She challenges the usefulness of the concept of a language of thought in explaining language acquisition, and draws on the later work of Wittgen.

Barry C. Smith; VI*—Understanding Language, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 109–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

My dissertation concerns the nature of linguistic understanding. A standard view about linguistic understanding is that it is a propositional knowledge state. The following is an instance of this view: given a speaker S and an expression alpha that means M, S understand alpha just in case S knows that alpha means M. I refer to this as the epistemic view of linguistic understanding. The epistemic view would appear to be a mere conceptual truth about linguistic (...) class='Hi'>understanding, since it is entailed by the following two claims that themselves seem to be mere conceptual truths: S understands alpha iff S knows what alpha means, and---given that a means M--- S knows what alpha means iff S knows that alpha means M. I argue, however, that this is not a mere conceptual truth. Contrary to the epistemic view, propositional knowledge of the meaning of alpha is not necessary for understanding alpha. I argue that linguistic understanding does not even require belief. My positive proposal is that our understanding of language is typically realized, at least in native speakers, as a perceptual capacity. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that our perceptual experience of language comes to us already semantically interpreted. We perceive a speaker's utterance as having content, and it is by perceiving the speaker's utterances as having the right content that we understand what the speaker says. We count as understanding language in virtue of having this capacity to understand what speakers say when they use language. This notion of perceiving an utterance as having content gets analyzed in terms of Dretske's account of representation in terms of a teleological notion of function: you perceive a speaker's utterance as having content when the utterance produces in you a perceptual state that has a certain function in your psychology. I show how this view about the nature of linguistic understanding provides an attractive account of how identity claims can be semantically informative, as opposed to merely pragmatically informative, an account that avoids the standard difficulties for Fregean views that attempt to account for the informativeness of identity claims in terms of their semantics. (shrink)

Language does not fossilize but this does not mean that the language's evolutionary timeline is lost forever. Great apes provide a window back in time on our last prelinguistic ancestor's communication and cognition. Phylogeny and cladistics implicitly conjure Pan (chimpanzees, bonobos) as a superior (often the only) model for language evolution compared with earlier diverging lineages, Gorilla and Pongo (orangutans). Here, in reviewing the literature, it is shown that Pan do not surpass other great apes along genetic, (...) cognitive, ecologic, or vocal traits that are putatively paramount for language onset and evolution. Instead, revived herein is the idea that only by abandoning single‐species models and learning about the variation among great apes, there might be a chance to retrieve lost fragments of the evolutionary timeline of language. (shrink)

Most theories of semantic competence in natural language implicitly assume the Language of Thought Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, all human cognition consists in the deployment of a language of thought. This language of thought is supposed to be independent of natural language, yet at the same time, it is supposed to be semantically isomorphic with natural language. Given this assumption, it is easy to answer basic questions regarding semantic competence in natural language. (...) What are semantic properties of natural language, and how did they originate? Natural language inherits the semantic properties of the language of thought it is used to express. What does semantic competence consist in? It consists in knowing how to translate items in one's language of thought into a public medium. ;The starting point of this dissertation is the rejection, by some prominent paradigms in cognitive science, of the view that human cognition consists in the deployment of a language of thought that is, at the same time, independent of natural language, yet semantically isomorphic with it. The dissertation constitutes a fledgling attempt to explore an alternative approach to explaining semantic competence in natural language, an approach that is compatible with this rejection of the Language of Thought Hypothesis. ;Rather than conceive of natural language as a tool for expressing items in a pre-existing, semantically isomorphic, language of thought, I urge that language be conceived of as a norm-governed social practice. On this view, the semantic properties of natural language are determined by the inferential norms governing linguistic performances. In order to explain the origin of its semantic properties, one must explain the origin of the inferential norms that govern language. In order to explain what semantic competence consists in, one must explain how individuals learn to abide by these inferential norms. The bulk of the dissertation is devoted to showing that neither of these explanatory projects requires endorsing the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I do this by sketching the form that such explanations might take, and showing that they are consistent with much current research in ethology, comparative psychology, developmental psychology, and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Landgrebe and Smith :2061–2081, 2021) present an unflattering diagnosis of recent advances in what they call language-centric artificial intelligence—perhaps more widely known as natural language processing: The models that are currently employed do not have sufficient expressivity, will not generalize, and are fundamentally unable to induce linguistic semantics, they say. The diagnosis is mainly derived from an analysis of the widely used Transformer architecture. Here I address a number of misunderstandings in their analysis, and present what I take (...) to be a more adequate analysis of the ability of Transformer models to learn natural language semantics. To avoid confusion, I distinguish between inferential and referential semantics. Landgrebe and Smith ’s analysis of the Transformer architecture’s expressivity and generalization concerns inferential semantics. This part of their diagnosis is shown to rely on misunderstandings of technical properties of Transformers. Landgrebe and Smith also claim that referential semantics is unobtainable for Transformer models. In response, I present a non-technical discussion of techniques for grounding Transformer models, giving them referential semantics, even in the absence of supervision. I also present a simple thought experiment to highlight the mechanisms that would lead to referential semantics, and discuss in what sense models that are grounded in this way, can be said to understand language. Finally, I discuss the approach Landgrebe and Smith advocate for, namely manual specification of formal grammars that associate linguistic expressions with logical form. (shrink)

When the language-dominant hemisphere is damaged by a focal lesion, the brain may reorganize the language network through functional and structural changes known as adaptive plasticity. Adaptive plasticity is documented for triggers including ischemic, tumoral, and epileptic focal lesions, with effects in clinical practice. Many questions remain regarding language plasticity. Different lesions may induce different patterns of reorganization depending on pathologic features, location in the brain, and timing of onset. Neuroimaging provides insights into language plasticity due (...) to its non-invasiveness, ability to image the whole brain, and large-scale implementation. This review provides an overview of language plasticity on MRI with insights for patient care. First, we describe the structural and functional language network as depicted by neuroimaging. Second, we explore language reorganization triggered by stroke, brain tumors, and epileptic lesions and analyze applications in clinical diagnosis and treatment planning. By comparing different focal lesions, we investigate determinants of language plasticity including lesion location and timing of onset, longitudinal evolution of reorganization, and the relationship between structural and functional changes. (shrink)

An ambitious work that endorses a broad approach, it argues strongly against the roles both of truth theory and of radical interpretation. Weiss discusses a range of relevant themes relating to language, including translation, interpretation, normativity, community, and rules in order to reshape our understanding of language. A rigorous and systematic analysis, How to Understand Language advances the work of key thinkers in the area.

An ambitious work that endorses a broad approach, it argues strongly against the roles both of truth theory and of radical interpretation. Weiss discusses a range of relevant themes relating to language, including translation, interpretation, normativity, community, and rules in order to reshape our understanding of language. A rigorous and systematic analysis, How to Understand Language advances the work of key thinkers in the area.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have ushered in a transformative phase in artificial intelligence (AI). Unlike conventional AI, LLMs excel in facilitating fluid human–computer d...

Philosophers in general are uncomfortable, if not downright skeptical, about attributing semantic knowledge, particularly of a semantic theory, to ordinary speakers. 2 Those who do not feel the pinch often adopt a two-pronged defense: they rebut skeptics with an array of distinctions (and hedges), contending that the skeptics' confusions arise because they ignore such..

It is a natural thought that understanding language consists in possessing knowledge—to understand a word is to know what it means. It is also natural to suppose that this knowledge is propositional knowledge—to know what a word means is to know that it means such-and-such. Thus it is prima facie plausible to suppose that understanding a bit of language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of its meaning. I refer to this as the epistemic view of (...) class='Hi'>understanding language. The theoretical appeal of this view for the philosophy of language is that it provides for an attractive account of the project of the theory of meaning. If understanding language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of the meanings of expressions, then a meaning theory amounts to a theory of what speakers know in virtue of understanding language. In this paper I argue that, despite its intuitive and theoretical appeal, the epistemic view is false. Propositional knowledge is not necessary for understanding language, not even tacit knowledge. Unlike knowledge, I argue, linguistic understanding does not fail in Gettier cases, does not require epistemic warrant and does not even require belief. The intuitions about knowledge that have been central to epistemology do not seem to hold for linguistic understanding. So unless epistemologists have been radically mistaken about what knowledge requires, knowledge is unnecessary for understanding language. (shrink)

We discuss two problems for a general scientific understanding of language, sequences and synergies: how language is an intricately sequenced behavior and how language is manifested as a multidimensionally structured behavior. Though both are central in our understanding, we observe that the former tends to be studied more than the latter. We consider very general conditions that hold in human brain evolution and its computational implications, and identify multimodal and multiscale organization as two key characteristics (...) of emerging cognitive function in our species. This suggests that human brains, and cognitive function specifically, became more adept at integrating diverse information sources and operating at multiple levels for linguistic performance. We argue that framing language evolution, learning, and use in terms of synergies suggests new research questions, and it may be a fruitful direction for new developments in theory and modeling of language as an integrated system. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Problem‐solving Summary: problem solving ‐ Gory, Kuczaj, Pryor, Grover, DRC Language Comprehension Commands: FETCH, IN, MIMIC.

:Many writers have expressed scepticism about the explanatory power of transformational generative grammar, but little of this scepticism has been aimed towards formal semantics for natural languages. To a large extent, this neglect is a consequence, not of widespread agreement, but of a lack of clarity, about the aims of philosophers and linguists who construct these semantic theories. Here I hope to make clear a sense in which these theories are explanatory. In short, I argue that the importance and legitimacy (...) of semantics rests on its contribution to epistemology. First, I argue that what distinguishes someone who understands a language from someone who does not is not any linguistic or non‐linguistic behavior but rather the capacity to acquire certain justified beliefs upon hearing another's utterances. It is this justificatory element which is the chief mark of understanding. Second, I argue that in order for someone to have this capacity to acquire certain justified beliefs he must have knowledge of the meanings of the sentences in question. (shrink)

From a leading authority in artificial intelligence, this book delivers a synthesis of the major modern techniques and the most current research in natural language processing. The approach is unique in its coverage of semantic interpretation and discourse alongside the foundational material in syntactic processing.

Although Grodzinsky's target article has merit, it neglects the importance of neural mechanisms underlying language functions. We present results from our clinical studies on different levels of temporal information processing in aphasic patients and briefly review the existing data on neurobiology of language to cast new light on the main thesis of the target article.

We add evidence in support of Corballis's gestural theory of language. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation, we found that productive and receptive linguistic tasks excite the motor cortices for both hands. This indicates that the language and the hand motor systems are still tightly linked in modern man. The bilaterality of the effect, however, implies that lateralisation is a secondary issue.

We introduce a computational theory of situated language understanding in which the meaning of words and utterances depends on the physical environment and the goals and plans of communication partners. According to the theory, concepts that ground linguistic meaning are neither internal nor external to language users, but instead span the objective‐subjective boundary. To model the possible interactions between subject and object, the theory relies on the notion of perceived affordances: structured units of interaction that can be (...) used for prediction at multiple levels of abstraction. Language understanding is treated as a process of filtering perceived affordances. The theory accounts for many aspects of the situated nature of human language use and provides a unified solution to a number of demands on any theory of language understanding including conceptual combination, prototypicality effects, and the generative nature of lexical items.To support the theory, we describe an implemented system that understands verbal commands situated in a virtual gaming environment. The implementation uses probabilistic hierarchical plan recognition to generate perceived affordances. The system has been evaluated on its ability to correctly interpret free‐form spontaneous verbal commands recorded from unrehearsed game play between human players. The system is able to “step into the shoes” of human players and correctly respond to a broad range of verbal commands in which linguistic meaning depends on social and physical context. We quantitatively compare the system's predictions in response to direct player commands with the actions taken by human players and show generalization to unseen data across a range of situations and verbal constructions. (shrink)

Wittgenstein has often explored language games that have to do with musical objects of different sizes (phrases, themes, formal sections or entire works). These games can refer to a technical language or to common parlance and correspond to different targets. One of these coincides with the intention to suggest a way of conceiving musical understanding. His model takes the form of the invitation to "hear (something) as (something)": typically, to hear a musical passage as an introduction or (...) as a conclusion or in a certain tonality. However one may ask to what extent or in what terms (literal or metaphorical) these procedures, and usually the intervention of language games, is requested by our common ways of understanding music. This article shows through the use of some examples that aspectual perception inherent to musical understanding does not require language games as a necessary condition (although in many cases the link between them seems very strong), in contradiction with the thesis of an essential linguistic character of music. At a basic level, it seems more appropriate to insist on the notion of a game: to understand music means to enter into the orbit of "music games" which show an autonomous functioning. Language games have, however, an important function when we develop this comprehension in the light of the criteria of judgment that substantiate the manner in which music is incorporated in and operates within specific forms of life. (shrink)

When we say that we understand the language of God with the language of the universe, we mean that we can understand the language of God with the language of the universe and in other ways as well. Therefore, what we really want to say is that when we look at the event from our own point of view, that is, from our own factuality, we must necessarily understand the universe in order to understand the (...) class='Hi'>language of God, and for us to understand it can only be possible by understanding the language of the universe. We will present this with some examples. At the same time, we will talk about some styles of understanding in the history of philosophy. Since understanding the language of God is also understanding the language of religion, we will try to briefly show how the language of God or the language of the universe is understood through the language of religion, how this is wrong in Judaism, Christianity, especially in the idea of medieval Christian priests and a number of styles of understanding in the Islamic world. (shrink)

This article contains the results of a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of natural language understanding (NLU), as a methodological problem. The combination of structural-ontological and informational-psychological approaches provided an opportunity to describe the subject matter field of NLU, as a composite function of the mind, which systemically combines the verbal and discursive structural layers. In particular, the idea of NLU is presented, on the one hand, as the relation between the discourse of a specific speech message and (...) the meta-discourse of a language, in turn, activated by the need-motivational factors. On the other hand, it is conceptualized as a process with a specific structure of information metabolism, the study of which implies the necessity to differentiate the affective (emotional) and need-motivational influences on the NLU, as well as to take into account their interaction. At the same time, the hypothesis about the influence of needs on NLU under the scenario similar to the pattern of Yerkes-Dodson is argued. And the theoretical conclusion that emotions fulfill the function of the operator of the structural features of the information metabolism of NLU is substantiated. Thus, depending on the modality of emotions in the process of NLU, it was proposed to distinguish two scenarios for the implementation of information metabolism - reduction and synthetic. The argument in favor of the conclusion about the productive and constitutive role of emotions in the process of NLU is also given. (shrink)

Linguistic interaction between two people is the fundamental form of communication, yet almost all research in language use focuses on isolated speakers and listeners. In this innovative work, Garrod and Pickering extend the scope of psycholinguistics beyond individuals by introducing communication as a social activity. Drawing on psychological, linguistic, philosophical and sociological research, they expand their theory that alignment across individuals is the basis of communication, through the model of a 'shared workspace account'. In this workspace, interlocutors are actors (...) who jointly manipulate and control the interaction and develop similar representations of both language and social context, in order to achieve communicative success. The book also explores dialogue within groups, technologies, as well as the role of culture more generally. Providing a new understanding of cognitive representation, this trailblazing work will be highly influential in the fields of linguistics, psychology and cognitive linguistics. (shrink)

Young children's early understanding of emotion was investigated by examining their use of emotion terms such as happy, sad, mud, and cry. Five children's emotion language was examined longitudinally from the age of 2 to 5 years, and as a comparison their reference to pains via such terms as burn, sting, and hurt was also examined. In Phase 1 we confirmed and extended prior findings demonstrating that by 2 years of age terms for the basic emotions of happiness, (...) sadness, anger, and fear are commonly used by children as are terms for such related states as crying and hurting. At this early age children produce such terms to refer to self and to others, and to past and future as well as to present states. Over the years from 2 to 5 children's emotion vocabulary expands, their discussion of hypothetical emotions gets underway, and the complexity of their emotion utterances increases. In Phase 2 our analyses go beyond children's production of emotion terms to analyses of their conception of emotion. We focus especially on when children use emotion terms to refer to subjective experiential states of persons. From their earliest uses of these terms in our data children. (shrink)

The codification of language has both its advantages and disadvantages, both its prospects and its limitations. It is possible to determine this not from linguistic, but from meta-scientific, namely philosophical positions. At the heart of the codification procedure is the creation of specialized dictionaries based on a particular national language. The language of science is also always built on the basis of a certain national language — even if this language later serves as the (...) class='Hi'>language of international scientific communication (for example, English). At the same time, codification of the language of science should reproduce the most significant resources of natural language as a symbolic system, as well as develop the institutional potential of science based on the capabilities of language as an institution. The codification of language of science should perform three main functions: descriptive-classification, system-legitimation and projective-predictive. The language of science is the embodiment of the symbolic universe studied by social phe- nomenologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and at the same time must correspond to the four main functions of the system of action, which were distinguished by Talcott Parsons. Codification is a relentless process that reflects and stimulates the development of language as a symbolic system, the meaning of which is set by specific language practices. The language of science is a set of all language practices of scientists in various fields, these practices must be harmonized through the codification of the language of science, while they constantly stimulate the renewal of codification of the language of science. It should be done through the creation of new practices and new scientific objects — and through the extrapolation of the application of existing terminology to new scientific fields as well. (shrink)

Understanding is a ‘language event’ founded upon a ‘silent agreement’ between participants in a conversation. This silent agreement, built up of conversational aspects held in common, is what makes social solidarity possible and shows that the methods of science are an inappropriate starting point for our self-understanding. However, with the advent of industrial technical civilization, the question arises whether understanding has come under the control of a centrally steered communication system where language is a consciously (...) wielded instrument of politics with a corresponding loss of free insight and critical judgement. Only via a hermeneutic logic of words, which begins from recognition that words get their meaning from the open space of living conversation, can critical judgement be defended in the face of the authority of science and technology. (shrink)

"To my knowledge, there has never [before] been a volume that analyzes, in one place, the actual language of science--those elements of thinking that are acknowledged to be the basis of scientific thought. . . . [Thus] this is a very important book, contributing to several fields: science, education, rhetoric, medicine, and perhaps even philosophy. . . . Darian's erudition is truly astonishing." --Celest A. Martin, Associate Professor, College Writing Program, University of Rhode Island From astronomy to zoology, the (...) practice of science proceeds from scientific ways of thinking. These patterns of thought, such as defining and classifying, hypothesizing and experimenting, form the building blocks of all scientific endeavor. Understanding how they work is therefore an essential foundation for everyone involved in scientific study or teaching, from elementary school students to classroom teachers and professional scientists. In this book, Steven Darian examines the language of science in order to analyze the patterns of thinking that underlie scientific endeavor. He draws examples from university science textbooks in a variety of disciplines, since these offer a common, even canonical, language for scientific expression. Darian identifies and focuses in depth on nine patterns--defining, classifying, using figurative language, determining cause and effect, hypothesizing, experimenting, visualizing, quantifying, and comparing--and shows how they interact in practice. He also traces how these thought modes developed historically from Pythagoras through Newton. (shrink)

Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communities often problematic and even unattainable? To answer this question, the author first introduces a notion of presuppositional languages. Based on the semantic structure of a presuppositional language, the author identifies a significant condition necessary for effective understanding of a language: the interpreter is able to effectively understand a language only if he/she is able to recognize and comprehend its metaphysical presuppositions. The essential role (...) of the knowledge of metaphysical presuppositions in understanding is further strengthened by developing a truth-value conditional theory of understanding. It is concluded that if the interpreter approaches an incompatible alien language from the standpoint of the interpreter's own language by projecting the metaphysical presuppositions of his/her own language upon the alien language, then the mutual understanding between the two language communities is doomed to failure. (shrink)

Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis have recently argued that certain kinds of regress arguments against the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis as an account of how we understand natural languages have been answered incorrectly or inadequately by supporters of LOT ('Regress arguments against the language of thought', Analysis, 57 (1), 60-6, J 97). They argue further that this does not undermine the LOT hypothesis, since the main sources of support for LOT are (or might be) independent of it (...) providing an account of how we understand natural language. In my paper I seek to refute both these claims, and reinstate the putative explanation of natural language understanding as a necessarily central part of the support for LOT. The main argument exploits the fact that Laurence and Margolis give too little weight to the ideas (a) that LOT might be innate (b) that for LOT supporters a semantic theory must apply to in-the-head tokens, not linguistic utterances. (shrink)

The article argues that cognitive linguistic theory may prove an alternative to the Montague paradigm for designing natural language understanding systems. Within this framework it describes a system which models language understanding as a dialogical process between user and computer. The system operates with natural language texts as input and represent language meaning as entity-relationship diagrams.