Animal welfare has a long history of disregard. While in recent decades the study of animal welfare has become a scientific discipline of its own, the difficulty of measuring animal welfare can still be vastly underestimated. There are three primary theories, or perspectives, on animal welfare - biological functioning, natural living and affective state. These come with their own diverse methods of measurement, each providing a limited perspective on an aspect of welfare. This paper describes (...) a perspectival pluralist account of animal welfare, in which all three theoretical perspectives and their multiple measures are necessary to understand this complex phenomenon and provide a full picture of animal welfare. This in turn will offer us a better understanding of perspectivism and pluralism itself. (shrink)

In this article we aim to reduce the force of the expensive tastes objection to equality of welfare by constructing a pluralist welfare egalitarian theory which is not defeated by it. In the first part, we argue that Cohen’s condition of responsibility-sensitiveness is not able to provide a satisfactory rebuttal of the expensive tastes objection for at least a class of theories of justice, namely those that adhere to a methodologically fact-sensitive view. In the second part, we explore (...) the possibility of constructing a welfare egalitarian theory that gives weight to both equality and efficiency. We propose two alternatives, which integrate a utilitarian constraint and a Weak Pareto constraint on equality and show that both theories consistently differentiate between compensable and non-compensable expensive tastes, but should ultimately be rejected because of other unattractive implications. Finally, we develop a fairness-constrained theory of welfare egalitarianism and suggest that it can distinguish between compensable and non-compensable expensive tastes in both a conceptually consistent and a morally plausible manner, without generating decisive additional objections. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism (...) that currently dominates moral philosophy, he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

Theories of well-being purport to identify the basic goods and bads whose presence in a person's life determines how well she is faring. Monism is the view that there is only one basic good and one basic bad. Pluralism is the view that there is either more than one basic good or more than one basic bad. In this paper, I give an argument for pluralism that is general in the sense that it does not purport to identify (...) any basic goods or bads. If I am right, then even if you cannot name a single basic good or bad, you can know that pluralism is true. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anderson’s “pluralist–expressivist” value theory, an alternative to the understanding of value and rationality underlying the “rational actor” model of human behavior, provides rich resources for addressing questions of environmental and animal ethics. It is particularly well-suited to help us think about the ethics of commodification, as I demonstrate in this critique of the pet trade. I argue that Anderson’s approach identifies the proper grounds for criticizing the commodification of animals, and directs our attention to the importance of maintaining social (...) practices and institutions that respect the social meanings of animals. Her theory alone, however, does not adequately address the role of the state in this project. Drawing on social contract theory to fill this gap, I conclude that the state’s role in regulating the pet trade should be limited to ensuring the welfare of animals in the stream of commerce, not prohibiting their mass marketing altogether. (shrink)

This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing that makes our lives (...) or the world better, while substantive pluralists hold that there is more than one such thing. A more radical kind of pluralism holds that each of the plurality of good things is good in its own way, thus raising questions concerning value comparability and compensability. The essay elucidates these theories and discusses important arguments for and against them. (shrink)

I argue that the distinction between monism and pluralism about well-being should be understood in terms of explanation: the monist affirms (but the pluralist denies) that whenever two particular things are basically good for you, the explanation of their basic goodness for you is the same. I then consider a number of arguments for monism and a number of arguments for pluralism.

While aligned with John Neville Figgis’ pluralism and Marxist socialism, Harold Laski endorsed liberal and democratic values. However, he synthesised several elements from older liberal theories in a way that diluted the division to which these theories had adhered, namely that between the private and the political spheres. The resulting combination preserves privacy’s status as the realm where individuals are free to pursue their separate ends, but enables essentially private activities based in voluntary social spaces to infuse the space (...) of politics. From this emerged a vision of liberal democracy, in which freedom plays out in multiple private spaces that do not require an autonomous civic arena to complement them. The combination was reached within the contexts of mid-century thinking about the welfare state and a broader project of reformulating democracy by reducing its equation with representation. (shrink)

Private-property anarchy is better than the state in the enhancement of liberty and welfare. Strictly speaking, market exchange is one aspect of private-property anarchy. But I here focus on market-anarchy as that is a main source of confusion and debate. Similarly, pluralism is another aspect of private-property anarchy. I focus on pluralism as an example of a currently popular topic where private-property anarchy is misunderstood. ‘Pluralism’ here means ‘(tolerating) different ways of life’. ‘The market’ means ‘voluntary (...) exchange’. ‘Anarchy’ means ‘no rule’. Both interpersonal liberty and private property are inherently anarchic: no one is ruled to the extent that these exist. They are also naturally pluralist. The state, by contrast, coercively imposes ultimate control and is thus inherently illiberal and naturally Procrustean. Democratic prejudice obscures these facts. (shrink)

This anthology contains several of Thomas E. Hill’s essays on the contributions various basic Kantian themes can be seen to make to the topics of human welfare and moral worth. The essays have been written over the last decade, and all but two have been previously published in academic journals and anthologies. This volume complements one published in 2000 entitled, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives, and it is part of Hill’s “ongoing project to develop a moral theory (...) in the Kantian tradition that is as plausible as possible”. The essays reveal Hill’s Kantian sympathies and sensibilities, without being apologies for Kantian ethics: what Hill takes to be untenable Kantian claims are identified and explicitly rejected. What Hill takes to be unreasonable interpretations of Kantian points suffer a similar fate. The anthology has a very useful introduction by Hill, which provides a brief synopsis of each essay as well as the organizing principles behind the selections and their ordering. Those readers who do not think of themselves as Kant scholars will not be out of their depths. (shrink)

This anthology contains several of Thomas E. Hill’s essays on the contributions various basic Kantian themes can be seen to make to the topics of human welfare and moral worth. The essays have been written over the last decade, and all but two have been previously published in academic journals and anthologies. This volume complements one published in 2000 entitled, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives, and it is part of Hill’s “ongoing project to develop a moral theory (...) in the Kantian tradition that is as plausible as possible”. The essays reveal Hill’s Kantian sympathies and sensibilities, without being apologies for Kantian ethics: what Hill takes to be untenable Kantian claims are identified and explicitly rejected. What Hill takes to be unreasonable interpretations of Kantian points suffer a similar fate. The anthology has a very useful introduction by Hill, which provides a brief synopsis of each essay as well as the organizing principles behind the selections and their ordering. Those readers who do not think of themselves as Kant scholars will not be out of their depths. (shrink)

In this article, I defend a democratic form of the productivist welfare state. I argue that this form of the state can best cope, theoretically and practically, with the diversity of deeply morally pluralistic democratic societies for two reasons. First, the justification of this form of the state rests solely on general facts about human nature, basic human needs, and efficiency considerations in a world of moderately scarce resources. Second, this state does not aim to promote a specific view (...) of justice, but human flourishing more generally, expressed in terms of individual and collective productivity. The proposed democratic productivist welfare state supports its citizens up to the level that allows them to develop and exercise their talents and abilities without providing incentives for free riding. I argue that, under the specific empirical circumstances that I describe, in particular certain informational restrictions concerning the precise productive and destructive capacities of the members of society in practice and the soundness of the Aristotelian principle, this goal may best be achieved in practice by the introduction of an unconditional basic income at subsistence level, if society is sufficiently developed economically to provide such an income. On productivist grounds, such an unconditional subsistence income also addresses, pragmatically and partially, the problem of historical injustices against the weakest members of society and provides all group members with the means for democratic participation. (shrink)

A well-known objection to prioritarianism, famously levelled by Mike Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, is that it wrongly ignores the unity of the individual in treating intra-personal cases like inter-personal cases. In this paper we accept that there should be a moral shift between these cases, but argue that this is because autonomy is a relevant consideration in intra-personal but not inter-personal cases, and one to which pluralist prioritarians ought to attend. To avoid this response, Otsuka and Voorhoeve must assume we (...) know nothing about the subjective information of the person being chosen for. But we show that this commits them to two controversial assumptions: that welfare consists in an objective list of goods, and – if one accepts an unorthodox but plausible account of the relationship between risk aversion and rationality – that there is only a narrow range of rational risk aversions. Only prioritarians who accept both these assumptions are on the hook of Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s objection; for all others, the examples have insufficient information, and so lose their sting. (shrink)

A critical survey of the major philosophical arguments that have been used to justify the institutions and policies of contemporary welfare states considers the claims of rights theory, egalitarianism, and citizenship and communitarian doctrines. It finds that these arguments are both internally confused and inconsistent with conventional welfare policies. It is argued that the welfare state itself has serious ambiguities: it claims to cater for the needy, as part of its ?public good?; obligations, yet in practice it (...) delivers a range of private goods, e.g., health, housing, education and pensions, often irrespective of need. Yet classical liberal theories of state welfare, which favor simple cash payments, are flawed in theory and potentially costly in practice, while neocon?servative theories, by imposing ?values?; on welfare recipients, undermine liberal pluralism. The author concludes that welfare philosophy should be concerned with two neglected areas: the possibility that welfare be provided outside the familiar market and state categories, and the construction of constitutional rules to prevent the middle?class ?capture?; of existing welfare states. (shrink)

Digital health and welfare technologies and artificial intelligence are proposed to revolutionise healthcare systems around the world by enabling new models of care. Digital health and welfare technologies enable remote monitoring and treatments, and artificial intelligence is proposed as a means of prediction instead of reaction to individuals’ health and as an enabler of proactive care and rehabilitation. The digital transformation not only affects hospital and primary care but also how the community meets older people's needs. Community care (...) is often provided by informal and formal care‐givers, most of whom are women. Gender equality is at the heart of many national strategies, but do all genders have equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities when it comes to community care and its digital transformation? The digital transformation of community care is entangled with how care is provided to older people and the working conditions of community‐care professionals. Current and, even more so, future community‐care systems are and will be partly constituted by networks of technological artefacts. These health and welfare technological artefacts and the discourse surrounding them mediate and constitute social relations and community care. This article looks into how health and welfare technology and artificial intelligence‐based devices and systems mediate and constitute gender relations in community care and presents an argument for reflexivity, embodiment, pluralism, participation and ecology as an alternative strategy to treating community care as one‐size‐fit‐all and being blind to gender‐related issues. (shrink)

This paper presents the Norwegian national health care system and the manner in which the problems of rationing and pluralism of values create new ethical and political challenges. The paper concludes with some doubts about the feasibility of the transformation taking place within this kind of health care system, with special reference to governmental control and consumer preference. Keywords: national health care, pluralism, rationing, two-tier system CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Book review of "Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice" by P. Illari and F. Russo,.

In this paper, we advance a holistic ecological approach based on a three-compartment model. This approach favors policy initiatives that lie at the intersection of the three major areas of concern common to most environmental controversies: environmental protection, provision of basic human needs, and advancing economic welfare. In support of this approach, we propose a “pluralistic stewardship”integrating core elements of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. After presenting the basics of our model, we then explain why it is important to identify (...) and promote a holistic ecological approach to sustainability. Here we employ the economic concept of path dependence, emphasizing that there exist multiple paths society can follow in environmental ethics and policy but once one has been chosen, implicitly or explicitly, there may be little opportunity to reverse such choices. (shrink)

Federico Zuolo | : Most contemporary Western laws regarding the treatment of animals in livestock farming and animal slaughter are primarily concerned with the principle that animal suffering during slaughter should be minimized, but that animal life may be taken for legitimate human purposes. This principle seems to be widely shared, intuitively appealing and capable of striking a good compromise between competing interests. But is this principle consistent? And how can it be normatively grounded? In this paper I discuss critically (...) this principle. I argue that this principle can be justified on the ground of respect for the value commitment toward animal welfare, which is held by many people. The advantage of this perspective is its inclusiveness: it can justify without contradiction the principle at stake and allow for the admissibility of religious slaughter while promoting animals’ interest in not suffering. This justification also has the advantage of being compatible with the cultural and religious pluralism of contemporary societies. | : La plupart des lois contemporaines portant sur le traitement des animaux, leur élevage et les techniques d’abattage en usage en Occident se préoccupent principalement du principe selon lequel la souffrance des animaux doit être minimisée durant l’abattage, mais reconnaissent que les animaux peuvent être tués à des fins humaines légitimes. Ce principe semble être largement accepté par la société, séduisant intuitivement et susceptible de constituer un bon compromis entre des intérêts concurrents. Mais ce principe est-il cohérent? Et quel peut être son fondement normatif? Dans cet article, j’aborde ce principe de manière critique. J’affirme que ce principe peut être justifié dans le cadre du respect de l’engagement envers le bien-être des animaux, lequel est soutenu par de nombreuses personnes. L’avantage de cette perspective est son caractère inclusif : elle permet de justifier de manière non contradictoire le principe en question et rend acceptable l’abattage rituel tout en faisant la promotion de l’intérêt des animaux à la non-souffrance. Cette justification présente également l’avantage d’être compatible avec le pluralisme culturel et religieux qui caractérise les sociétés contemporaines. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that the European Union is presently suffering from a lack of social justice. Yet there is significant disagreement about what the relevant injustice consists in: Federalists believe the EU can only remedy its justice deficit through the introduction of direct interpersonal transfers between people living in separate states. Intergovernmentalists believe the justice-related purpose of the EU is to enable states to cooperate fairly, and to remain internally just and democratic in the face of increased global pressure (...) on welfare states. I suggest that despite their fundamental differences, many of the most reasonable and prominent philosophical accounts of social justice in the EU nonetheless converge in their institutional prescriptions. In particular, they may each serve as a justificatory basis for introducing the European social minimum, an EU-wide income support scheme. (shrink)

The author offers a conceptual investigation of the tension between openness and protection in well-developed welfare states. Because of a combination of demographic tendencies and labor market shortages, a growing number of European welfare states is currently exploring market-led immigration policies. However, the level of protection these welfare states offer seems hard to reconcile with the low threshold markets that are needed to incorporate newcomers. The author argues that the “solution”lies not so much in a clear political (...) choice for either but rather in the coordinated institutionalization of differentiated citizenship rights. The author illustrates this case with examples taken from the Dutch context, claiming further that the particular combination of corporatist welfare arrangements and the tradition of lenient enforcement in the Netherlands provides a “natural”habitat for the kind of regime pluralism that differentiated citizenship requires. (shrink)

Absence of health, that is, sickness in Africa is viewed in personalistic terms. A disease is explained as effected by 'the active purposeful intervention of an agent, who may be human', non-human (a ghost, an ancestor, an 'evil spirit), or supernatural (a deity or other very powerful being)' (Foster). Illness is thus attributed to breaking of taboos, offending God and/ or ancestral spirits; witchcraft, sorcery, the evil eye, passion by an evil spirit and a curse from parents or from an (...) offended neighbour. In view of these personalistic theories of ill health, treatment is through ritual purification, exorcism or sacrifices. For an appropriate diagnosis and intervention, it is imperative to determine 'who' caused the illness and then 'why' it was caused, to which answers are offered through divination by a healer. This interpretive framework, is applicable to all types of sickness, facilitates co-existence of African traditional healing and biomedical treatment, that is, plurality of health seeking practices. The approach fails to offer a constructive approach and contradicts the biblical healing framework whereby one may not have explanatory causes to a situation of ill health. This article engaged the biblical concept of shalōm as a relevant constructive framework. The Hebrew concept of shalōm, though distinctly salvific, is inclusive of holistic and personalistic healing aspects. The concept encompasses constructive aspects of completeness, wholeness, health, peace, welfare, safety, soundness, tranquillity, prosperity, perfectness, fullness, rest, harmony and the absence of agitation or discord, which provides a useful holistic healing theological framework. It therefore provides a health and well-being framework that is relational, sensitive and applicable to healing patterns in Africa. Using the case study of the Abaluyia people of East Africa, this article discussed bereavement as a state that requires healing and how the biblical framework of shalōm could be applied in fostering bereavement healing. (shrink)

Determining appropriate authorship recognition in student-faculty collaborative research is a complex task. In this quantitative study, responses from 1346 students and faculty in education and some social science disciplines at 36 research-intensive institutions in the United States were analyzed to provide a description of current and recommended practices for authorship in student-faculty collaborative research. The responses revealed practices and perceptions that are not aligned with ethical guidelines and a lack of consensus among respondents about appropriate practice. Faculty and student respondents (...) agreed that students deserve more authorship recognition than they get in common practice but they did not agree on the appropriate authorship arrangement for several of the collaborative scenarios described in the study or on the relative value of various contributions to research projects. The misalignment with ethical codes and lack of consensus among the respondents is problematic because student-faculty collaborative research is common and authored publications are powerful indicators of research competency. With these detailed results, students and faculty can better anticipate areas where their perspectives are likely to differ and faculty can work to clarify ambiguous expectations. (shrink)

While discussing critical individuality as oneof the main goals of liberal education, theemphasis has usually been on direct educationalmeasures. Much less attention has been given tothe social preconditions for its development.This paper discusses the societal aspect of thequestion by employing the notion of spherepluralism. The attempt is to point out someways in which the diversified nature of societycan be employed in its full potential for thedevelopment of critical individuality. Thearticle aims to outline a form of spherepluralism, which is based on (...) structuraldifferentiation, cultural diversity, communalvitality, confessional pluralism andcross-communal criticism. The suggestion isthat the critical potential of sphere pluralismpresupposes a proper balance between sphereautonomy and inter-sphere criticism as well asthat between social construction of meaning andobjective-structural constraints. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 99-102 [Access article in PDF] Living with Contested Knowledge and Partial Jennifer Clegg and Richard Lansdall-Welfare THESE CAREFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE comments bring grist to our mill. Before responding to them, we observe first that they offer no substantive challenge to our thesis: ambiguities associated with meaning in the disabled life make it more likely that professional service providers will make dogmatic responses (...) to bereavement, and perhaps other essentially contested topics, responses that are defended by isolationism.Some welcome ideas came from left field to refresh our thinking, such as Colman's observations on the gendered nature of care. She reminded us that although the audit from which these cases came was established to investigate bereavement in general among adults with intellectual disability, its rough and ready sampling failed to ensure the expected range of bereavement types. Somehow the bereavements constructed as relevant for audit all transpired to concern the death of mothers. Moreover, of the six relatives who agreed to be interviewed concerning these bereavements, two were stepfathers and four were sisters. Colman underlines the invisibility of care work usually done by female family members: how wise or less wise decisions create the conditions for bereavement reactions, and how changes to care arrangements following bereavement fall most heavily on them. Traustadottir (2002) discussed the way new care initiatives often put pressure on female family members and staff to do more unpaid work. For example, Circles of Support encourages them to include people with intellectual disability in their personal social networks, without considering the personal costs. Such observations have yet to emerge from the umbrella of feminist research. Separatism has served feminism well, but issues of women and care do need to find their place in mainstream reviews.Another useful reminder from Colman is that the person with intellectual disability is not the only concern to families, although only a few adult services manage to hold wider systemic factors in mind (Clegg and Burnham 2000). If the person may make naïve comments at a funeral that would devastate family members whose needs take priority, the person will be excluded.The potency of bereavement was discussed twice. Casenave suggests that because "disability is a loss experience" bereavement resonates with it, casting some doubt onto the suggestion that our thesis generalizes to other contested topics. Reinders criticizes clinicians for being purblind to the tragic. The anonymous reviewer who questioned [End Page 99] the relevance of our discussion of the quality of "presence," a quality Reinders considers highly relevant, illustrates the point better than we can. Recognizing the way clinicians have little "patience with the notion of the tragic" encourages reflection on what other human experiences fail to capture our attention.Although these are all potentially valuable directions, we focus here on comments that may enhance our ability to work without dogma. Since at least the 1980s, clinicians in intellectual disability have criticized the discipline for using linear and univariate rather than complex and multivariate theories, and for a naïve search for magic answers (reviewed in Clegg 1993). It is our contention that little has changed, and that uncertain meaning and normalization combine to create ideal conditions for dogma. Reinders' exposition of the various uses of meaning in our article and in different linguistic and historical traditions develops a vital but neglected topic in intellectual disability, which we consider in some detail. We conclude by arguing that developments require us to distance ourselves from the universality and commonality inherent to normalization, and create new ways to appreciate particularity and diversity.The gist of Reinders' complex argument appears to be that the problems we identify in managing bereavement in intellectual disability stem from a modernist understanding of meaning that is erroneous. Implicitly, those who eschew its pursuit demonstrate the greater wisdom, because neither dialogue nor activities such as reflection can generate meaning that is unattainable. If we understand his position correctly, he contrasts two principal understandings of meaning: comprehension and apprehension.Comprehension is the illusory modernist idea that humans are agents who make sense of themselves... (shrink)

An important debate in the reasoning literature concerns the extent to which inference processes are domain-free or domain-specific. Typically, evidence in support of the domain-specific position comprises the facilitation observed when abstract reasoning tasks are set in realistic context. Three experiments are reported here in which the sources of facilitation were investigated for contextualised versions of Raven's Progressive Matrices (Richardson, 1991) and non-verbal analogies from the AH4 test (Richardson & Webster, 1996). Experiment 1 confirmed that the facilitation observed for the (...) contextualised matrices was in part due to extraneous aspects of commentaries originally intended to activate domainspecific processes. Experiments 2 and 3 indicated that the remainder of the facilitation for the matrices, and all of the facilitation for the analogies, could be explained by visual salience: Converting the item elements into realistic objects had enabled them and their transitions to be identified more easily. Hence, performance at simplified abstract items was as good as, or better than, at contextualised items. It is concluded that facilitation effects cannot be interpreted as showing that domain-specific processes constitute a self-contained system separate from domain-free processes. In turn, this means that domain-free processes cannot be dismissed as being unimportant for reasoning. (shrink)

Mourning exists at the nexus between individual experience, professional discourses, research, and culture, making it a complex issue for health services that has shown vibrant change in recent years. By contrast, bereavement discourse in intellectual disability is suffused by dogmatic assertions about correct intervention: we describe four vignettes to illustrate bereavement issues in intellectual disability. Suggestions concerning issues and management are made, but the article focuses primarily on the conceptual issues that underpin clinical intervention. The analysis shows how challenges to (...) the meaning of the disabled life, and to the understandings carers and staff draw on, tend to be resisted. We hypothesize this is most likely to surround issues that evoke cultural uncertainty, such as bereavement. The thesis is that the field of intellectual disability tends to be isolationist because meaning is difficult to create and easily dissolved, especially when addressing culturally contested topics. Dialogue with other disciplines is necessary to stop the field from atrophying, but needs to be carried out in ways that enable carers and clinicians to continue providing the support that people with intellectual disability require. (shrink)

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire (...) satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive. (shrink)

This chapter introduces and analyzes the concepts of welfare mix, welfare pluralism, and a mixed economy of welfare in relation to activities for older adults.

Starzenie siȩ społeczeństw stanowi wyzwanie, które wymaga opracowywania i wdrażania horyzontalnej polityki społecznej. Polityka ta powinna uwzglȩdniać zróżnicowanie osób starszych oraz odmienność działań skierowanych do osób starszych i na wizerunek starości. Złożoność negatywnych konsekwencji starzenia siȩ sprawia, iż kluczowe jest zwiȩkszenie współpracy podmiotów publicznych, komercyjnych, pozarz¸adowych i nieformalnych na wszystkich poziomach organizacji polityki społecznej. Opracowanie ma na celu przybliżenie modeli wielosektorowej polityki społecznej oraz podkreślenie możliwości integracji usług społecznych. Artykuł wskazuje na szanse i zagrożenia dla integracji usług ze szczególnym uwzglȩdnieniem (...) zagadnień srebrnej gospodarki, wykluczenia cyfrowego i robotycznego. W podsumowaniu wskazano na możliwości rozwoju innowacji społecznych oraz kierunki dalszych badań. ** Ageing is a challenge that requires development and implementation of the horizontal social policy. This policy should take into account diversity of older adults and division of interventions aimed at this population and on the image of old age. Complexity of the negative consequences of ageing shows that there is a need to enhance cooperation between the public sector, the commercial sector, the NGO sector, and the informal sector at all levels of social policy social policy. The article discusses models of the multisectoral social policy and possibilities of integrating social services. Conclusions include directions for further research and social innovation. (shrink)