Wir beenden unsere Überlegungen. Bei der Frage nach der Würde des Menschen benutzten wir die Worte Pascals, um das zu verdeutlichen, was die "Größe" des Menschen ausmacht. Es war der Hinweis auf die Beziehung des Menschen zur absoluten Transzendenz. Eher unbesprochen blieb die gewissermaßen andere Seite des Menschen, die Pascal als dessen "Elend" bezeichnet. Diese Ausklammerung bedeutet jedoch nicht, daß wir diese Seite nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen. Der Grund für die Ausklammerung lag in der Absicht, dem Thema der Größe und (...) Würde des Menschen zu folgen. Mehr denn je vielleicht wird heute vom "Elend" des Menschen gesprochen. Mehr denn je will man heute den Menschen gänzlich verstehen und rechtfertigen durch das, was den Menschen bloß mit dieser Welt verbindet. Man wird also viel mehr den Blick auf das richten müssen, was die Größe des Menschen ausmacht. Denn, wird diese Größe des Menschen nicht erkannt oder verkannt, geht diese Größe in der Tat dem Menschen verloren. Dann finden auch die im Leben des Menschen geltenden Regeln ihre Begründung nicht mehr in der Erkenntnis dessen, was das eigentliche und wahre Ziel des Lebens ist, und seine Verwirklichung wird unmöglich. Letztlich geht es immer darum, so wie Aristoteles dies schon sagt, dem Verrat am Menschen und dem Unglück des Menschen vorzubeugen. (shrink)

Recensiòn del libro Jacques Ellul de Carlos Díaz.

Reseña de la obra Carta de una mujer indignada desde el Magreb a Europa de Wassyla Tamzali (Cátedra 2011)).

The approach adopted in the paper is based on the theory known as Montague grammar. Accepting, in general, that theory — especially in its modified version, which is due to Thomason and Kaplan — the author points out certain inadequacy in its treatment of the meaning of some indexical expressions and suggests some modification of its theoretical framework in order to avoid that shortcoming. It is claimed that to do justice to the meaning of so-called indefinite indexicals (such as we, (...) you, now) two kinds of dependence of their semantic values upon the context of use must be taken into account — a semantic (or lexical) and a pragmatic (or extralexical) one. (shrink)

William Jaworski shows how hylomorphism can be used to solve mind-body problems--the question of how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phenomena fit into the physical world. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle, and is responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are, and having the powers or capacities they have. From a hylomorphic perspective, mind-body problems are byproducts of a worldview that rejects structure, and which lacks a basic principle which distinguishes (...) the parts of the physical universe that can think, feel, and perceive from those that can't. Without such a principle, the existence of those powers in the physical world can start to look inexplicable and mysterious. But if mental phenomena are structural phenomena then they are uncontroversially part of the physical world. Hylomorphism thus provides an elegant way of solving mind-body problems. (shrink)

Descartes developed a compelling characterization of mental and physical phenomena which has remained more or less canonical for Western philosophy ever since. The greatest testament to the power of Cartesian thinking is its ubiquity. Even philosophers who are critical of post-Cartesian anthropology nevertheless tacitly endorse Cartesian assumptions. Part of what leads to this strange inconsistency is that by and large philosophers no longer know what a non-Cartesian anthropology looks like. I discuss some commitments characteristic of post-Cartesian philosophy of mind, and (...) present an alternative conception of psychological phenomena more consistent with a hylomorphic framework. (shrink)

Ota Weinberger was a Czech-Austrian jurist, whose core academic work on issues of democracy was mostly published in the 1990s. In his writings, he focused primarily on legal philosophy from a positivist perspective. However, there are also significant overlaps with the field of political theory as Weinberger examined the conditions for the functioning of contemporary democracies. In this paper, some of the main features of his conception of the so-called “structured democracy” are clarified. The conception opposed several other democratic theories, (...) especially the elitist (Schumpeterian), the majoritarian, but also the discursive one, as represented by Jürgen Habermas, with whom Weinberger fundamentally disagreed. The paper focuses on several key elements of his theory, such as the leading ideas, the role of institutions, open society, and his critique of marketing methods in politics. (shrink)

It is quite popular nowadays to postulate various kinds of unarticulated constituents that have essential bearing on truth conditions of utterances. F. Recanati champions an elaborated version of contextualism according to which one has to distinguish two kinds of unarticulated constituents: those that are articulated at the level of the logical form of a given sentence and those that are truly unarticulated. Recanati offers a theory which explains the manner of incorporating truly unarticulated constituents into the propositions expressed. This theory (...) invokes variadic functions. The present paper shows that variadic functions are unnecessary because no constituents are truly unarticulated in the sense assumed by Recanati. An alternative explanation is offered according to which all propositional constituents are either explicitly or implicitly represented at the syntactic level. (shrink)

I aim to develop a tool for comparing theories of vagueness, using Structured Query Language. Relevant SQL snippets will be used throughout.

In this article I wish to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental critique on the ideal of independency in human life without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral value altogether. In care ethics, a relational account of autonomy is developed instead. Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the literature as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall begin by elaborating on how care ethics and its place in ethical theory can be understood. I shall stipulate a definition of (...) care ethics as a moral perspective or orientation from which ethical theorizing can take place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance from which we can theorize ethically, than ready-made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in this way, it becomes possible to make clear that, for instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not abandoned, but instead is given a particular place and interpretation. In the final part of this article I will show how ‘relational autonomy’ can be applied fruitfully in the practice of psychiatric care. (shrink)

May you sell your vote? May you sell your kidney? May gay men pay surrogates to bear them children? May spouses pay each other to watch the kids, do the dishes, or have sex? Should we allow the rich to genetically engineer gifted, beautiful children? Should we allow betting markets on terrorist attacks and natural disasters? Most people shudder at the thought. To put some goods and services for sale offends human dignity. If everything is commodified , then nothing is (...) sacred. The market corrodes our character. Or so most people say. In Markets without Limits , Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski give markets a fair hearing. The market does not introduce wrongness where there was not any previously. Thus, the authors claim, the question of what rightfully may be bought and sold has a simple answer: if you may do it for free, you may do it for money. Contrary to the conservative consensus, they claim there are no inherent limits to what can be bought and sold, but only restrictions on how we buy and sell. (shrink)