Inhalt: Vorwort - F. Chiereghin: Das griechische Erbe in Hegels Anthropologie - N. Waszek: Descartes und die 'Subjektivitatsphilosophie' in der Sicht Hegels - R. Brandt: Beobachtungen zur Anthropologie bei Kant (und Hegel) - E. Dusing: Zum Verhaltnis von Intelligenz und Wille bei Fichte und Hegel - M. Bienenstock: Der Wille bei Rousseau und beim Jenaer Hegel. Zur Entstehung von Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes - U. Rameil: Bewusstseinsstruktur und Vernunft - M. Wolff: Eine Skizze zur Auflosung des Leib-Seele-Problems. Analytischer Kommentar (...) zu 389 der Enzyklopadie (1830) - M. J. Petry: Systematik und Pragmatik in Hegels Behandlung von animalischem Magnetismus und Verrucktheit - H.-Ch. Lucas: Die 'souverane Undankbarkeit' des Geistes gegenuber der Natur. Logische Bestimmungen, Leiblichkeit, animalischer Magnetismus und Verrucktheit in Hegels Anthropologie - K. Dusing: Hegels Theorie der Einbildungskraft - H. F. Fulda: Vom Gedachtnis zum Denken - A. Th. Peperzak: Hegel uber Wille und Affektivitat. Ein Kommentar zu Enz. 387-392; 468-474; 468-473 - G. Severino: Subjekt und Freiheit in Hegels Denken - J. O'Malley: Die Wurzeln der Freiheit als politische Gesinnung im subjektiven Geist - L. Eley: Anmerkungen zu den drei Hauptformen des subjektiven Geistes - M. Bykowa: Einige Gedanken zum Geheimnis der Subjektivitat bei Hegel - F. Hespe: System und Funktion der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes - B. Tuschling: Die Idee in Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes - Literatur- und Personenverzeichnis. (shrink)

It could seem prima facie that when Hegel sought to ground Law in the teleological structure of the objective spirit instead of in the free will he was returning to the Aristotelian concept of politics. It will be shown, however, that Hegel did not seek to ground the State and Law in a predetermined order that precedes any activity of the subject. Instead, he thought of Law as the connection between legal norms and legal relations within which Law is realized.

We review some of the main implications of the free-energy principle (FEP) for the study of the self-organization of living systems – and how the FEP can help us to understand (and model) biotic self-organization across the many temporal and spatial scales over which life exists. In order to maintain its integrity as a bounded system, any biological system - from single cells to complex organisms and societies - has to limit the disorder or dispersion (i.e., the long-run entropy) of (...) its constituent states. We review how this can be achieved by living systems that minimize their variational free energy. Variational free energy is an information theoretic construct, originally introduced into theoretical neuroscience and biology to explain perception, action, and learning. It has since been extended to explain the evolution, development, form, and function of entire organisms, providing a principled model of biotic self-organization and autopoiesis. It has provided insights into biological systems across spatiotemporal scales, ranging from microscales (e.g., sub- and multicellular dynamics), to intermediate scales (e.g., groups of interacting animals and culture), through to macroscale phenomena (the evolution of entire species). A crucial corollary of the FEP is that an organism just is (i.e., embodies or entails) an implicit model of its environment. As such, organisms come to embody causal relationships of their ecological niche, which, in turn, is influenced by their resulting behaviors. Crucially, free-energy minimization can be shown to be equivalent to the maximization of Bayesian model evidence. This allows us to cast natural selection in terms of Bayesian model selection, providing a robust theoretical account of how organisms come to match or accommodate the spatiotemporal complexity of their surrounding niche. In line with the theme of this volume; namely, biological complexity and self-organization, this chapter will examine a variational approach to self-organization across multiple dynamical scales. (shrink)

L'etude historique du principe de vie dans l'oeuvre de Descartes et dans celle de ses predecesseurs souligne notamment l'enjeu de la scission cartesienne entre l'ame et les phenomenes biologiques. Elle permet de comprendre, dans sa nouveaute radicale, la notion de principe de vie chez Descartes, qui associe la decouverte recente de la circulation du sang par W. Harvey, a une explication mecanique de la chaleur du coeur. Du traite de L'Homme aux Passions de l'ame, Descartes identifie en effet la notion (...) de principe de vie a la chaleur contenue dans le coeur, nourrie par la circulation du sang. Une telle conception s'oppose a la vision aristotelicienne, ou la biologie et la psychologie sont etroitement liees, ainsi qu'aux adeptes du panpsychisme que Descartes a critiques: Campanella et Henry More. (shrink)

Fusing philosophy and theology, the book assigns both Judaism and Christianity distinct but equally important roles in the spiritual structure of the world and ...

"Cet ouvrage est le fruit d'un seminaire de philosophie des sciences organise au Centre Sevres a Paris pendant l'annee universitaire 1987-1988"--Avant-propos.

In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...) budget items with budgetary constraints. Often more or less demanding constraints on decisions are imaginable. For instance, in preference ranking problems, the transitivity constraint is often contrasted with the weaker acyclicity constraint. In this paper, we make constraints explicit in judgment aggregation by relativizing the rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure to a constraint set, whose variation yields more or less strong notions of rationality. We review several general results on judgment aggregation in light of such constraints. (shrink)

This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present edition; the (...) bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects. (shrink)

Den Plan, seine Untersuchungen zur Deskriptiven Psychologie in einem umfassenden Werk zur Darstellung zu bringen, hat Brentano nicht verwirklicht. Neben kleineren Schriften zu diesem Gedankenkreis sind aber die Kollegmanuskripte der 1887 bis 1891 unter wechselnden Titeln gehaltenen Wiener Vorlesungen zur Deskriptiven Psychologie erhalten.

Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...) generalizes: there exists no local function from degrees of belief to binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions of rationality and non-triviality. “Locality” means that the binary belief in each proposition depends only on the degree of belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. One might think that the impossibility can be avoided by dropping the assumption that binary beliefs are a function of degrees of belief. We prove that, even if we drop the “functionality” restriction, there still exists no local relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions. Thus functionality is not the source of the impossibility; its source is the condition of locality. If there is any non-trivial relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs at all, it must be a “holistic” one. We explore several concrete forms this “holistic” relation could take. (shrink)

As cause we often specify an event the occurrence of which first guaranteed that of the effect. This notion is explicated in a framework of branching worlds in Sections I to V. VI and VII point out its close relations to the concept of an agent's bringing about an event. The topic of the last two sections is the distinction between causes and necessary circumstances. For this purpose conditionals are used, interpreted with respect to branching worlds without a similarity relation (...) between them. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft und Universalgeschichte.--Bd. 2. Althistorische Kontroversen zu Mythos und Geschichte.

When one thinks—knows, believes, imagines—that something is the case, one’s thought has a topic: it is about something, towards which one’s mind is directed. What is the logic of thought, so understood? This book begins to explore the idea that, to answer the question, we should take topics seriously. It proposes a hyperintensional account of the propositional contents of thought, arguing that these are individuated not only by the set of possible worlds at which they are true, but also by (...) their topic: what they are about. The book then builds epistemic, doxastic, probabilistic, and conditional logics based on this view. It applies them to issues ranging from dogmatism, scepticism, and epistemic fallibilism, to imagination and suppositional reasoning, belief revision, framing effects, and the acceptability of indicative conditionals. (shrink)

In this commentary, I first acknowledge points of common ground with the target article by Bruineberg and colleagues. Then, I consider how certain ambiguities could be resolved by considering spatiotemporal constraints on causality. In particular I show how blanket closure emerges from localized interactions between temporally separable subsystems, and how this points to valuable directions of future research. Finally, I close with a process note discussing the allegorical implications of the authors' creative title.

Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...) pooling functions (most of them classic, but one new) and argue that linear pooling can be justified procedurally, but not epistemically, while the other two pooling methods can be justified epistemically. The choice between them, in turn, depends on whether the individuals' probability assignments are based on shared information or on private information. We conclude by mentioning a number of other pooling methods. (shrink)

The Description Logic Handbook covers all aspects of the research in the field of knowledge representation. Written by some of the most prominent researchers in the field, and covering the basic technical material and implementational aspects, it is both a unique reference and a self-study guide.

Pets are truly great companions. Some individuals feel that owning a pet can help them prepare for a growing family by giving them a taste of what it would be like to have children. This study also looks into the psychological well-being and life experiences of LGBT fur parents. Employing the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, the findings of this study were: (1) With the presence of fur babies, participants had the ease to overcome stressful events, especially the ones that affect their (...) mental health. With these, they have the desire to take care of their fur babies under all circumstances because they see their fur babies as family members. Fur babies are excellent sources of motivation, confidence, and happiness for fur parents. They are treated as family members because they contribute to the mental and emotional aspects of fur parents. Moreover, the majority of respondents valued their pets far more than their actual family members, however, some didn't spend as much time with their relatives and friends. This study comes to the conclusion that a stronger bond with one's dog was also linked to higher anxiety about being unloved and rejected by family members and people surrounding us, which was linked to a heavier impact on one's psychological well-being. In reality, fur parents, especially LGBT parents, offer their fur babies a lot of love and attention compared to other things. (shrink)