Continuous culture techniques were developed in the early twentieth century to replace cumbersome studies of cell growth in batch cultures. In contrast to batch cultures, they constituted an open concept, as cells are forced to proliferate by adding new medium while cell suspension is constantly removed. During the 1940s and 1950s new devices have been designed—called “automatic syringe mechanism,” “turbidostat,” “chemostat,” “bactogen,” and “microbial auxanometer”—which allowed increasingly accurate quantitative measurements of bacterial growth. With these devices cell growth came under the (...) external control of the experimenters and thus accessible for developing a mathematical theory of growth kinetics—developed mainly by Jacques Monod, Aron Novick and Leo Szilard in the early 1950s and still in use today. The paper explores the development of continuous culture devices and claims that these devices are simulators for standard cells following specific requirements, in particular involving mathematical constraints in the design and setting of the devices as well as experiments. These requirements have led to contemporary designs of continuous culture techniques realizing a specific event-based flow algorithm able to simulate directed evolution and produce artificial cells and microorganisms. This current development is seen as an alternative approach to today’s synthetic biology. (shrink)

Although the emerging field of synthetic biology looks back on barely a decade of development, the stakes are high. It is a multidisciplinary research field that aims at integrating the life sciences with engineering and the physical/chemical sciences. The common goal is to design and construct novel biological components, functions and systems in order to implement, in a controlled way, biological devices and production systems not necessarily found in nature. Among the many potential applications are novel drugs and pesticides, cancer (...) treatments, biofuels, and new materials. According to the most optimistic visions, synthetic biology may thus lead to a biotechnological revolution by transforming microorganisms into ‘factories’ of sorts, which could eventually displace conventional industrial methods. (shrink)

"Viel ist über Medien geschrieben worden, und doch ist dem Medium aller Medien bislang keinerlei Abhandlung gewidmet. Die Rede ist vom Schleim. Nicht irgendein Schleim, sondern der Urschleim jeglichen Lebens, dem Rätsel der Wissenschaft, das bis heute als ungelöst gilt. Und noch ein Rätsel gilt es zu lösen, nämlich von der eigenartigen Koalition von Schleim und technischen Medien. Schleim, so die Wissenschaft, ist nicht nur Beginn der Menschwerdung sondern auch die Zukunft der Technologie. Much has been written about media, but (...) the medium of all media has not been studied so far: I am referring to slime. Not just any slime, but the protoplasm of all life, the scientific mystery, which is still regarded as unsolved. And another mystery remains be solved, namely the peculiar coalition of slime and technical media. According to science, slime is not only the origin of the human species, but also the future of technology. ". (shrink)

Morphological engineering is an emerging research area in synthetic biology. In 2008 “synthetic morphology” was proposed as a prospective approach to engineering self-constructing anatomies by Jamie A. Davies of the University of Edinburgh. Synthetic morphology can establish a new paradigm, according to Davies, insofar as “cells can be programmed to organize themselves into specific, designed arrangements, structures and tissues.” It is obvious that this new approach will extrapolate morphology into a new realm beyond the traditional logic of morphological research. However, (...) synthetic morphology is a highly idealized vision of morphology which derives its visionary ideas from morphological engineering and mathematical idealizations in order to understand the principles of molecular morphology. Thus, the question is, if this approach will help to understand morphogenesis better or if it will just enable biologists to engineer morphogenesis. The paper investigates the development of synthetic morphology and its relation to synthetic biology as well as its epistemic gains. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungGenomdaten, Kernstück der 2008 ausgerufenen Big Data-Revolution der Biologie, werden voll automatisiert sequenziert und analysiert. Der Wechsel von der manuellen Laborpraktik der Elektrophorese-Sequenzierung zu DNA-Sequenziermaschinen und softwarebasierten Analyseprogrammen vollzog sich zwischen 1982 und 1992. Erst dieser Wechsel ermöglichte die Flut an Daten, die mit der zweiten und dritten Generation der DNA-Sequenzierer erheblich zunimmt. Doch mit diesem Wechsel verändern sich auch die Validierungsstrategien der Genomdaten. Der Beitrag untersucht beides – die Automatisierung und die damit verbundene Validierungskultur – um ein Bild der (...) Komplexität der Datengenerierung und deren Datenpositivismus zu geben. Leitend ist dabei die Frage, ob dieser Datenpositivismus die Grundlage der aktuell angekündigten Big Data-Revolution der Molekularbiologie ist oder deren Datenhybris. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungGenomdaten, Kernstück der 2008 ausgerufenen Big Data-Revolution der Biologie, werden voll automatisiert sequenziert und analysiert. Der Wechsel von der manuellen Laborpraktik der Elektrophorese-Sequenzierung zu DNA-Sequenziermaschinen und softwarebasierten Analyseprogrammen vollzog sich zwischen 1982 und 1992. Erst dieser Wechsel ermöglichte die Flut an Daten, die mit der zweiten und dritten Generation der DNA-Sequenzierer erheblich zunimmt. Doch mit diesem Wechsel verändern sich auch die Validierungsstrategien der Genomdaten. Der Beitrag untersucht beides – die Automatisierung und die damit verbundene Validierungskultur – um ein Bild der (...) Komplexität der Datengenerierung und deren Datenpositivismus zu geben. Leitend ist dabei die Frage, ob dieser Datenpositivismus die Grundlage der aktuell angekündigten Big Data-Revolution der Molekularbiologie ist oder deren Datenhybris. (shrink)

Re-Design des Lebens: Wissenschaft und Technik rekurrieren zunehmend auf das Prinzip des Synthetischen. Die Synthetische Chemie und seit Neuestem die Synthetische Biologie zielen auf ein Zusammensetzen von Bausteinen, um neue Entitäten zu designen - von Molekülen bis hin zu Stoffwechselnetzwerken in Organismen. Dieser Band unternimmt wissenschaftsphilosophische und -historische Annäherungen an das Prinzip der Syn-Thesis. Die Beiträge fragen: Welche Konstruktionsbedingungen realisieren die synthetischen Wissenschaften? Wie ist das Verhältnis zu analytischen Methoden? Und wo liegen die Grenzen technischer Synthesis?

The modern program of operationalizing the mind, from Descartes to Kant, in the form of the externalization of human mind functions in logic and calculations, and its continuation in the program of formalization from the middle of the 19th century with Boole, Peirce and Turing, have led to the form of rationality that has become machine rationality: the digital computer as a logical-mathematical machine and algorithms as machine-rational interpretations of human thinking in the form of problem solving and decision making. (...) The modern program of the operationalization of the mind can be understood as the first program of an "artificial intelligence" on paper. With the advent of digital computers, it was transformed into the programs of "strong" and "weak" AI. As early as 2015, machine learning methods surpassed human competencies in image recognition and other fields, such turning AI increasingly into "superhuman AI." Thus, the philosophical question is, how to deal with this development as humans? (shrink)

Inspired by the success of synthesising organic substances by Friedrich Wöhler in 1828, the vision of creating life in the laboratory synthetically has become increasingly accessible for today’s synthetic biology and synthetic genomics, respectively. The engineering of biology – a contemporary version of the liaison of technology and organic form – creates cellular machines, biobricks, biomolecular ‘borgs’, and entire synthetic genomes of artificial organisms. Besides major ethical concerns, the shift in scientific epistemology is of interest. Unlike classical analytical science, synthetic (...) science understands by a process of generation, through which myriads of new things are created, dramatically changing the living environment. (shrink)

The increasing digitalization of science particularly forgrounds the status of its visual objects. While more and more disciplines depend on methods of computer visualization, the respective transformation processes of knowledge on which the visualizations are based often remain unthematized. The article argues that an ontographic aisle between the abstraction and representation of knowledge lies in the visualization processes. This aisle is central to digitized scientific cultures. Therefore, two case studies from the history of computer graphics will be discussed.

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

The use of genomic testing in pregnancy is increasing, giving rise to questions over how the information that is generated should be offered and returned in clinical practice. While these tests provide important information for prenatal decision-making, they can also generate information of uncertain significance. This paper critically examines three models for approaching the disclosure of variants of uncertain significance (VUS), which can arise from forms of genomic testing such as prenatal chromosomal microarray analysis (CMA). Contrary to prevailing arguments, we (...) argue that respect for reproductive autonomy does not justify adopting a model on which an offer to disclose VUS is a routine part of genetic counselling. Instead, we contend that a commitment both to solidarity between healthcare providers and pregnant women and to the acceptance of a novel principle of caution under normative uncertainty means that we should instead adopt a model of VUS disclosure that imposes a strong presumption against offering to disclose VUS. The upshot of this is that it should be standard practice to only offer to disclose VUS when this is requested by the woman undergoing CMA. We defend our position against claims that arise from an alleged right to such information and that a presumption against an offer will lead to inequity. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating a prima facie sense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is justified, then (...) assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

In recent years, many disciplines have become interested in the scientific study of morality. However, a conceptual framework for this work is still lacking. In The Moral Background, Gabriel Abend develops just such a framework and uses it to investigate the history of business ethics in the United States from the 1850s to the 1930s. According to Abend, morality consists of three levels: moral and immoral behavior, or the behavioral level; moral understandings and norms, or the normative level; and the (...) moral background, which includes what moral concepts exist in a society, what moral methods can be used, what reasons can be given, and what objects can be morally evaluated at all. This background underlies the behavioral and normative levels; it supports, facilitates, and enables them. Through this perspective, Abend historically examines the work of numerous business ethicists and organizations--such as Protestant ministers, business associations, and business schools--and identifies two types of moral background. "Standards of Practice" is characterized by its scientific worldview, moral relativism, and emphasis on individuals' actions and decisions. The "Christian Merchant" type is characterized by its Christian worldview, moral objectivism, and conception of a person's life as a unity. The Moral Background offers both an original account of the history of business ethics and a novel framework for understanding and investigating morality in general. (shrink)

The principle of proportionality demands that a war (or action in war) achieve more goods than bads. In the philosophical literature there has been a wealth of work examining precisely which goods and bads may count toward this evaluation. However, in all of these discussions there is no mention of one of the most certain bads of war, namely the psychological harm(s) likely to be suffered by the combatants who ultimately must fight and kill for the purposes of winning in (...) conflict. This paper argues that harms to one’s own soldiers must be included in proportionality judgments, and goes on to argue that one of the most significant harms one’s soldiers face are the psychological stresses and traumas associated with combat. The arguments draw on a growing wealth of psychological literature exploring the connections between combatancy and psychological trauma, and highlight, in particular, the uniquely negative impact which killing has on a combatant’s mental well-being. The paper concludes that these factors place an almost certain and rather weighty negative weight in any proportionality calculations concerning wars with ground combatants who must fight “up close and personal”, and that for more remote warfighters, there is also evidence to show that they may suffer deep psychological harm as a result of their combat roles as well. The argument, however, does not attempt to demonstrate that these factors render war impermissible. Rather, it merely shows that these harms, or bads, which can be quite significant, must be factored into our considerations of proportionality. The arguments themselves are rather uncontroversial, but they bring to light an element in the moral calculus which is sadly overlooked in most discussions of the ethics of war. (shrink)

We explore three questions about Earth system modeling that are of both scientific and philosophical interest: What kind of understanding can be gained via complex Earth system models? How can the limits of understanding be bypassed or managed? How should the task of evaluating Earth system models be conceptualized?

This discussion of pride, shame, and guilt centers on the beliefs involved in the experience of any of these emotions. Through a detailed study, the author demonstrates how these beliefs are alike--in that they are all directed towards the self--and how they differ. The experience of these three emotions are illustrated by examples taken from English literature. These concrete cases supply a context for study and indicate the complexity of the situations in which these emotions usually occur.

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. (...) While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed. (shrink)

In this article I ask what recent moral psychology and neuroscience can and can’t claim to have discovered about morality. I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality but a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral yet not moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments yet not of that particular kind. If moral things (...) are various and diverse, then empirical research about one kind of individual moral judgment doesn’t warrant theoretical conclusions about morality in general. If that kind of individual moral judgment is a peculiar and rare thing, then it is not obvious what it tells us about other moral things. What is more, it is not obvious what its theoretical importance is to begin with—that is, why we should care about it at all. In light of these arguments, I call for a pluralism of methods and objects of inquiry in the scientific investigation of morality, so that it transcends its problematic overemphasis on a particular kind of individual moral judgment. (shrink)

The history of the field of business ethics in the U.S. remains understudied and misunderstood. In this article I begin to remedy this oversight about the past, and I suggest how it can be beneficial in the present. Using both published and unpublished primary sources, I argue that the business ethics field emerged in the early twentieth century, against the backdrop of the establishment of business schools in major universities. I bring to light four important developments: business ethics lectures at (...) the University of California and Yale University, Leon Marshall’s curriculum at the College of Commerce of the University of Chicago, and the William A. Vawter Foundation on Business Ethics at Northwestern University. Then, I consider the payoffs of my historical account for business ethics theory, pedagogy, and practice. Specifically, I present four implications of my account under these headings: business ethics as a public problem; the place of ethics in business schools; historicizing business ethics; and historical self-knowledge. (shrink)

The results of tests carried out using next-generation genomic sequencing (NGS) possess a peculiar and perhaps unique ‘diagnostic durability’. Unlike most other forms of testing, if genomic results or data are stored over time, then it remains possible to interrogate that information indefinitely, without having to retest the patient. Another peculiar property of genomic results is that their interpretations are subject to change within relatively short time frames. For instance, a genomic variant that is of uncertain significance (VUS) at the (...) time of testing may shortly afterwards come to be understood as pathogenic (P) or benign (B). Moreover, variant classifications might be downgraded from likely pathogenic to VUS or B, or regraded from B to VUS. These two properties of genomic testing have important implications for the responsible implementation of genomic testing in healthcare. One of these is that they prompt the question whether diagnostic laboratories are morally required to routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. We take up this question in our paper, in which we argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications (as had been argued for by Appelbaum et al 1). Still, we maintain that a restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised.2 We thank the authors of the commentaries on our paper for their attention to our argument and for their thoughtful responses to (and expansions of) our position. Oerlemans et al address …. (shrink)

Innovation is a key driver of care provision in assisted reproductive technologies (ART). ART providers offer a range of add‐on interventions, aiming to augment standard in vitro fertilization protocols and improve the chances of a live birth. Particularly in the context of commercial provision, an ever‐increasing array of add‐ons are marketed to ART patients, even when evidence to support them is equivocal. A defining feature of ART is hope—hope that a cycle will lead to a baby or that another test (...) or intervention will make a difference. Yet such hope also leaves ART patients vulnerable in a variety of ways. This article argues that previous attempts to safeguard ART patients have neglected how the use of add‐ons in commercial ART can exploit patients’ hopes. Commercial providers of ART should provide add‐ons only free of charge, under a suitable research protocol. (shrink)

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

Concepts of decision, choice, decision-maker, and decision-making are common practical tools in both social science and natural science, on which scientific knowledge, policy implications, and moral recommendations are based. In this article I address three questions. First, I look into how present-day social scientists and natural scientists use decision/choice concepts. What are they used for? Second, scientists may differ in the application of decision/choice to X, and they may explicitly disagree about the applicability of decision/choice to X. Where exactly do (...) these disagreements lie? Third, I ask how scientists should use decision/choice concepts. What are they correctly and incorrectly used for? I argue that scientists must responsibly attend to a methodological demand: you have to have a principled, non-ad hoc, well-argued-for way of telling where decision/choice applicability ends. Thus, I aim to minimize the risk of conceptual stretching and foster responsible conceptual practices in a large body of scientific work. (shrink)