"The premise of the Jewish attitude toward illness is that living is sacred, that good health enables us to live a fully religious life, and that disease is an evil. Any effective therapy is permitted, even if it conflicts with Jewish law. To bring about healing is a responsibility not only of the person who is ill and of the professional caregivers, but also of the loved ones, and of the larger circle of family, friends, and community." "Illness and Health (...) in the Jewish Tradition is an anthology of traditional and modern Jewish writings that highlights these basic principles."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

We describe the ongoing citations to biomedical articles affected by scientific misconduct, and characterize the papers that cite these affected articles. The citations to 102 articles named in official findings of scientific misconduct during the period of 1993 and 2001 were identified through the Institute for Scientific Information Web of Science database. Using a stratified random sampling strategy, we performed a content analysis of 603 of the 5,393 citing papers to identify indications of awareness that the cited articles affected by (...) scientific misconduct had validity issues, and to examine how the citing papers referred to the affected articles. Fewer than 5% of citing papers indicated any awareness that the cited article was retracted or named in a finding of misconduct. We also tested the hypothesis that affected articles would have fewer citations than a comparison sample; this was not supported. Most articles affected by misconduct were published in basic science journals, and we found little cause for concern that such articles may have affected clinical equipoise or clinical care. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to identify and describe published research articles that were named in official findings of scientific misconduct and to investigate compliance with the administrative actions contained in these reports for corrections and retractions, as represented in PubMed. Between 1993 and 2001, 102 articles were named in either the NIH Guide for Grants and Contracts (“Findings of Scientific Misconduct”) or the U.S. Office of Research Integrity annual reports as needing retraction or correction. In 2002, 98 of (...) the 102 articles were indexed in PubMed. Eighty-five of these 98 articles had indexed corrections: 47 were retracted; 26 had an erratum; 12 had a correction described in the “comment” field. Thirteen had no correction, but 10 were linked to the NIH Guide “Findings of Scientific Misconduct”, leaving only 3 articles with no indication of any sort of problem. As of May 2005, there were 5,393 citations to the 102 articles, with a median of 26 citations per article (range 0–592). Researchers should be alert to “Comments” linked to the NIH Guide as these are open access, and the “Findings of Scientific Misconduct’ reports are often more informative than the statements about the retraction or correction found in the journals. (shrink)

Lucid, non-intimidating presentation of propositional logic, propositional calculus and predicate logic by Russian scholar. Topics of concern in a variety of fields, including computer science, systems analysis, linguistics, etc. Accessible to high school students; valuable review of fundamentals for professionals. Exercises (no solutions). Preface. Three appendices. Indices. Bibliogaphy. 14 figures.

In the debate over clinicians’ conscience, there is a greater ethical, legal, and scholarly focus on negative, rather than positive, claims of conscience. This asymmetry produces a seemingly unjustified double standard with respect to clinicians’ conscience under the law. For example, a Roman Catholic physician working at a secular institution may refuse to provide physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience, but a secular physician working at a Roman Catholic institution may not insist on providing physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience. (...) This article outlines arguments against this asymmetry and critiques them for failing to distinguish between positive claims of conscience as positive or negative rights. I suggest the asymmetry debate should be focused on whether positive claims of conscience as positive rights ought to enjoy the same protections as negative claims of conscience. Clarifying the debate in this way helps elucidate some of the best reasons for the asymmetry, which these arguments have not addressed. This article does not take a definitive position on whether the asymmetry is justified, but attempts to bring some focus to the debate by directing arguments against the asymmetry to address the significant differences between positive claims of conscience as positive rights and negative claims of conscience. (shrink)

Our aim in this article is to bring some clarity to the clinical ethics expertise debate by critiquing and replacing the taxonomy offered by the Core Competencies report. The orienting question for our taxonomy is: Can clinical ethicists offer justified, normative recommendations for active patient cases? Views that answer “no” are characterized as a “negative” view of clinical ethics expertise and are further differentiated based on (a) why they think ethicists cannot give justified normative recommendations and (b) what they think (...) ethicists can offer, if they cannot offer recommendations. Views that answer “yes” to the orienting question are characterized as a “positive” view of clinical ethics expertise. Positive views are distinguished according to four additional questions. First (P1), how are those recommendations generated? Second (P2), what is the nature of the recommendations? Third (P3), we ask, how are the recommendations justified? And finally (P4), how are the recommendations communicated? (shrink)

Schopenhauer is famously abusive toward his philosophical contemporary and rival, Friedrich William Joseph von Schelling. This chapter examines the motivations for Schopenhauer’s immoderate attitude and the substance behind the insults. It looks carefully at both the nature of the insults and substantive critical objections Schopenhauer had to Schelling’s philosophy, both to Schelling’s metaphysical description of the thing-in-itself and Schelling’s epistemic mechanism of intellectual intuition. It concludes that Schopenhauer’s substantive criticism is reasonable and that Schopenhauer does in fact avoid Schelling’s errors: (...) still, the vehemence of the abuse is best perhaps explained by the proximity of their philosophies, not the distance. Indeed, both are developing metaphysics of will with full and conflicted awareness of the Kantian epistemic strictures against metaphysics. In view of this, Schopenhauer is particularly concerned to mark his own project as legitimate by highlighting the manner in which he avoids Schelling’s errors. (shrink)

In a recent paper in Psychological Science, Kouider and Dupoux reported obtaining unconscious Stroop priming only when subjects had partial awareness of the masked distractor words . Kouider and Dupoux conjectured that semantic priming occurs only when such partial awareness is present. The present experiments tested this conjecture in an affective categorization priming task that differed from Kouider and Dupoux’s in using masked distractors that subjects had practiced earlier as visible words. Experiment 1 showed priming from practiced words when subjects (...) had no partial awareness of those words. Experiment 2 showed that, in the absence of partial awareness, practiced words yielded priming but not-practiced words did not. Experiment 3 corroborated Experiment 1 and 2s results using a different test of partial awareness. These results suggest that unconscious processing of subword elements drives masked semantic priming by practiced words. (shrink)

This paper is divided into three sections. The first presents some examples of the killing/letting die distinction. The second draws a further distinction between what I call negative and positive cases of acting or refraining. Here I argue that the moral significance of the acting/refraining distinction is different for positive and for negative cases. In the third section I apply the above distinction to euthanasia, and argue that mercy killing should be regarded as analogous to positive rather than negative cases. (...) On the basis of this, I then support active rather than passive euthanasia. (shrink)

This article examines a handful of recent creative works that reflect speculatively on transgender pasts. I argue that each of these creative texts uses ontological interventions to reimagine moments in trans activist history that scholars have narrated only in terms of the attenuation of sociality and of political participation. These works do this by ratifying trans activists’ relations of reciprocity with extraordinary entities that are not often supported by secular and anthropocentric historiographies. Instead of engaging accounts of coalition work with (...) extraterrestrials, nonhuman animals, and magical powers mainly as sites of “subjugated knowledges”, these creative works all consider the political capacitations afforded by trans collaborations with other-than-human agencies. In order to make this argument, I draw from the recent body of anthropological scholarship known as the “new animism,” and consider the absence of commentary on religion and secularism within the Anglo-American posthuman turn. Ultimately, beyond offering alternatives to historical declension narratives about trans activism, these works urge scholars to consider how relations with “subaltern” agentive forces have become increasingly important to disenfranchised communities’ efforts to negotiate the political debilitations of a post-neoliberal world. (shrink)

I take issue with several themes in Ted Toadvine’s lively paper, “Limits of the Flesh,” suggesting that he has significantly misread many of the arguments in The Spell of the Sensuous. I first engage his contention that I disparage reflection and denigrate the written word. Then I take up the assertion that I exclude the symbolic dimension of experience from my account, and indeed that I seek to eliminate the symbolic from our interactions with others. Finally, I refute his claim (...) that my ecophenomenological stance leaves no room for resistance, contradiction, and alterity—elements that are, in fact, central to my understanding of ethics. My reply leads directly into a discussion of one of the crucial concerns of my work: the manner in which the very style of our discourse—our way of wielding words—tacitly works to either enhance, or to stifle, the solidarity between the human community and the more-than-human earth. (shrink)

Moral pluralism poses a foundational problem for secular clinical ethics: How can ethical dilemmas be resolved in a context where there is disagreement not only on particular cases, but further, on...

Descartes’s arguments about the certainty of mathematics in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind cannot be understood independently of his attack on the authority of ancient authors. The author maintains this view by reading Descartes’s claims about mathematics through the lens of status theory, a framework for disputation revived by Renaissance dialecticians. Within status theory, “certainty” was closely associated with consensus. The essay shows how Descartes used status to attack the authority of the ancient authors and elevate mathematics (...) as an alternative. Descartes’s arguments about the certainty of mathematics are colored by his effort to make mathematics satisfy the demands of status-based disputation. Specifically, in order to elevate the status of mathematics, Descartes portrayed it as more common—prone to consensus—than he really believed it was. (shrink)

What is the proper role of a clinical ethics consultant’s religious beliefs in forming recommendations for clinical ethics consultation? Where Janet Malek has argued that religious belief should have no influence on the formation of a CEC’s recommendations, Clint Parker has argued a CEC should freely appeal to all their background beliefs, including religious beliefs, in formulating their recommendations. In this paper, I critique both their views by arguing the position envisioned by Malek puts the CEC too far from religion (...) and the position envisioned by Parker puts the CEC too close. For a CEC to give recommendations about what is morally prohibited, permissible, or obligatory in the clinic, I propose a view of the CEC that is neither religious nor non-religious but quasi-religious. I argue that a quasi-religious approach avoids the problems of both religious and non-religious views while preserving their benefits. Additionally, a quasi-religious view resists the marginalization of “religious” traditions that occurs when secular ethicists come to think of their approach as somehow distinctly non-religious. (shrink)

Tiffany was seventeen when injury to her brain stem put her in the intensive care unit on life‐sustaining treatment and in a permanently locked‐in state—fully conscious but able to control no bodily movements other than her eye movements. As a clinical ethicist at the hospital, I was consulted by her neurologist, who had established a blink‐once‐for‐yes, twice‐for‐no system of communication so that Tiffany could respond to questions. Her mother wanted Tiffany to continue receiving treatment that could prolong her life for (...) years, potentially decades. In a meeting with the neurologist and family, I felt like suggesting what nobody seemed willing to suggest: that we should ask Tiffany what she wants. (shrink)

Aristotle wrote that "the ultimate purpose in studying ethics is not as it is in other inquiries, the attainment of theoretical knowledge; we are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, else there would be no advantage in studying it." Ethics for Life is a multicultural and interdisciplinary introductory ethics textbook that provides students with an ethics curriculum that has been shown to significantly improve students' ability to make real-life moral (...) decisions. (shrink)

While many Catholic hospitals permit the prescription of the emergency contraception drug levonorgestrel for rape victims, some continue to prohibit this practice as a matter of institutional conscience. While the standard approach to this issue has been to offer an argument that levonorgestrel either is or is not morally permissible, we have taken a different tack. We begin by briefly describing and acknowledging that reasonable disagreement exists on this question (part one), and then arguing that the reasonable disagreement itself can (...) serve as a compelling basis for Catholic leadership at hospitals that prohibit emergency contraception for rape victims to accommodate physicians who wish to provide levonorgestrel as a matter of conscience (part two). We end by anticipating and responding to some objections. (shrink)

Given recent legal developments in the United States, now is a critical time to draw attention to how ‘conscientious objection’ is sometimes used by health care providers to discriminate against the LGBTQ community. We review legal developments from 2019 and present several cases where health care providers used conscientious objection in ways that discriminate against the LGBTQ community, resulting in damaged trust by this underserved population. We then discuss two important conceptual points in this debate. The first involves the interpretation (...) of discrimination (provider versus patient-centered views), and we argue for a patient-centered view; the second involves the use of the people versus procedure distinction to reach a compromise between LGBTQ individuals and the clinicians who do not want to treat them. We argue the distinction is problematic when applied to treatment of the LGBTQ population. (shrink)

We describe a case of parents refusing a tracheostomy for an otherwise healthy newborn. The refusal was not honored because permitting the refusal would have violated state law, which required a child to have a qualifying condition (e.g. a terminal diagnosis, permanent unconsciousness, incurable condition with severe suffering) to remove or withhold life-sustaining treatment. However, this case strained the relationship between the parents and medical staff, who worried about sending the newborn home with a tracheostomy where she was not wanted. (...) While many ethical issues arise in treatment refusal cases like this, we focus on the opportunity for ethicists to help the medical staff reflect on the technological alienation of the parents, which may help foster empathy, reduce moral distress, and strengthen the quality of the doctor-parent-patient triad. (shrink)

The legal and ethical asymmetry between honoring positive claims of conscience versus negative claims of conscience was recently analyzed by several articles in this journal. The first author of this article (ALB) identified unique but defeasible reasons against honoring positive claims of conscience, such as the greater threat they post to institutional values and institutional resources than negative claims of conscience. However, ALB wrote, when these reasons can be overcome, positive claims of conscience should enjoy the same ethical and legal (...) respect as negative claims of conscience. This article argues that the prescription of birth control by non-Roman Catholic physicians in Roman Catholic institutions is an example of a positive claim of conscience that can overcome concerns of institutional values and resources, and therefore ought to receive the same ethical respect and legal protection as negative claims of conscience. In making this argument, this article also responds to several of the thoughtful comments raised by Alberto Giubilini and Dominic Wilkinson. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson; Killing, Letting Die, and The Trolley Problem, The Monist, Volume 59, Issue 2, 1 April 1976, Pages 204–217, https://doi.org/10.5840/monis.

Legal precedent, professional‐society statements, and even many medical ethicists agree that some situations may call for a clinician to engage in an act of lying or nonlying deception of a patient or patient's family member. Still, the moral terrain of clinical deception is largely uncharted, and when it comes to practical guidance for clinicians, many might think that ethicists offer nothing more than the rule never to deceive. This guidance is insufficient to meet the real‐world demands of clinical practice, and (...) this article endeavors to articulate a framework to help clinicians better navigate the ethics of clinical deceit. The framework articulates four morally relevant dimensions of a potential deceptive act that should be examined to better determine the moral justification that might be required: the target of the act, the nature of the information, the nature of the act, and the context of the act. (shrink)

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying (...) state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements, it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated. (shrink)