In this article, the author considers the particularities of Franz Brentano’s psychognosy in the context of notion of “basic” or “analytic” truths and his methodological approaches to scientific, philosophical investigations as well as his influence upon Kasimir Twardowski, who was the pupil of Brentano and accepted the main points of his methodological program. The author also stresses that the study of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s heritage is important for tracing the origin of scientific/analytic philosophy. It is very important (...) to investigate Brentano-Twardowski relations in the context of the concept of “basic truths” or “analytic truths”. Brentano stresses that “basic truths” can be found thanks to “psychognosy” or “pure psychology”. For Twardowski, psychology is the base for philosophical investigations because it helps to understand the formation of notions and judgements. This article is also dedicated to the inquiries of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s legacy provided by Ukrainian scholars Borys Dombrowskiy and Yanosh Sanotskiy. The reception of Brentano’s theory of judgement in Dombrowskiy’s works and the problem of Brentano’s psychologism in Sanotskiy’s works were examined. (shrink)

F. Brentano. Franz Brentano ARISTOTELES LEHRE VOM URSPRUNG DES_ MENSOHLIOI-IEN GEISTES VON FRANZ BREN'I'ANO. Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes. Front Cover.

Brentano claims to have taken his idea of intentionality from scholastic thought. However, in St. Thomas Aquinas, intentionality is not just the mark of knowledge, although some scholastics have interpreted it this way, even during Brentano’s lifetime. Moreover, to elaborate his idea of intentional presence, the German philosopher was not only inspired by him, but also by Francisco Suárez. In an unpublished manuscript from his legacy, Brentano understands Suarez’s objective concept as a representation of the thing in (...) the psyche. Thus, even before writing his definitive doctoral thesis, Brentano maintained that the object of thought is not the external thing but its mental copy. In short, modern philosophy seems to have been more decisive than scholasticism in shaping the substance of his theory of intentionality. (shrink)

The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion (...) of hyle, whose role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched. (shrink)

The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion (...) of hyle, whose role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched. (shrink)

The article examines some aspects of Brentano's ontology, starting with his 1862 dissertation "On the ambiguity of Being according to Aristotle", as well as its influence on the philosophy of M. Heidegger. The author shows that the ontology of the early Brentano is not limited to ousiology, since it includes a discussion of the field of mental being (ens rationis, ὂν ὡς ἀληθές) and it is in this aspect that he influences the young Heidegger. Following Aristotle, Brentano (...) assigns a central role to the ontology of essence, which in the late period leads him to the position of reism, but in the lectures of the middle period Brentano discusses the problems of intentional inexistence, thanks to which projects of "new types of ontology" by Husserl and Mainong appear. The author believes that Heidegger was also influenced by these ideas. Of course, there are fundamental differences between the positions of Brentano and Heidegger, but the similarities are quite large. In particular, if Brentano, highlighting the real and true areas, gives preference in favor of the former, then Heidegger's ontology is built on the second member of this opposition. In particular, everything that can be given is called being by Heidegger, because we are talking about intentional being, about ens rationis, or ὂν ὡς ἀληθές. (shrink)

H. 46 und H 47: >Geschichte der Philosophie mit älteren, von Brentano ausgeschiedenen Blättern. ... Vorlesung über >Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie im christlichen Abendland< nicht mehr angekündigt worden. ' Die von F.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

traduzione di n. de domenico del testo di f. brentano "sul nominalismo. contro guastella".

The language of phenomenology includes terms such as intentionality, phenom- enon, insight, analysis, sense, not to mention the key term of Edmund Husserl’s manifesto, “the things themselves” to return to . But what does the “things them- selves” properly mean? How come the term is replaced by the “findings” over time? And what are the findings for? The investigation begins by looking at the tricky legacy of the modern turn, trying to clarify ties to past masters, including Francis- co Suárez (...) and Augustine of Hippo . The former, because his influence goes beyond René Descartes reaching undoubtedly Franz Brentano and his students, as well as Martin Heidegger . The latter, because Augustine gives a personal component to the Greek inheritance, marked by the “inward turn .” However, it would not be possible to review the history of thought without the help offered by Jan Patočka's analyses . Patočka discloses the “care” of the Greek philosophers, Plato and Dem- ocritus among others, “for the soul”, we would say with Patočka for “being,” whose sense “does not leave us indifferent” as the leitmotiv of Ancient Philosophy . Nev- ertheless, in his lectures on Plato and Europe, Patočka points out that you must be careful not to confuse the phenomena of things, of existens, with the phenomena of being . Finally, Patočka’s legacy is found in the efforts to reconcile the life-feeling with the modern construction of reality, which means “a radical reconstruction of the naive and natural world of common sense .” In some ways, intentionality is to be revised . (shrink)

Comment penser le logique? Le propre de Brentano, dont se réclament la phénoménologie comme l'École de Vienne, ce n'est pas d'abord d'avoir réformé la syllogistique d'Aristote, mais — à chacune des étapes de sa doctrine — de reconduire la proposition logique au jugement, c'est-à-dire à la subjectivité, sans qu'il soit pour autant évident qu'il succombe au « psychologisme ». Il n'en viendra ainsi à défendre une théorie non-prédicative puis non-propositionnelle du jugement. Wie soll des Logische gedacht werden? Was (...) class='Hi'>Brentano, worauf sich die Phänomenologie wie auch die Wienerschule beruft, auszeichnet, ist nicht in erster Linie die Reform der aristotelischen Syllogistik, sondern die Rückführung — auf jedem Schritt seiner Lehre — des logischen Satzes zum Urteil, d.h. zur Subjektivität, ohne sich deshalb offensichtlich dem « Psychologismus » zu unterwerfen. So gelangt er zu einer Urteilslehre, die zunächst die prädikative Relation und dann selbst die Idee einer Relation zwischen dem Urteilenden und einem Objeckt zurückweist. (shrink)

With his usual conciseness and lucidity, Körner attempts to show what philosophy is by looking at what it does, i.e., by investigating its problems, its branches and its history. Körner begins by setting out classic problems ranging from the problem of class-existence to the problem of freedom, and follows this by an investigation of various methodologies. After this introductory material the bulk of the book ranges over the central problems of most branches of philosophy and concludes with a brief sketch (...) of the history of philosophy. Of special note is Körner's treatment of metaphysics to which he gives an entire section of almost seventy pages. Those familiar with Körner's other work will find it a concise summary of his notion of metaphysics as exhibition and/or replacement-analysis of categorial frameworks. Also of note is his refreshing treatment of philosophy of mind. He sees the problem of intentionality as the chief consideration for that branch of philosophy. Although he makes mention of the linguistic approach to philosophy of mind his main thrust is to set the problems in Brentano's terms and show how the mind-body problem and theories of truth are handled from that framework. There are some drawbacks in the book. First: given the length of his treatment of metaphysics one could wish that somewhere Körner in his explication of metaphysics had given some recognition to the realistic alternatives to his transcendental metaphysics. Second: one must wonder to whom the book is addressed. The conciseness of Körner's style allows him to range over an unbelievably large area, but in such a pithy manner that it seems almost unimaginable that the educated layman will be able to follow the presentations and arguments, particularly those interspersed with logical notation. For example, how much value is there in condensing the logic of truth-functions, quantification and axiomatization into less than ten pages? For those in the field it is repetitive, for those not, it must be nearly unintelligible. One feels Körner really wanted to write a defense of metaphysics. This may have been a more efficacious project eliminating the need to write first for one audience then for another. The book is concise, lucid, and illuminating.--R. F. D. (shrink)

This brief book surveys the theories of four German psychologists/philosophers, Wolff, Tetens, Wundt, and Brentano, in order to describe the transition in rationalistic psychology from a static to a dynamic concept of thought. Rappard presents this notion as a valuable corrective to the positivistic approach which has tended to predominate: for "sensory immediacy," the direct evidence of the data of the senses, these thinkers substitute "nonsensory immediacy," the direct evidence of the primordial activity of knowledge, which is only later (...) differentiated into inner and outer, self and other. This immediacy is self-knowledge, since the primary object of knowledge must first be the activity of knowing itself, prior to the separation from it of "activity centre" and "activity object". This nonsensory immediacy is in fact identified with the cogito, though it is not clear why the subject-side of such an original unity should thus be stressed. (shrink)

Although this work begins with Franz Brentano’s critique of both the Humean "content" theory of awareness and the Cartesian "idea" view of consciousness, it is not precisely an historical presentation of Brentano’s study of intentionality. It is more properly a philosophic study of the ontological and epistemological problems raised by Brentano’s work and modern efforts to solve them. Aquila thus attempts to analyze and evaluate Chisholm’s attack on Brentano’s view of "intentional relations"; he presents and criticizes (...) Meinong’s, Bergmann’s, and Russell’s theories regarding the proper objects of judgment; he examines the difference between the contents and objects of mental acts, contrasting Husserl’s early conception of this distinction with his later, more Fregean view; finally he referees the debate between Wilfrid Sellars and Chisholm on the nature of intentionality, concerning whether or not it is a real "characteristic" or "property" of an entity. (shrink)

ALTHOUGH THERE is no direct dependence of Bernard Lonergan upon Edmund HusserI in the manner, say, of Husserl himself upon Franz Brentano, there are nonetheless points of similarity and contrast between them. It would be possible to list these matching points singly on their own, such as Epoche and self-appropriation, Erlebnis and consciousness, monad and subject, Anschauung and affirmation. However, besides and beneath these individual points of similarity and contrast, lying as their basis, there is similarity and contrast at (...) the level of the fundamental conceptions of the two philosophers. Husserl and Lonergan share a common problematic: the structure of intentionality. If intentionality is the common problematic where Husserl and Lonergan meet, one might ask if and how various notions of theirs viewed in relation to intentionality are common or divergent. For the sake of comparison-confrontation, one might take the two central notions, Anschauung (intuition) in Husserl and affirmation in Lonergan, and inspect some of the implications they have for the two philosophers. Husserl calls intuition the "principle of all principles for his phenomenology." For his part, Lonergan conceives of affirmation as the culmination of the knowing process. Intuition and affirmation have analogous roles. For Husserl it is through intuition that cognition attains what is real, whereas for Lonergan it is through affirmation. The comparison-confrontation between Husserl and Lonergan can be summed up in terms of the three questions that Lonergan sets up to mark off the range of human knowing. First, what happens when one knows? Secondly, why is doing that knowing? Thirdly, what does one know when he does it? Husserl and Lonergan would seem closest in their approach to answering question one. However, they would part company in their answers to questions two and three, for here intuition and affirmation essentially determine what kind of an answer can be given. This paper will work within the brackets of these three questions. (shrink)

This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) (...) will not be strictly true. However, intentional descriptions will always be intensional, though not all intensional descriptions will be intentional. (shrink)

This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) (...) will not be strictly true. However, intentional descriptions will always be intensional, though not all intensional descriptions will be intentional. (shrink)

This book covers a period of Austrian history stretching from 1848 to 1933, a period of amazing intellectual activity, on a scale comparable perhaps only with renaissance Italy. Johnston includes chapters on Emperor Franz Joseph, the Beidermeir culture, legal and economic theorists, Austro-marxists, and Viennese aestheticism. Perhaps most interesting for philosophers are sections on positivism and impressionism and the author’s discussions of men such as Mach, Boltzman, Schlick, Mauthner, the ever-present Karl Kraus, Wittgenstein, Buber, and Freud. There is another notable (...) section on Bohemian Reform Catholicism which includes discussions of Bolzano, Herbart, Brentano, and Husserl. The author’s scholarship is excellent. A large amount of significant information is exceedingly well-organized. (shrink)

La filosofia austriaca presenta tratti di originalità nei suoi esponenti: anzitutto B. Bolzano, F. Brentano e la sua scuola. Grazie all’influenza di Herbart essa rimane estranea all’idealismo e al neokantismo e sviluppa temi poi decisivi nel novecento come la fenomenologia e la filosofia analitica.

The paper considers F. Brentano’s judgement theory and its influence upon the develop-ment of analytical philosophy. It is asserted that this judgement theory in Brentano’s reistic ontology, using the notion of accidental extension, leads to the creation of the existence of things “by word”. Such an “art” becomes possible only when the “accidental extension” is treated as an aesthetic or ethic evaluation. Brentano owes the separation of a logical evalua-tion of “truth” to Descartes’ dualism. Judgement theory does (...) not satisfy the criterion of in-tersubjectivity. Therefore Brentano as well as his admirers must read the judgements by de-scription. It is stated that the description defence mechanism against the expression of the presented subject in language lies in the fact that it does not allow for the unique junction in the composition of the description of existence and essence (accidental extension), allowing to express the existence of only a part of the presented subject. (shrink)

The growth of knowledge and its effects on the practice of medicine have been issues of philosophical and ethical interest for several decades and will remain so for many years to come. The outline of the present volume was conceived nearly three years ago. In 1987, a conference on this theme was held in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on the occasion of the founding of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care (ESPMH). Most of the chapters of this (...) book are derived from papers presented at that meeting, and for the purpose of editing the book Stuart Spicker, Ph. D., joined two founding members of ESPMH, Henk ten Have and Gerrit Kimsma. The three of them successfully brought together a number of interesting contribu tions to the theme, and ESPMH is grateful and proud to have initiated the production of this volume. The Society intends that annual meetings be held in different European countries on a rotating basis and to publish volumes related to these meetings whenever feasible. In 1988, the second conference was held in Aarhus, Denmark on "Values in Medical Decision Making and Resource Allocation in Health Care". In 1989, a meeting was held in Czestochowa, Poland, on "European Traditions in Philosophy of Medicine. From Brentano to Bieganski". It is hoped that these conferences and the books to be derived from them, will initiate a new European tradition, lasting well into the 21 st century! P. J. (shrink)

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual (...) saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225. (shrink)