracy's legitimacy, since this form of government is grounded more than any other in the idea that "power must be the expression of the community." Yet even here the issue of limits orders the discussion. The unaccounted-for new powers described above remove too many limitations either on crass populism or encroaching rule of elites. The former can abuse individual rights, which he says "are not negotiable," based on oppressive whims... (shrink)

Many actors mobilize the cognitive, legal and technical tool-box of data protection when they discuss and address controversial issues such as digital mass surveillance. Yet, critical approaches to the digital only barely explore the politics of data protection in relation to data-driven governance. Building on governmentality studies and Actor-Network-Theory, this article analyses the potential and limits of using data protection to critique the ‘digital age’. Using the conceptual tool of dispositifs, it sketches an analytics of data protection and the emergence (...) of its configuration as ‘data protection by design and by default’. This exploration reminds us that governing through data implies, first and foremost, governing digital data. (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important interdisciplinary area in contemporary philosophy of mind, with an explosion of research over the past thirty years from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists. It is also perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world despite the fact that it is familiar to each of us. Consciousness also seems resistant to any straightforward physical explanation. This book introduces readers to the contemporary problem of consciousness, providing a clear introduction to the overall landscape and a fair-minded critical (...) survey of various theories of consciousness. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem of consciousness, Rocco Gennaro explores the following key topics and debates: the metaphysical problem of consciousness, including varieties of dualism and materialism; consciousness and neuroscience, particularly the question of whether consciousness can be reduced to brain activity or attentional mechanisms; representational and cognitive theories of consciousness; consciousness and psychopathology; animals, machines, and consciousness. Extensive use is made of interesting phenomena throughout the book, ranging from blindsight, synaesthesia, and change blindness to phantom limb syndrome, split-brain cases, and dissociative identity disorder. The inclusion of chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary make this book essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative overview of the problem of consciousness, not only in philosophy but related fields such as psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

This collection presents some of the most vital and original recent writings on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, the three greatest rationalists of the early modern period. Their work offered brilliant and distinct integrations of science, morals, metaphysics, and religion, which today remain at the center of philosophical discussion. The essays written especially for this volume explore how these three philosophical systems treated matter, substance, human freedom, natural necessity, knowledge, mind, and consciousness. The contributors include some of the most prominent writers (...) in the field, including Jonathan Bennett, Michael Della Rocca, Jan A. Cover, Catherine Wilson, Stephen Voss, Edwin Curley, Don Garrett, and Margaret D. Wilson. (shrink)

In the absence of any plausible reductionist account of consciousness in nonmentalistic terms, the HOT theory says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought (or awareness) that one is in that state. I discuss HOT theory with special attention to how Leibnizian theses can help support it and how it can shed light on Leibniz's theory of perception, apperception, and consciousness. It will become clear how treating Leibniz as (...) a HOT theorist can solve some of the problems he faced and some of the puzzles posed by commentators, e.g. animal mentality and the role of reason and memory in self-consciousness. (shrink)

Preterm discharge effects: Relationship between the maternal experience and newborn's psychobiological regulation The purpose of this study is to investigate how the past experiences of mothers and their potentially traumatic events during pregnancy may have influenced the processes of psychobiological self-regulation and cognitive development in a child born preterm. Eighty children who had a gestational age of < 32 weeks were examined at the 9th month of the corrected age. The mothers and children were divided in two groups: multipara mothers (...) and their children and the primipara mothers and their children. These children were examined on the basis of sleep disorders, nutritional problems and mental development. Perinatal data from clinical observations and data from standardized developmental tests were used to describe the differences. The children of primipara mothers who had unexpected preterm delivery presented major incidences of sleep disorders while the children of primipara mothers, who programmed preterm delivery, presented a major incidences of nutrition problems. The predictability of preterm delivery has a major influence on the capacity of newborns for self-regulation in the case of primipara mothers. (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and (...) animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what he calls the HOT-brain thesis. He defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. Gennaro proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that he calls the "wide intrinsicality view" and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. -/- Thus Gennaro argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. Gennaro’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make his argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers. (shrink)

The vocabulary of seeing shows three types of “mediation” provided by the chorus between spectacle and spectators. As persona spectans, i. e. internal spectator, the chorus mirrors the figure of the spectator; as persona sentiens, it shows its own emotional response, which operates like instructions for use of tragic spectacle for spectators; as persona monstrans, the chorus focuses public attention on spectacle and involves it in the representation. These three choral modalities act as a catalyst of public emotional response and (...) allow for a definition of ideal posture of tragic spectators. (shrink)

Background: Moral distress, defined as moral suffering or a psychological imbalance, can affect nursing students. However, many new instruments or adaptations of other scales that are typically used to measure moral distress have not been used for nursing students. Aim: This study aimed to translate, culturally adapt and evaluate the psychometric properties of an Italian version of the Moral Distress Scale for Nursing Students for use with delayed nursing students. Research design: The study used a cross-sectional research design. Participants and (...) research context: Incidental sampling resulted in a sample of 282 delayed nursing students enrolled between May and August 2020 in a University of central Italy. Ethical considerations: The research protocol was approved by the internal review board of the university, and all participants provided their written informed consent. Results: The study confirmed a multidimensional second-order factorial structure for the It-ESMEE with five dimensions: improper institutional conditions to teach user care, authoritarian teaching practices, disrespect for the ethical dimension of vocational training, lack of competence of the teacher and commitment of ethical dimension of user care. The internal consistency was high, and the standard error of measurement and smallest detectable change were adequate. Discussion: The It-ESMEE is able to assess moral distress in delayed nursing students with good validity and reliability. It can be used in research and to determine moral distress levels, helping teachers to monitor the condition in nursing students. Conclusion: This instrument can help in comprehending moral distress, enabling students to develop coping and intervention strategies to maintain their well-being, and to ensure the quality of nurse education. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 2 Seiten: 413-432.

The higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is a reductive representational theory of consciousness which says that what makes a mental state conscious is that there is a suitable HOT directed at that mental state. Although it seems that any neural realization of the theory must be somewhat widely distributed in the brain, it remains unclear just how widely distributed it needs to be. In section I, I provide some background and define some key terms. In section II, I argue (...) against the view that HOT theory should treat first-order (i.e. world-directed) conscious states as requiring prefrontal cortical activity though it is reasonable to suppose that conscious states are realized in the brain. In section III, I then explore some of the key background metaphysical issues involved in understanding the nature of consciousness, such as the debate between realism and idealism as well as the prospects for solving the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness. Some of the differences in question often mirror the traditional differences between Western and Eastern perspectives on the nature of consciousness. Overall, I argue that some form of realism and physicalism is more plausible than the opposing views. I also argue that materialists (and especially HOT theorists) can offer plausible replies to the hard problem. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.

An overview of higher-order representational theories of consciousness. Representational theories of consciousness attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been fairly popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is (...) that it is the object of some kind of higher-order mental state directed at M. The primary focus of this entry is on HOR and especially higher-order thought (HOT) theory. The key question that should be answered by any theory of consciousness is: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? Section 1 introduces the overall representationalist approach to consciousness and briefly discuss Tye’s FOR. Section 2 presents three major versions of HOR: higher-order thought theory, dispositional higher-order thought theory, and higher-order perception theory. In section 3, a number of common and important objections and replies are presented. Section 4 briefly outlines a close connection between HOT theory and conceptualism, that is, the claim that the representational content of a perceptual experience is entirely determined by the conceptual capacities the perceiver brings to bear in her experience. Section 5 examines several hybrid higher-order and “self-representational” theories of consciousness which all hold that conscious states are self-directed in some way. Section 6 addresses the potentially damaging claim that HOT theory requires neural activity in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in order for one to have conscious states. (shrink)

This book argues that God can be found within the edifice of the scientific understanding of physics, cosmology, biology and philosophy. It is a rewarding read that asks the Big Questions which humans have pondered since the dawn of the modern human mind, including: Why and how does the universe exist? From where do the laws of physics come? How did life and mind arise from inanimate matter on Earth? Science and religion have a common interest in the answers to (...) such questions, yet many scientists and believers have been at odds for centuries. The author and contributors present a program for moving beyond the vastly different perspectives of reality offered by science and religion. Historical proofs for the existence of God are considered in light of the possibility that the universe may be only one in an eternal multiverse that contains an infinite number of other universes. Readers will find a modification of St. Augustine’s Argument from Truth for the existence of the necessary, self-sufficient being commonly referred to as God. This book is suited to all with an interest in the crossing points of science and religion, providing much food for thought and reflection. If in the end, you cannot accede to philosophy’s proofs, or theism’s invitation to faith, perhaps you will nevertheless say ‘yes’ to the amazing universe in which we live. (shrink)

“Leibniz on Consciousness and Self‐Consciousness” It is argued that Leibniz held a version of the so‐called “higher‐order thought” theory of consciousness. According to this theory, what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. For example, in elaborating on his theory of monads, Leibniz explains that an unconscious perception becomes conscious when it is accompanied by an apperception of it. Apperception is best understood as a form of self‐consciousness, and (...) reflection is best understood as a sophisticated form of apperception. With these crucial terminological distinctions in place, it is then argued that treating Leibniz as a HOT theorist can help us understand how he did indeed hold that animals apperceive even if most of them are incapable of sophisticated forms of reflection and rationality. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (...) which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of consciousness and reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspective. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called ‘analytic Anglo-American’ tradition, but I attempt to show how this obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contemporary theory of consciousness. (shrink)

A más de 300 años de la primera edición del Leviatán, las lecturas acerca de las pasiones allí descritas deben realizarse teniendo en cuenta cambios históricos, políticos y discursivos. Aún así, continúa siendo posible hacer un rastreo conceptual de algunas de las pasiones aquí tratadas, sobre todo de las que en la actualidad participan con efervescencia de la vida pública. ¿Qué valor podemos rescatar de ellas a más de 300 años? Al consistir la presente obra de un tratado de filosofía (...) política sobre los orígenes y desarrollos del pacto social, es posible comprender estas pasiones, en principio, desde sus valores contractuales. Cada una de ellas representa un valor en la relación con los otros, formas de ser y de estar en el mundo de los propios sujetos en contrato. Reflexionamos con especificidad aquí sobre la indignación, sobre su potencial político y jurídico para contornear los bordes del contrato, pero también sobre su potencial hermenéutico, habilitando otros modos de recorrer la lectura a través de la pregunta por las injusticias, los mecanismos de devolución legítimos ante ellas exigidos y el uso de la violencia racionalizada. (shrink)

Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...) HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases. I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states. (shrink)

“If you find it strange that, in setting out these elements, I do not use those qualities called heat, cold, moistness, and dryness, as do the philosophers, I shall say to you that these qualities appear to me to be themselves in need of explanation. Indeed, unless I am mistaken, not only these four qualities, but also all the others (indeed all the forms of inanimate bodies) can be explained without the need of supposing for that purpose any other thing (...) in their matter than the motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its parts.” So does Descartes, in his The World, or Treatise on Light [Le Monde ou Traité de la Lumière], express the uniphenomenal principle of the physical world, which is the basis - or foundation - of his great cosmic synthesis. The uniphenomenal character of Cartesian physics - namely, explaining all phenomena and appearances from a single primordial phenomenon (and substance) - has such a great semantic and intuitive value for the structure of the human mind that Plato, even before Aristotle’s hyle, had come to contemplate his concept of chora, the cosmic and universal matrix at the base of all phenomena, existing before and beyond the coming into existence of the elements and of sensible things. Even the physics of Democritus is uniphenomenal. A perfect example of uniphenomenal physics in our time is the Spacio-fluido-dynamics of the scientist Marco Todeschini (Bergamo, 1899 - 1988) who, with his monumental Teoria delle apparenze [Theory of Appearances] of ’49 tried to clear a path towards the hope of reaching a Cartesian kind of unified cosmic synthesis. (We accept only the fundamental concept of Todeschi’s theory here, that is, the uniphenomenal character of his physics, without occupying ourselves with criteria such as the value or the plausibility of his hypotheses.) This concept of uniphenomenal physics will serve as an ultra-clear instrument to dissipate the epistemological fog of AI (Artificial Intelligence). (shrink)

Misrepresentation, empty HOTs, and intrinsic HOTs: A reply to Pereplyotchik.

This book consolidates and extends the authors’ work on the connection between iconicity and abductive inference. It emphasizes a pragmatic, experimental and fallibilist view of knowledge without sacrificing formal rigor. Within this context, the book focuses particularly on scientific knowledge and its prevalent use of mathematics. To find an answer to the question “What kind of experimental activity is the scientific employment of mathematics?” the book addresses the problems involved in formalizing abductive cognition. For this, it implements the concept and (...) method of iconicity, modeling this theoretical framework mathematically through category theory and topoi. Peirce's concept of iconic signs is treated in depth, and it is shown how Peirce's diagrammatic logical notation of Existential Graphs makes use of iconicity and how important features of this iconicity are representable within category theory. Alain Badiou’s set-theoretical model of truth procedures and his relational sheaf-based theory of phenomenology are then integrated within the Peircean logical context. Finally, the book opens the path towards a more naturalist interpretation of the abductive models developed in Peirce and Badiou through an analysis of several recent attempts to reformulate quantum mechanics with categorical methods. Overall, the book offers a comprehensive and rigorous overview of past approaches to iconic semiotics and abduction, and it encompasses new extensions of these methods towards an innovative naturalist interpretation of abductive reasoning. (shrink)

Rocco Gangle addresses the methodological questions raised by a commitment to immanence in terms of how diagrams may be used both as tools and as objects of philosophical investigation. Gangle integrates insights from Spinoza, Pierce and Deleuze in conjunction with the formal operations of category theory.

It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...) consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness. (shrink)