The spinal cord provides an alternative model for nerve tissue grafting experiments. Anatomo-functional correlations are easier to make here than in any other region of the CNS because of a direct implication of spinal cord neurons in sensorimotor activities. Lesions can be easily performed to isolate spinal cord neurons from descending inputs. The anatomy of descending monoaminergic systems is well defined and these systems offer a favourable paradigm for lesion-graft experiments.

Written in code under constant threat of battle, Wittgenstein's searing and illuminating diaries finally emerge in this first-ever English translation. During the pandemic, Marjorie Perloff, one of our foremost scholars of global literature, found her mind ineluctably drawn to the profound commentary on life and death in the wartime diaries of eminent philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Upon learning that these notebooks, which richly contextualize the early stages of his magnum opus, the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, had never before been published in English, the (...) Viennese-born Perloff determinedly set about translating them. Beginning with the anxious summer of 1914, this historic, en-face edition presents the first-person recollections of a foot soldier in the Austrian Army, fresh from his days as a philosophy student at Cambridge, who must grapple with the hazing of his fellow soldiers, the stirrings of a forbidden sexuality, and the formation of an explosive analytical philosophy that seemed to draw meaning from his endless brushes with death. Much like Tolstoy's The Gospel in Brief, Private Notebooks takes us on a personal journey to discovery as it augments our knowledge of Wittgenstein himself. (shrink)

Although public law scholars have long addressed the problems of accountability generated by private decision-making and "privatization," they have largely ignored this phenomenon in the immigration context. Our ignorance is increasingly indefensible. Millions of employers - private parties - are required by law to screen their workers for unauthorized immigrants, and growing evidence suggests that they use their screening power to ignore workplace protections and to otherwise exploit these workers. This article is the first attempt to apply the insights (...) generated by the privatization literature to immigration law. It argues that our nation's employers have emerged as private immigration screeners who, like airport inspectors screening for ineligible entrants and law enforcement officers screening for criminal noncitizens, assist the Department of Homeland Security in identifying unauthorized workers for removal. More than just agents of exploitation, reframing employers as private screeners demonstrates that they are also agents of the state. Borrowing analytical concepts developing in the privatization literature, I argue that the high risk of abuse and the lack of readily available mechanisms for reducing that risk raise troubling implications over the kind of power that employers wield as private immigration screeners in the workplace. Reframing our nation's employers as private screeners gives theoretical coherence to the discretionary decision-making authority they actually wield, and explains why they have used that authority to exploit workers - as private parties carrying out public duties, they are incentivized to serve their own interests instead of verifying the immigration status of their workers in good faith. Examining the problem of private immigration screening also forces us to reconsider two aspects about immigration screening generally. First, although immigration law tends to reward unauthorized immigrants who lay low and tends to punish those who draw attention to themselves, I suggest that we ought to rethink this logic at least in the context of the workplace. Because workplace violations committed by employers are typically enforced by private parties, punishing unauthorized immigrants who attempt to assert these rights and thus draw attention to themselves, only encourages workplace violations by employers and fosters a culture of lawlessness. Second, thinking about how decision-making authority within immigration law should be allocated between the public and the private contributes to the current conversation over how similar decision-making authority should be allocated between federal entities and local entities. Although questions of accountability have lingered in the backdrop of the immigration federalism debate, I suggest that scholars would be well served to foreground these questions and answer them head-on. (shrink)

This paper focuses on independent training providers (ITPs) – in other words, private companies – as suppliers of vocational education and training in post-war England. Whilst acknowledging the central role of further education (FE) colleges in delivering vocational learning, it draws attention to a large, diverse sector of ITPs operating alongside FE colleges, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s. Data suggest that around 15–20% of vocational learners were enrolled as fee-paying customers with private providers at that time – a figure (...) broadly similar to today. There are, it is argued, three related reasons for this. First, the post-war policy environment, and the varied and uneven nature of colleges at that time, allowed significant room for ITPs to operate as alternative providers of vocational education. Second, the far-reaching ‘efficiency’ gains required since FE colleges left local authority control have largely attenuated the space in which ITPs previously operated. Third, neoliberal assumptions about the superiority of private enterprise mean that ITPs now receive significant funding from the state, largely to deliver Apprenticeships and other programmes of work-related learning – which has, somewhat perversely, reduced the incentive for them to act as bone fide commercial providers of a broader range of vocational learning. (shrink)

The cases of corruption reported by the media tend almost always to involve a private party (a citizen or a corporation) that pays, or promises to pay, money to a public party (a politician or a public official, for example) in order to obtain an advantage or avoid a disadvantage. Because of the harm it does to economic efficiency and growth, and because of its social, political and ethical consequences, private-to-public corruption has been widely studied. Private-to-private corruption, by contrast, has (...) been relatively neglected and only recently has started to receive the attention it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to offer some thoughts on the nature and importance of private-to-private corruption; the legal treatment it receives in some of the world''s leading countries; and the measures that companies can take to combat it, with special consideration of its ethical aspects. (shrink)

Van oudsher proberen liberaal-democratische samenlevingen private en publieke sferen gescheiden te houden. Individuen en bedrijven kunnen privaat handelen op de markt, winst maken en daar de vruchten van plukken. De publieke macht moet daar onafhankelijk van uitgeoefend worden, op democratische basis. Maar die strikte scheiding tussen privaat en publiek staat onder druk. Oligarchen beïnvloeden in veel landen de politiek, door partijdonaties en lobbyactiviteiten. Bedrijven reguleren hun eigen activiteiten, en overheden slagen er in een geglobaliseerde economie lang niet altijd in om (...) daar effectieve controle over te hebben. In dit boek presenteert Rutger Claassen een filosofische analyse van de relatie tussen privaat en publiek. In het feodalisme waren beide met elkaar verweven, op een ongezonde manier. De moderne, open samenleving ontstond in de 18e eeuw als een reactie daarop. Maar vandaag de dag lijken we een terugval te beleven. Opnieuw vermengen economische en politieke belangen zich, ten koste van burgers. Zijn we aangeland in een ‘neo-feodaal’ tijdperk? En hoe daarop te reageren? Voor iedereen die wil begrijpen hoe politiek en economie elkaar beïnvloeden, en hoe een filosofische blik ons daarbij kan helpen. (shrink)

Why our workplaces are authoritarian private governments—and why we can’t see it One in four American workers says their workplace is a “dictatorship.” Yet that number almost certainly would be higher if we recognized employers for what they are—private governments with sweeping authoritarian power over our lives. Many employers minutely regulate workers’ speech, clothing, and manners on the job, and employers often extend their authority to the off-duty lives of workers, who can be fired for their political speech, recreational activities, (...) diet, and almost anything else employers care to govern. In this compelling book, Elizabeth Anderson examines why, despite all this, we continue to talk as if free markets make workers free, and she proposes a better way to think about the workplace, opening up space for discovering how workers can enjoy real freedom. (shrink)

The dominance of agency theory can reduce our collective scope to analyse private equity in all its diversity and depth. We contribute to theorisation of private equity by developing a contrasting perspective that draws on a rich tradition of virtue ethics. In doing so, we juxtapose 'private equity' with 'public good' to develop points of rhetorical and analytical contrast. We develop a typology differentiating various forms of private equity, and focus on the 'take private' form. These takeovers are where private (...) equity funds are used to buy all a firm's publicly listed shares. Take private deals reduce reporting requirements and lessen the amount of public scrutiny a firm comes under. They allow greater control of a firm's assets and resources but also have effects in terms of the wider social fabric. The 'public good' and virtue ethics offer an alternative basis for theorisation of these deals. This provides a needed contrast to accounts of private equity based on agency theory. (shrink)

The book combines philosophical exposition and legal analysis, and pays special attention to issues of tort law.

This article is part of a symposium on property-owning democracy. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form (...) families, as well as personal associations which reflect their tastes as well as their beliefs and interests. He seems also to have assumed that people are entitled to seclude themselves, as well as to associate with others, and to keep some of their beliefs, knowledge, feelings and ideas to themselves, rather than having to share them with others. So, thinking of privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion, solitude, anonymity and intimate association, we can say that Rawls appears to include at least some forms of privacy in his account of the liberties protected by the first principle of justice. -/- However, Rawls did not say very much about how he understands people’s claims to privacy, or how those claims relate to his ideas about property-ownership. This is unfortunate, because two familiar objections to privacy seem particularly pertinent to his conception of the basic liberties. The first was articulated with customary panache by Judith Thomson, in a famous article on the moral right to privacy, in which she argued that talk of a moral right to privacy is confused and confusing, because privacy rights are really just property rights in disguise. The second objection has long been a staple of leftist politics, and is that the association of privacy with private property means that privacy rights are just a mask for coercive and exploitative relationships, and therefore at odds with democratic freedom, equality and solidarity. If the first objection implies that Rawls is wrong to think that protection for privacy can be distinguished from protection of personal property, the second objection implies that Rawls cannot hope to protect privacy without thereby committing himself to the grossest forms of capitalist inequality. -/- In this paper I will not discuss Rawls’ views of property-owning democracy. However, by clarifying the relationship between claims to privacy and claims to property-ownership, I hope to illuminate some of the conceptual, moral and political issues raised by Rawls’ ideas, and by work on the concept of a property-owning democracy, which he inspired. As we will see, privacy-based justifications of private ownership are not always unappealing, and privacy is sometimes promoted, rather than threatened, by collective ownership. The conclusion draws out the significance of these claims for the idea of a property-owning democracy. (shrink)

Habermas dialogically recasts the Kantian conception of moral autonomy. In a legal-political context, his dialogical approach has the potential to redress certain troubling features of liberal and communitarian approaches to democratic politics. Liberal approaches attach greater normative weight to negatively construed individual freedoms, which they seek to protect against the interventions of political authority. Communitarian approaches prioritize the positively construed freedoms of communal political participation, viewing legal-political institutions as a means for collective ethical self-realization. Habermas’ discourse theory of law and (...) democracy seeks to overcome this competition between the negative and positive liberties. Doing so entails reconciling private and public autonomy at a fundamental conceptual level. This is his co-originality thesis, which seeks to show that private and public autonomy are internally connected and evenly balanced. I support his aim but argue that he fails to achieve it due to an unsatisfactory account of private autonomy. I suggest an alternative dialogical conception of autonomy as ethically self-determining agency that would enable him to establish his thesis. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive moral theory of privatization in war. It examines the kind of wars that private actors might wage separate from the state and the kind of wars that private actors might wage as functionaries of the state. The first type of war serves to probe the _ad bellum_ question of whether private actors can justifiably authorize war, while the second type of war serves to probe the _in bello_ question of whether private actors can justifiably (...) participate in war. The cases that drive the analysis are drawn from the rich and complicated history of private military action, stretching back centuries to the Italian city-states whose mercenaries were reviled by Machiavelli. The book also takes up the hypothetical examples conjured by philosophers—the private protective agencies of Robert Nozick’s _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_, for example, and the private armies of Thomas More’s _Utopia_. The aim of this book is to propose a theory of privatization that retains currency not only in assessing current military engagements, but past and future ones as well. In doing so, it also raises a set of important questions about the very enterprise of war. This book will be of much interest to students of ethics, political philosophy, military studies, international relations, war and conflict studies, and security studies. (shrink)

Transnational corporations have become actors with significant political power and authority which should entail responsibility and liability, specifically direct liability for complicity in human rights violations. Holding TNCs liable for human rights violations is complicated by the discontinuity between the fragmented legal/political structure of the TNC and its integrated strategic reality and the international state system which privileges sovereignty and non-intervention over the protection of individual rights. However, the post-Westphalian transition—the emergence of multiple authorities, increasing ambiguity of borders and jurisdiction (...) and blurring of the line between the public and private spheres—should facilitate imposing direct responsibility on transnational firms. Mechanisms for imposing direct responsibility on TNCs are considered including voluntary agreements and international law. However, I conclude that a hybrid public-private regime which relies on non-hierarchical compliance mechanisms is likely to be both more effective and consistent with the structure of the emerging transnational order. (shrink)

Copyright law in recent years has undergone a process of privatization. While weakening the enforceability of conventional legislation (copyright rules), cyberspace facilitates alternative types of regulation such as contracts and technical self-help measures. Regulation by the code is significantly different from traditional types of public ordering (copyright law) and private ordering (contracts). Norms that technically regulate the use of information are not merely self-made they are also self-enforced. Furthermore, the law was recruited to uphold the superiority of such technical (...) self-help measures. The recently adopted U.S. Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) 1998 prohibits the development and use of technologies designed to circumvent copyright management systems. The underlying assumption of this legislation is that in Cyberspace, the target of regulation should become the technologies that affect users'' behavior rather than the behaviors themselves. This paper critically examines this regulatory approach and highlights its shortcomings. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's treatment of private language is the dissolution of some of the major problems in traditional philosophy. Philosophical problems, for Wittgenstein, are the conceptual confusion arising due to the abuse of language. They can be fully dispensed with by commanding a clear view of language. Language, for Wittgenstein, is on the one hand, the source of philosophical problems while, on the other hand, it is a means to dispense with them. Private language is one such issue which is ultimately rooted (...) I a mistaken conception of language and is the sources of various philosophical problems/ puzzles. (shrink)

Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it. Since people lack the normative power to privately transfer custody, attempts to do so are illegitimate, and the law should reflect this fact.

I try to explain the difference between three kinds of negation: external negation, negation of the predicate and privation. Further I use polygons of opposition as heuristic devices to show that a logic which contains all three mentioned kinds of negation must be a fragment of a Łukasiewicz-four-valued predicate logic. I show, further, that, this analysis can be elaborated so as to comprise additional kinds of privation. This would increase the truth-values in question and bring fragments of (more generally speaking) (...) Łukasiewicz-n-valued predicate logics into the scene. (shrink)

The role of private food standards in agriculture is increasingly raising questions of legitimacy, particularly in light of the impacts such standards may have on food producers. While much work has been carried out at a macro policy level for developing countries, there have been relatively few empirical case studies that focus on particular food supply chains, and even fewer studies still of the impact of private standards on developed countries such as Australia. This study seeks to address this imbalance, (...) with a particular focus on examining the impact of private standards on an Australian vegetable supply food system in North Tasmania as well as tracing the impact of perceived and actual power relations among actors. Applying a governance framework and adopting a Foucauldian position we show that private standards are a “technology of power” that have risen out of a crisis discourse in the mid-1990s about on-farm food safety. Private standards have the effect of using knowledge from particular actors to establish truths about good agricultural practice (GAP), however we show that Tasmanian vegetable growers are not docile bodies and are employing alternative knowledge and technologies of power to challenge how GAP is implemented on-farm. (shrink)

Most modern writers accept that a privation theory of evil should explicitly account for the evil of pain. But pains are quintessentially real. The evil of pain does not seem to lie in an absence of good. Though many directly take on the challenges this raises, the metaphysics and axiology of their answers is often obscure. In this paper I try to straighten things out. By clarifying and categorizing the possible types of privation views, I explore the ways in which (...) privationists about evil are—or should or could be—privationists about pain’s evil. (shrink)

Codes of conduct are the main tools to privately regulate worker rights in global value chains. Scholars have shown that while codes may improve outcome standards (such as occupational health and safety), they have had limited impact on process rights (such as freedom of association and collective bargaining). Scholars have, though, only provided vague or general explanations for this empirical finding. We address this shortcoming by providing a holistic and detailed explanation, and argue that codes, in their current form, have (...) limited impact on trade union rights due to (i) buyers paying lip service to trade union rights, (ii) workers being treated as passive objects of regulation in codes of conduct, (iii) auditing being unable to detect and remediate violations of trade union rights, (iv) codes emphasizing parallel means of organizing, (v) suppliers having limited incentives for compliance, and (vi) codes being unable to open up space for union organizing when leveraged in grassroots struggles. Our arguments suggest that there is no quick fix for codes’ limited impact on trade union rights, and that codes, in their current form, have limited potential to improve trade union rights. We conclude by discussing ways in which codes of conduct, and private regulation of worker rights more generally, could be transformed to more effectively address trade union rights. (shrink)

Private copying exception is an exception to copyright which is present both in Lithuanian national law and law of the European Union. Recent jurisprudence of Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted legal regulation of private copying exception in the laws of the European Union. The mentioned jurisprudence raised concern whether Lithuanian copyright laws on private copying exception and their interpretation in case law of Supreme Court of Lithuania are compatible with the European Union law. This paper analyses the (...) nature and intention of private copying exception, its reflection in Lithuanian and European copyright law and evaluates Lithuanian laws and case law in the light of recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The authors conclude that recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on private copying exception shall not lead to any dramatic or substantial changes of Lithuanian national copyright laws. (shrink)

Chiara Cordelli’s The Privatized State offers a powerful critique of privatization and an inspiring vision of the kind of democratic governance that could secure citizens’ equal freedom. This essay raises questions about how Cordelli’s arguments apply in non-ideal theory. It asks whether her arguments about the illegitimacy of privatization provide us with adequate reasons to reject ongoing processes of privatization. It also queries some of her recommendations for how philanthropy should be practiced by individuals and incentivized by (...) the state. (shrink)

When advocates of insurance‐privatization consider whether private insurance‐dominated systems achieve justice at all, they tend to rely on an incomplete set of criteria for a just healthcare system. They also mistakenly assume that it is enough to show that justice is in principle achievable within a private insurance‐dominated system. This essay offers a more complete set of criteria for a just healthcare system. It then argues that the motivational assumptions needed to make insurance‐privatization at all plausible are inconsistent (...) with the motivational assumptions needed to show that in practice a private insurance‐dominated system will achieve justice. A private insurance‐dominated system can be expected to satisfy the criteria for just healthcare only if there is extensive and effective regulation to constrain the normal competitive behavior of private insurers or if generous public funds are provided to fill the gaps in access left by the private insurance market. Yet the assumptions about the motivations and abilities of the public, regulators, and public officials needed to satisfy conditions or contradict the privatization advocate's explanations of how privatization will maximize efficiency, choice, and quality of care. (shrink)

Despite the prevalence of externalization, much work in the ethics of immigration continues to assume that the admission of immigrants is determined by state immigration officials who decide whether to admit travelers at official crossings. This assumption neglects how decisions about entrance have been increasingly relocated abroad – to international waters, consular offices, airports, or foreign territories – often with non-governmental or private actors, as well as foreign governments functioning as intermediaries. Externalization poses a fundamental challenge to achieving just migration (...) policies. It reliably harms vulnerable people, prevents refugees from receiving protection, leads to human rights abuses, and dissipates blame and accountability, creating a serious lacuna in assigning moral responsibility. (shrink)

Why government outsourcing of public powers is making us less free Many governmental functions today—from the management of prisons and welfare offices to warfare and financial regulation—are outsourced to private entities. Education and health care are funded in part through private philanthropy rather than taxation. Can a privatized government rule legitimately? The Privatized State argues that it cannot. In this boldly provocative book, Chiara Cordelli argues that privatization constitutes a regression to a precivil condition—what philosophers centuries ago called "a (...) state of nature." Developing a compelling case for the democratic state and its administrative apparatus, she shows how privatization reproduces the very same defects that Enlightenment thinkers attributed to the precivil condition, and which only properly constituted political institutions can overcome—defects such as provisional justice, undue dependence, and unfreedom. Cordelli advocates for constitutional limits on privatization and a more democratic system of public administration, and lays out the central responsibilities of private actors in contexts where governance is already extensively privatized. Charting a way forward, she presents a new conceptual account of political representation and novel philosophical theories of democratic authority and legitimate lawmaking. The Privatized State shows how privatization undermines the very reason political institutions exist in the first place, and advocates for a new way of administering public affairs that is more democratic and just. (shrink)

A private property right is a collection of particular rights that relate to the control of an object. The ground for such moral rights rests on the value of project pursuit. It does so because the individual ownership of particular objects is intimately related to the formation and application of a coherent set of projects that are the major parts of a self-shaped life. Problems arise in explaining how unowned property is appropriated. Unilateral acts with regard to an object, e.g., (...) mixing in one’s labor into it, probably don’t ground particular rights to private property. Nor do bilateral contracts since a stable pre-institutional contract with regard to appropriation is not likely to form. However, a conventional method of appropriation can allow for such appropriation while at the same time preserving the pre-institutional nature of such rights. This theory can also account for a person’s property rights in her own body. However, the value of project formation requires that persons have at least some private property that is to serve as the object of their projects. These positive rights to property undermine the libertarian claim that all non-commitment-based rights are negative. However, a further empirical argument is needed in order to justify protecting these positive moral rights to private property by positive legal rights. (shrink)

The privation account of moral evil holds that the badness of morally bad acts consists not in the positive act itself or in any positive feature of the act but rather in the act’s lack of conformity to the moral standard. Traditionally recognized for its theological usefulness, the account has been the target of at least five recent objections. In this paper I offer a positive philosophical argument for the account and then show that the objections fail.

When advocates of insurance‐privatization consider whether private insurance‐dominated systems achieve justice at all, they tend to rely on an incomplete set of criteria for a just healthcare system. They also mistakenly assume that it is enough to show that justice is in principle achievable within a private insurance‐dominated system. This essay offers a more complete set of criteria for a just healthcare system. It then argues that the motivational assumptions needed to make insurance‐privatization at all plausible (on grounds (...) of choice, efficiency, and quality of care) are inconsistent with the motivational assumptions needed to show that in practice a private insurance‐dominated system will achieve justice. A private insurance‐dominated system can be expected to satisfy the criteria for just healthcare only if (a) there is extensive and effective regulation to constrain the normal competitive behavior of private insurers or if (b) generous public funds are provided to fill the gaps in access left by the private insurance market. Yet the assumptions about the motivations and abilities of the public, regulators, and public officials needed to satisfy conditions (a) or (b) contradict the privatization advocate's explanations of how privatization will maximize efficiency, choice, and quality of care. (shrink)

The paper looks at arguments for and against private schools, first in general and then, at greater length, in their British form. Here it looks first at defences against the charge that private schooling is unfair, discussing on the way problems with equality as an intrinsic value and with instrumental appeals to greater equality, especially in access to university and better jobs. It turns next to charges of social exclusiveness, before looking in more detail at claims about the dangers private (...) schools pose for democratic government. It then examines complications arising from shifts in the notion of ‘private’ education since the 1980s, before concluding, in the light of recent articles in JOPE about criteria for admission to university, with a discussion of Brighouse's proposal for the reform of private schooling. There are also shorter discussions of other suggestions for such reform. (shrink)

The conception of a private event as an inferred, theoretical construct is critically examined. The foundation of this conception in logical positivist epistemology is noted, and the basis of the radical behaviorist alternative is presented. Of particular importance is the radical behaviorist stance on the contributions of physiology and private behavioral events to psychological explanations. Two cases are then reviewed to illustrate radical behaviorist concerns about private events, theoretical terms, and the relation between them. The first is the position of (...) cognitive psychology toward internal states and processing mechanisms. The second is the recent suggestion that even radical behaviorists regard the private event as an inferred, theoretical construct. (shrink)

Across countries, governments are urging civil society, in particular charitable and non-profit associations, to take up a part of the social burden, and to produce and provide critical human services and social goods, either independently or on governments' behalf. This type of privatization, or public–private partnership, is encouraged by many on grounds of pluralism and liberty, as empowering individuals and their associations. In this paper, I aim to provide a liberty-based normative argument against privatization. A common view, supported (...) by both conservatives and classical liberals, is that the more social responsibility is left or delegated to civil society, the more civil society will flourish. I contend, by contrast, that when political societies rely on civil society to provide critical goods and services, individuals' freedom of association is threatened. The consequence of privatization is a multiple loss, in terms of individual freedom, value pluralism and the expressive character of civil society. (shrink)

The private provision of security services has attracted a great deal of recent attention, both professional and popular. Much of that attention suggests the questioned moral legitimacy of the private vs. public provision of security. Linking the literature on moral legitimacy and responsibility from new institutional and stakeholder theories, we examine the relationship between moral legitimacy and responsible behavior by both private security companies (PSCs) and their stakeholders. We ask what the moral-legitimacy-enhancing responsibilities of both might be, and contribute to (...) both literatures and their managerial implications by detailing the content of those responsibilities, emphasizing the reciprocal nature of moral obligations. We suggest that the moral legitimacy of the industry depends upon responsible behavior by both PSCsandtheir stakeholders. (shrink)

John White (2016) defends the UK private school system from the accusation that it allows an unfair form of ‘queue jumping’ in university admissions. He offers two responses to this accusation, one based on considerations of harm, and one based on meritocratic distribution of university places. We will argue that neither response succeeds: the queue-jumping argument remains a powerful case against the private school system in the UK. We begin by briefly outlining the queue-jumping argument (§1), before evaluating White’s no-harm (...) (§2) and meritocracy (§3) arguments. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a 'useable criterion of successful performance' (Pears) or 'operational standard of correctness' (Glock) for its (...) correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails. (shrink)

In Aristotle’s account of change, lacking a form is called privation (Physics I.7 191a14). For example, someone takes on the form of being musical only from previously having the privation of being unmusical. However, he also states that “shape and nature are spoken of in two ways, for the privation too is in a way form” (Physics II.1 193b19). I will demonstrate that these seemingly contradictory statements are not actually in tension. Since all perceptible matter must be enformed, we would (...) have trouble discussing things that have yet to undergo generation, like menstrual fluid, and things that have undergone corruption, like corpses, if we did not cite the privation as a sort of form. I will argue that, given his commitment to hylomorphism, Aristotle is committed to privation being a form in a qualified sense. It cannot be a form in an unqualified sense because privation often spoils the matter such that it can no longer be reformed. The fact of the matter is we cannot draw a bright line between privation and form because the two are contraries and can be said to hold to different degrees at different points on a spectrum. (shrink)

A la source de ce livre il y a la conviction que certaines des evolutions les plus negatives des societes contemporaines conferent une actualite nouvelle au concept d'alienation selon la comprehension qu'en ont proposee des penseurs aussi apparemment eloignes l'un de l'autre que Marx et Heidegger: l'alienation comprise comme privation de monde. Nos societes mondialisees sont paradoxalement celles ou s'impose l'experience d'une privation de monde sans precedent. Plusieurs dimensions de cette privation sont analysees ici, notamment l'experience temporelle d'un present eternel, (...) l'epuisement de l'historicite et l'acceleration frenetique des maintenant successifs. Quant au lieu ou se joue originairement la privation de monde, Franck Fischbach soutient la these qu'il s'agit du travail dans la forme salariale qui est la sienne sous le capital et dont le caractere mutilant n'a cesse d'etre amplifie par les plus recentes evolutions. C'est donc aussi d'une transformation du travail que depend la possibilite d'un advenir historique de l'etre de l'homme dans le monde. (shrink)

Near the end of 'Naming the Colours', Lewis (1997) makes an interesting claim about the relationship between linguistic and mental content; we are typically unable to read the content of a belief off the content of a sentence used to express that belief or vice versa. I call this view autonomism. I motivate and defend autonomism and discuss its importance in the philosophy of mind and language. In a nutshell, I argue that the different theoretical roles that mental and linguistic (...) content play suggest these kinds of content should be understood as sensitive to different things. (shrink)

In Public/Private, Fairfield examines the ethical-political significance as well as the policy implications of a right to privacy. Discussing the different applications of privacy laws, technology,property, relationships, Fairfield writes in a style accessible to specialists and students alike.

This article attempts to critically challenge Richard Rorty's view that the work of Jacques Derrida has no political utility. For Rorty, Derrida is a ‘private ironist’ whose quest for personal perfection renders him ineffectual as a ‘public liberal’. This view, I contend, is the consequence of looking at Derrida from the perspective of critics, such as Simon Critchley, who suggest that there is a strong ethico‐political strain in deconstruction on the basis of its Levinasian import. But to ally Derrida too (...) closely with Levinas, I maintain, runs the risk of obfuscating the rich and powerful insights regarding the nature of justice and democracy which Derrida has been developing for some time now. By showing how the theme of justice in Derrida differs from that encountered in Levinas, it becomes possible for us to show how Derrida's political intuitions bear remarkable and surprising similarity to those forged by Rorty. Derrida, on this reading, appears as a Utopian liberal in the pragmatic mode, one for whom progress in the political sphere is engendered by attending to the suffering of those about us and not (pace Marx, Althusser, and Foucault) by way of large‐scale revolution. The notion that solidarity is ultimately founded on our mutual susceptibility to suffering, I argue finally, is what serves to link Rorty's idea of a ‘liberal utopia’ to Derrida's ‘new international’, a comparison which significantly undermines the contention that the latter is useful for exclusively private purposes. (shrink)

The impending missions to exploit natural resources of celestial bodies may at some point start interfering with the scientific interests, including those of astrobiology, in these bodies. While the legal status of celestial bodies at the highest level is clear, uncertainty has arisen as to the extent private property rights over such objects or over their resources are legally acceptable, legally impossible, or potentially legal. This also provides for a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding how the legal framework could or (...) may need to be changed to accommodate private interests. The article analyzes the two main international treaties relevant from this perspective, as well as their backgrounds, in order to outline the current legal status of celestial bodies and the resulting legal rights and obligations pertinent to both private exploitation and exploration. Based on such an analysis, it concludes by highlighting an approach that could actually incentivize the private sector and the science community to work together in a manner conducive to their interests in exploitation and exploration respectively. (shrink)

The sections of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations which contain the Private Language (PL) Argument are dense, cryptic and wide ranging. I argue that a specific argument against a private language can be distilled from the text that is less involved and obscure than is often supposed in the immense secondary literature. It is also far less self-contained and isolated from the mainstream of philosophy than many make out, including Brian Garrettand Michael Ming Yang in recent papers in this journal. It can (...) be distinguished from arguments about rule-following, pain and the problem of other minds, forms of life, etc. and, as I have framed it, avoids Garrett's objections. Moreover, a number of would-be conclusions Garrett takes its proponents to draw from the argument, far from depending on it, are long standing positions, on some of which the PL Argument itself depends. (shrink)

That every response is also a stimulus has important implications for how we characterize the private experiences of both people and non-human animals. Acting as stimuli, responses, whether covert or overt, change the probability of subsequent responses. Hence, all behavior, covert and overt, is necessarily associative in some sense, and thinking may be characterized as “covert autochaining.” According to this view, animals capable of responding to temporally remote stimuli and to characteristics of their own bodies necessarily engage in some form (...) of associative thinking. This characterization of thinking necessarily presumes that private behavioral events adhere to at least some processes that occur in — and have been extensively studied in — overt behavior. To assume otherwise, as do Daniel Dennett, Robert Nozick, and others, is to be unnecessarily pessimistic both about the robustness of evolutionary processes and about our ability to explain complex human phenomena in rigorous empirical terms. (shrink)