Cet article explore une problématique de l'identité personnelle alternative à celle du contrôle policier pour étudier les traces numériques que créent ou laissent les usagers sur Internet et sur les dispositifs informatiques en général. Cette problématique embrasse toutes les traces, numériques et non numériques. Le constat de départ est celui d'une évolution récente de la présentation de soi dans l'espace public qui expose désormais des données jadis réservées à l'intimité. L'hypothèse conséquente est qu'existe un lien entre l'affichage d'une identité plus (...) détaillée et la conscience de vivre dans une société incertaine. Dans cette perspective, les motivations qui président à cet affichage sont la recherche de l'estime de soi et de la considération par autrui, deux composantes du lien social, ébranlées dans les sociétés incertaines. Une attention particulière est également accordée, dans ce climat d'incertitude, à la géolocalisation qui contribue au travers de divers appareils à situer en temps réel et constamment les individus les uns par rapport aux autres.This paper explores an approach to personal identity issues that offers an alternative to police surveillance for investigating digital traces created or left behind by people who use the Internet and information technology in general. The approach covers all traces, whether digital or not. The paper posits a recent trend in which personal identities are presented in a public sphere that has begun to exhibit information of a type that was formerly divulged only in intimate circles. The ensuing hypothesis is that there is a link between the public display of more detailed personal identities and people s awareness of living in a society of uncertainty. If this is indeed the case, then the reason underlying the display of one s private identity in public is a quest for self-esteem and for the esteem of others - both being integral to the social cohesion now being undermined by uncertainty in society. In this context of uncertainty, particular attention is given to geolocation, which, through various technical systems, enables individuals to locate each other in real time, and at any time. (shrink)

Tout titulaire d’un compte dans un réseau socionumérique organise et gère son propre réseau de relations. De récents travaux en géographie considèrent que certaines frontières sont elles-mêmes aujourd’hui des réseaux. L’hypothèse explorée ici est que ces réseaux de relations sont en même temps des frontières. Cette « frontièreréseau » délimite un espace virtuel, est flexible, de géométrie et perméabilité variables, mais présente une faible capacité de protection. Par contre, elle permet le dépassement des frontières traditionnelles et peut jouer un rôle (...) stratégique dans des conflits. Des exemples d’application en sont donnés dans les domaines de la vie privée et professionnelle et de la géopolitique.Anyone who has a social network account sets up and manages its own network of relationships. Recent studies in geography consider that besides traditional physical borders, a new kind of border is developing in the form of social networks. The hypothesis explored here is that these networks of relationships make up border areas in themselves, by setting the bounds of a virtual space. These networkcum-border areas are flexible according to circumstances, they vary in shape, size and permeability, but they are relatively ineffectual in terms of protection. On the other hand, they can transcend traditional frontiers and thus have a strategic role in conflicts. Examples are given in private and professional life and in geopolitics. (shrink)

Depuis le début des années 1960, l'information et la communication font en France l'objet de réflexions et de pratiques dispersées. Elles ont bénéficié à la fois de l'inquiétude des philosophes sur le devenir de la technique et d'apports extérieurs aux sciences sociales, avant que celles-ci ne finissent par les intégrer dans leurs problématiques. Ces apports proviennent notamment de trois milieux : le milieu des techniciens des médias, le milieu artistique et le mouvement social.Since the early 1960s, information and communication in (...) France are subject to reflections and practices spread. They have benefited both the concern of philosophers on the future of technology and external inputs to the social sciences before they do eventually integrate them into their problems. These contributions mainly concern three environments: the middle technicians media, the arts and the social movement. (shrink)

Cet article examine certains aspects sociocognitifs et sémiotiques des jeux virtuels. Il commence par rappeler quelques travaux sociocognitifs fondamentaux relatifs au cheminement du joueur dans un espace virtuel et présente des acquis récents à la lumière de travaux en neurosciences. Ces acquis concernent le codage commun des fonctions relatives à l’espace, notamment la perception d’un espace virtuel ainsi que du mouvement et de la rotation dans celui-ci. Un résultat important est que ces jeux virtuels améliorent les performances du joueur. La (...) contribution aborde ensuite le contrôle sémiotique du processus et insiste sur l’instrumentalisation de la fonction abductive comme balisage de la construction du sens du jeu par le joueur. Elle se termine par un retour sur le jeu virtuel en tant que dispositif sociocognitif et sémiotique de communication et sur sa nécessaire prise en compte lors de la phase de conception.This contribution explores some of the sociocognitive and semiotic aspects of virtual games. We begin by reviewing a number of fundamental studies on the way players move through virtual space, describing recent findings in the light of neuroscientific research. These concern the common mental coding of functions relating to space, and especially perceptions of virtual space and mental motion and rotation within it. One important finding is that these virtual games improve the performance of players. We then look into semiotic control of the game, highlighting the instrumentalisation of the abductive function to provide reference points in the construction of meaning by the game player. We conclude with a discussion on virtual games as a socio- cognitive and semiotic means of communication and on the need to take this into account in the early stages of game design. (shrink)

La normalisation des échanges sur les réseaux numériques joue un rôle décisif dans la mondialisation en cours. Son élaboration - ici sur l'apprentissage en ligne - requiert à la fois des connaissances issues des sciences de l'information, des sciences de la communication et d'autres disciplines, car les règles qui en résultent produisent de nouveaux alliages faits de rapports sociaux, d'information et de télécommunications.It is clear that standardization plays a decisive role in the ongoing process of globalization. Setting up standards - (...) e. g. online access to learning resources - requires knowledge derived from several disciplines, among them the French disciplinary grouping, "sciences de l'information & de la communication". It is argued that this grouping gathers many of the necessary rules required for the study of this new mix of social relationships, information and telecommunications. (shrink)

Du fait de la mondialisation, notre histoire présente est pleine de nouveaux enjeux culturels, éducatifs, économiques, et technologiques, qu'accompagnent un cortège de problèmes. Les différentes aires culturelles et linguistiques produisent de plus en plus de savoirs en ligne sur toute une variété de supports. Il semble que la normalisation des accès à ces savoirs soit une condition essentielle et incontournable pour, à la fois, faciliter la circulation de ces données et respecter la diversité de leurs sources. Cette normalisation devrait contribuer (...) non seulement à combler le fossé séparant les pays du Nord et du Sud, mais aussi à préserver le pluralisme culturel de l'humanité.Due to globalization, our present history is full of new challenges cultural, educational, economic, and technological, accompanied a procession of problems. Different cultural and linguistic areas produce more online knowledge on a variety of substrates. It seems that the standardization of access to knowledge is an essential and indispensable to both facilitate the movement of such data and respect the diversity of their sources. This standardization should contribute not only to bridge the gap between the North and South, but also to preserve the cultural pluralism of humanity. (shrink)

Les analyses de la mondialisation procèdent souvent de modes de réflexion qui excluent le principe de non contradiction et conduisent à des hypothèses rigides sur son évolution. La pensée complexe, selon Edgar Morin, ne présente pas cette contrainte et admet, à l’instar de la pensée chinoise stricto sensu, la coexistence de contraires, dont le dynamisme, selon la philosophie taoïste devrait aboutir à l’harmonie. Cela laisse en quelque sorte du jeu, ouvrant ainsi la porte à une pluralité de possibles. Cet article (...) présente quelques-unes des parentés entre pensée complexe et mode de réflexion chinois. Il examine aussi une touche spécifique qu’apporte Edgar Morin, héritée de la pensée grecque. Elle concerne l’accompagnement de ce jeu des contraires, par la démocratie cognitive et communicationnelle, alors que le système de pensée chinois n’intègre pas cette question. Un pont est ainsi jeté entre les modes de pensée de l’Occident et d’Extrême-Orient.Analyzes of globalization often proceed ways of thinking that excludes the principle of non-contradiction and leads to rigid assumptions about its evolution. Complex thought, according to Edgar Morin, does not have this constraint and admits, like Chinese thought, strictly speaking, the coexistence of opposites, whose dynamism, according to Taoist philosophy should lead to harmony. This leaves some sort of game, thus opening the door to a plurality of possibilities. This article presents some of the kinship between complex thought and Chinese way of thinking. It also examines a specific key brings Edgar Morin, inherited from Greek thought. It relates to the accompaniment of this game of opposites, the cognitive and communicative democracy, while the Chinese system of thought does not include this question. A bridge is built between and modes of thought of the West and the Far East. (shrink)

One of Jacques Derrida’s richest and most provocative works, Life Death challenges and deconstructs one of the most deeply rooted dichotomies of Western thought: life and death. Here Derrida rethinks the traditional philosophical understanding of the relationship between life and death, undertaking multidisciplinary analyses of a range of topics, including philosophy, linguistics, and the life sciences. In seeking to understand the relationship between life and death, he engages in close readings of Freudian psychoanalysis, the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger, (...) French geneticist François Jacob, and epistemologist Georges Canguilhem. Derrida gave his “Life Death” seminar over fourteen sessions between 1975 and 1976 at the École normale supérieure in Paris as part of the preparation for students studying for the agrégation, a notoriously competitive qualifying exam. The theme for the exam that year was “Life and Death,” but Derrida made a critical modification to the title by dropping the coordinating conjunction. The resulting title of Life Death poses a philosophical question about the close relationship between life and death. Derrida argues that death must be considered neither as the opposite of life nor as the truth or fulfillment of it, but rather as that which both limits life and makes it possible. Through these captivating sessions, Derrida thus not only questions traditional understandings of the relationship between life and death, but also ultimately develops a new way of thinking about what he calls “life death.”. (shrink)

This collection of essays and interviews, some previously unpublished and almost all of which appear in English for the first time, encompasses the political and ethical thinking of Jacques Derrida over thirty years. Passionate, rigorous, beautifully argued, wide-ranging, the texts shed an entirely new light on his work and will be welcomed by scholars in many disciplines--politics, philosophy, history, cultural studies, literature, and a range of interdisciplinary programs. Derrida's arguments vary in their responsiveness to given political questions--sometimes they are (...) vivid polemics on behalf of a position or figure, sometimes they are reflective analyses of a philosophical problem. They are united by the recurrent question of political decision or responsibility and the insistence that the apparent simplicity or programmatic character of political decision is in fact a profound avoidance of the political. This volume testifies to the possibility and the necessity of a philosophical politics. Negotiations assembles some of the most telling examples of the intrinsic relationship, so often affirmed by Derrida in more abstract philosophical terms, between deconstructive reading practices and what is called the "political"--more precisely, politics in an almost down-to-earth, pragmatic, and commonsense use of the word. Among the many subjects covered in the book are: the death penalty in the United States, the civil war in Algeria, globalization and cosmopolitanism, the American Declaration of Independence, Jean-Paul Sartre, the value of objectivity, politics and friendship, and the relationship between deconstruction and actuality. (shrink)

The subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics and Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics are both notable for embracing the radical idea that measurement outcomes correspond to events whose occurrence is relative to an observer. Here we provide a detailed study of their similarities and especially their differences.

It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible (...) to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty. (shrink)

Is knowledge the epistemic norm of action and assertion? Gettier and justified-false-belief cases have been raised as counterexamples to the necessity direction of that claim. Most knowledge normers reply by distinguishing permissibility from excusability. An important objection to this move, however, is that it requires a still lacking view of epistemic excuses sufficiently general to cover all the cases, correctly relating the supposed excuse to the subject's cognitive life, and not collapsing into an account of the fundamental normative standard (see (...) Gerken 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm. (shrink)

Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degres du savoir was first published in 1932 by Jacques Maritain. In this new translation of The Degrees of Knowledge, Ralph McInerny attempts a more careful expression of Maritain's original masterpiece than previous translations. Maritain proposes a hierarchy of the forms of knowledge by discussing the degrees of rational and suprarational understanding. Nine appendices, some longer than the chapters of the book, advance Maritain's thought, often by taking on criticism of earlier editions of the (...) work. Rightly called Maritain's cardinal work, The Degrees of Knowledge is a magnificent and sagacious achievement. Jacques Maritain's masterpiece proposes a hierarchy of forms of knowledge that culminate in mystical experience and wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Maritain argues that the intellectual life is meant to be complemented by the spiritual life and should culminate in sanctity. (shrink)

A recent paper has given a lucid treatment of Bell’s notion of local causality within the framework of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, the authors went on to conclude that the quantum violation of Bell’s notion of local causality is no more surprising than a common cause. Here, I argue that this conclusion is unwarranted by the authors’ own analysis. On the contrary, within the framework outlined by the authors, I argue that far from saving the notion of (...) ‘locality’ from the grip of Bell’s theorem, the authors have deprived it of a meaningful definition. (shrink)

According to a widely discussed view, knowledge plays a significant normative role in action: It is epistemically rational to treat p as your reason for action if and only if you know that p. As many philosophers have observed, however, this view clashes with the claim that knowledge is moderate and stable. For, granting that claim, there will be high stakes cases in which knowledge seems insufficient. To deal with such cases, some philosophers embracing the knowledge norm combine three independently (...) plausible claims. First, they say that no non-trivial condition is luminous; second, they say that doing something while not being in a position to know that that is appropriate is bad (in high stakes cases); third, they say that in the high stakes cases in question, the subject knows but fails to be in a position to know that she knows (Williamson Philos Q 55:213–235, 2005). This paper argues that this account can overcome the main objections already raised in the literature, but that it still faces the apparently insurmountable challenge of providing a natural and helpful way of substantiating the second claim. (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

. Fresh evidence from Free Choice Items (FCIs) in French question the current perception of the class. The role of some standard distinctions found in the literature is weakened or put in a new perspective. The distinction between universal and existential is no longer an intrinsic property of FCIs. Similarly, the opposition between variation-based vs intension-based analyses is relativized. We show that the regime of free choiceness can be characterized by an abstract constraint, that we call Non-Individuation (NI), and which (...) can be satisfied in different ways that match current distinctions. NI says that the information conveyed by a sentence containing a FCI should not be reducible to a referential situation, that is a situation in which particular individuals satisfy the sentence in the current world. The widely used resource of modal variation becomes a particular scenario of free-choiceness, not its essence. In fact, we show that under certain conditions, FCIs can occur in episodic, non-modal sentences, a fact that NI can accommodate. We also discuss more fine-grained aspects of the semantics of FCIs, such as their emotional colour. (. . .) the tripod fell spontaneously, because, though it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall so as to serve for a seat. Aristotle, Physics II,6. (shrink)

Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that concessive knowledge attributions—assertions of the form “I know that p but it might be that not p”—can be true. Yet, these assertions plainly sound incoherent. Fallibilists have proposed to explain this incoherence pragmatically. The main proponents of this approach appeal to Gricean implicatures (Rysiew in Noûs 35(4):477514, 2001; Dougherty and Rysiew in Philos Phenomenol (...) Res 78(1):123132, 2009; Dougherty and Rysiew in Synthese 181(3):395403, 2011). Very recently, some philosophers have observed that fallibilists can also explain this apparent incoherence pragmatically if they embrace a (context-sensitive) certainty norm for assertion (Petersen in Synthese 196(11):4691–4710, 2019; Beddor in Philos Impr 20(8), 2020; Vollet in Dialectica 74:3, 2020). In this paper, I argue for the superiority of this latter explanation over its older rivals. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

This critique of Henri Bergson is Jacques Maritain's first book. In it he shows he has a grasp of the thought of St Thomas Aquinas and an ability to show its relevance to other systems such as that of Bergson. This text presents Jacques Maritain's as a philosopher, a Thomist and a critic.

A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and (...) insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning. (shrink)

In this engaging APSA address, Jacques Maritain outlines the essential relationship between Christianity and democracy. In Maritain's view, it is the Gospel or the Christian leaven which has awakened the secular, temporal consciousness to supreme moral principles and the real content of democracy understood as the earthly pursuit of Gospel truths conceming the transcendent origins and destiny of man and society. Christianity teaches the inalienable dignity of every human being fashioned in the image of God, the inviolability of conscience, (...) the unity of the human race, the natural equality of all men, children of the same God and redeemed by the same Christ, the dignity of labor and the dignity of the poor, the primacy of inner values and good will over external values, universal brotherhood, love, and justbe. Maritain distinguishes between the procedural aspects and the substantive content of democracy, but anchors the Gospel vision in the free exercise of rational and moral faculties as key to democratic self-government. He cautions that without a superior moral law by virtue of which men are bound in conscience toward what is just and good, the rule of the majority runs the risk of being raised to the supreme rule of good and evil, and democracy is liable to tum to totalitahanism, that is, to self-destruction. Maritain concludes that what has been gained for the secular consciousness, if it does not veer to barbarism, is the sense of freedom consonant with the vocation of our nature. (shrink)