Mossner's Life of David Hume remains the standard biography of this great thinker and writer. First published in 1954, and updated in 1980, it is now reissued in paperback in response to increased interest in Hume. E. C. Mossner was Emeritus Professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin. 'Mossner's work is a quite remarkable scholarly achievement; it will be an indispensable tool for Hume scholars and a treasure-trove of information for all students of the (...) intellectual and literary history of the eighteenth century' Richard H. Popkin in the Philological Quarterly. (shrink)

In this new edition are a detailed bibliography, index, and textual supplements, making it the perfect text for scholars and advanced students of Hume, ...

HUME’S PHILOSOPHICAL SUBVERSION OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED, WAS LIFELONG: THE "RELIGIOUS HYPOTHESIS" IS EMPTY. SO I HAVE ARGUED IN A NEW READING OF THE "DIALOGUES". THE ONLY HOPE FOR HUMANITY LIES IN MAN HIMSELF. HUME DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE "VULGAR" AND THE "ENLIGHTENED." AT THE APEX OF THE "ENLIGHTENED" STAND THE "HEROES IN PHILOSOPHY," OF WHOM ONLY GALILEO AND NEWTON ARE SPECIFIED. THE "ENLIGHTENED" PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE, A DUTY WE MAY VIEW AS THE "RELIGION OF MAN." QUITE POSSIBLY HUME (...) CONSIDERED HIMSELF THE THIRD "HERO IN PHILOSOPHY." EVIDENCE IS PROVIDED BY HIS TRIUMPHAL RECEPTION IN PARIS, 1763-1765: "THEY CONSIDER ME AS ONE OF THE GREATEST GENIUSES IN THE WORLD." THUS THE "RELIGION OF MAN" IRONICALLY CONSTITUTES HUME’S PERSONAL RELIGION. (shrink)

Mossner's Life of David Hume remains the standard biography of this great thinker and writer. First published in 1954, and updated in 1980, it is now reissued in paperback in response to increased interest in Hume. E. C. Mossner was Emeritus Professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin. 'Mossner's work is a quite remarkable scholarly achievement; it will be an indispensable tool for Hume scholars and a treasure-trove of information for all students of the (...) intellectual and literary history of the eighteenth century' Richard H. Popkin in the Philological Quarterly. (shrink)

This volume, first published in 1954, is one of three presenting the correspondence of David Hume. It collects letters from 1737 to 1776 which do not appear in J. Y. T. Greig's two volumes of 1932, and offers a rich picture of the man and his age. The correspondents include such famous thinkers as Adam Smith, James Boswell, and Benjamin Franklin.

Hume'sDialogues Concerning Natural Religion are still much with us. What appears to be the definitive edition was published by Professor Norman Kemp Smith in 1935 with a learned introduction which, among other things, assembled a mass of evidence pointing to the conclusion that Philo is to be identified with Hume himself, and that Hume in the Dialogues is deliberately trying to undermine the religious hypothesis. Though these conclusions have been widely accepted, Dr. B. M. Laing, in the April issue of (...) Philosophy, strenuously attacked them in an ingenious argument based in part on his already published thesis that Hume's fundamental philosophy is not really the scepticism so long assigned him. Dr. Laing takes the opportunity in passing to indicate his sympathy with the recent position of a distinguished British poet that Voltaire, also, has been traditionally abused in the assumption that on the question of religion he wrote with his tongue in his cheek. The present examination is not designed to inquire into this new mode of making the wicked pious; nor to push the question back from the Dialogues to Hume's basic philosophy; nor to press the writer's conviction [“The Enigma of Hume,” Mind, XLV pp. 334–349] that not only is Philo to be identified as Hume, but in addition, Cleanthes as Joseph Butler, and Demea as Samuel Clarke. The present purpose is solely to indicate certain unhistorical bases of Dr. Laing's attack on the more traditional view so ably championed by Professor Norman Kemp Smith. (shrink)

Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are still much with us. What appears to be the definitive edition was published by Professor Norman Kemp Smith in 1935 with a learned introduction which, among other things, assembled a mass of evidence pointing to the conclusion that Philo is to be identified with Hume himself, and that Hume in the Dialogues is deliberately trying to undermine the religious hypothesis. Though these conclusions have been widely accepted, Dr. B. M. Laing, in the April issue (...) of Philosophy , strenuously attacked them in an ingenious argument based in part on his already published thesis that Hume's fundamental philosophy is not really the scepticism so long assigned him. Dr. Laing takes the opportunity in passing to indicate his sympathy with the recent position of a distinguished British poet that Voltaire, also, has been traditionally abused in the assumption that on the question of religion he wrote with his tongue in his cheek. The present examination is not designed to inquire into this new mode of making the wicked pious; nor to push the question back from the Dialogues to Hume's basic philosophy; nor to press the writer's conviction [“The Enigma of Hume,” Mind , XLV pp. 334–349] that not only is Philo to be identified as Hume, but in addition, Cleanthes as Joseph Butler, and Demea as Samuel Clarke. The present purpose is solely to indicate certain unhistorical bases of Dr. Laing's attack on the more traditional view so ably championed by Professor Norman Kemp Smith. (shrink)

A volume in Evaluation and Society Series Editors, Jennifer C. Greene, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Stewart I. Donaldson, Claremont Graduate University In this book, Ernie House reframes how we think about evaluation by reconsidering three key concepts of values, biases, and practical wisdom. The first part of the book reconstructs core evaluation concepts, with a focus on the origins of our values and biases. The second part explores how we handle values and biases in practice, and the third (...) shows how we learn practical wisdom and use it in evaluations. Value is the central concept in this volume, yet it's a fuzzy concept. In Part I, Ernie clarifies the concept of value by addressing basic questions: What are values? Where do they come from? Why do we have them? Why is our conception so confused? How do we handle values in evaluations? In Part II, another central concept is added, that of biases. Prominent evaluation frameworks have focused on biases, including Campbell and Stanley's (1963) framework for validating causal inferences and Scriven's (1972) conception of objectivity, which is achieved by correcting for biases in general. In addition, research on thought processes has made progress by focusing on cognitive biases (Kahneman, 2011). Even so, through a case example, Ernie demonstrates that the concept of biases is under-appreciated and not well engaged in evaluation practice. The third important concept, featured in Part III, is practical wisdom, which is the knowledge that evaluators acquire through experience. Practical wisdom informs what we do, possibly as much as theory. Experienced evaluators often conduct evaluations in similar ways, regardless of their theory, because practical wisdom determines much of what they do. Ernie provides concrete examples of practical wisdom and how we employ it. Throughout the book, he draws on the empirical research on thinking processes, especially Kahneman's Thinking Fast and Slow (2011). This book will be of interest and relevance to all evaluation scholars and practitioners, as it thoughtfully engages core constructs of the field. The book can also well serve as a supplementary text in multiple evaluation courses, as it offers valuable conceptual and practical perspectives on our craft. (shrink)

The Bibliographic Bases of Hume's Understanding of Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonism PETER S. FOSL N~q~e ~vaoo 6t~ttoxe~v' Epicharmus OVER THE PAST FORTY YEARS, the work of many scholars has served to advance and secure a hermeneutical approach to the development of modern philoso- phy first articulated by Richard H. Popkin3 The central proposition upon which this approach turns is that the discovery and application of ancient I am grateful to Richard Popkin, Julia Annas , Jonathan Barnes , Craig Walton , (...) Tom L. Beauchamp , and a number of anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. LOn the back of one of the sheets of his memoranda Hume wrote this remark. It may be translated as: "Keep sober and remember to be skeptical"; Ernest Campbell Mossner, "Hume's Early Memoranda, 1729-4o: The Complete Text," Journal of the Histo U of Ideas 9.4 : 5o3n.17 9 Richard H. Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism," The Philosophical Quarterly 1. 5 : 385-4o7; "The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern Philosophy," Parts I, II, and III, Review of Metaphysics 8 : 131-51, 3o7-33, 499-51o; The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza ; "Scepticism and the Counter-Reformation in France," Archiv ffir.. (shrink)

The book combines philosophical exposition and legal analysis, and pays special attention to issues of tort law.

Extends the ideas of social constructivism to the philosophy of mathematics, developing a powerful critique of traditional absolutist conceptions of mathematics, and proposing a reconceptualization of the philosophy of mathematics.

THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...

This book is an examination of the foundations and applications of the program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages introduced in 1967 by Donald Davidson in his classic paper “Truth and Meaning.” This is the second of two books on Donald Davidson’s central philosophical project. The first, Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), dealt with the basic framework of Davidson’s truth-theoretic approach to providing a meaning theory for a natural language, and then with his (...) development of his general project in the philosophy of language and theory of meaning by way of the analysis of the empirical confirmation of a meaning theory for a speaker, from the stance of the radial interpreter, that is, the interpreter who starts out without any detailed knowledge of the speakers’ meanings or attitudes. This book turns to the development of details of Davidson’s semantic program, specifically, the pursuit of the project of providing a compositional semantic theory for natural languages by making strategic use of an appropriately adapted Tarski-style axiomatic truth theory. Such a theory aims to provide a specification of the truth conditions of any felicitous utterance of a natural language sentence which serves to interpret it, and exhibits in the proof of the theorem that gives the truth conditions the compositional structure of the sentence and how its truth depends on its context of utterance. The book develops the basic framework, applies it to quantifiers, proper names, indexicals, simple and complex demonstratives, quotation, adjectives and adverbs, simple tenses of state and event verbs, temporal adverbs and quantifiers, tense in sentential complements and perfect tenses, opaque contexts, especially indirect discourse and attitude sentences, non-declarative sentences, semantic structure and logical form, and discusses the relation of the framework the metaphysics of truth. (shrink)

In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...