Simone de Beauvoir a beau avoir placé en épigraphe du Deuxième sexe une citation de François Poulain de la Barre (1647-1723), cet écrivain cartésien, qui est l’auteur de trois traités féministes essentiels, reste pour ainsi dire inconnu. Dans son ouvrage, François Poulain de la Barre and the Invention of Modern Equality, Siep Stuurman entend lui restituer toute son importance, non seulement dans l’histoire du féminisme et du genre, mais aussi dans celle de la critique sociale et politique. C’...

Marie-Frédérique Pellegrin | : Poulain de la Barre fait un usage original des procédés d’inversion tels qu’on les trouve en littérature et en philosophie, afin de démontrer l’égalité des sexes. Chez lui, l’inversion des valeurs ne vise pas seulement à remettre en cause le bien-fondé de la domination masculine et à louer une supériorité féminine en matière de moeurs et d’intelligence. Cette inversion entend abolir toute hiérarchisation entre les sexes. Tout d’abord l’auteur émancipe le genre du sexe. (...) Ensuite il prône un efféminage de tous les êtres humains. Le concept d’efféminage que nous forgeons est à distinguer de celui d’efféminement, qui implique l’idée d’une féminisation au sens d’une inclination vers des valeurs considérées comme féminines d’un point de vue culturel. L’efféminage est une prescription morale et sociale à devenir femme au sens d’un retour à l’état prélapsaire parfait dont les femmes sont plus héritières que les hommes car elles ont moins été touchées par le péché originel. L’efféminage ne consiste donc pas à devenir femme au sens d’une simple féminisation — sociale — des moeurs. L’efféminage fait signe vers l’égalité et non vers une supériorité féminine que sous-entend l’impératif d’efféminement. Le concept d’efféminage permet donc de penser, de manière explicite, le genre contre le sexe, non pas comme inversion mais comme construction ou plutôt reconstruction d’une autre nature humaine. | : Poulain de la Barre made original use of methods of inversion such as are found in literature and in philosophy, in order to demonstrate the equality of the sexes. In his work, the inversion of values is aimed not only at calling into question the legitimacy of male dominance and at praising feminine superiority in matters of morals and intelligence. It is an attempt to abolish any organization of the sexes into a hierarchy. In the first place, the author liberates gender from sex. Next, he advocates the “efféminage” of all human beings. The concept of “efféminage” that we are constructing here is to be distinguished from that of “efféminement”, which implies the idea of feminization in the sense of an inclination toward values considered feminine from a cultural perspective. “Efféminage” is a moral and social prescription to become a woman in the sense of a return to the perfect prelapsarian state of which women are more properly the inheritors because they have been less affected by original sin. “Efféminage” does not then consist in becoming a woman in the sense of a simple social feminization of morals. “Efféminage” gestures toward equality and not toward the feminine superiority implied by the imperative of “efféminement”. The concept of “efféminage” allows us then to think explicitly about gender in distinction with sex, not as an inversion but as a construction or rather a reconstruction of another human nature. (shrink)

L'article propose d'appliquer les critères de la radicalité tels qu'ils sont définis par Jonathan Israel à un philosophe, François Poulain de la Barre, afin d'éprouver la validité et la pertinence de ces critères, censés définir des groupes de penseurs fondateurs des Lumières dites radicales. Poulain de la Barre, premier féministe « moderne », est en effet mobilisé par trois fois par Israel, mais subit un sort curieux. Cette étude de cas montre que la cohérence des critères nécessaires pour définir le (...) radical peut être discutée, notamment à partir d'un examen critique du dernier paragraphe du Traité politique de Spinoza. (shrink)

Nicolas Malebranche looks at the phenomena of imaginative contagion up to the point of madness, as in the case of the visions of sorcerers and werewolves. Although Malebranche relies on a psycho-physiological description, it becomes obvious that the responsibility for such contagions is not to be attributed to those who were expected to be the cause, that is would-be sorcerers, but to those who picked up on their deeds and gave them some importance. It is therefore the material conditions of (...) these stories and the use made by them of the social and intellectual authorities that should be underlined. In the final analysis, the Malebranchian reflexion on imaginative contagion is a critique of the writers of such stories and of the anxiety they may produce in their readers' minds. At this point, the general explanatory schema according to which a contagion is due to the action of a strong imagination upon a weaker one is no longer relevant. For as regards the writer, given that he is impressed by the visionary's tales and has himself a strong imagination, this makes him all the more responsible for what he writes. (shrink)

Le philosophe François Poulain de La Barre réfléchit aux conditions nécessaires pour fonder une nouvelle science d'inspiration cartésienne. Parfaite et universelle, celle-ci s'oppose au savoir de type scolastique en remettant en question la distinction traditionnelle entre le savant et le vulgaire. Poulain entend démontrer que la véritable réforme de la science suppose une féminisation de ses acteurs. Les femmes se caractérisent en effet par le désir naturel de se comprendre elles-mêmes, or la véritable science se définit justement comme connaissance de (...) soi-même. Elles ont, de plus, une capacité tout aussi naturelle de la diffuser autour d'elles, capacité qui manque à la plupart des hommes. Avec l'émergence de savantes aux côtés des savants, le sage pourra enfin sortir de son statut ambigu d' « esprit fort ». The philosopher François Poulain de La Barre discussed the conditions that are necessary to found a new science that is inspired by Cartesianism. Since it would be perfect and universal, such a science would contrast with knowing in a scholastic manner by challenging the traditional distinction between the learned and the uneducated. Poulain wished to show that a genuine reform of science presupposes the feminization of its contributors. Women are characterized by a natural desire for self-understanding, and genuine science or knowledge is defined precisely as self-knowledge. Women also have a completely natural capacity for disseminating knowledge -a capacity that is lacking in most men. If learned women appeared sideby-side with learned men, the concept of a wise person would eventually be liberated from its ambiguous association with a 'strong mind'. (shrink)

Malebranche interroge le mystère de l’Incarnation par un biais très particulier, celui de « l’in-animation » de Dieu. En s’incarnant, Dieu se dote en effet d’une âme et pas seulement d’un corps. Or, dès lors qu’il est pourvu d’une âme humaine, le Christ en éprouve les limitations. Certes, celles-ci sont consenties et illustrent la volonté d’endosser véritablement la condition humaine, mais elles ont des conséquences surprenantes. Elles expliquent en dernier ressort le nombre important des hommes qui n’entreront pas dans le (...) temple céleste, puisque le Christ le construit au moyen de son âme qui pense de manière finie. On arrive ainsi au paradoxe d’un Dieu qui s’incarne pour sauver les hommes et que cette opération rend impuissant à le faire. L’obscurité de l’âme christique joue donc un rôle central dans la théodicée malebranchiste. (shrink)

Le deuil a été largement étudié par la psychanalyse. L’aptitude à la séparation mère-bébé l’est également par les spécialistes du développement infantile. Nous souhaitons former des ponts entre ces deux épistémologies pour démontrer que l’aptitude à la séparation permet la prédisposition au deuil. L’aptitude à la séparation résulte de la cessation de l’état fusionnel mère-bébé qui permet l’établissement de l’intersubjectivité puis de la subjectivité. Le rythme des interactions mère-bébé donne accès à la temporalité. Ces étapes sont essentielles pour le travail (...) de la pensée nécessaire au deuil. Le bébé dont la mère est déprimée dès la naissance ne pourra pas développer son aptitude à la séparation dans une perpétuelle attitude de stimulation. L’enfant qui connaît la dépression maternelle aura les plus grandes difficultés à accepter son ambivalence. Nos illustrations thérapeutiques témoignent qu’il est possible maintenant de proposer une prévention de la dépression maternelle en maternité ou en pédiatrie. (shrink)

Resenhas dos seguintes livros: Scarlett Marton. Nietzsche e as mulheres: Figuras, imagens e tipos femininos. Autêntica, 2022; Marie-Frédérique Pellegrin. Pensées du corps et différences des sexes à l’époque moderne. ENS Éditions, 2020; e Ana Gabriela Colantoni; Georgia Cristina Amitrano; Carla Milani Damião (orgs.). Ensaios de filósofas brasileiras. Ape’Ku Editora, 2022.

Dans la Querelle des femmes, il n’y a guère d’auteur plus connu et disputé que F. Poulain de la Barre. Il était pourtant impossible de lire ses textes dans une édition moderne, surtout son traité (ironique) sur l’excellence des hommes. Fort à propos, Marie-Frédérique Pellegrin nous présente une édition complète et commentée des trois textes de cet auteur, pourvue d`une introduction aussi bien informée qu’informative. Cette quarantaine de pages sur « Poulain de la Barre : Un féminisme (...) philosop... (shrink)

Cartesianism constitutes a particular and crucial moment in the history of the relations between the aims of philosophy and feminist claims. This is explained by theoretical reasons (the new Cartesian science posits a human being that is fundamentally non-sexual and ungendered) and by practical reasons (the importance of the philosophical vocations for women and the feminist vocations for men that Cartesianism has permitted). Recent readings of Descartes (which see him either as a misogynist or as a philogynist) show that the (...) theoretical connections between Cartesianism and feminism are strong: Cartesianism powerfully questions the relation of women to philosophy, both as subjects and as philosophical objects. (shrink)

English summary: This book examines the philosophy of Elisabeth of Bohemia in conjunction with Descartess. She maintained a philosophical dialogue with another philosopher employing pertinent arguments. In addition, she perhaps developed her own theses, truly philosophical theses which can be better understood in consideration with her numerous correspondents. The study seeks to better understand Elisabeths role in Cartesian thought, and to determine her own philosophical thought. French description: Le titre meme de ce volume, sous forme d'interrogation, est a comprendre comme (...) un postulat. Il s'explique comme suit : il s'agit de s'interroger sur la pensee philosophique d'Elisabeth tout autant que sur celle de Descartes. La reflexion d'Elisabeth semble en effet posseder une dimension philosophique a deux titres au moins : d'abord parce que la princesse entretient un dialogue philosophique de haute tenue avec un autre philosophe, en deployant des arguments pertinents; ensuite parce qu'elle developpe peut-etre elle-meme des theses qui lui sont personnelles, qui seraient des theses au sens fort et pleinement philosophique du terme, et dont l'etude pourrait etre affinee par la prise en consideration de ses tres nombreux autres correspondants. Reste un scrupule : celui de trahir le souhait meme d'Elisabeth de cantonner ses echanges intellectuels au plan prive, en la propulsant en pleine lumiere et en lui faisant endosser une posture philosophique qu'elle a soigneusement evitee de son vivant. Qu'on songe qu'elle voulait que cet echange soit code! Mais comme le premier traitre fut Descartes lui-meme, transmettant les lettres d'Elisabeth a Christine de Suede, considerons-nous comme habilites, en bons cartesiens, a divulguer la pensee de la princesse palatine. C'est a ce prix en effet, que nous pourrons redefinir le role de cette derniere dans le cartesianisme, determiner s'il existe une pensee propre d'Elisabeth et enfin, si elle existe, savoir en quoi elle consiste. (shrink)

Constitution d’un grand corpus d’écrits émergents et novices : principes et méthodes Cette contribution propose une réflexion sur la construction d’un vaste corpus d’écrits qui permet d’approfondir notre compréhension des processus en jeu dans l’accès à la littératie dans sa diversité, au travers de la pluralité des genres et des types discursifs qui la constituent et chez des apprenants de profils divers : enfants/adultes, langue 1 / langue 2, entendants/sourds. La réflexion sur la mise en place de ce corpus s’inscrit (...) dans une perspective fonctionnaliste et énonciative et fait fond sur deux ensembles théoriques complémentaires. Du point de vue de l’acquisition des langues, nous souscrivons à la conception selon laquelle les productions d’apprenants ne constituent pas une déviance par rapport à la norme mais sont des manifestations (idiolectales) de systèmes linguistiques per se dont il s’agit de dégager les normes propres. Du point de vue de la littératie, nous nous inscrivons dans la tradition des travaux, d’inspiration bakhtinienne, qui considèrent l’hétérogénéité comme constitutive de toute production verbale. Ainsi, nous expliquons et justifions nos choix en matière de profils d’apprenants et de tâches rédactionnelles, en relation avec la perspective théorique adoptée, ainsi que les options retenues en matière d’outillage du corpus. (shrink)

The body may be the object we know the best. It is the only object from which we constantly receive a flow of information through sight and touch; and it is the only object we can experience from the inside, through our proprioceptive, vestibular, and visceral senses. Yet there have been very few books that have attempted to consolidate our understanding of the body as it figures in our experience and self-awareness. This volume offers an interdisciplinary and comprehensive treatment of (...) bodily self-awareness, the first book to do so since the landmark 1995 collection The Body and the Self, edited by José Bermúdez, Naomi Eilan, and Anthony Marcel. Since 1995, the study of the body in such psychological disciplines as cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, and neuropsychology has advanced dramatically, accompanied by a resurgence of philosophical interest in the significance of the body in our mental life. The sixteen specially commissioned essays in this book reflect the advances in these fields. The book is divided into three parts, each part covering a topic central to an explanation of bodily self-awareness: representation of the body; the sense of bodily ownership; and representation of the self. ContributorsAdrian Alsmith, Brianna Beck, José Luis Bermúdez, Anna Berti, Alexandre Billon, Andrew J. Bremner, Lucilla Cardinali, Tony Cheng, Frédérique de Vignemont, Francesca Fardo, Alessandro Farnè, Carlotta Fossataro, Shaun Gallagher, Francesca Garbarini, Patrick Haggard, Jakob Hohwy, Matthew R. Longo, Tamar Makin, Marie Martel, Melvin Mezue, John Michael, Christopher Peacocke, Lorenzo Pia, Louise Richardson, Alice C. Roy, Manos Tsakiris, Hong Yu Wong. (shrink)

Dans un article consacré au nom de famille, une juriste pose une question récurrente : « Le système onomastique a-t-il un genre? » La réponse affirmative donnée ne surprendra pas. S’il est certain que l’évolution du droit et des mœurs conduit à plus d’égalité, le nom reste, en droit civil, une des dernières règles reflétant les rapports hiérarchiques de pouvoir entre les hommes et les femmes dans la famille. Le nom des femmes, comme mères ou épouses, semblent encore aujourd’hui être (...) le refle... (shrink)

Review on Kieran McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead I.4, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis (...) of this notion, we will clarify what distinguishes constitutive mechanistic explanations from etiological ones. 1 Introduction 2 Criteria of Adequacy 2.1 Descriptive adequacy 2.2 Constitutive–etiological distinction 2.3 Constitution 3 The Ontological Nature of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena 3.1 Phenomena as input–output relations 3.2 Phenomena as end states 3.3 Phenomena as dispositions 3.4 Phenomena as behaviours 4 Phenomena as Object-Involving Occurrents 4.1 What object-involving occurrents are and why we need them 4.2 The object in the phenomenon 4.3 The adequacy of option 5 Conclusion. (shrink)

This dissertation aims to construct a non-dogmatic defence of common sense. It tries to show why the absence of justification for the judgements of common sense, which the sceptic reveals, does not invalidate them.

Leuridan (2011) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mech-anistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see e.g. Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 1996; MDC 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2003; Weber 2005). In our view, Leuridan (...) misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim, that all causal claims require laws, is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation and control. (shrink)

Mechanisms are said to consist of two kinds of components, entities and activities. In the first half of this chapter, I examine what entities and activities are, how they relate to well-known ontological categories, such as processes or dispositions, and how entities and activities relate to each other (e.g., can one be reduced to the other or are they mutually dependent?). The second part of this chapter analyzes different criteria for individuating the components of mechanisms and discusses how real the (...) boundaries of mechanisms are. (shrink)

Individuals of many animal species are said to have a personality. It has been shown that some individuals are bolder than other individuals of the same species, or more sociable or more aggressive. In this paper, we analyse what it means to say that an animal has a personality. We clarify what an animal personality is, that is, its ontology, and how different personality concepts relate to each other, and we examine how personality traits are identified in biological practice. Our (...) analysis shows that biologists often study specific personality traits, such as boldness, sociability or aggressiveness, rather than personalities in general. We claim that personality traits are best understood as dispositions and that they are operationally defined in terms of certain sets of behaviours, which are studied in specific experimental set-ups. Furthermore, we develop an integrative philosophical account that specifies and formalises three criteria for identifying personality traits, which are used in biological practice. For an individual animal to have a personality trait it must, first, behave differently than others. Second, these behavioural differences must be stable over a certain time, and third, they must be consistent in different contexts. (shrink)

What are the conditions under which one biological object is a part of another biological object? This paper answers this question by developing a general, systematic account of biological parthood. I specify two criteria for biological parthood. Substantial Spatial Inclusionrequires biological parts to be spatially located inside or in the region that the natural boundary of t he biological whole occupies. Compositional Relevance captures the fact that a biological part engages in a biological process that must make a necessary contribution (...) to a condition that is minimally sufficient to one or more of the characteristic behaviors of the biological whole. Instead of emphasizing the diversity of part-whole relations in the biological world, this paper asks what biological part-whole relations have in common and what constrains their existence, in general. After presenting the two criteria for biological parthood I discuss in how far my account can cope with hard cases (e.g., redundant parts) and I reveal the merits and limits of monism. (shrink)

In the contemporary life sciences more and more researchers emphasize the “limits of reductionism” (e.g. Ahn et al. 2006a, 709; Mazzocchi 2008, 10) or they call for a move “beyond reductionism” (Gallagher/Appenzeller 1999, 79). However, it is far from clear what exactly they argue for and what the envisioned limits of reductionism are. In this paper I claim that the current discussions about reductionism in the life sciences, which focus on methodological and explanatory issues, leave the concepts of a reductive (...) method and a reductive explanation too unspecified. In order to fill this gap and to clarify what the limits of reductionism are I identify three reductive methods that are crucial in the current practice of the life sciences: decomposition, focusing on internal factors, and studying parts in isolation. Furthermore, I argue that reductive explanations in the life sciences exhibit three characteristics: first, they refer only to factors at a lower level than the phenomenon at issue, second, they focus on internal factors and thus ignore or simplify the environment of a system, and, third, they cite only the parts of a system in isolation. (shrink)

This paper looks at statements I am in a position to make ‘straight off’: observational judgements, perceptual and memory statements, statements about my posture, my intentions, and so on. These kinds of statement pose a problem: what is the nature of my entitlement to them? I focus on observational judgements and on two contrasting approaches to them. The first, which I reject, provides an account of my warrant for them; the second, which I defend, disconnects my entitlement from possession of (...) a justification. I consider what light the second approach sheds on the other kinds of statements I am in a position to make straight off. (shrink)

The topic of this special issue of Synthese is hyperintensionality. This introduction offers a brief survey of the very notion of hyperintensionality followed by a summary of each of the papers in this collection. The papers are foundational studies of hyperintensionality accompanied by ample philosophical applications.Hyperintensionality concerns the individuation of non-extensional entities such as propositions and properties, relations-in-intension and individual roles, as well as, for instance, proofs and judgments and computational procedures, in case these do not reduce to any of (...) the former. Hyperintensional individuation is frequently also referred to as ‘fine-grained’ or sometimes simply ‘intensional’ individuation, when ‘intensional’ is not understood in the specific sense of possible-world semantics or in the pejorative sense of flouting various logical rules of extensional logic. A principle of individuation qualifies as hyperintensional as soon as it is finer than necessary .. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving , Panksepp and Vandekerckhove we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which relies on affective experiential states (...) and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher ‘knowing consciousness’. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a new account of the philosophical motivations for Descartes’s theory of judgment. The theory needs explanation because the idea that judgment, or belief, is an operation of the will seems problematic at best, and Descartes does not make clear why he adopted what, at the time, was a novel view. I argue that attending to Descartes’s conception of the will as the active, free faculty of mind reveals that a general concern with responsibility motivates his (...) theory of judgment. My account avoids some unappealing features of the standard interpretation, renders the theory more plausible than many have suggested, and explains why his theory does not fall neatly into any current-day position on the issue of the control we have over belief. (shrink)

AI systems that demonstrate significant bias or lower than claimed accuracy, and resulting in individual and societal harms, continue to be reported. Such reports beg the question as to why such systems continue to be funded, developed and deployed despite the many published ethical AI principles. This paper focusses on the funding processes for AI research grants which we have identified as a gap in the current range of ethical AI solutions such as AI procurement guidelines, AI impact assessments and (...) AI audit frameworks. We highlight the responsibilities of funding bodies to ensure investment is channelled towards trustworthy and safe AI systems and provides case studies as to how other ethical funding principles are managed. We offer a first sight of two proposals for funding bodies to consider regarding procedures they can employ. The first proposal is for the inclusion of a Trustworthy AI Statement’ section in the grant application form and offers an example of the associated guidance. The second proposal outlines the wider management requirements of a funding body for the ethical review and monitoring of funded projects to ensure adherence to the proposed ethical strategies in the applicants Trustworthy AI Statement. The anticipated outcome for such proposals being employed would be to create a ‘stop and think’ section during the project planning and application procedure requiring applicants to implement the methods for the ethically aligned design of AI. In essence it asks funders to send the message “if you want the money, then build trustworthy AI!”. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it is finally time to move beyond the Nagelian framework and to break new ground in thinking about epistemic reduction in biology. I will do so, not by simply repeating all the old objections that have been raised against Ernest Nagel’s classical model of theory reduction. Rather, I grant that a proponent of Nagel’s approach can handle several of these problems but that, nevertheless, Nagel’s general way of thinking about epistemic reduction in terms of (...) theories and their logical relations is entirely inadequate with respect to what is going on in actual biological research practice. (shrink)

In [12], P. Scowcroft and L. van den Dries proved a cell decomposition theorem for p-adically closed fields. We work here with the notion of P-minimal fields defined by D. Haskell and D. Macpherson in [6]. We prove that a P-minimal field K admits cell decomposition if and only if K has definable selection. A preprint version in French of this result appeared as a prepublication [8].