(1994). Settling on what we are: The central place of the sense‐of‐self in education, and the implication of the concepts of the teleon and telentropy for the development of the sense‐of‐self. World Futures: Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 165-181.

The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure. Consequently, attempts to solve AGI alignment should, all else equal, prefer false negatives (ignoring research programs that would have been successful) to false positives (pursuing research programs that will unexpectedly fail). Thus, we propose adopting a policy of responding to points of philosophical and practical uncertainty associated with the alignment problem by limiting and choosing necessary assumptions (...) to reduce the risk of false positives. Herein we explore in detail two relevant points of uncertainty that AGI alignment research hinges on---meta-ethical uncertainty and uncertainty about mental phenomena---and show how to reduce false positives in response to them. (shrink)

This work is primarily a study in the history of ideas, but the author also incidentally presents some interesting views in normative ethics. Various meanings of perfectibility are distinguished: the author carefully differentiates, for example, between theories that man can reach a final state of perfection and theories that mankind can progress indefinitely. The history begins with Greek conceptions of human perfectibility; Hellenistic theories receive a separate chapter. Both orthodox and heretical--chiefly Pelagian-- Christian views are summarized. The Christian mystical tradition (...) and Protestant theories also receive separate attention. Modern theories that seek human perfection from government, education, or scientific progress are reviewed. Two very interesting chapters treat theories of natural progress from Joachim of Flora to Marx and from Darwin to Teilhard. Theories that reject perfectibility are reviewed briefly. Passmore completes his study with his own critical appraisal, in which he is particularly severe with contemporary ideas that man can be perfected by drugs or by revolution. The scholarship gathered together in this work is vast and the author's work of synthesis is most helpful. Passmore's own disposition is toward a tolerant scepticism in regard to all the theories of perfectibility that he reviews. His position might be summed up with the adage that the best is the enemy of the good, or perfection is the enemy of humanism. Many particular criticisms and many comparisons of views drawn from disparate historical contexts contain valuable insights, which will be useful to readers who disagree with the author's general position. Scholars will find all the references they need to check out the author's interpretations of various positions. Understandably, many will find particular interpretations inadequate, for the work covers a vast range of positions which it would be difficult for any one person to enter into perfectly.--G. G. G. (shrink)

The expression "fundamental change" in the title was chosen as wider and less laden with connotation than "revolution." The study, which was originally a Yale Ph.D. dissertation, compares the views of fundamental change in H. L. A. Hart's Concept of Law and in J. P. Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique. The two authors studied offer opportunity for interesting contrasts between analytic and dialectical methodologies. Hart's philosophy of law is considered in the first part in contrast with the less convincing (...) theories of Kelsen and of several contemporary Scandinavian legal philosophers. The central place of rules in Hart's thinking is suitably emphasized; fundamental change is considered in this legal philosophy under the heading, "The Pathology of a Legal System." In Sartre, the notions of totalization and the oath are as central as the notions of rules and acceptance are in Hart. McBride's treatment of the two authors is even-handedly critical, void of partisan polemics. Both approaches are seen to have some strengths and also some limitations. McBride feels that the two methods should somehow be complementary, but he has not yet developed an adequate framework for bringing them into dynamic and fruitful relationship. Nevertheless, this study contains a wealth of useful information regarding two very important works; it suggests important points of comparison and contrast; and it raises many important and often-neglected questions. The author has done a careful job of research which indicates that he has very considerable potential as a scholar, perhaps especially in the continental materials which he handles with assurance.--G. G. G. (shrink)

This study of the relationships of the concept of freedom to other allied notions is written from the libertarian point of view. It is based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation at Emory University in 1962. While the present version is a revised and improved one, it remains somewhat narrow in the scope of historical materials used, concentrating on works available in English, and giving particular attention to Sir David Ross, Hastings Rashdall, C. A. Campbell, P. Nowell-Smith, and Charles Hartshorne. The (...) author locates freedom primarily in choice and argues that the key to choice-making is the ability actively to focus attention. Theories that argue for psychological determinism on the basis of motives are found to conflict with the phenomena of paying attention and trying. At the same time, Campbell's sharp distinction between the freedom of moral and non-moral choices is rejected, and also denied is the metaphysical grounding of freedom in a personality or self as agent distinct from the activity. The author is at his best in dealing with arguments of determinists concerning particular points; many of the distinctions and clarifications proposed are serious objections often overlooked by those defending determinism. Edwards is especially helpful in showing that determinist arguments generally assume universal determinacy of action on the ground of particular and/or partial determinacy, which libertarians need not deny. The examination of the relations between freedom and responsibility is intended to show that the "plain man's" views on moral responsibility cannot be adequately accounted for by a utilitarian theory of praise and blame and a determinist theory of action. The weakness of this study is its lack of an integrated metaphysical position. Thus, while Edwards rightly argues that nothing can be chosen unless it is first desired, he confusingly suggests that the function of choice is to supplement the strength of desires too weak to make themselves effective. An integrated metaphysical study might have raised questions about the commensurability of desires and goods. Again, the process-theory of agency is assumed too easily. Still, this is a useful study, and those interested in the problem will find much of value in it.--G. G. G. (shrink)

Includes bibliographical references and index.