Many people assume that the claims of scientists are objective truths. But historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have long argued that scientific claims reflect the particular historical, cultural, and social context in which those claims were made. The nature of scientific knowledge is not absolute because it is influenced by the practice and perspective of human agents. Scientific Perspectivism argues that the acts of observing and theorizing are both perspectival, and this nature makes scientific (...) knowledge contingent, as Thomas Kuhn theorized forty years ago. Using the example of color vision in humans to illustrate how his theory of “perspectivism” works, Ronald N. Giere argues that colors do not actually exist in objects; rather, color is the result of an interaction between aspects of the world and the human visual system. Giere extends this argument into a general interpretation of human perception and, more controversially, to scientific observation, conjecturing that the output of scientific instruments is perspectival. Furthermore, complex scientific principles—such as Maxwell’s equations describing the behavior of both the electric and magnetic fields—make no claims about the world, but models based on those principles can be used to make claims about specific aspects of the world. Offering a solution to the most contentious debate in the philosophy of science over the past thirty years, Scientific Perspectivism will be of interest to anyone involved in the study of science. (shrink)

Big data biology—bioinformatics, computational biology, systems biology (including ‘omics’), and synthetic biology—raises a number of issues for the philosophy of science. This article deals with several such: Is data-intensive biology a new kind of science, presumably post-reductionistic? To what extent is big data biology data-driven? Can data ‘speak for themselves?’ I discuss these issues by way of a reflection on Carl Woese’s worry that “a society that permits biology to become an engineering discipline, that allows that science to slip into (...) the role of changing the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself.” And I argue that scientific perspectivism, a philosophical stance represented prominently by Giere, Van Fraassen, and Wimsatt, according to which science cannot as a matter of principle transcend our human perspective, provides the best resources currently at our disposal to tackle many of the philosophical issues implied in the modeling of complex, multilevel/multiscale phenomena. (shrink)

In current debates, many philosophers of science have sympathies for the project of introducing a new approach to the scientific realism debate that forges a middle way between traditional forms of scientific realism and anti-realism. One promising approach is perspectivism. Although different proponents of perspectivism differ in their respective characterizations of perspectivism, the common idea is that scientific knowledge is necessarily partial and incomplete. Perspectivism is a new position in current debates but it (...) does have its forerunners. Figures that are typically mentioned in this context include Dewey, Feyerabend, Leibniz, Kant, Kuhn, and Putnam. Interestingly, to my knowledge, there exists no work that discusses similarities to the phenomenological tradition. This is surprising because here one can find systematically similar ideas and even a very similar terminology. It is startling because early modern physics was noticeably influenced by phenomenological ideas. And it is unfortunate because the analysis of perspectival approaches in the phenomenological tradition can help us to achieve a more nuanced understanding of different forms of perspectivism. The main objective of this paper is to show that in the phenomenological tradition one finds a well-elaborated philosophy of science that shares important similarities with current versions of perspectivism. Engaging with the phenomenological tradition is also of systematic value since it helps us to gain a better understanding of the distinctive claims of perspectivism and to distinguish various grades of perspectivism. (shrink)

In this paper, I address a prominent realist challenge recently raised by Anjan Chakravartty (2010) against scientific perspectivism. I offer a response to the challenge, by rethinking scientific perspectivism as a view on how we form scientific knowledge, as opposed to a view about what sort of objects we have scientific knowledge of. My response follows Ernest Sosa’s perspectivism in epistemology by drawing a distinction between truth and justification for our knowledge claims. With (...) this distinction in place, I pledge to defend scientific perspectivism as a promising alternative to both objectivist realism and relativism. (shrink)

Adopting the stage metaphor suggested in Brown’s review, and treating Scientific perspectivism as a play in five acts, I respond to his review as a playwright might respond to a generally favorable review. Taking the reader behind the stage door, I discuss the playwright’s intentions for each act, paying special attention to the expected audience for the play as a whole. The result, therefore, supplements the review from the standpoint of the playwright. It also provides answers to some (...) of the reviewer’s questions.Keywords: Matthew Brown; Scientific perspectivism. (shrink)

Historians and sociologists of psychiatry often claim that psychiatric diagnoses are discontinuous. That is, a particular diagnoses will be described in one way in one era and described quite differently in a different era. Historians and sociologists often draw epistemic consequences from such discontinuities, claiming that truth is pluralistic, provisional and historicised. These arguments do not readily fit in with how analytical philosophers of science approach scientific realism. I show how the pessimistic meta induction does not capture the point (...) which historians and sociologists are making but scientific perspectivism seems to capture their point much better. I then highlight conceptual innovations which scientific perspectivists add. They demarcate between truth and objective reality, they specify which type of truth they endorse and they put down constraints on possible truths. This blocks an anything goes relativism which historians and sociologists can be in danger of falling into. I highlight my argument by discussing a discontinuous episode in the history of autism. I discuss three aspects of this discontinuity and show how scientific perspectivism can portray each aspect as non-trivially true. My argument shows that we can be scientific realists about autism even if we can formulate notions of autism in quite different ways. (shrink)

The current state of philosophy of science is characterized by stasis in the struggle between realism and antirealism. In recent years, a number of authors have come out with a program of scientific perspectivism that claims to sublate this great collision and gain the status of a new epistemological paradigm: “perspectivism, or, better, perspectival realism, is one of the newest attempts to find a middle ground between scientific realism and antirealism” [1. P. 2]. Important milestones of (...) the perspective movement were the works of Ronald Giere, Francois Recanati, Bas van Fraassen, Michela Massimi, and others. The thesis of the article is that perspectivism has not yet realized its claims to autonomy, although it has become an important new arena for discussions between realists and antirealists who try to appropriate perspectivist concepts and arguments. The “middle ground,” when thought out consistently and thoroughly, turns out to lie not “between,” but either in the territory of realism or in the territory of antirealism, depending on the presumptions of the author of a particular perspectivist conception. This is demonstrated by the analysis of the conceptions of Giere, Massimi, and Recanati. Giere’s perspectivism is based on the metaphor of color vision, and for him only some (secondary) qualities of real objects turn out to be perspectival, i.e., subject-dependent. Massimi’s perspectivism attempts, on the basis of a visual arts metaphor, to combine the phenomenon of the plurality of scientific theories (“perspectival disagreement” about what an object is) with the general realist attitude of science (agreement about that there is an object). Recanati’s perspectivism syncretizes realism about ordinary objects and relativism about other things. The first two versions of perspectivism rely on a perceptual metaphor: perspective is conditioned by the perceptual constitution of the observer, that is, it arises at the mental or cognitive level. Recanati’s version attempts to derive perspective from contextuality, that is, it is semantic. However, it does not show exactly how perceptual categories are superimposed on theories or how scientific concepts reveal their perspectival character. The isomorphism of perception and theoretical thinking, sensibility and understanding, remains undemonstrated. On the one hand, perspectivist efforts are motivated by an important concern to account for antirealist critique (lack of access to the “view from nowhere,” factual and semantic underdetermination, difficulties with the idea of approaching the truth, the historicity of knowledge, the activeness of the constructing subject, etc.) while preserving the scientific commitment to universality, validity, and truthfulness. On the other hand, the ontological question remains fundamental and unavoidable, and perspectivism (yet?) fails to circumvent it. As we see, all three versions of perspectivism considered in this article turn out to be varieties of realism: Giere and Massimi recognize this explicitly, while Recanati de facto assumes a quite respectable and conservative position of selective realism with respect to ordinary objects. (shrink)

Perspectival realists often appeal to the methodology of science to secure a realist account of the retention and continued success of scientific claims through the progress of science. However, in the context of modern physics, the retention and continued success of scientific claims are typically only definable within a mathematical framework. In this article, I argue that this concern leaves the perspectivist open to Cassirer’s neo-Kantian critique of the applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences. To support this (...) criticism, I present a case study on the conservation of energy in modern physics. (shrink)

Ron Giere’s recent book Scientific perspectivism sets out an account of science that attempts to forge a via media between two popular extremes: absolutist, objectivist realism on the one hand, and social constructivism or skeptical anti-realism on the other. The key for Giere is to treat both scientific observation and scientific theories as perspectives, which are limited, partial, contingent, context-, agent- and purpose-dependent, and pluralism-friendly, while nonetheless world-oriented and modestly realist. Giere’s perspectivism bears significant similarity (...) to earlier ideas of Paul Feyerabend and John Dewey. Comparing these to Giere’s work not only uncovers a consilience of ideas, but also can help to fill out Giere’s account in places where it is not fully developed, as well as helping us understand the work of these earlier authors and their continuing relevance to contemporary concerns in philosophy of science.Keywords: Ronald Giere; Paul Feyerabend; John Dewey; Perspectivism; Pragmatism; Pluralism. (shrink)

Contemporary scientific perspectivism is primarily viewed as a methodological framework of how we obtain and form scientific knowledge of nature, through a broadly perspectivist process, especially, with reference to quantum mechanics. In the present study, this is implemented by representing categorically the global structure of a quantum algebra of events in terms of structured interconnected families of local Boolean probing frames, realized as suitable perspectives or contexts for measuring physical quantities. The essential philosophical meaning of the proposed (...) approach implies that the quantum world can be consistently approached and comprehended through a multilevel structure of locally variable perspectives, which interlock, in a category-theoretical environment, to form a coherent picture of the whole in a non-trivial way. (shrink)

Perspectivism is often understood as a conception according to which subjective conditions inevitably affect our knowledge and, therefore, we are never confronted with reality and facts but only with interpretations. Hence, subjectivism and anti-realism are usually associated with perspectivism. The thesis of this paper is that, especially in the case of the sciences, perspectivism can be better understood as an appreciation of the cognitive attitude that consists in considering reality only from a certain ‘point of view’, in (...) a way that can avoid subjectivism. Whereas the way of conceiving a notion is strictly subjective, the way of using it is open to intersubjective agreement, based on the practice of operations whose nature is neither mental nor linguistic. Therefore, intersubjectivity is possible within perspectivism. Perspectivism can also help understand the notion of ‘scientific objects’ in a referential sense: they are those ‘things’ that become ‘objects’ of a certain science by being investigated from the ‘point of view’ of that science. They are ‘clipped out’ of things by means of standardized operations which turn out to be the same as those granting intersubjectivity. Therefore this ‘strong’ sense of objectivity, which is clearly realist, coincides with the ‘weak’ one. The notion of truth appears fully legitimate in the case of the sciences, being clearly defined for the regional ontology of each one of them and, since this truth can be extended in an analogical sense to the theories elaborated in each science, it follows that are real also the unobservable entities postulated by those theories. (shrink)

This edited collection is the first of its kind to explore the view called perspectivism in philosophy of science. The book brings together an array of essays that reflect on the methodological promises and scientific challenges of perspectivism in a variety of fields such as physics, biology, cognitive neuroscience, and cancer research, just as a few examples. What are the advantages of using a plurality of perspectives in a given scientific field and for interdisciplinary research? Can (...) different perspectives be integrated? What is the relation between perspectivism, pluralism, and pragmatism? These ten new essays by top scholars in the field offer a polyphonic journey towards understanding the view called ‘perspectivism’ and its relevance to science. (shrink)

How should emotions figure in scientific practice? I begin by distinguishing three broad answers to this question, ranging from pessimistic to optimistic. Confirmation bias and motivated numeracy lead us to cast a jaundiced eye on the role of emotions in scientific inquiry. However, reflection on the essential motivating role of emotions in geniuses makes it less clear that science should be evacuated of emotion. I then draw on Friedrich Nietzsche’s perspectivism to articulate a twenty-first century epistemology of (...) science that recognizes the necessity of emotion to inquiry but aims to manage the biases that emotions can introduce. Twenty-first century perspectivism is both social and (temporally) distal, helping it to overcome a paradox of self-critical inquiry. (shrink)

Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the present paper investigates three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge (...) asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems. (shrink)

The special theory of relativity holds significant interest for scientific perspectivists. In this paper, I distinguish between two related meanings of “perspectival,” and argue that reference frames are perspectives, provided that perspectival means “being conditional” rather than “being partial.” Frame-dependent properties such as length, time duration, and simultaneity, are not partially measured in a reference frame, but their measurements are conditional on the choice of frame. I also discuss whether the constancy of the speed of light depends on perspectival (...) factors such as the idealized definition of the speed of light in a perfect vacuum and the Einstein synchronization convention. Furthermore, I argue for the view that the constancy of its speed is a robust property of light according to the conditions of currently acceptable experimental setups pertaining to special relativity, and conclude that this view supports perspectivism. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that scientific theories are often associated with strictly inconsistent models, but there is little agreement concerning the epistemic consequences. Some argue that model inconsistency supports a strong perspectivism, according to which claims serving as interpretations of models are inevitably and irreducibly perspectival. Others argue that in at least some cases, inconsistent models can be unified as approximations to a theory with which they are associated, thus undermining this kind of perspectivism. I examine the (...) arguments for perspectivism, and contend that its strong form is defeasible in principle, not merely in special cases. The argument rests on the plausibility of scientific knowledge concerning non-perspectival, dispositional facts about modelled systems. This forms the basis of a novel suggestion regarding how to understand the knowledge these models afford, in terms of a contrastive theory of what-questions. (shrink)

Discussions about perspectivism in the current philosophical literature often focus on questions concerning perspectival modeling or the compatibility between perspectivism and realism. In this paper, I propose to extend the debate on perspectivism by taking into account the social dimension of scientific perspectives. Scientific perspectives are always adopted and advocated for by individual scientists and groups of scientists with different epistemic affinities. I describe an example of a current and ongoing controversy in the field of (...) epigenetics in order to illustrate that diverging scientific perspectives on open scientific questions are often not fully explained by empirical underdetermination or diverging theoretical approaches alone. Opposing perspectives frequently arise from differences in systems of practice and the scientific socializations of the involved scientists, including differences in training, experimental skills, and epistemic priorities. The paper ends with a discussion of the important epistemic function of perspectives in scientific discovery. Ultimately, perspectivism is described as a valid philosophical position that explains how scientific knowledge is generated in situations of empirical underdetermination and why trust in science can be justified even in the absence of a community consensus. (shrink)

Perspectivism: A Contribution to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences advances the philosophy of perspectivism, showing how its capacity to assess competing views of a particular concept by approaching them as different 'sides' of a multi-dimensional object supports a concept of 'adequate' rather than 'absolute' truth. Presenting four case studies - of the social scientific concepts of power, equality, crime, and sex and gender - Smith demonstrates the manner in which the perspectivist approach does not take all (...) differing views of a concept to be equally good, but views all perspectives taken together as contributing towards the best that we can know about any given concept at the present time. An exposition and analysis of the means by which perspectivism allows for truth and objectivity in the social sciences, this volume will appeal to scholars of philosophy and across the social sciences with interests in questions of epistemology and research methodology. (shrink)

This chapter defends a (minimal) realist conception of progress in scientific understanding in the face of the ubiquitous plurality of perspectives in science. The argument turns on the counterfactual-dependence framework of explanation and understanding, which is illustrated and evidenced with reference to different explanations of the rainbow.

This paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify the notion of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’ with (...) an episode from the history of modern physics: namely, how we came to agree about the electric charge as a minimal natural unit despite different scientific perspectives and associated data-to-phenomena inferences available for it in the period 1897–1906. (shrink)

This paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify the notion of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’ with (...) an episode from the history of modern physics: namely, how we came to agree about the electric charge as a minimal natural unit despite different scientific perspectives and associated data-to-phenomena inferences available for it in the period 1897–1906. (shrink)

This paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify the notion of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’ with (...) an episode from the history of modern physics: namely, how we came to agree about the electric charge as a minimal natural unit despite different scientific perspectives and associated data-to-phenomena inferences available for it in the period 1897–1906. (shrink)

I discuss changes of perspective of four kinds in science and about science. Section 2 defends a perspectival nonrealism—something akin to Giere’s perspectival realism but not a realism—against the idea of complete, “Copernican” objectivity. Section 3 contends that there is an inverse relationship between epistemological conservatism and scientific progress. Section 4 casts doubt on strong forms of scientific realism by taking a long-term historical perspective that includes future history. Section 5 defends a partial reversal in the status of (...) so-called context of discovery and context of justification. Section 6 addresses the question of how we can have scientific progress without scientific realism—how progress is possible without the accumulation of representational truth. The overall result is a pragmatic instrumentalist perspective on the sciences and how to study them philosophically, one that contains a kernel of realism—instrumental realism. (shrink)

Scientific perspectivism, or perspectival realism, is a view according to which scientific knowledge is neither utterly objective nor independent of the world “as it is”, but always tied to some particular ways of conceptualization and interaction with Nature. In the present paper, I employ Robert Rosen’s concept of the modeling relation for arguing that there are two basic reasons why our knowledge of natural systems is perspectival in this sense. The first of these pertains to the dualism (...) between a system and its environment, which is necessarily imposed by a scientist focusing on the former. The second pertains to the complexity of complex systems; a complex system understood as a system in which different kinds of causal entailments intertwine together. As I discuss in the paper besides developing the argument, perspectivism thus understood ties together several issues ranging from organicism to emergentism and to processual philosophy, and from the ceteris paribus talk of biology to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I also discuss Rosen’s relational formalisms as a concrete example of how perspectival epistemology might directly suggest novel strategies and practices of doing theoretical science. (shrink)

This paper draws on the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to philosophy of science to develop realist perspectivism, an integration of experimental realism and perspectivism. Specifically, the paper employs the distinction between “manifestation” and “phenomenon” and it advances the view that the evidence of a real entity is “explorable” in order to argue that instrumentally-mediated robust evidence indicates real entities. Furthermore, it underpins the phenomenological notion of the horizonal nature of scientific observation with perspectivism, so accounting for scientific (...) pluralism even in the cases of inconsistent models. Overall, realist perspectivism is proposed as the way to go for (phenomenologically-hermeneutically minded) philosophers of science. (shrink)

When Ron Giere introduced perspectivism into philosophy of science, he provided a perspectivist analysis of both scientific instruments and scientific theorizing. Today, there is a burgeoning literature that extends Giere’s analysis of theorizing, with many philosophers examining the perspectivist approach to aspects of theorizing such as models, laws, explanations, and so on. However, relatively little attention has been paid to Giere’s analysis of instruments. In this article, I hope to fill this gap. I argue that the perspectivist (...) analysis of instruments should be rejected. First, I give a general account of the kind of instrumentation relevant to instrumental perspectivism, drawing on Cartwright’s notion of nomological machines, which forms the basis of my criticism of Giere’s argument for instrumental perspectivism. Next, I present the case against instrumental perspectivism. I argue that instrumental perspectivism is dependent on theoretical perspectivism in a way that robs it of philosophical significance, and that it introduces new puzzles while adding little to our understanding of instruments. (shrink)

The question, “Will science remain human?” expresses a worry that deep learning algorithms will replace scientists in making crucial judgments of classification and inference and that something crucial will be lost if that happens. Ever since the introduction of telescopes and microscopes humans have relied on technologies to “extend” beyond human sensory perception in acquiring scientific knowledge. In this paper I explore whether the ways in which new learning technologies “extend” beyond human cognitive aspects of science can be treated (...) instrumentally. I will consider the norms for determining the reliability of a detection instrument, nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, in predicting models of protein atomic structure. Do the same norms that apply in that case be used to judge the reliability of Artificial Intelligence deep learning algorithms? (shrink)

I critically examine the assumption that the theoretical structure that varies under theoretical symmetries is redundant and should be eliminated from a metaphysical picture of the universe, following a ‘symmetry to reality’ inference. I do so by analysing the status of coordinate change symmetries taking a pragmatic approach. I argue that coordinate systems function as indexical devices, and play an important pragmatic role for representing concrete physical systems. I examine the implications of considering this pragmatic role seriously, taking what I (...) call a perspectivist stance. My conclusion is that under a perspectivist stance, all symmetries (including local gauge symmetries) potentially have a direct empirical status: they point to dynamical aspects that are invariant under changes of operationalisation, and they constitute a guide not to reality, but to nomology and kinship. (shrink)

Many science teachers are presented with the challenge of characterizing science as a dynamic, human endeavour. Perspectivism, as a hermeneutic philosophy of science, has the potential to be a learning tool for teachers as they elucidate the complex nature of science. Developed earlier by Nietzsche and others, perspectivism has recently re-emerged in the context of the philosophy of science in the work of Ronald Giere. Giere presents a compelling case that scientific theories and scientific observation are (...) perspectival by using science itself. There are many tangible examples already present in science textbooks which, when approached in a certain way, offer an exciting opportunity for a realistic incorporation of philosophy of science into the classroom. Furthermore, introducing perspectivism to students necessitates an engagement with notions such as truth, reality, perception and experimentation, through a familiar medium, while painting a nuanced conception of the nature of science. (shrink)

From the traditional point of view, power and truth are not related. Since 20th century there has been a social and historical breach in conventional assumptions about the relationship between power and truth. On one hand, it is generally accepted that scientific facts are considered artificial, in the sense of being constructed. This assumption neither implied any kind of fraud nor did it mean that they could be created ex-nihilo. But the interpretation of Kuhn as well as the subsequent (...) developments of the Strong Programme, successfully postulates that truth is merely a social issue. Since then, it has been increasingly suspected that any objective or neutral description of society is too difficult, rendering it completely illusory. That is why it is necessary to ask again for the relation between the structures of truth and the social structures of power and what kind of impact they have on contemporary sociological theory. In this paper, it is given two examples of that kind of enterprise related to two major leading sociologists: Bourdieu and Giddens. Desde el punto de vista tradicional, no hay asociación entre poder y verdad. Pero desde el Siglo XX existió un quiebre social e histórico en las presuposiciones convencionales acerca de la relación entre poder y verdad. De un lado, en general se acepta que los hechos científicos son artificiales en el sentido que son construidos y se asume que esto no implica algún tipo de fraude ni significa que ellos son creados ex-nihilo. Pero la interpretación de Kuhn, así como también los desarrollos posteriores del Programa Fuerte, permite postular que la verdad es un asunto puramente social. Desde entonces, se ha sospechado cada vez más que cualquier descripción neutral u objetiva de la sociedad es tan difícil que llega a ser completamente ilusoria. Por eso, es necesario preguntarse nuevamente por la relación entre las estructuras de la verdad y las estructuras sociales del poder y qué tipo de impacto ellas tienen en la teoría sociológica contemporánea. En este trabajo, se discuten dos ejemplos de ese tipo de empeño, relacionado con las obras de los sociólogos Bourdieu y Giddens. (shrink)

We use recent developments within philosophy of science and within certain strands of linguistic research to throw light on each other. According to Ronald Giere's perspectivist philosophy of science, the scientific understanding of reality must proceed along different, mutually irreducible lines of approach. Giere's proposal, however, leaves unresolved the problem of how to integrate the ever‐growing multitude of highly diverse scientific accounts of what is, after all, one and the same world. We propose a technique for the alignment (...) of different perspectives that will permit cross‐perspectival explanation, and thus allow for a more holistic picture of reality to emerge. With respect to modern linguistics, however, Giere's perspectivism merely legalises a de facto state of affairs, as this discipline displays the peaceful coexistence of a multitude of different theoretical perspectives. Still, this makes it all the more important to show how the different aspects of language picked out by these different perspectives combine to form one single complex reality. During our investigation, a largely overlooked type of reduction within linguistics comes to light, prevalent in classical as well as current work within speech act theory and politeness theory. We suggest how a more holistic understanding of language can be attained through our technique for integrating different perspectives. (shrink)

Upshot: In our response we focus on five questions that point to important common themes in the commentaries: why start in wicked problems, what kind of system is a scientific perspective, what is the nature of second-order research processes, what does this mean for understanding interdisciplinary work, and how may polyocular research help make real-world decisions.

This paper uses several case studies to suggest that (1) two prominent definitions of data do not on their own capture how scientists use data and (2) a novel perspectival account of data is needed. It then outlines some key features of what this account could look like. Those prominent views, the relational and representational, do not fully capture what data are and how they function in science. The representational view is insensitive to the scientific context in which data (...) are used. The relational account does not fully account for the empirical nature of data and how it is possible for data to be evidentially useful. The perspectival account surmounts these problems by accommodating a representational element to data. At the same time, data depend upon the epistemic context because they are the product of situated and informed judgements. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade.ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. (shrink)

In the first section I outline the theory of abstraction, discussing first its con- ceptual basis, then its psychological-epistemological basis, and last its causal basis. My purpose throughout is to show how these bases, and thus the theory itself, were not only paramountly Aristotelian, but also eminently sensible. In the second section I draw the perspectivist account of vision within the bounds of the theory of abstraction and show stage by stage how that account unfolds coherently within those bounds. This (...) procedure should make clear that what the perspecti- vists actually offered was less a scientific theory of light or vision than a scientifi- cally justified world view. (shrink)

This topical collection was an invitation to offer a better understanding of the philosophical view called “perspectivism” and its relevance to science by exploring a variety of metaphysical and epistemological issues arising from perspectivism in science. The papers here collected deliver on this two-fold goal. I will not try to summarise each of them, but suffice to say that they map onto three broad inter-related themes, which I shall call scientific practice, normativity, and history.

Do physicists believe that general relativity is true, and that electrons and phonons exist, and if so, in what sense? To what extent does the spectrum of positions among physicists correspond to philosophical positions like scientific realism, instrumentalism, or perspectivism? Does agreement with these positions correlate with demographic factors, and are realist physicists more likely to support research projects purely aimed at increasing knowledge? We conducted a questionnaire study to scrutinize the philosophical stances of physicists. We received responses (...) from 384 physicists and 151 philosophers. Our main findings are (1) On average, physicists tend toward scientific realism, and slightly more so than philosophers of science. (2) Physicists can be clustered into five groups. Three show variants of scientific realism, one is instrumentalist, and one seems undecided or incoherent. (3) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with approval of building a bigger particle collider. (4) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with the seniority of physicists. (5) We did not find correlations with other factors, such as whether physicists focus on theoretical or experimental research and whether they engage with applied or basic research. (shrink)

Featuring the Gestalt Model and the Perspectivist conception of science, this book is unusual in its non-relativistic development of the idea that successive scientific theories are logically incommensurable. This edition includes four new appendices in which the central ideas of the book are applied to subatomic physics, the distinction between laws and theories, the relation between absolute and relative conceptions of space, and the environmental issue of sustainable development.

Perspectival realism combines two apparently contradictory aspects: the epistemic relativity of perspectives and the mind-independence of realism. This paper examines the prospects for a coherent perspectival realism, taking the literature on scientific representation as a starting point. It is argued that representation involves two types of norms, referred to as norms of relevance and norms of accuracy. Norms of relevance fix the domain of application of a theory and the way it categorises the world, and norms of accuracy give (...) the conditions for the theory to be true. Perspectival realism could be made coherent by taking a realist stance towards one type of norm, and a perspectival stance towards the other, by assuming they are relative to a community. This provides two versions of perspectival realism, called relevance perspectivism and accuracy perspectivism. How each option fares with respect to the challenge of incompatible models is examined. Finally, the prospects of full perspectivism are evaluated. (shrink)

Almost everyone has an intuitive notion of what a random number is. For example, consider these two series of binary digits: 01010101010101010101 01101100110111100010 The first is obviously constructed according to a simple rule; it consists of the number 01 repeated ten times. If one were asked to speculate on how the series might continue, one could predict with considerable confidence that the next two digits would be 0 and 1. Inspection of the second series of digits yields no such comprehensive (...) pattern. There is no obvious rule governing the formation of the number, and there is no rational way to guess the succeeding digits. The arrangement seems haphazard; in other words, the sequence appears to be a random assortment of 0's and 1's. (shrink)

What could be more certain than the fact that 2 plus 2 equals 4? Since the time of the ancient Greeks mathematicians have believed there is little---if anything---as unequivocal as a proved theorem. In fact, mathematical statements that can be proved true have often been regarded as a more solid foundation for a system of thought than any maxim about morals or even physical objects. The 17th-century German mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz even envisioned a ``calculus'' of reasoning such (...) that all disputes could one day be settled with the words ``Gentlemen, let us compute!'' By the beginning of this century symbolic logic had progressed to such an extent that the German mathematician David Hilbert declared that all mathematical questions are in principle decidable, and he confidently set out to codify once and for all the methods of mathematical reasoning. (shrink)