In this paper we propose a modern theory of linguistic iconicity, comparing it with similar, though more primitive ideas expounded in Plato's Cratylus. In the Cratylus two views on natural language compete: Hermogenes favours absolute arbitrariness of names, Cratylus defends the naturalness — iconicity — of names. In the end, both these extreme views are rejected, the main conclusion being that one should not base philosophy on the study of words. The ancient controversy shows up again as a clash between (...) Saussurean and Peircean thinking, though extreme views are avoided. Onomatopoeia and Plato's articulatory mimicry are instances of imagic iconicity, now recognized by everybody. Less known but more interesting for grammar is diagrammatic iconicity. A diagram is „a systematic arrangement of signs, none of which necessarily resembles its referent, but whose relationships to each other mirror the relationships of their referents” . A well-known example is word-order reflecting temporal sequence . The most interesting area of diagrammatic iconicity is to be found in the opposition between marked and unmarked structures in natural language. For example, the plural is marked as opposed to the singular. The iconicity lies in the fact that the unmarked form of the singular corresponds to an unmarked meaning, while the marked form of the plural matches a marked meaning, i.e. the more form, the more meaning. Unmarked meaning is then viewed not in objectivist but in experiential terms: ‘unmarked’ is related to ‘prototypical‘. Prototypical linguistic structures are seen to go back to biological, psychological and cultural properties of the prototypical speaker . A number of examples of this kind of iconicity are discussed. On the biological level, so-called freezes exist, whereby unmarked sounds precede marked counterparts . On the biologicalpsychological level, this is paralleled by lexical coordinations . In morphological categories, one finds pairs like singular-plural, definite-indefinite, animate-inanimate, masculine-feminine, present-past, positive-negative, locativetemporal. As to semantic-syntactic structures, direct perception and direct causation are unmarked in relation to the indirect counterparts. On the cultural level, politeness structures are adduced. We conclude that both Plato and Wittgenstein II rejected iconicity too radically : languages are more motivated, less arbitrary, than is commonly thought. Our view qualifies the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as well. Other consequences concern feminism, Montaguegrammar, the place of intensions in a reference-theory of names and philosophy as a ‘critique of language’. (shrink)

The main thesis of this book is that "we find in Russell more system than he is given credit for, and indeed more than he even knew he had". With this the author opposes the current interpretations, which chop Russell's philosophy into pieces without any connection. The basic notion is that of "order", defined in Russell's terms as asymmetrical and transitive connexity. This serial relation would be omnipresent for Russell: in thought and in reality, both cosmological and political. Yet the (...) author is not blind to the fact that "not only did Russell constantly alter his theories of truth; at any period of development we can find him taking both sides to illuminate the problem in a dialectical way". Thus Russell's journey may have gone in different directions, but what incited him was always "his concern with objective truth and with the explicit virtues of the liberal humanitarian". So the unity of his work may have to do also with Russell's staying faithful to himself. (shrink)

We re-examine Peres' statement “opposite momenta lead to opposite directions”. It will be shown that Peres' statement is only valid in the large distance or large time limit. In the short distance or short time limit an additional deviation from perfect alignment occurs due to the uncertainty of the location of the source. This error contribution plays a major role in Popper's orginal experimental proposal. Peres' statement applies rather to the phenomenon of optical imaging, which was regarded by him as (...) a verification of his statement. This is because this experiment can in a certain sense be seen as occurring in the large distance limit. We will also reconsider both experiments from the viewpoint of Bohmian mechanics. In Bohmian mechanics particles with perfectly opposite momenta will move in opposite directions. In addition it will prove particularly useful to use Bohmian mechanics because the Bohmian trajectories coincide with the conceptual trajectories drawn by Pittman et al. In this way Bohmian mechanics provides a theoretical basis for these conceptual trajectories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 55-59 [Access article in PDF] One Stage Is Not Enough Andrew W. Young and Karel W. de Pauw Keywords: delusions, Cotard delusion, Capgras delusion, cognitive neuropsychiatry. WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY to offer our reflections on Philip Gerrans' interesting paper. Our opinion is that on fundamental issues we agree quite a bit—but there are clear differences when it comes to details.The most basic issue (...) concerns the nature of the enterprise. Like Gerrans, we think that it is possible to create testable accounts of the formation and maintenance of what would otherwise seem bizarre and inexplicable delusions, and that these accounts should be grounded in theoretical models of factors that underpin our everyday perception and reasoning. This general approach certainly forms part of what has been called cognitive neuropsychiatry. However, we disagree with Gerrans in that we see cognitive neuropsychiatry as an attempt to draw on the underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychology, rather than (as Gerrans implies) its current methods. The underlying logic of cognitive neuropsychological approaches has been to try to understand the effects of brain injury in terms of disruption of different components of theoretical models of normal abilities. In this approach, a model of normal performance is tested by its ability to account for the effects of brain injury. Where the model of normal performance also provides a convincing account of brain injury it is retained, and when it fails to account for effects of brain injury, it is revised or abandoned. In cognitive neuropsychiatry, the key theoretical move has been to argue that an adequate model of normal performance should be able to account for any disordered pattern (Ellis and Young 1990). The same logic of seeking to explain disordered performance by reference to models of normal function is then attempted, but for disorders that would usually fall within the province of psychiatry.In our opinion, however, cognitive neuropsychiatry will not simply involve importing the methods of cognitive neuropsychology into the new domain; they will need to be developed and adapted to fit the new agenda (Young 2000).In cognitive neuropsychology, progress has often come from the careful investigation of people with stable, selective deficits of fundamental cognitive functions involved in sensory analysis, memory, and verbal or motor output. In contrast, delusional beliefs can be relatively unstable; often they are only held for a few weeks or even days. When the delusions change, patients may modify or abandon them as suddenly as they seemed to form them, or they may give them up much more slowly and reluctantly. At the very least, this creates difficulties in the timing of investigations and in interpreting the relation of deficits and symptoms, which may be recorded on separate dates. These methodological problems [End Page 55] are exacerbated by the fact that deficits linked to complex abnormal experiences such as delusions may be multifaceted and diffuse, even when the delusions themselves have a specific content or theme. Such complications do not invalidate cognitive neuropsychiatry, but they do mean it will need to develop its own methods for dealing with them and making appropriate inferences.One of the key complexities that has surfaced already involves the idea that delusional beliefs might reflect the interaction of two or more contributory factors. Gerrans discusses a particular variant of this idea, which had been suggested by Young and Leafhead (1996) as an approach to understanding the Cotard delusion: The Cotard delusion represents a depressed person's attempt to account for abnormal perceptual experiences. It follows that the delusion is based on an unfortunate interaction between different contributory factors. One set of factors creates the abnormal perceptual experiences, which are characterised by lack of emotional responses and feelings of emptiness, depersonalisation and derealisation. The other factors result in a misinterpretation of these perceptual changes, in which the patients' depressed moods lead them correctly to attribute the changes to themselves, but to exaggerate their consequences. (Young and Leafhead, 1996, 166) Gerrans describes this as a two-stage account, but argues that a one-stage account based only on abnormal perceptual... (shrink)

One of the central explananda in the debate on social cognition is the interpretation of other people in terms of reasons for action. There is a growing dissatisfaction among participants in the debate concerning the descriptive adequacy of the traditional belief-desire model of action interpretation. Applying this model as an explanatory model at the subpersonal level threatens to leave the original explanandum largely unarticulated. Against this background we show how Brandom’s deontic scorekeeping model can be used as a valuable descriptive (...) tool for making folk psychology explicit. Following Brandom’s non-formalist and non-mentalistic account of reason discourse, we suggest that the process of making sense of others is best captured as proceeding from a ‘factive’ baseline. According to this picture the ascription of beliefs and desires is not the default interpretation strategy, but rather the result of prior scaffolding of the agent’s deontic score. We close by discussing Brandom’s model in the light of empirical findings on the ontogeny of reason attribution. (shrink)

'This book is an excellent, theoretically sound and politically relevant reader', Professor Wolfschaefer, Universitat des Bundeswehr, Hamburg 'Up to date complete overview of European monetary and fiscal policy issues. Highly readable, good mix of theory and data' 'I think the book contains a wealth of useful, precise information, presented in a straightforward, readable way in a quintessentially comparative perspective', Dr M Mclean, Royal Holloway University 'Excellent treatment - quite comprehensive, full references, accessible for non-economists', Charlotte Bretherton, Liverpool John Moores Univesity (...) 'A useful addition to student literature', MJ Macmillan, Exeter University 'This is a top class book and does not limit itself to assessing the adequacy of the European political economy to the precepts of advanced monetary economics...This book is an excellent tool for teaching EMU economics, and raising the level of EMU economics in the reaserch-field of international political economy. Students and scholars will appreciate the explicit assessment the authors make of complex economic issues, and their unbiased stance in the study of EMU economic and political interplay.' Miriam L.Campamella, Jean Monnet Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Turin. ECSA Review, Winter 2001This textbook offers a fresh and comprehensive examination of European monetary and fiscal policy in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union. Professors Eijffinger and de Haan give a brief history of European economic integration before the transition to EMU, and continue with a comprehensive analysis of institutions, legislation, and policies. Their analysis includes the functions and goals of the European Central Bank, the Treaty on European Union, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the harmonization of taxes. Other topics discussed include the targets and instruments of European monetary policy, the integration of European financial markets, and the competition between financial institutions in Europe. (shrink)

Decisions related to animal welfare standards depend on farmer’s multiple goals and values and are constrained by a wide range of external and internal forces. The aim of this paper is twofold, i.e., to develop a theoretical framework for farmers’ AW decisions that incorporates farmers’ goals, use and non-use values and to present an approach to empirically implement the theoretical framework. The farmer as a head of the farm household makes choices regarding production to maximize the utility of the household. (...) The overall utility of the farmer is determined by his multiple objectives. For the analysis of multi-objective problems, the multiple criteria decision - making paradigm provides an appropriate theoretical framework. However, theories from the field of social-psychology are needed to facilitate the identification of all relevant aspects in the decision making. The practical use of the conceptual framework is demonstrated using a simple numerical application of a multi-objective programming model. Two workshops were devoted to examining the scientific consistency and the practical usefulness of the approach. Implementing this approach will increase knowledge of the main factors and barriers that determine farmers’ decisions with regard to AW standards. This knowledge is relevant during the development of new AW concepts that aims to supply products that comply with above-legal AW standards for middle-market segments. (shrink)

Artifacts are probably our most obvious everyday encounter with technology. Therefore, a good understanding of the nature of technical artifacts is a relevant part of technological literacy. In this article we draw from the philosophy of technology to develop a conceptualization of technical artifacts that can be used for educational purposes. Furthermore we report a small exploratory empirical study to see to what extent teachers’ intuitive ideas about artifacts match with the way philosophers write about the nature of artifacts. Finally, (...) we suggest a teaching and learning strategy for improving teachers’ concepts of technical artifacts through practical activities. (shrink)

This article examines the role of philosophy in the development of the kinetic theory of gases. Two opposing accounts of this role, by Peter Clark and John Nyhof, are discussed and criticized. Contrary to both accounts, it is argued that philosophical views of scientists can fundamentally influence the results of their scientific work. This claim is supported by a detailed analysis of the philosophical views of Maxwell and Boltzmann, and of their work on the kinetic theory, especially concerning the so-called (...) specific heat anomaly. It leads to the conclusion that the scientific development of the kinetic theory cannot be understood without taking into account the role of philosophy. (shrink)