Theories of decision-making and its neural substrates have long assumed the existence of two distinct and competing valuation systems, variously described as goal-directed vs. habitual, or, more recently and based on statistical arguments, as model-free vs. model-based reinforcement-learning. Though both have been shown to control choices, the cognitive abilities associated with these systems are under ongoing investigation. Here we examine the link to cognitive abilities, and find that individual differences in processing speed covary with a shift from model-free to model-based (...) choice control in the presence of above-average working memory function. This suggests shared cognitive and neural processes; provides a bridge between literatures on intelligence and valuation; and may guide the development of process models of different valuation components. Furthermore, it provides a rationale for individual differences in the tendency to deploy valuation systems, which may be important for understanding the manifold neuropsychiatric diseases associated with malfunctions of valuation. (shrink)

How do people pursue rewards in risky environments, where some outcomes should be avoided at all costs? We investigate how participant search for spatially correlated rewards in scenarios where one must avoid sampling rewards below a given threshold. This requires not only the balancing of exploration and exploitation, but also reasoning about how to avoid potentially risky areas of the search space. Within risky versions of the spatially correlated multi‐armed bandit task, we show that participants’ behavior is aligned well with (...) a Gaussian process function learning algorithm, which chooses points based on a safe optimization routine. Moreover, using leave‐one‐block‐out cross‐validation, we find that participants adapt their sampling behavior to the riskiness of the task, although the underlying function learning mechanism remains relatively unchanged. These results show that participants can adapt their search behavior to the adversity of the environment and enrich our understanding of adaptive behavior in the face of risk and uncertainty. (shrink)

Background: Prejudices against minorities can be understood as habitually negative evaluations that are kept in spite of evidence to the contrary. Therefore, individuals with strong prejudices might be dominated by habitual or “automatic” reactions at the expense of more controlled reactions. Computational theories suggest individual differences in the balance between habitual/model-free and deliberative/model-based decision-making.Methods: 127 subjects performed the two Step task and completed the blatant and subtle prejudice scale.Results: By using analyses of choices and reaction times in combination with computational (...) modeling, subjects with stronger blatant prejudices showed a shift away from model-based control. There was no association between these decision-making processes and subtle prejudices.Conclusion: These results support the idea that blatant prejudices toward minorities are related to a relative dominance of habitual decision-making. This finding has important implications for developing interventions that target to change prejudices across societies. (shrink)

Introduction Dans les premiers vers de son Roland Furieux, L'Arioste écrit : « Je dirai [...] comment, par amour, il devint furieux et fou, d’homme qui auparavant avait été tenu pour si sage. Je le dirai, si, par celle qui en a fait quasi autant de moi en m’enlevant par moments le peu d’esprit que j’ai, il m’en est pourtant assez laissé pour qu’il me suffise à achever tout ce que j’ai promis ». Ainsi, craint-il, par amour, de perdre la (...) raison avant d'avoir terminé son œuvre mais surtout de se... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the definition of a possible world in the actualist tradition of A. Plantinga, R.M. Adams, R. Chisholm, J. Pollock and N. Wolterstorff is unable to accomodate tensed states of affairs. An example of a tensed state of affairs is the transiently obtaining state of affairs that the storm is present, which obtains only if its negation, it is not the case that the storm is present also obtains but at different times. (...) A possible world that includes tensed states of affairs and their negations cannot be defined in the traditional way, which states that a possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (exclusive disjunction) the negation of S'. Rather, it must be defined in a new way: A possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (inclusive disjunction) the negation of S', such that for every pair P of mutually contradictory tensed states of affairs entailed by S, the members of P obtain nonsimultaneously in S. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the definition of a possible world in the actualist tradition of A. Plantinga, R.M. Adams, R. Chisholm, J. Pollock and N. Wolterstorff is unable to accomodate tensed states of affairs. An example of a tensed state of affairs is the transiently obtaining state of affairs that the storm is present, which obtains only if its negation, it is not the case that the storm is present also obtains but at different times. (...) A possible world that includes tensed states of affairs and their negations cannot be defined in the traditional way, which states that a possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (exclusive disjunction) the negation of S'. Rather, it must be defined in a new way: A possible world is a state of affairs S that includes every state of affairs S' or (inclusive disjunction) the negation of S', such that for every pair P of mutually contradictory tensed states of affairs entailed by S, the members of P obtain nonsimultaneously in S. (shrink)

To those who are already familiar with the minute and detailed erudition which went into M.J. Petry’s three-volume translation of and commentary on Hegel’s “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit” as presented in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia, it will come as no surprise that the same author has presented in this sequel an equally meticulous study of the Berlin “Phenomenology of Spirit.” There is, however, a significant difference to be found in this latter work. Whereas, in the earlier “Philosophy of (...) Subjective Spirit”, Petry was content to translate and comment on the 1845 Zusätze, drawn from a variety of sources by Ludwig Boumann, he has been able in the present text to substitute a set of lecture notes written by Major Karl Gustav von Griesheim who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin during the Summer Term of 1825, the most complete single set of notes on those lectures now available. Petry assures us that Griesheim must have taken down Hegel’s lectures word for word, thus, presumably, assuring us of a text which is at once more reliable and more authoritative than the Encyclopedia text which Hegel himself had published - this, despite the many utter incoherences of Griesheim’s text! If nothing else, this explains the disproportionate number of notes devoted to Griesheim’s text rather than to Hegel’s; Petry is concerned not with the Encyclopedia but with the “Lectures” - and Griesheim’s transcript is the most reliable order to make sense out of Griesheim. (shrink)

To those who are already familiar with the minute and detailed erudition which went into M.J. Petry’s three-volume translation of and commentary on Hegel’s “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit” as presented in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia, it will come as no surprise that the same author has presented in this sequel an equally meticulous study of the Berlin “Phenomenology of Spirit.” There is, however, a significant difference to be found in this latter work. Whereas, in the earlier “Philosophy of (...) Subjective Spirit”, Petry was content to translate and comment on the 1845 Zusätze, drawn from a variety of sources by Ludwig Boumann, he has been able in the present text to substitute a set of lecture notes written by Major Karl Gustav von Griesheim who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin during the Summer Term of 1825, the most complete single set of notes on those lectures now available. Petry assures us that Griesheim must have taken down Hegel’s lectures word for word, thus, presumably, assuring us of a text which is at once more reliable and more authoritative than the Encyclopedia text which Hegel himself had published - this, despite the many utter incoherences of Griesheim’s text! If nothing else, this explains the disproportionate number of notes devoted to Griesheim’s text rather than to Hegel’s; Petry is concerned not with the Encyclopedia but with the “Lectures” - and Griesheim’s transcript is the most reliable order to make sense out of Griesheim. (shrink)

The Constitution of the Athenians ascribed to Xenophon the orator.--The Politeia of the Spartans by Xenophon.--The Boeotian Constitution from the Oxyrhynchus historian.--The Constitution of Athens by Aristotle.

With the passing of S. A. Janovskaja, contemporary Soviet philosophy has lost one of its leading experts in logic and in combining creativity with survival.

Until now, adult crying has received relatively little interest from investigators, whereas in the popular media there are many strong claims about crying (e.g., crying brings relief) of which the scientific basis is not clear. In this review, we provide an overview of the current state of the scientific literature with respect to crying. We identify gaps in knowledge and propose questions for future research. The following topics receive special attention: Ontogenetic development, antecedents, individual and gender differences, and the intra- (...) and interindividual effects of crying. We conclude that the study of crying may help us obtain better insight into human nature, that is, not only our emotional, but also social, and moral functioning. (shrink)

Outstanding translations by leading contemporary scholars--many commissioned especially for this volume--are presented here in the first single edition to include the entire surviving corpus of works attributed to Plato in antiquity. In his introductory essay, John Cooper explains the presentation of these works, discusses questions concerning the chronology of their composition, comments on the dialogue form in which Plato wrote, and offers guidance on approaching the reading and study of Plato's works. Also included are concise introductions by Cooper and Hutchinson (...) to each translation, meticulous annotation designed to serve both scholar and general reader, and a comprehensive index. This handsome volume offers fine paper and a high-quality Smyth-sewn cloth binding in a sturdy, elegant edition. (shrink)

In this 1974 book a practising scientist and gifted expositor sets forth an exciting point of view on the nature of science and how it works.

BLWith new text and full apparatus criticus The Eudemian Ethics was one of two ethical treatises which Aristotle wrote on the subject of ethica or `matters to do with character'. Although the two works cover much the same ground, the Nicomachean Ethics is better known; the poor manuscript tradition of the Eudemian Ethics has made correct translation and interpretation of the text extremely difficult. The subject of the work is the choice of a certain means of conduct, made by a (...) `man of practical wisdom', between two extremes of behaviour: asceticism and yielding to uncontrolled impulses. Aristotle also stresses the notion of moral intention and the importance of virtue of character. This new Oxford Classical Text of the Eudemian Ethics is the result of many years of work. After Sir David Ross's death, his original text was substantially reworked and revised by his friend and colleague R. R. Walzer, who was aided in the revision by his former pupil Mrs Jean Mingay, who continued his work after his death in 1974. Mrs Mingay was fortunate in being able to make use of previously unpublished contributions from D. J. Allan after his death in the late seventies, and more recently has been helped in her work by the suggestions of Professor D. A. Russell, David Robinson, and Christopher Rowe. (shrink)

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN SELF-REGULATION PARADOX The relationship of consciousness to biology has intrigued mankind thoroughout recorded history. However, little progress has been made not only in understanding these issues but also in raising fundamental questions central to the problem. As Davidson and Davidson note in their introduction, William James suggested, almost a century ago in his Principles of Psychology, that the brain was the organ of mind and be havior. James went so far as to suggest that the remainder (...) of the Principles was but a "footnote" to this central thesis. This volume brings together diverse biobehavioral scientists who are addressing the various aspects of the mindlbrainlbodylbehavior issue. Although some of the authors have previously published together in other volumes, by and large the particular combination of authors and topics selected by the editors makes this volume unique and timely. Unlike the Consciousness and Self-Regulation series (Schwartz & Shapiro, 1976, 1978), also published by Plenum, this volume is devoted entirely to a psychobiological approach to consciousness. Although readers will differ in their interest in specific chapters, the well-rounded investigator who is concerned with the psychobiology of consciousness will want to become intimately acquainted with all the views presented in this volume. As noted by the individual contributors, the topic of this volume stimulates fundamental questions which, on the surface, may appear trivial, yet, on further reflection, turn out to have deep significance. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno is best known for his contributions to aesthetics and social theory. Critics have always complained about the lack of a practical, political or ethical dimension to Adorno's philosophy. In this highly original contribution to the literature on Adorno, J. M. Bernstein offers the first attempt in any language to provide an account of the ethical theory latent in Adorno's writings. Bernstein relates Adorno's ethics to major trends in contemporary moral philosophy. He analyses the full range of Adorno's (...) major works, with a special focus on Dialectic of Enlightenment, Minima Moralia and Negative Dialectics. In developing his account Bernstein lays particular stress on Adorno's contention that the event of Auschwitz demands a new categorical imperative. This book will be widely acknowledged as the standard work on Adorno's ethics and as such will interest professionals and students of philosophy, political theory, sociology, history of ideas, art history and music. (shrink)