On the productive-operative approach to the foundations of geometry in protophysics. Attempts to establish a foundation to elementary geometry as a theory of spatial figures in Protophysics are surveyed in Section 1. An idea suggested by H. Dingler was to extract the basic properties of the geometrical primitive notions from descriptions of the operations performed in the ‘first’ production of the corresponding objects. P. Janich presents this ‘productive-operative’ approach as a succesful methodical alternative to the ‘geometry of forms’ (...) of R. Inhetveen and P. Lorenzen (Section 2). However, in his work not even one fundamental task seems to be achieved in a satisfactory manner. The article evaluates Janich’s contributions (Section 3) and discusses the shortcomings of his approach (Section 4). In this process a ‘functional-operative’ alternative emerges (Section 5). (shrink)

The critique of my protophysical approaches to operational foundation of geometry by Lucas Amiras (Journal for General Philosophy of Science Vol. 34 (2003)) concerns my first publication from 1976 but not the further 30 years of work. It does not offer any argument leading from the (erroneous) judgement “lacking success” to the conclusion “impossible”. And it is, in general, based on a philosophical defect: it ignores the principle of methodical order as leading for constructivist protophysics.

Protoscience and Reconstruction. A central concept of the constructivist philosophy of science is the term 'protoscience'. From an orthodox point of view, protosciences are bound to give the so called 'measurement-theoretical Apriori' ('meßtheoretisches Apriori') for a science. Protophysics for example (operationally) defines the quantities 'length', 'time', and 'mass'. Thereby it yields some basic physical laws, which usually are regarded as "laws of nature", but in fact follow already from the definitions of the basic quantities. The attempt to establish other (...) protodisciplines than protophysics is traditionally regarded as not very promising, because other sciences do not like physics build their main theories on certain basic quantities. Nevertheless such enterprises like "protochemistry", "protobiology" and "protopsychology" recently appeared on the scene. Does this mark a breakthrough in constructivist philosophy of science or is this multiplication of protosciences no more than a promotion strategy? In the article it is shown that the orthodox definition of 'protoscience' is in fact far to narrow. An alternative definition is proposed which on one hand preserves the classic tasks of protophysics but on the other hand allows for other protosciences as equally useful enterprises. A central concept within the complex topic "protoscience" is the one of 'reconstruction'. It can be shown that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of this critical concept. Therefore the article ends with a reconstruction of the term 'reconstruction'. (shrink)

Protophysics and Special Theory of Relativity. First, a proposal for a constructive foundation of the Special Theory of Relativity by M. Buth is criticized and confronted with an alternative proposal by the author. The main idea is to solve the problem of transforming coordinates between inertial systems in terms of the General Theory of Measurement. Regarding transformations of co-ordinates as transformations of thecorresponding “functions of measurement” these functions have to meet two demands. 1. To identify measured values which are (...) related to different inertial systems and measuring procedures as the same magnitude, the ratio scale of length and duration has to be defined with respect to the whole class of inertial systems. 2. Using the concept of a certain physical magnitude, propositions about measuring devices are made which are invariant with respect to measuring procedures. As aconsequence every transformation between functions of measurement has to be an equivalence relation. The first demand leads to linearity, the second one reduces the set of permissible transformations between inertial systems to the alternative of Galilei- and Lorentz-transformation. The (im)possibility of putting an absolute simultaneity into practice decides between these transformations. (shrink)

In Fechner's psychophysics, the 'mental' and the 'physical' were conceived as two phenomenal domains, connected by functional relations, not as two ontologically different realms. We follow the path from Fechner's foundational ideas and Mach's radical programme of a unitary science to later approaches to primary, psychophysically neutral experience (phenomenology, protophysics). We propose an 'integral psychophysics' as a mathematical study of law-like, invariant structures of primary experience. This approach is illustrated by a reinterpretation of psychophysical experiments in terms of perceptual (...) situations involving a constructed apparatus and an instructed subject. The problematic notion of 'measurement of sensation' is thus eliminated: 'sensations' are merely indices for classes of perceptually equivalent configurations (states of the apparatus) specified by the instruction. The locus of the measured is in the inter-subjectively shared, communicable world—not inside the subject's mind. Finally we discuss the role of integral psychophysics as a scientia prima , logically and methodically preceding physics and psychology. (shrink)

Summary Some leading ideas of the constructivist protophysics are discussed on the basis of P. Janich's Protophysik der Zeit. After having reviewed the contents of the second edition Janich's claim that analytical philosophy of science is purely affirmative and not critical towards science in its historical appearence is refuted. In the next section the principles of constructivist methodology of physics are criticised, and the claim is refuted that prescriptions for measurement cannot without circularity be shown to be invalid by (...) experimental results. In the last section we discuss Janich's foundation of time measurement in a mathematical frame similar to that for extensive systems. Thus the relation between Janich's and the ordinary account is cleared up. (shrink)

Protochemistry. The Program of a Methodical Foundation of Chemistry. "Protochemistry" - in analogy to protophysics - is sketched as the program of a methodical foundation of chemistry. "Foundation" means to reconstruct the methods (both linguistic and poietic) which lead from the prescientific every-day-practice of mastering properties of substances to scientific theories of modern chemistry. Four types of chemical terms are distinguished, depending on different methods of definition and different areas of reference. Consequences of the program if realized are pointed (...) out. (shrink)

Abstraction and Ideation - The Semantics of chemical and biological fundamental concepts. The methods of abstraction and ideation are indispensable tools to introduce new concepts in a scientific terminology. The latter is paradigmatically introduced within the 'protophysical program' whereas abstraction is commonly applied in logics and mathematics. The application within the reconstruction of chemistry and biology causes several problems. Ideation appears to be inadequate whereas the application of abstraction necessitates a critical and minute examination of the corresponding equivalence relations. These (...) problems are solved by the introduction of the method of materially-synthetic (material-synthetische) abstraction which is exemplified by the introduction of the chemical concept of 'substance' (Stoff) and the biological concept of 'hereditary factor' (Erbanlage). (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Bedeutung des Koinzidenzbegriffs für eine protophysikalische Chronometrie wird untersucht und eine Abänderung der von P. Janich gegebenen Definition einer Uhr vorgeschlagen. Einige Beziehungen zwischen protophysikalischer und Relativistischer Zeitmessung, insbesondere eine mögliche Unverträglichkeit beider, werden erörtet und einige Folgerungen bezüglich des Sinnes 〈protophysikalischer Begründung〉 gezogen.SummaryThe significance of the concept of coincidence for a protophysical chronometry is investigated and an alteration to P. Janich's definition of a clock proposed. Some relations, in particular a possible incompatibility, between proto‐physical and relativistic time measurement (...) are discussed and some conclusions drawn as to the meaning of “proto‐physical foundation”.RésuméUne analyse de la signification de la notion de coïncidence en chronométrie protophysique conduit à proposer une modification de la définition d'une horloge donnée par P. Janich. Certaines relations entre la mesure proto‐physique et relativiste du temps et plus particuliàrement la possibilité d'une incompatibilité entre elles sont étudiées. Il en découle quelques conclusions concernant le sens exact d'un 〈fondement proto‐physique〉. (shrink)

Constructivism. This is an unpublished lecture read 5 years ago stating the program of constructive 'Wissenschaftstheorie' (i.e. philosophy of the sciences and humanities). Its publication now is an attempt to clarify the muddle documented in the issue 23/2 of this journal, which discussed radical constructivism (referring to biological evolution) and constructionism (referring to psychological genesis). The muddle is caused by the uncritical use of 'elaborated' speech (Bildungssprache) with terms such as: empirical, metaphysical, explanation, description, reality, actuality, object, entity, etc.). Constructivism (...) as first tought in Erlangen reconstructs its own elaborated code for use in the constructive Wissenschaftstheorie. All constructions (reconstructions) start from practice with the language reduced to unelaborated talk within practice. This is called the 'practicist' turn of Wissenschaftstheorie. This turn is limited to scientific or humanistic disciplines supporting common action in response to precritical needs, especially war and hunger. Traditional disciplines can be reformed to serve this purpose. The lecture sketches the beginnings of such a reform for mathematics and technology (including physics as a step towards better technology) and for ethical politics - in contrast to strategies for more power - (including history as a step towards more consensus). The sketch follows the terminological proposal worked out in my 'Lehrbuch' of constructive Wissenschaftstheorie (1987). Logical particles are introduced dialogically, modalities are defined syntactically. The compatibility of relativistic physics with constructive theories of space and time (protophysics) is shown. For ethical politics the starting point is, that we live in states with laws enforced with respect to all citizens alike - and that we live in a post-traditional pluralism of ways of life (Lebensformen). Without the rhetoric of values and without the abstraction of human rights, it is shown how an enlightened style of argumentation can transform our states into 'republics' with a compatible plurality of ways of life. Whether such enlightened argumentation has a chance of being accepted by intellectuals (before they have destroyed our world) - this question remains unanswered. (shrink)

On the Protophysics of time. Reply to H. Andreas* critique along with a remark on the scope of operational foundations of measurement. In 2004, H. Andreas presented in this journal a refutation of Janich's operational foundation of time measurement. Pursuing suggestions made by F. Mühlhölzer in 1981, Andreas intends to show that Janich's proof of the uniqueness of the operationalization that he suggested fails. It is shown that Andreas' arguments, like Mühlhölzer's, are mistaken and do not challenge Janich's theory. (...) Some remarks on the scope of Protophysics are added, which may lead to a more substantial discussion of the merits of Janich's approach. (shrink)

Some leading ideas of the constructivist protophysics are discussed on the basis of P. Janich's Protophysik der Zeit. After having reviewed the contents of the second edition Janich's claim that analytical philosophy of science is purely affirmative and not critical towards science in its historical appearence is refuted. In the next section the principles of constructivist methodology of physics are criticised, and the claim is refuted that prescriptions for measurement cannot without circularity be shown to be invalid by experimental (...) results. In the last section we discuss Janich's foundation of time measurement in a mathematical frame similar to that for extensive systems. Thus the relation between Janich's and the ordinary account is cleared up. (shrink)

ion and Ideation - The Semantics of chemical and biological fundamental concepts. The methods of abstraction and ideation are indispensable tools to introduce new concepts in a scientific terminology. The latter is paradigmatically introduced within the 'protophysical program' whereas abstraction is commonly applied in logics and mathematics. The application within the reconstruction of chemistry and biology causes several problems. Ideation appears to be inadequate whereas the application of abstraction necessitates a critical and minute examination of the corresponding equivalence relations. These (...) problems are solved by the introduction of the method of materially-synthetic abstraction which is exemplified by the introduction of the chemical concept of 'substance' and the biological concept of 'hereditary factor'. (shrink)

Protoscience and Reconstruction. A central concept of the constructivist philosophy of science is the term 'protoscience'. From an orthodox point of view, protosciences are bound to give the so called 'measurement-theoretical Apriori' for a science. Protophysics for example defines the quantities 'length', 'time', and 'mass'. Thereby it yields some basic physical laws, which usually are regarded as "laws of nature", but in fact follow already from the definitions of the basic quantities. The attempt to establish other protodisciplines than (...) class='Hi'>protophysics is traditionally regarded as not very promising, because other sciences do not like physics build their main theories on certain basic quantities. Nevertheless such enterprises like "protochemistry", "protobiology" and "protopsychology" recently appeared on the scene. Does this mark a breakthrough in constructivist philosophy of science or is this multiplication of protosciences no more than a promotion strategy? In the article it is shown that the orthodox definition of 'protoscience' is in fact far to narrow. An alternative definition is proposed which on one hand preserves the classic tasks of protophysics but on the other hand allows for other protosciences as equally useful enterprises. A central concept within the complex topic "protoscience" is the one of 'reconstruction'. It can be shown that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of this critical concept. Therefore the article ends with a reconstruction of the term 'reconstruction'. (shrink)