Abstract

This study of the relationships of the concept of freedom to other allied notions is written from the libertarian point of view. It is based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation at Emory University in 1962. While the present version is a revised and improved one, it remains somewhat narrow in the scope of historical materials used, concentrating on works available in English, and giving particular attention to Sir David Ross, Hastings Rashdall, C. A. Campbell, P. Nowell-Smith, and Charles Hartshorne. The author locates freedom primarily in choice and argues that the key to choice-making is the ability actively to focus attention. Theories that argue for psychological determinism on the basis of motives are found to conflict with the phenomena of paying attention and trying. At the same time, Campbell's sharp distinction between the freedom of moral and non-moral choices is rejected, and also denied is the metaphysical grounding of freedom in a personality or self as agent distinct from the activity. The author is at his best in dealing with arguments of determinists concerning particular points; many of the distinctions and clarifications proposed are serious objections often overlooked by those defending determinism. Edwards is especially helpful in showing that determinist arguments generally assume universal determinacy of action on the ground of particular and/or partial determinacy, which libertarians need not deny. The examination of the relations between freedom and responsibility is intended to show that the "plain man's" views on moral responsibility cannot be adequately accounted for by a utilitarian theory of praise and blame and a determinist theory of action. The weakness of this study is its lack of an integrated metaphysical position. Thus, while Edwards rightly argues that nothing can be chosen unless it is first desired, he confusingly suggests that the function of choice is to supplement the strength of desires too weak to make themselves effective. An integrated metaphysical study might have raised questions about the commensurability of desires and goods. Again, the process-theory of agency is assumed too easily. Still, this is a useful study, and those interested in the problem will find much of value in it.--G. G. G.