Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information or from the intentional actions of fake news factory workers, but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake science can be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible than the retraction notice. We hypothesize (...) that the reason for this lies in the popularity-based logic governing Google, in particular its foundational PageRank algorithm, in conjunction with a psychological law which we refer to as the “law of retraction”: a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interesting and therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. We conduct an empirical study drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud in the Retraction Watch public database. The study tests the extent to which such retracted scientific articles are still highly ranked in Google –and more so than information about the retraction. We find, among other things, that both Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not ranked a link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted. Surprisingly, Google Scholar did not perform better in this regard than Google Search.We also found cases in which Google did not track the retraction of an article on the first result page at all. We conclude that both Google Search and Google Scholar run the risk of disseminating fake science through their ranking algorithms. (shrink)

I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games, proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules generate Expansions, Contractions and Revisions, and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly sources of answers, and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some remarks about the potential extensions of interrogative games, (...) with respect to some issues in the theory of belief change. (shrink)

This paper examines critically the reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction’ proposed jointly by M.B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka in the 1980s, and its successor, the interrogative model of inquiry developed by J. Hintikka and his collaborators in the 1990s. The Hintikkas’ model explicitly used game theory in order to formalize a naturalistic approach to inquiry, but the imi abandoned both the game-theoretic formalism, and the naturalistic approach. It is argued that the latter better supports the claim that (...) the imi provides a ‘logic of discovery’, and safeguards its empirical adequacy. Technical changes necessary to this interpretation are presented, and examples are discussed, both formal and informal, that are better analyzed when these changes are in place. The informal examples are borrowed from Conan Doyle’s The Case of Silver Blaze, a favorite of M.B. and J. Hintikka. (shrink)

This volume includes a target paper, taking up the challenge to revive, within a modern (formal) framework, a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox which did ...

We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.

We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.Send (...) article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.HOW CAN QUESTIONS BE INFORMATIVE BEFORE THEY ARE ANSWERED? STRATEGIC INFORMATION IN INTERROGATIVE GAMESVolume 9, Issue 2Emmanuel J. Genot and Justine JacotDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.8Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. HOW CAN QUESTIONS BE INFORMATIVE BEFORE THEY ARE ANSWERED? STRATEGIC INFORMATION IN INTERROGATIVE GAMESVolume 9, Issue 2Emmanuel J. Genot and Justine JacotDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.8Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. HOW CAN QUESTIONS BE INFORMATIVE BEFORE THEY ARE ANSWERED? STRATEGIC INFORMATION IN INTERROGATIVE GAMESVolume 9, Issue 2Emmanuel J. Genot and Justine JacotDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.8Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Olsson and his collaborators have proposed an extension of Belief Revision Theory where an epistemic state is modeled as a triple S=⟨K_,E,A_⟩ , where A_ is a research agenda, i.e. a set of research questions. Contraction and expansion apply to states, and affect the agenda. We propose an alternative characterization of the problem of agenda updating, where research questions are viewed as blueprints for research strategies. We offer a unified solution to this problem, and prove it equivalent to Olsson’s own. (...) We conclude arguing that: (i) our solution makes the idea of ‘minimal change’ in questions and agendas clearer; (ii) can be extended in ways the original theory was not, and may help better realize the aims this theory was proposed for; (iii) unveils some limitations of the initial approach, yet opening a way to overcome them. (shrink)

M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka claimed that their reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction’ can “serve as an explication for the link between intelligence and memory”. The claim is vindicated, first for the single-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing the content of a distributed and associative memory; then, for the multi-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing knowledge distributed in a community. Moreover, the reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction’ allows (...) to conceptualize those strategies as belonging to a continuum of behavioral strategies. (shrink)

This paper examines whether Sherlock Holmes’ “Science of Deduction and Analysis,” as reconstructed by Hintikka and Hintikka The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), exemplifies a logic of discovery. While the Hintikkas claimed it does, their approach remained largely programmatic, and ultimately unsuccessful. Their reconstruction must thus be expanded, in particular to account for the role of memory in inquiry. Pending this expansion, the Hintikkas’ claim is vindicated. However, a tension between the naturalistic aspirations of (...) their model and the formal apparatus they built it on is identified. The paper concludes on suggestions for easing this tension without losing the normative component of the Hintikkas’ epistemological model. (shrink)

The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe and Hintikka and Hintikka Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical (...) dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic. (shrink)

We describe a class of semantic extensive entailment game with algorithmic players, related to game-theoretic semantics, and generalized to classical first-order semantic entailment. Players have preferences for parsimonious spending of computational resources, and compute partial strategies, under qualitative uncertainty about future histories. We prove the existence of local preferences for moves, and strategic fixpoints, that allow to map eeg game-tree to the building rules and closure rules of Smullyan's semantic tableaux. We also exhibit a strategy profile that solves the fixpoint (...) selection problem, and can be mapped to systematic constructions of semantic trees, yielding a completeness result by translation. We conclude on possible generalizations of our games. (shrink)

: A popular belief is that the process whereby search engines tailor their search results to individual users, so-called personalization, leads to filter bubbles in the sense of ideologically segregated search results that would tend to reinforce the user’s prior view. Since filter bubbles are thought to be detrimental to society, there have been calls for further legal regulation of search engines beyond the so-called Right to be Forgotten Act. However, the scientific evidence for the filter bubble hypothesis is surprisingly (...) limited. Previous studies of personalization have focused on the extent to which different users get different results lists without taking the content on the webpages into account. Such methods are unsuitable for detecting filter bubbles as such. In this paper, we propose a methodology that takes content differences between webpages into account. In particular, the method involves studying the extent to which users with strong opposing views on an issue receive search results that are correlated content-wise with their personal view. Will users of with strong prior opinion that X is true on average have a larger share of search results that are in favor of X than users with a strong prior opinion that X is false? We illustrate our methodology at work, but also the non-trivial challenges it faces, by a small-scale study of the extent to which Google Search leads to ideological segregation on the issue of man-made climate change. (shrink)

We apply an algorithmic learning model of inquiry to model reasoning carried by experimental subjects in Wason's _Selection Task_ that represents reasoning in the task as computation of a decision tree that supervenes on semantic representations. We argue that the resulting model improves on previous probabilistic and pragmatic models of the task. In particular, it suggests that subjects' selection could in fact be guided by sophisticated patterns of argumentative reasoning.

In Wason’s Selection Task, subjects: process information from the instructions and build a mental representation of the problem, then: select a course of action to solve the problem,under the constraints imposed by the instructions. We analyze both aspects as part of a constraint satisfaction problem without assuming Wason’s ‘logical’ solution to be the correct one. We show that outcome of step may induce mutually inconsistent constraints, causing subjects to select at step solutions that violate some of them. Our analysis explains (...) why inconsistent constraints are less likely disrupt non-abstract versions of the tasks, but unlike Bayesians does not posit different mechanisms in abstract and thematic variants. We then assess the logicality of the task, and conclude on cognitive tasks as coordination problems. (shrink)

If semantic consequence is analyzed with extensive games, logical reasoning can be accounted for by looking at how players solve entailment games. However, earlier approaches to game semantics cannot achieve this reduction, by want of explicitly dened preferences for players. Moreover, although entailment games can naturally translate the idea of argumentation about a common ground, a cognitive interpretation is undermined by the complexity of strategic reasoning. We thus describe a class of semantic extensive entailment game with algorithmic players, who have (...) preferences for parsimonious spending of computational resources and thus compute partial strategies under qualitative uncertainty about future histories. We prove the existence of local preferences for moves and of strategic fixpoints that allow to map game-trees to tableaux proofs, and exhibit a strategy prole that solves the fixpoint selection problem, and can be mapped to systematic constructions of semantic trees, yielding a completeness result by translation. We then discuss the correspondence between proof heuristics and strategies in our games, the relations of our games to gts, and possible extensions to other entailment relations. We conclude that the main interest of our result lies in the possibility to bridge argumentative and cognitive models of logical reasoning, rather than in new meta-theoretic results. All proofs are given in appendix. (shrink)

Erik J. Olsson and David Westlund have recently argued that the standard belief revision representation of an epistemic state is defective. In order to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set K and an entrenchment relation E, a research agenda A, i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions the agent would like to have answers to. Informally, the preconditions guarantee that the set of potential answers represent a partition of possible expansions of (...) K, hence are equivalent to well-behaved sets of alternative hypotheses. (shrink)

Fake news can originate from an ordinary person carelessly posting what turns out to be false information orfrom the intentional actions of fake news factory workers,but broadly speaking it can also originate from scientific fraud. In the latter case, the article can be retracted upon discovery of the fraud. A case study shows, however, that such fake sciencecan be visible in Google even after the article was retracted, in fact more visible thanthe retraction notice. We hypothesize that the reason for (...) this lies in the popularity-based logic governing Google, in particular its foundational PageRank algorithm,in conjunction with a psychological law which we refer to as the “law of retraction”: a retraction notice is typically taken to be less interestingand therefore less popular with internet users than the original content retracted. We conduct anempiricalstudy drawing on records of articles retracted due to fraud in the Retraction Watch public database. The study tests the extent to which such retracted scientific articles are still highly ranked in Google –and more so than information about the retraction. We find, among other things, thatboth Google Search and Google Scholar more often than not rankeda link to the original article higher than a link indicating that the article has been retracted.Surprisingly, Google Scholar did not perform better in this regard than Google Search.We also foundcases in which Google didnot track the retraction of anarticle on the first result page at all.We conclude thatboth Google Search and Google Scholar runthe risk of disseminating fake science through theirranking algorithms. (shrink)

Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage: “If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery, the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring (...) epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes. (shrink)

Instructions in Wason’s Selection Task underdetermine empirical subjects’ representation of the underlying problem, and its admissible solutions. We model the Selection Task as an interrogative learning problem, and reasoning to solutions as: selection of a representation of the problem; and: strategic planning from that representation. We argue that recovering Wason’s ‘normative’ selection is possible only if both stages are constrained further than they are by Wason’s formulation. We conclude comparing our model with other explanatory models, w.r.t. to empirical adequacy, and (...) modeling of bounded rationality. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms and proof trees. Both rules (...) are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed. (shrink)

As Emmanuel Levinas states in the preface to Existence and Existents, "this study is a preparatory one. It examines . . . the problem of the Good, time, and the relationship with the other [person] as a movement toward the Good." First published in 1947, and written mostly during Levinas's imprisonment during World War II, this work provides the first sketch of his mature thought later developed fully in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. This (...) new edition marks the first time this important work has been made available in an inexpensive paperback edition. Levinas's project in Existence and Existents is to move from anonymous existence to the emergence of subjectivity; to subjectivity's practice, theory and morality; to its encounter with the alterity of the other person. He is concerned here primarily with the time of the solitary subject; time is the inner structure of subjectivity, of the movement of existing. "Levinas's work," says Alphonso Lingis, "contains not only wholly new analyses of the forms of time of the present, the past, the future but also a new conception of the work of time." Beginning with Existence and Existents, then, it is possible to begin tracing the progressive "alterization" of time as it unfolds across the development of Levinas's entire philosophy. As a "preparatory" study, Existence and Existents introduces the major themes and concerns that occupied Levinas throughout his career. This is essential reading for understanding both Levinas's own philosophy and the developments in philosophical thought in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Certain questions have recurred throughout the history of philosophy. They are the big questions-about happiness and the good life, the limits of knowledge, the ultimate structure of reality, the nature of consciousness, the relation between causality and free will, the pervasiveness of suffering, and the conditions for a just and flourishing society-that thinkers in different cultures across the ages have formulated in their own terms in an attempt to make sense of their lives and the world around them. The essays (...) in this book turn to the major figures and texts of the Buddhist tradition in order to expand and enrich our thinking on these enduring questions. Examining them from a comparative and cross-cultural perspective demonstrates the value of alternative ways of addressing philosophical problems, showing how different approaches can produce new and unexpected kinds of questions and answers. Engaging with the Buddhist tradition, this book shows, helps return philosophy to its practical as well as theoretical aim: not only understanding the world but also knowing how to live in it. Featuring striking and generative comparisons of Buddhist and Western thought, Philosophy's Big Questions challenges our thinking in fundamental ways and offers readers new conceptual tools, methods, and insights for the pursuit of a good and happy life. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most important figures of twentieth-century philosophy. Exerting a profound influence upon such thinkers as Derrida, Lyotard, Blanchot, and Irigaray, Levinas's work bridges several major gaps in the evolution of continental philosophy--between modern and postmodern, phenomenology and poststructuralism, ethics and ontology. He is credited with having spurred a revitalized interest in ethics-based philosophy throughout Europe and America. _Entre Nous_ (Between Us) is the culmination of Levinas's philosophy. Published in France a few years before his (...) death, it gathers his most important work and reveals the development of his thought over nearly forty years of committed inquiry. Along with several trenchant interviews published here, these essays engage with issues of suffering, love, religion, culture, justice, human rights, and legal theory. Taken together, they constitute a key to Levinas's ideas on the ethical dimensions of otherness. Working from the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Levinas pushed beyond the limits of their framework to argue that it is ethics, not ontology, that orients philosophy, and that responsibility precedes reasoning. Ethics for Levinas means responsibility in relation to difference. Throughout his work, Levinas returns to the metaphor of the face of the other to discuss how and where responsibility enters our lives and makes philosophy necessary. For Levinas, ethics begins with our face to face interaction with another person--seeing that person not as a reflection of one's self, nor as a threat, but as different and greater than self. Levinas moves the reader to recognize the implications of this interaction: our abiding responsibility for the other, and our concern with the other's suffering and death. Situated at the crossroads of several philosophical schools and approaches, Levinas's work illuminates a host of critical issues and has found resonances among students and scholars of literature, law, religion, and politics. _Entre Nous_ is at once the apotheosis of his work and an accessible introduction to it. In the end, Levinas's urgent meditations upon the face of the other suggest a new foundation upon which to grasp the nature of good and evil in the tangled skein of our lives. (shrink)

The paradoxical logic of transparency and mediation Transparency is the metaphor of our time. Whether in government or corporate governance, finance, technology, health or the media – it is ubiquitous today, and there is hardly a current debate that does not call for more transparency. But what does this word actually stand for and what are the consequences for the life of individuals? Can knowledge from the arts, and its play of visibility and invisibility, tell us something about the paradoxical (...) logics of transparency and mediation? This Obscure Thing Called Transparency gathers contributions by international experts who critically assess the promises and perils of transparency today. (shrink)

One of the most influential philosophers of our day has selected 16 previously uncollected pieces that are unified by Levinas's project of revising the phenomenological description of the world in light of our experience of other persons.

Internationally renowned as one of the great French philosophers of the twentieth century, the late Emmanuel Levinas remains a pivotal figure across the humanistic disciplines for his insistence--against the grain of Western philosophical tradition--on the primacy of ethics in philosophical investigation. This first English translation of a series of twelve essays known as _Alterity and Transcendence_ offers a unique glimpse of Levinas defining his own place in the history of philosophy. Published by a mature thinker between 1967 and 1989, (...) these works exhibit a refreshingly accessible perspective that seasoned admirers and newcomers will appreciate. In today's world, where religious conceptions of exalted higher powers are constantly called into question by theoretical investigation and by the powerful influence of science and technology on our understanding of the universe, has the notion of transcendence been stripped of its significance? In Levinas's incisive model, transcendence is indeed alive--not in any notion of our relationship to a mysterious, sacred realm but in the idea of our worldly, subjective relationships to others. Without presupposing an intimate knowledge of the history of philosophy, Levinas explores the ways in which Plotinus, Descartes, Husserl, and Heidegger have encountered the question of transcendence. In discourses on the concepts of totality and infinity, he locates his own thinking in the context of pre-Socratic philosophers, Aristotle, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and Descartes. Always centering his discussions on the idea of interpersonal relations as the basis of transcendence, Levinas reflects on the rights of individuals (and how they are inextricably linked to those of others), the concept of peace, and the dialogic nature of philosophy. Finally, in interviews conducted by Christian Chabanis and Angelo Bianchi, Levinas responds to key questions not directly addressed in his writings. Throughout, _Alterity and Transcendence_ reveals a commitment to ethics as first philosophy--obliging modern thinkers to investigate not merely the true but the good. (shrink)

One of the most influential philosophers of our day has selected 16 previously uncollected pieces that are unified by Levinas's project of revising the phenomenological description of the world in light of our experience of other persons.

La philosophie, et en particulier la phénoménologie, se trouve aujourd'hui en France dans une situation pour le moins paradoxale dans son vis-à-vis avec la théologie. Alors que les uns e - accusent les phénoménologues d'un prétendu tournant théologique et que les autres s'en défendent comme si toute théologisation devait entacher leur intégrité, nul ne tente délibérément la traversée en prenant en charge les deux disciplines comme telles. En osant " passer le Rubicon " avec cette conviction que " plus on (...) théologise, mieux on philosophe ", cet ouvrage tente donc de mettre fin à la trop fréquente position de " chiens de faïence " et propose un " choc en retour " de la théologie sur la phénoménologie. Loin des philosophies du " seuil " ou du " saut ", une véritable rencontre des disciplines est ici revendiquée, dans l'assurance qu'elles seront mieux distinguées si elles acceptent d'être davantage assumées. Alea jacta est : " le sort en est jeté ", avec audace et peut-être témérité mais en sachant que nul ne pense s'il ne vient à s'exposer. (shrink)

This article discusses the ecological and cultural criteria underlying the management practices for protected areas in France. It examines the evolution of French conservation from its roots in the 19th century, when it focused on the protection of scenic landscapes, to current times when the focus is on the protection of biodiversity. However, biodiversity is often socially defined and may not represent an ecologically sound objective for conservation. In particular, we question the current approach to protecting a specific type of (...) biodiversity that is at the basis of traditional landscape but does not value systems that are left to develop naturally (i.e., without significant human intervention). We present several examples of current attempts in France and Europe to managing traditional ecosystems and then discuss the values that exist in systems that develop naturally. We feel the latter systems often have much to offer in terms of biodiversity as well as providing important sites for the study of dynamic ecological communities in an ever-changing world. (shrink)

La question de Dieu dans la pensée de Husserl fut très tôt un objet d'attention pour la recherche phénoménologique, mais la diversité des textes est telle qu'il était nécessaire d'établir le dossier historique relatif à cette question. Bien évidemment, la mise en lumière de l'unité et de la continuité des analyses de Husserl sur Dieu est animée par une interrogation proprement spéculative : quelle place pour Dieu dans une philosophie descriptive qui se veut méthodologiquement athée? A partir du "je" transcendantal, (...) quel est l'accès possible à la pure phénoménalité de Dieu? Si Husserl décrit la transcendance de Dieu comme celle d'une Idée théorique, éthique et téléologique, il ne s'agit pas pour lui de s'en tenir aux reconstructions abstraites de la métaphysique, niais de revenir à l'expérience originaire de Dieu. La réduction phénoménologique ne demande pas de cesser de croire, mais elle rend possible une purification éthique de l'expérience religieuse qui permet d'élucider son sens. En cela, tout le projet contemporain d'un concept non ontologique de Dieu est redevable à Husserl d'avoir fait le premier pas décisif en affranchissant de tout en soi " et en montrant que la transcendance de Dieu ne peut être séparée de la vie intentionnelle dans laquelle elle s'annonce. Husserl ne confond pas pour autant philosophie et théologie, et la compréhension de Dieu comme évidence d'une Idée pratique infinie laisse ouverte la possibilité de la Révélation sans vouloir parler pour elle. (shrink)

En s'appuyant sur le prologue et la première partie du ¤¤Breviloquium¤¤ de Bonaventure, l'auteur étudie la question de l'entrée de Dieu en philosophie comme en théologie, autrement dit son mode de manifestation à l'homme.

Entend dégager l'enjeu philosophique de la pensée augustinienne du cogito, dans " La cité de Dieu " et dans " La Trinité ", en situant la réflexion du saint dans le champ de la philosophie antique, et en rapprochant sa perspective de celles de Descartes et de Husserl.

Suszko’s problem is the problem of finding the minimal number of truth values needed to semantically characterize a syntactic consequence relation. Suszko proved that every Tarskian consequence relation can be characterized using only two truth values. Malinowski showed that this number can equal three if some of Tarski’s structural constraints are relaxed. By so doing, Malinowski introduced a case of so-called mixed consequence, allowing the notion of a designated value to vary between the premises and the conclusions of an argument. (...) In this article we give a more systematic perspective on Suszko’s problem and on mixed consequence. First, we prove general representation theorems relating structural properties of a consequence relation to their semantic interpretation, uncovering the semantic counterpart of substitution-invariance, and establishing that mixed consequence is fundamentally the semantic counterpart of the structural property of monotonicity. We use those theorems to derive maximum-rank results proved recently in a different setting by French and Ripley, as well as by Blasio, Marcos, and Wansing, for logics with various structural properties. We strengthen these results into exact rank results for nonpermeable logics. We discuss the underlying notion of rank, and the associated reduction proposed independently by Scott and Suszko. As emphasized by Suszko, that reduction fails to preserve compositionality in general, meaning that the resulting semantics is no longer truth-functional. We propose a modification of that notion of reduction, allowing us to prove that over compact logics with what we call regular connectives, rank results are maintained even if we request the preservation of truth-functionality and additional semantic properties. (shrink)

Un - combat amoureux - (Heidegger) ou une - lutte entre les penseurs - (Husserl) determine le destin de l'histoire de la philosophie. Au coeur du debat avec la phenomenologie francaise, cet ouvrage engage une veritable disputatio philosophique ancree sur ledit -tournant theologique de la phenomenologie francaise-. Assure que l'heure n'est plus au simple choc frontal, mais a un veritable dialogue et confrontation entre les disciplines, ce livre tente de montrer en quoi une -phenomenologie de la limite- peut aussi servir (...) de contrepoint a la -phenomenologie de la revelation-, et la tourner davantage vers une pensee de l'-i ncarnation- ou de l'-e xperience-. Jacques Derrida, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chretien, Jean-Yves Lacoste, Claude Romano et Jean Greisch, marquent les differents etapes de cette -traversee- point par point articulee, et en quete d'un respondeo a meme d'autrement decider.". (shrink)

L’esprit contemporain nous vole nos intériorités. Il entend façonner nos goûts et nos imaginaires. Orienter nos expériences. Nous détourner de nous-mêmes dans un divertissement généralisé, une mise en réseau et un art consommé de l’inquiétude qui est une autre manière de nous emporter dans son flux. C’est un homme mutilé, abruti, amoindri spirituellement que produit ce monde dominé par la technique qui ose appeler progrès les0régressions qu’il programme. L’art – entendu non comme savoir ou culture mais comme passion de la (...) liberté et exploration de nos sources enfouies – est l’un des derniers moyens qui nous restent pour nous savoir humains. Tout art digne de ce nom est insurrection, quête d’absolu, tentative désespérée pour dire l’amour incommensurable qui nous taraude. Emmanuel Godo, ici, nous provoque et nous convoque. Et si nous faisions l’épreuve de notre humanité – pour en avoir la preuve – en nous confrontant à des oeuvres d’art? Mais pas à des simulacres sans épaisseur ou à des joujoux insipides, non! Car ce n’est pas en millions de dollars que s’évalue une oeuvre mais à sa capacité à faire se lever en nous nos forces en sommeil. Un plaidoyer magistral pour l’art contemporain, le vrai. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

The presupposition triggered by an expression E is generally satisfied by information that comes before rather than after E in the sentence or discourse. In Heim’s classic theory (1983), this left-right asymmetry is encoded in the lexical semantics of dynamic connectives and operators. But several recent analyses offer a more nuanced approach, in which presupposition satisfaction has two separate components: a general principle (which varies from theory to theory) specifies under what conditions a presupposition triggered by an expression E is (...) satisfied; and an ‘incremental’ component specifies that the principle must be checked on the basis of information that comes before E. Several researchers take this incremental component to be a processing bias, which can be overcome at some cost. If so, it should be possible, though costly, to satisfy presuppositions ‘symmetrically’, i.e. by taking into account linguistic material that comes both before and after the presupposition trigger. We test this claim with experimental means. Using inferential (and to some extent acceptability) tasks involving the anaphoric trigger aussi (‘too’) in French, we argue that symmetric readings are indeed possible (albeit degraded) in environments involving the connectives if, or, and unless. (shrink)

La philosophie de la nature de l'Encyclopedie des sciences philosophiques fut, jusqu'a une date recente, presque ignoree par les etudes hegeliennes. Hegel s'y serait rendu coupable d'une pretention a concurrencer les sciences positives sur leur propre terrain et a rivaliser avec elles, en revelant a la fois son incomprehension de la scientificite la mieux etablie et la faible rationalite de son propre projet. Une lecture attentive permet de rectifier ces prejuges, en montrant non seulement que Hegel s'y trouve attentif et (...) respectueux du savoir positif de son temps, mais encore qu'il tente d'y definir les modalites d'une collaboration methodologiquement reglee entre philosophie et sciences. En quoi consiste le projet d'une science speculative? En quoi consiste chez Hegel la deduction speculative de la verite? En quoi consiste la comprehension hegelienne du statut et des formes du discours des sciences de la nature? Quelle attitude la speculation doit-elle adopter face aux controverses scientifiques? C'est a ces questions que s'efforce de repondre cet ouvrage. (shrink)

Over the last decade, businesses, policymakers, and researchers alike have advocated the need for value creation through inter-organizational collaboration. Researchers have widely argued that organizations that are engaged in collaborative processes create value. Because researchers have tended to focus on the identification of organizational motivations and on key success factors for collaboration, however, both the nature and processes of value creation in inter-organizational collaboration have yet to be examined. A recent theory by Austin and Seitanidi :726–758, 2012a; Nonprofit Volunt Sect (...) Q 41:929–968, 2012b) has proposed an analytical framework for analyzing value creation in inter-organizational collaboration, based on four types of value. The purpose of this current study is to empirically test this framework, and to provide key pointers for analyzing the nature of value, particularly in relation to learning. Our detailed empirical research is based on a 6-year retrospective case study of an inter-organizational partnership within an international development project for local economic development in Guatemala. The study’s contributions are twofold. First, it provides evidence of the critical path of the creation of diverse types of values in a collaborative process; second, it links the different types of value creation with the types of learning that occur in an inter-organizational process. (shrink)