This important collection of essays includes Professor Hart's first defense of legal positivism; his discussion of the distinctive teaching of American and Scandinavian jurisprudence; an examination of theories of basic human rights and the notion of "social solidarity," and essays on Jhering, Kelsen, Holmes, and Lon Fuller.

An updated and extended second edition supporting the findings of its well-known predecessor which claimed that courts employ common-sense notions of causation in determining legal responsibility.

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart was born in Yorkshire in 1907 to second generation Jewish immigrants. Having won a scholarship to Oxford University, he went on to become the most famous legal philosopher of the twentieth century. From 1932-40 H.L.A Hart practised as a barrister in London. He was pronounced physically unfit for military service in 1940, and was recruited by MI5, where he worked until 1945. During his time at the Bar he had continued to (...) study philosophy and at M15 his interest was further stimulated by his philosopher colleagues in M16, Stuart Hampshire and Gilbert Ryle. After the war, Hart returned to Oxford to take up a philosophy fellowship, later to become Professor of Jurisprudence. H.L.A Hart single-handedly reinvented the philosophy of law and influenced the nation's thinking in the 1960s on abortion, the legalization of homosexuality, and on capital punishment. Hart's approach to legal philosophy was at once disarmingly simple and breathtakingly ambitious, combining as it did the insights of Austin and Bentham and the new linguistic philosophy of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He sought to elucidate a concept of law which would be of relevance to all forms of law, wherever or whenever they arose: his bestselling book, The Concept of Law, has sold tens of thousands of copies worldwide. In 1941, he married Jenifer Williams (a high-ranking civil servant, later an Oxford academic) with whom he had four children. Their relationship was an enduring if unconventional one. In the early 1950s, Jenifer was rumoured to be having a long-standing affair with Isaiah Berlin, one of Hart's closest friends. She was also, falsely, accused by the Sunday Times of having been a Russian spy, an allegation which was all the more scandalous given Hart's position at MI5 during the War. Nicola Lacey draws on Hart's previously unpublished diaries and letters to reveal a complex inner life. Outwardly successful, Hart was in fact tormented by doubts about his intellectual abilities, his sexual identity and his capacity to form close relationships. Her biography also sheds fascinating light on the origins of his ideas, and assesses his overall contribution. Above all, it chronicles of a life which had a depth ands impact far greater than many of Hart's readers have realized. (shrink)

In an attempt to resolve the problem or the marriage between law and morality, Dr. John Ezenwankwor publishes this book, Law and Morality: An Appraisal of Hart's Concept of Law. In it, he delves into a critical analysis of the works of a British legal philosopher, Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992), who made landmark contributions to the moral and legal questions surrounding human actions or conducts. Incidentally, he surpasses his master, Hart, in this book, (...) by correcting his mistaken and poor consideration of the influence of morality in holding the society together and his dismissal of legal enforcement of morality. (shrink)

The paper discusses the Anglo-American philosophy of law of the 20th century, more specifically the philosophy of law of Ronald Myles Dworkin and his criticism of the legal positivism of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. The author presents the history of the criticism of legal positivism in Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law and distinguishes historical stages. The subject of the study is the critique of legal positivism but not the Hart-Dworkin debate itself, well known in Western (...) philosophy of law. The reason is that the discussion was conducted between Dworkin and Hart’s supporters but not between Dworkin and Hart by himself. The latter responded to the criticism only after twenty seven years. The article explains why Dworkin chose for his criticism Herbert Hart’s version of legal positivism. This is due to the fact that Dworkin highly appreciated Hart’s positivist theory of law and characterized it as the “most clear.” The article presents the methodological foundations of criticism of Hart’s legal positivism in Dworkin’s philosophy of law. It reveals a methodological divergence between the two legal theories, which directly affects the understanding of the concept of law and its content. Therefore, we can assume that the legal theories of Hart and Dworkin are two competing models of law: Dworkin’s model considers law as a set of rules and principles and Hart’s model acknowledges only rules and court decisions as a source of law. The article also presents the key principles of positivism criticized by Dworkin. These principles, firstly, interpret law as a set of legal rules determined through a special legal criterion, secondly, provide the judge with an opportunity to make a decision “at his own discretion” in a situation not regulated by law, and, thirdly, recognize only legal rights and obligations enshrined in legal regulations. It is important to note that in this article the author describes criticism as an independent phenomenon of legal philosophy with a particular focus on the history and foundations of this phenomenon. (shrink)

A presente pesquisa propõe apresentar, pela primeira vez na área de conhecimento das Ciências da Religião, a análise do pensamento jusnaturalista de John Finnis acerca do aspecto humano da religião. Nas obras de sua autoria, Finnis apresenta uma reconstrução inovadora da teoria do direito natural de Aristóteles e Tomás de Aquino. Tal inovação foi publicada em 1980, sob a orientação de Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, que foi seu mentor quando na conclusão de seu doutorado, sendo que (...) este último lhe propôs o título da obra Natural Law and Natural Rights - Lei Natural e Direitos Naturais, o qual foi acolhido. A primeira publicação desta obra no Brasil ocorreu somente em 2007, pela editora Unisinos. Finnis enfatiza em suas obras a possibilidade de, por meio da razão prática, ser possível a identificação de sete bens humanos que ele mesmo os caracteriza como fundamentais básicos, dentre eles a Religião. Tais bens, segundo a sua compreensão acerca da teoria da lei natural de Aristóteles e Tomás de Aquino, consistem em valores inerentes ao ser humano, e, por assim o serem, são essenciais para o florescimento humano de cada indivíduo. Dessa forma, essa dissertação propõe-se a analisar como a teoria do direito natural de John Finnis colabora para pensar o lugar da religião no espaço público, no que condiz a sua ressignificação como fundamento ético para a formação dos direitos humanos. A análise será realizada mediante a leitura das obras do autor acerca deste tema, principalmente Natural Law & Natural Rights e Religion & Public Reasons. Como resultado geral, indica-se a necessidade de se fundamentar eticamente os direitos humanos sob a base dos bens humanos fundamentais básicos da teoria do direito natural de John Finnis. Sendo assim, fundamentando-se os Direitos Humanos na Religião, considerando-a de tal maneira, como bem fundamental básico, será possível pensar a importância do seu lugar na esfera pública. Como bem humano fundamental básico, a religião passa a ser entendida, segundo o autor determina, como essencial bem para o florescimento humano, assim como, para o bem comum da sociedade como um todo. (shrink)

There is more engagement with philosophy—Western and Eastern—in my work than you will find anywhere in the history of black American literature.1the coss dialogues, which began in 1995, resulted from a generous endowment provided to SAAP from the estates of Herbert W. Schneider and Albert G. Redpath, both students of John J. Coss at Columbia University. The dialogues are intended to promote conversation between philosophers in the “classic” American tradition and accomplished specialists in other fields. They seek to bridge (...) the seeming distance across disciplinary boundaries, thus promoting shared inquiry around themes, issues, questions of common interest to American philosophy and, for example, the social and... (shrink)

Capturing the lively modernist milieu of Kenneth Burke's early career in Greenwich Village, where Burke arrived in 1915 fresh from high school in Pittsburgh, this book discovers him as an intellectual apprentice conversing with "the moderns." Burke found himself in the midst of an avant-garde peopled by Malcolm Cowley, Marianne Moore, Jean Toomer, Katherine Anne Porter, William Carlos Williams, Allen Tate, Hart Crane, Alfred Stieglitz, and a host of other fascinating figures. Burke himself, who died in 1993 at the (...) age of 96, has been hailed as America's most brilliant and suggestive critic and the most significant theorist of rhetoric since Cicero. Many schools of thought have claimed him as their own, but Burke has defied classification and indeed has often been considered a solitary, eccentric genius immune to intellectual fashions. But Burke's formative work of the 1920s, when he first defined himself and his work in the context of the modernist conversation, has gone relatively unexamined. Here we see Burke living and working with the crowd of poets, painters, and dramatists affiliated with Others magazine, Stieglitz's "291" gallery, and Eugene O'Neill's Provincetown Players; the leftists associated with the magazines The Masses and Seven Arts; the Dadaists; and the modernist writers working on literary journals like The Dial, where Burke in his capacity as an associate editor saw T. S. Eliot's "The Wasteland" into print for the first time and provided other editorial services for Thomas Mann, e.e. cummings, Ezra Pound, and many other writers of note. Burke also met the iconoclasts of the older generation represented by Theodore Dreiser and H. L. Mencken, the New Humanists, and the literary nationalists who founded Contact and The New Republic. Jack Selzer shows how Burke's own early poems, fiction, and essays emerged from and contributed to the modernist conversation in Greenwich Village. He draws on a wonderfully rich array of letters between Burke and his modernist friends and on the memoirs of his associates to create a vibrant portrait of the young Burke's transformation from aesthete to social critic. (shrink)

In this thought-provoking book, David Hart challenges the creation myth of post--World War II federal science and technology policy. According to this myth, the postwar policy sprang full-blown from the mind of Vannevar Bush in the form of Science, the Endless Frontier. Hart puts Bush's efforts in a larger historical and political context, demonstrating in the process that Bush was but one of many contributors to this complex policy and not necessarily the most successful one. Herbert Hoover, (...) Karl Compton, Thurman Arnold, Henry Wallace, Robert Taft, and Curtis LeMay--along with more familiar figures like Bush--are among those whose endeavors he traces.Hart places these policy entrepreneurs in the broad scheme of American political development, connecting each one's vision of the state in this apparently esoteric policy area to the central issues, events, and figures of mid-century America and to key theoretical debates. Hart's work reveals the wide range of ideas, often in conflict with one another, that underlay what later observers interpreted as a "postwar consensus." In Hart's view, these visions--and the interests and institutions that shape their translation into public policy--form the enduring basis of American politics in this important area. Policymakers today are still grappling with the legacies of the forged consensus. (shrink)

The article is located in the iusphilosophical scenario of the mid-twentieth century. Its objective is to trace the sources of Hart's rule of recognition, taking as its starting point the thesis that makes such rule a weighted response to the debate between the Kelsenian formalism and the utilitarian theory of Bentham and Austin in the first instance. This is explored in the sources recognized and not recognized by the author himself since the article claims a decisive presence in methodology (...) of direct ancestors such as Hobbes, Hume, Malinowski, among otrs. These do not grant to the mentioned rule of recognition a mere conciliatory desire of the previous traditions, but they rather define the nature of the rule and the need for it to be addressed from interdisciplinary fields because it can bear fruit for the analysis of the underlying principles in judicial practice from the exploration of speech in context. (shrink)

Problema de investigación abordado en esta tesis de grado, fue el de explorar el alcance que tendría la conexión entre la tesis de la regla de reconocimiento y la tesis de los contenidos mínimos de derechos natural en la teoría de H.L.A. Hart. Se indaga a partir de las referencias directas y no directas, la contextualización histórica con escuelas o tendencias activas en el período de elaboración de "El Concepto de Derecho". para identificar los puntos relevantes que permiten desarrollar (...) los enlaces que inicialmente se plantean. Alcance para entender el trabajo maduro de Hart sin olvidar que ya en obras anteriores surgen las aproximaciones a la pragmática del lenguaje y el lugar que asigna a las "reglas prácticas" del derecho en el contexto social. Se culmina apoyada la argumentación en algunas tesis de J Raz en en caracter constitutivo de la regla de reconocimiento y por lo tanto, en su naturaleza de regla primaria y no secundaria como es ubicada por Hart en la obra mencionada. (shrink)

Even to disagree, we need to understand each other. If I reject what you say without understanding you, we will only have the illusion of a disagreement. You will be asserting one thing and I will be denying another. Even to disagree, we need some agreement.

The Postscript to The Concept of Law contains Herbert Hart's only sustained and considered response to the objections pressed against his views by his distinguished critic, Ronald Dworkin. In this extraordinary collection, many of the leading legal philosophers in the world evaluate the success of Hart's responses to Dworkin on several of these counts. Notable contributors include Joseph Raz of Oxford University and Jules L. Coleman of the Yale Law School.

La réflexion sur le positivisme juridique est au cœur d'interrogations importantes concernant la portée des règles de droit, la nature de l'Etat et les relations entre droit et morale. L'examen des présupposés et des thèses philosophiques de la Théorie pure du droit de Hans Kelsen et du Concept de droit d'Herbert Hart permet de s'orienter dans ces débats. Les deux auteurs proposent des théories distinctes d'une même réalité : la mise en vigueur, dans des collectivités, de règles possédant (...) une forme d'objectivité. Leurs descriptions du fonctionnement des systèmes juridiques obligent à reconduire à ses fondements l'examen de la nature et de la connaissance des normes. De ce fait, la comparaison des doctrines doit permettre de mieux comprendre, en particulier, l'articulation entre le registre du devoir-être et la prise en compte de la réalité de la vie sociale organisée par le droit. (shrink)

Near the end of the last century, some legal philosophers adapted the so called causal theories of reference to solve internal problems in legal theory. Among those philosophers, Nicos Stavropoulos adjusted Hilary Putnam’s semantic externalism claiming it as a better philosophical view than legal positivism defended by Herbert Hart. According to him, what determines the correct application of a legal rule must be determined by the objects themselves. In that case, what determines the reference of legal terms is (...) an issue to be solved by the best theory developed. However, this is not the case necessarily: Hart’s model can reach to the same conclusions as an externalist adjustment of law. Furthermore, the epistemic criteria required by Putnam to deal with value judgements are also acceptable in a positivist model. This paper presents the central thesis of Putnam’s semantic externalism, with Stavropoulos adaptations to law, and defends that Hart’s approach to deal with legal rules and Putnam’s approach to deal with language rules can converge. (shrink)

In 1985, Swiss legal philosopher Walter Ott visited Herbert Hart in Oxford and made this record of their meeting, which casts novel light on some of Hart’s ideas. Ott engaged Hart in a fresh encounter with the legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch, particularly Hart’s and Radbruch’s reasons for a minimum content of justice in law. They also discussed the grudge informer, state responsibility under laws of an earlier régime, and questions of the definition and falsifiability (...) of legal theories. Hart surprisingly reported Hans Kelsen as stating, when they had met at Berkeley in 1961, that Hume (and not Kant, and certainly not Wittgenstein) was the greatest philosopher who had ever lived. The translation is accompanied with annotations explaining references, assumptions and contexts. (shrink)

Scholars are grateful to Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901-1989) and Herbert Aptheker (1915-2003) for their pioneering work in the field of slave revolts. What they've virtually never mentioned, however, let alone explored, was Aptheker’s practice of rendering James invisible. It is highly improbable that Aptheker did not know either of James or of his noteworthy study of the Haitian Revolution, given that the latter was related to the slave revolts that Aptheker did study. Aptheker’s neglect of James was (...) not an anomaly, but rather symptomatic of an ideology that rationalized extreme oppression. (shrink)

The recent publication of a lost essay by Herbert Hart is important for an historical appreciation of his work, but its likely celebration is a sad testament to the poverty and lethargy of contemporary legal thought. I use this occasion to review the state and condition of contemporary legal theorising. After positioning Hart's essay in the prevailing jurisprudential milieu, I highlight the thrust and the failings of the three main traditional approaches to contemporary legal theorising in regard (...) to the nature and operation of 'judicial discretion'. Then, I suggest an alternative approach to legal theorising that recommends a more satisfying way of proceeding. (shrink)

O artigo analisa o significado de regra jurídica a partir dos modelos teóricos propostos por Hans Kelsen e Herbert Hart, levando em consideração as implicações do desafio proposto por David Hume sobre a denominada falácia naturalista. Com base em um método analítico-descritivo, pretende-se abordar em que consiste a falácia naturalista e qual é o seu impacto na metodologia do positivismo normativo de Kelsen e do positivismo de regras de Hart. Embora nenhum deles consiga refutar a falácia naturalista, (...) pretende-se, ao final, destacar que Hart parece dar a melhor resposta ao apontar para o uso das regras e as práticas institucionais. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to many contemporary observers, including Hillel Steiner [1], Herbert Hart [2], John Gray [3] and Isaiah Berlin [4], the equal liberty principle lies at the heart of liberalism. Yet despite its central place in liberal theory, it has attracted little critical appraisal. This paper seeks to examine the meaning and some of the policy implications of the equal liberty principle, paying particular attention to the elucidations produced by Herbert Spencer, Steiner and Hart — the (...) only systematic analysts of the notion of equal liberty. In part 1, the meaning of the equal liberty principle is discussed, and it is shown to be intrinsically ambivalent. In part 2, where certain policy implications are considered, the conclusion is reached that the equal liberty principle is ambiguous in its policy prescriptions, and requires to be supplemented by some other principle before it can be unequivocally applied. (shrink)

The famous mid-20th century debate between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart about the relationship between law and morality addressed the limits of the criminal law in the context of a proposal by the Wolfenden Committee to decriminalize male homosexual activity in private. The original exchanges and subsequent contributions to the debate have been significantly constrained by the terms in which the debate was framed: a focus on criminal law in general and sexual offences in particular; a preoccupation with (...) the so-called “harm principle,” a sharp delineation of the realms of law and morality, and a static conception of the relationship between them. This article explores the limitations imposed by these various starting-points and argues for a holistic and symbiotic understanding of the relationship between law and morality. (shrink)

Based on specific documentary evidence, historian Lionel Jensen reveals how 16th- and 17th-century Western missionaries used translations of the ancient RU ...

Two currently much discussed views about truth, truth pluralism and truth relativism, are found in Sellars’s writings. I show that his motivations for adoping these views are interestingly different from those shared by most of their recent advocates. First, I explain how Sellars comes to embrace a version of truth pluralism. I argue that his version overcomes a difficulty confronting pluralists, albeit at a serious cost. Then I argue that Sellars’s truth pluralism isn’t motivated by his interest in domains of (...) discourse beyond the “matter-of-factual.” Rather, the key to his truth pluralism, his analysis of truth as “semantical assertibility,” is motivated by the same consideration that leads him to adopt truth relativism. This is his interest in applying semantic notions to discourse that embodies conceptual structures other than ours. Despite their common motivation, I conclude that Sellars’s relativism is independent of, and indeed stands in tension with, the analysis of truth that underlies his pluralism. (shrink)

The famous mid-20th century debate between Patrick Devlin and Herbert Hart about the relationship between law and morality addressed the limits of the criminal law in the context of a proposal by the Wolfenden Committee to decriminalize male homosexual activity in private. The original exchanges and subsequent contributions to the debate have been significantly constrained by the terms in which the debate was framed: a focus on criminal law in general and sexual offences in particular; a preoccupation with (...) the so-called “harm principle,” a sharp delineation of the realms of law and morality, and a static conception of the relationship between them. This article explores the limitations imposed by these various starting-points and argues for a holistic and symbiotic understanding of the relationship between law and morality. (shrink)

Catholics normally approach the Eucharist with great love and devotion. The paper looks at how, through the character, Papa, the reality of this love and devotion to the Eucharist is captured by the Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Adichie, in her novel, Purple Hibiscus . The novel reveals that while Papa, in various ways, shows great love and devotion to Christ in the Eucharist, his devotion remains inauthentic: it does not lead him to a love of this same Christ in his neighbour. (...) The work, therefore, underscores not only the nexus between theology and creative literature, but also, in a special way, the social implications of the Eucharist. (shrink)

This paper looks, in the first place, at gender issues in Pentecostal Christianity in Nigeria. This is especially as captured by the Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, in her novel, Americanah. It is found that women in Nigerian Pentecostalism are more than the men in number and participate more actively both in church activities and in spiritual efforts at home. However, it is mostly the men who are the pastors and leaders of the Nigerian Pentecostal churches, even if at home, (...) by what is sometimes called ‘domestication’ of the same men, the women are empowered in some ways. The paper then considers what their place has in common with the place of women in the Roman Catholic Church in contemporary Nigeria. The paper adds to the existing literature on the place and role of women in both Pentecostalism and Catholicism in contemporary Nigeria. (shrink)

Surveys Western literature and thought to reveal the evolution of the ideals of sincerity and authenticity.

Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulnerable to the ‘blindness to inequality and other values objection’. This objection targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes from relational, and (...) not distributive, inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other, strategies of ‘internalizing’ and ‘externalizing’ relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework are explored. In turn, I suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions, but argue that a particular ‘hybrid view’ about justice is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist. (shrink)

El método de la “libre investigación científica del derecho” propuesto por François Gény ha marcado toda una generación de juristas. Tratado con detenimiento a lo largo de su extensa y compleja obra, la libre investigación científica se presenta como un método completo destinado a orientar al jurista en la creación, interpretación y aplicación del derecho positivo. Por desventura, el clima ambiente en el que nació su obra y en el que tuvo que desenvolverse con posterioridad, dominado por la escuela de (...) la exégesis, no ha sabido extraer de la obra de Gény más que elementos dispares no haciendo justicia a su método. En la actualidad, el redescubrimiento de su método de la libre investigación científica permitirá combatir el anquilosamiento dogmático, evitar los excesos formalistas, y aportar elementos de interés para la investigación iusfilosófica de nuestro tiempo. El método de la “libre investigación científica del derecho” propuesto por François Gény ha marcado toda una generación de juristas. Tratado con detenimiento a lo largo de su extensa y compleja obra, la libre investigación científica se presenta como un método completo destinado a orientar al jurista en la creación, interpretación y aplicación del derecho positivo. Por desventura, el clima ambiente en el que nació su obra y en el que tuvo que desenvolverse con posterioridad, dominado por la escuela de la exégesis, no ha sabido extraer de la obra de Gény más que elementos dispares no haciendo justicia a su método. En la actualidad, el redescubrimiento de su método de la libre investigación científica permitirá combatir el anquilosamiento dogmático, evitar los excesos formalistas, y aportar elementos de interés para la investigación iusfilosófica de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based (...) on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality. (shrink)