ABSTRACT This paper argues for a version of sceptical invariantism about knowledge on which the acceptability of knowledge-attributing sentences varies with the context of assessment.

This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of (...) described cases; they identify no special problem with fanciful examples. (shrink)

Fanciful fates is a discussion of ideas put forward by D.Z. Phillips in his book Wittgenstein and Religion, Ch. 13 –‘Authorship and Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein’. I begin by opposing the contention that Kierkegaard attacked Socrates (and that Josiah Thompson, one of Kierkegaard’s biographers, attacked Kierkegaard) because of a worry connected with the ‘the demise of foundationalism’. I then deal with Phillips's claim that a similarly motivated attack on Wittgenstein has been undertaken by me. I show that Phillips’s account of (...) my treatment of two problematic remarks by Wittgenstein is radically misconceived and I argue that his own approach to the problem is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Locke argues that the consent of market participants to the introduction of money justifies the economic inequalities resulting from monetarization. This paper shows that Locke’s argument fails to justify such inequalities. My critique proceeds in two parts. Regarding the consequences of the consent to money, neo-Lockeans wrongly take consent to justify inequalities in the original appropriation of land. In contrast, I defend the view that consent can only justify inequalities resulting directly from monetized commercial exchange. Secondly, regarding the nature of (...) consent, neo-Lockeans uncritically accept Locke’s account of money as a natural institution. In contrast, I argue that money is an irreducibly political institution and that monetary economies cannot develop in the state of nature. My political account of money has far-reaching implications for the normative analysis of the global monetary system and the justification of the economic inequalities consequent upon it. (shrink)

There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...) lower probabilities, etc. Updating probabilities introduces new considerations, and it is shown that the representation of belief as a set of probabilities conflicts in this regard with the updating procedures advocated by Shafer. The attempt to make subjectivistic probability plausible as a doctrine of rational belief by making it more flowery — i.e., by adding new dimensions — does not succeed. But, if one is going to represent beliefs by sets of distributions, those sets of distributions might as well be based in statistical knowledge, as they are in epistemological or evidential probability. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum's Poetic Justice undertakes a defense of the novel by showing it to develop the sympathetic imagination. Three parts of her argument come in for criticism, with implications for other such political defenses. Nussbaum sometimes interprets the imagination practically, sometimes theoretically; the two forms have different effects on deliberation. Nussbaum credits the novelistic tradition with fostering the imagination; her example of Hard Times interferes with establishing this general point. Nussbaum suggests an aesthetic element in literature that produces its effect, (...) but does not succeed in identifying that element so as to preserve the consequences of art while avoiding reductionism. (shrink)

There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...) lower probabilities, etc. Updating probabilities introduces new considerations, and it is shown that the representation of belief as a set of probabilities conflicts in this regard with the updating procedures advocated by Shafer. The attempt to make subjectivistic probability plausible as a doctrine of rational belief by making it more flowery -- i.e., by adding new dimensions -- does not succeed. But, if one is going to represent beliefs by sets of distributions, those sets of distributions might as well be based in statistical knowledge, as they are in epistemological or evidential probability. (shrink)

May 2020 marked the 25th anniversary of the death of Miguel Sánchez-Mazas, founder of Theoria. An International Journal of Theory, History and Foundations of Science, and regarded as the person who brought mathematical logic to Spain. Here we present some of his biographical features and a summary of his contributions, from his early work in the 1950s - introducing contemporary advances in logic and philosophy of science in a philosophically backward milieu dominated by the scholasticism of that era in Spain (...) - to the development of a project of Lebnizian lineage aimed at producing an arithmetic calculation that would elude some of the difficulties confronting Leibniz’s calculus. (shrink)

ROBERT M. PRICE replies to Sciabarra's criticism that Carol Selby Price and Robert Price's Mystic Rhythms erroneously classifies Rush lyricist Neil Peart as "conservative." "Conservative" may imply limitation of individual freedom by the government—or by organized religion. Peart leans more toward a non-religious libertarianism and Rand's Objectivism, which may be considered "conservative" in the same narrow sense. Ironically, Randian thinkers share with religion the use of the Hero Myth archetype. Price focuses on recent Rand-type comic book superheroes, including Steve Ditko's (...) Mister A and The Question, and Alan Moore's parody on these, Rorschach. (shrink)

Not uncommon for Russian translations of British philosophical classics is the problem of not conveying the notions of imagination and fancy properly. The purpose of this paper is to serve as a reminder of the fact that concepts of fancy and imagination began to grow apart as early as the first part of 18 th century, and it is necessary to treat them accordingly for the translation to be correct. Very soon, the notion of imagination and the distinction (...) between imagination and fancy began to be involved in the contemplation of political reality. Today it is the notion of political imagination that attracts researchers the most, providing a tool for explaining continuity and discontinuities in political process as well as left utopianism and conservative nostalgia. The awareness of the distinction between imagination and fancy could foster research activity in such fields as the history of ideas and intellectual history as well as studies in ideology and power. The distinction is examined on the basis of texts usually considered to be written by authors of conservative strand. It is an interesting fact, indeed, that it was conservatives who made the main contribution to the development of this distinction in English-language philosophy. Among them are Coleridge, who resolutely draw the line between fancy and imagination, and Burke with his appeal to the moral imagination. The kindred typology of imagination was proposed in 20 th century by such thinkers as Irving Babbitt, T.S. Eliot and Russell Kirk. The importance of Kirk lies partly in that fact that he began the discussion of the conservative attitude to imagination and tried to frame it as a coherent narrative. (shrink)

Philosophy needs to be popularised, as science needs to be popularised, and philosophy professors should be involved in the popularisation of philosophy, rather than leaving the task to well-meaning amateurs. Popular science is not necessarily pseudo-science; in fact, it rarely is. Likewise, popular philosophy does not have to be pseudo-philosophy. To democratise philosophy is not necessarily to “dumb it down” but to make it available in at least some form for all.

Philosophy needs to be popularised, as science needs to be popularised, and philosophy professors should be involved in the popularisation of philosophy, rather than leaving the task to well-meaning amateurs. Popular science is not necessarily pseudo-science; in fact, it rarely is. Likewise, popular philosophy does not have to be pseudo-philosophy. To democratise philosophy is not necessarily to “dumb it down” but to make it available in at least some form for all.

Flights of fancy Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9572-y Authors Sahotra Sarkar, Section of Integrative Biology, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, Waggener Hall 316, Austin, TX 78712-1180, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Various promising claims have been made that business can help alleviate poverty, and can do so in ways that add value to the bottom line. This article begins by highlighting that the evidence for such claims is not especially strong, particularly if business is thought of as a development agent, i.e. an organization that consciously and accountably contributes towards pro-poor outcomes. It goes on to ask whether, if we did know more about either the business case or the poverty alleviation (...) case, would this give cause for greater optimism that business could make a significant contribution to development. By exploring the experiences of producers of Fairtrade tea in Kenya, we reveal the complex nature of what constitutes a beneficial outcome for the poor and marginalized, and the gap that can exist between ethical intentions and the experience of their intended beneficiaries. The lessons of these experiences are relevant for Fairtrade and any commercial initiative that seeks to achieve outcomes beneficial and recognizable to the poor, and raise questions about the integration of social and instrumental outcomes that a future generation of ethical entrepreneurship will need to address. (shrink)

The article investigates the philosophical foundations and details of Mary Wollstonecraft's criticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's views on the education and nature of women. I argue that Wollstonecraft's criticism must not be understood as a constructionist critique of biological reductionism. The first section analyzes the differences between Wollstonecraft's and Rousseau's views on the possibility of a true civilization and shows how these differences connect to their respective conceptions of moral psychology. The section shows that Wollstonecraft's disagreement with Rousseau's views on women (...) was rooted in a broad scope of philosophical disagreement. The second section focuses on Rousseau's concept of nature, and I argue that Rousseau was neither a biological determinist nor a functionalist who denied that nature had any normative significance. The section ends with a discussion of Wollstonecraft's criticism of Rousseau's application of the distinction between the natural and the artificial. The third section focuses on Wollstonecraft's critique of Rousseau's claim that there are different standards for the perfectibility of men and women. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the claim that Aristotle would have provided Wollstonecraft with the philosophical tools she needed for her criticism of Rousseau. (shrink)

This essay examines the impact of the Great War on the breeding and showing of pedigree dogs in Britain. Hostility toward Germany led first to a decline in the popularity of breeds such as the dachshund, with both human and canine “aliens” targeted by nationalist fervor. Second, the institutions of dog breeding and showing came under threat from accusations of inappropriate luxury, frivolity, and the wasting of food in wartime, amounting to the charge of a want of patriotism on the (...) part of breeders. Third, the paper shows how the “dog fancy” responded to this “agitation against dogs,” turning on mongrels, stray dogs, and “useless” and unpatriotic humans, exposing deep divisions within the dog breeding community. By looking at the politics of the “dog fancy” in wartime, this paper extends the discussion of animals and national identity, arguing that while dogs could be used to articulate patriotic sentiments, their conditional citizenship meant that they were uniquely vulnerable at a time of national crisis. (shrink)

Suppose Boeing 747s grew on trees. They would first sprout as embryonic planes, the size of an acorn. Then they would grow until they reached full size, when they would plop off the trees, ready to fly. Suppose also that we knew how to feed and care for them, how to make minor repairs, and of course how to fly them. But let us suppose that all of this transpired at a very early stage in our scientific history, when we (...) did not yet understand the physics or the engineering of flight: Hence the phenomenon was a complete mystery to us. (To keep things simple, let us suppose that no other entity on earth could fly, only 747s.) And for the last ingredient in this fantasy world, suppose that computers likewise grew on trees, and we knew how to use and fix them too. (shrink)

This article discusses Margaret Cavendish's position on reality and fiction in dreams and her role within the moderate skepticism of her philosophy. While Cavendish argues that there is no distinction between dream-like and waking depictions, she does not consider the difference between fact and fiction to be sharp or relevant. We will argue that, although Cavendish promotes a philosophical discourse that articulates reason –that seeks to know reality— and fancy —which constructs fictions—, considers that only "elevated" poetic fantasies are (...) competent for the construction of this discourse. (shrink)

If only one of us could go there and return by air.1"To fly." From the first mission they erected in 1769 to the last, and twenty-first, in 1823, the Franciscans in California aspired to take wing in thought and deed. They dreamed of flight, celebrated it, prayed for it, and, as one witness claimed, even did it. Thus, to fly, which, in one sense means moving from one point to another through the air, speaks to the priests' efforts to traverse (...) any distance, and overcome any burden, to realize the spiritual and physical sides of their nature.2 For their spiritual endeavors, they claimed to heed, and uphold, God's will, a duty for which flight provided them with ways to express their devotion. When using references to... (shrink)

ABSTRACTKant is concerned to give meaning, depth and veracity to the notion of the subject, which he does on transcendental grounds, and also to shift it beyond purely cognitivist formulations. He opens the subject up to other dimensions of the world that he or she establishes – not only the cognitive, but also the political – ethical and the aesthetic. He does this by constructing and denoting different faculties and their principles that ought to be employed in the distinct domains (...) – the understanding, reason in its pure and practical orientations, and the imagination. Whilst practical reason is Kant’s main focus, the imagination is Kant’s unfinished business and is not limited to the issue of aesthetics. It is both reason’s “other”, and “an indispensable dimension of the human soul”, equal in power and capacity to the other faculties. (shrink)

The analysis of Political Action Committee activities is dominated by the perspective that PAC contributions are a rational investment in political candidates; they yield valuable short-term payoffs. PACs buy access to officeholders and their votes on important legislation. Despite broad acceptance of this morally suspect theory, the evidence upon which it is based is weak. An alternative perspective — what we call the principled approach — both fits the evidence and rejects the morally repugnant interpretation of the relationship between business (...) and politics that permeates the rational investment perspective. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Numerous attempts have been made recently to argue from premises about ‘human nature’ to conclusions about social policy. This essay offers a critique of one such attempt, Melvin Konner's argument from the fact that women are more nurturing and less aggressive than men, to the claim that the world would be safer if women rather than men had control over the world's armaments, especially nuclear weapons (and thus they ought to occupy positions of power). I claim that the argument (...) is badly flawed at several points, and that as such, it does not advance but impedes the movement towards equal access to governmental positions. (shrink)