In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires minimal content -- a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person methodology in the study (...) of mind and language and argues that these deficiencies can be corrected only by the incorporation of a first-person methodology. Nevertheless, this expanded methodology makes possible an objective understanding of the subjective. Georgalis argues against the conflation of consciousness and subjectivity with phenomenal experience. Consequently, and contrary to common belief, he argues that consciousness without phenomenality is as strongly implicated in intentionality as it is in phenomenal states. He proposes a broader understanding of the "hard problem" of consciousness, arguing that there is an "explanatory gap problem" for both phenomenal and intentional states. His theory provides a framework that renders the vexing relations between mental and brain states comprehensible. Georgalis also argues for novel explanations of the phenomenal and of representation -- explanations that follow from the core concept of minimal content. Treating the topics of meaning and reference, he introduces a first-person concept of intended reference derivative from minimal content that resolves various problems in the philosophy of language. Eschewing ontology, Georgalis proposes his theory as a means to make sense of, analyze, and relate issues in the philosophies of mind and language. The concept of minimal content, he argues, plays a necessary, pivotal, unifying, and foundational role in advancing our understanding of these issues. (shrink)

Neoliberalization is a distinctive economic, political, and social project that promotes profit-oriented, market-mediated accumulation as the primary axis of societalization. This might suggest that neoliberalism promotes the primacy of the economic but, since its extension and reproduction require continuing state support and, indeed, involve what Weber called political capitalism, one might also argue that it entails a primacy of the political. To address this paradox, my article offers a baseline definition of neoliberalism and identifies four ideal-typical historical forms (...) thereof; relates neoliberalism to the world market, geopolitics and global governance; disambiguates the primacy of the economic; and addresses the role of the political in promoting neoliberalism and handling its contradictions and crisis-tendencies. It illustrates this exercise in critical theory from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and how its management has strengthened the neoliberal project, enabled its main promoters and beneficiaries to escape the need to learn from their mistakes, and even enabled them to further enrich themselves. (shrink)

In fairly recent times there has been an enormous growth of interest, especially from ethical theorists generally under the spell of Aristotle, in both the moral virtues and the central significance of the notion of a virtue for an adequate grasp of the character of moral life. In the light of this it may well appear a useful exercise to sketch in very broad terms how a virtue-theoretical account of moral life and the nature of our moral responses stands in (...) relation to other ethical views and to present the general outline of a case for regarding such an approach as preferable to others. In the first part of this article, then, I shall try to prepare the ground for a virtue-theoretical account by showing how a safe conceptual course needs to be steered between the Scylla of ethical realism and the Charybdis of non-cognitivism. In the second part, however, I shall endeavour to develop a more positive view of the way in which a virtue-theoretical approach may successfully steer this course. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo parte del supuesto que Merleau-Ponty realiza en su filosofía una formulación y caracterización del conocimiento humano. Se explican cuatro notas que dan cuenta, no exhaustiva, de los rasgos centrales de su pensamiento gnoseológico. La característica principal, de la que se desprenden las otras tres notas, es la primacía de la percepción. La segunda nota, que dice relación con la opacidad del conocimiento, se explica tomando una expresión de Bech: “el pensamiento de la no-coincidencia”. La tercera nota corresponde (...) a la interrogación radical y la cuarta se expone a través del concepto de no-filosofía.The article starts from the assumption that Merleau-Ponty, in hisphilosophy, formulates and characteriges human knowledge. Four traits are explained, each of which gives account, in a non-exhaustive way, of hisgnoseological thinking centralfeatures. The main feature, from which emerge the other three, is the primay of perception. The second feature, which is related to the opaaty of knowledge, is explained by Bech ’s expression of “the thought of non-coincidence”. The third feature corresponds to radical interrogation and the fourth is explained through the concept of non-philosophy. (shrink)

In fairly recent times there has been an enormous growth of interest, especially from ethical theorists generally under the spell of Aristotle, in both the moral virtues and the central significance of the notion of a virtue for an adequate grasp of the character of moral life. In the light of this it may well appear a useful exercise to sketch in very broad terms how a virtue-theoretical account of moral life and the nature of our moral responses stands in (...) relation to other ethical views and to present the general outline of a case for regarding such an approach as preferable to others. In the first part of this article, then, I shall try to prepare the ground for a virtue-theoretical account by showing how a safe conceptual course needs to be steered between the Scylla of ethical realism and the Charybdis of non-cognitivism. In the second part, however, I shall endeavour to develop a more positive view of the way in which a virtue-theoretical approach may successfully steer this course. (shrink)

In fairly recent times there has been an enormous growth of interest, especially from ethical theorists generally under the speIl of Aristotle, in both the moral virtues and the central significance of the notion of a virtue for an adequate grasp of the character of moral life. In the light of this it may weIl appear a useful exercise to sketch in very broad terms how a virtue-theoretical account of moral life and the nature of our moral responses stands in (...) relation to other ethical views and to present the general outline of a case for regarding such an approach as preferable to others. In the first part of this article, then, I tried to prepare the ground for a virtue-theoretical account by showing how a safe conceptual course needs to be steered between the Scylla of ethical realism and the Charybdis of non-cognitivism. In this second part, however, I shall endeavour to develop a more positive view of the way in which a virtue-theoretical approach may successfully steer this course. (shrink)

These essays "develop in a more ample and emphatic form the pragmatic perspective of the idealistic position" defended in previous books. The basic question deals with validating the criterion employed in the practice of determining factual truth. The pragmatic thesis is defended along the criterial rather than propositional line. Criterial pragmatism asserts "that a proposition is to be accepted if it conforms to an epistemologically warranted criterion, and that a criterion is warranted if its adoption as a principle of propositional (...) acceptance is maximally success-promoting." It is concerned with validating methodology rather than establishing substantive theses or validating specific criteria for factual knowledge. "Since the rational espousal of a factual truth must be governed by some appropriate criterion of acceptance, and any such criterion is in effect methodological, it follows that in the factual domain practical reason is basic to the theoretical.". (shrink)

In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interpretation suggested (...) by Quine’s recently published Kant Lectures from 1980 according to which his global structuralism is a semantic thesis that belongs to his theory of ontological reduction. It claims that a theory can always be reformulated in such a way that its truth does not presuppose the existence of the original objects, but only of some objects that can be considered as their proxies. Quine derives this claim from the principle of the semantic primacy of sentences, which is supposed to license the ontological reductions he uses to establish his global structuralism. It is argued that these reductions do not actually work because they do not account for some hidden ontological commitments that are not detected by his criterion of ontological commitment. (shrink)

72 1024x768 This paper presents evidence from the fields of cognitive science and quantum information theory suggesting quantum theory to be the dominant fundamental logic in the natural world, in direct challenge to the long-held assumption that quantum logic only need be considered ‘in the quantum realm.' A summary of the evolution of quantum logic and quantum theory is presented, along with an overview for the necessity of incomplete quantum knowledge, and some representative aspects of quantum logic. (...) A case can be made that classical logic and theory is a subset of quantum logic and theory, given that elements of quantum physics exist that can never admit classical understanding, including: Bell's theorem, Hardy's theorem, and the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem. Support can be found for the primacy of quantum logic in the natural world in the cognitive sciences, where recent research studies recognize quantum logic in studies of: the subconscious, decisions involving unknown interconnected variables, memory, and question sequencing. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE. (shrink)

Building upon the scholarship of Michael Polanyi, William Poteat has dedicated himself to offering an alternative model to the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter that has dominated Western thought for centuries. These essays, collected by James Nickell and James Stines, cover a wide range of subjects, from Poteat's analysis of the epistemological crisis brought on by the Cartesian program to his first attempts at formulating an alternative to the mind-body dichotomy. These essays relentlessly diagnose the present situation of Western (...) thought by making explicit the philosophical presuppositions to which it is committed. They include theological affirmations, reflections on epistemology, conceptual analyses, as well as dialogues with other writers in the field of cultural criticism and linguistic theory such as George Steiner, Noam Chomsky, and Walker Percy. Most significant is Poteat's bold affirmation of the primacy of persons and his analysis and critique of our cultural misconstructions of human awareness. _The Primacy of Persons and the Language of Culture_ provides an excellent introduction to the scholarship of William Poteat. It should be of particular interest to scholars of philosophy and theology, as well as others who share Poteat's deep concern for the state of human culture. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- The above was already on the database - below was copied from the web William Poteat has dedicated himself to offering an alternative model to the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter that has dominated Western thought for centuries. These essays further diagnose the present situation of Western thought by making explicit the philosophical presuppositions to which it is committed. (shrink)

The core of the work is a lengthy hermeneutically-oriented discussion of political judgment, which projects the notion of political competence as a language mediated capacity of human subjects to recognize the common good by way of discourse. This discursive conception of the political which is mediated on the one hand by a relationship to the moral and on the other to the conception which can be contrasted with the modern paradigm of politics as the episteme of power relations. The earlier (...) chapters build up to this contrast of the classical and the contemporary paradigms and stake out a claim for the primacy of the political in the classical mould. The work is a return to the classical idea of the political by way of a long detour via the theory of judgment, the Kuhnian theory of paradigms, Ricoeur's theory of textual hermeneutics and rhetorical theory. Ranging from discussions of sociological and political theory to philosophy of language and philosophical logic, the work seeks to connect the Aristotelian-Kautilyan conception of the political to contemporary debates in the metatheory of the social sciences. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate (...) several distinct, though related, objections grounded in this intuition, and to argue that virtue ethicists have ample resources to respond to these worries. The explanatory primacy of the virtuous over the right or the good emerges as a distinct and viable position. (shrink)

I argue along the following lines: For Wollstonecraft, liberty is independence in two different spheres, one presupposing the other. On the one hand, liberty is independence in relation to others, in the sense of not being vulnerable to their whim or arbitrary will. Call this social, or political, liberty. For liberty understood in this way, infringements do not require individual instances of interfering. Liberty is lost in unequal relationships, through dependence on the goodwill of a master. In addition, liberty is (...) independence of mind, a state I am in when I trust my own reasoned judgement above any other authority. Call this moral liberty. Moral liberty needs social liberty. In other words, to the extent I am subject to the whim of others, I am not in a position to be guided by my own judgement. Moral liberty is one of two aspects of virtue: a disposition to independent deliberation according to reason. As such, virtue is a habit of mind. The second aspect of virtue is universal benevolence as its action guiding principle. This is how liberty, equality, and virtue fit together. Social liberty, understood as independence in relation to others, necessarily coexist with equality, and is necessary for moral liberty, the habit of mind that makes up one aspect of virtue, as well as for universal benevolence as virtue’s action guiding principle. This triad explains her views on property, on sex equality, and also on legitimate government. My second line of argument is that according to Wollstonecraft, we have a duty to be virtuous. Virtue is the main object of human life. But since virtue, in both its aspects, needs social liberty and since liberty is the birthright of man, the duty is conditioned on the right. The foundation for the triad of liberty, equality, and virtue is a theory of rights. The basis for the discussion of virtue is the right to the conditions necessary for its realization. The duty is conditioned on the right to liberty. (shrink)

The concept of justice, a cornerstone in Aristotle's political philosophy, holds intrinsic significance in both historical and contemporary contexts. This article embarks on an intricate exploration of the primacy of global justice within Aristotle's philosophical framework and its far-reaching implications in addressing contemporary challenges. Drawing from Aristotle's perspective on justice within the polis, the article navigates the terrain of his ideas, extending them beyond conventional boundaries and examining their pertinence in the global arena. Aristotle's nuanced definitions of justice lay (...) the foundation for dissecting its role within the community. The dichotomy of distributive and corrective justice adds depth to the discussion, setting the stage for the exploration of justice on a global scale. Indications within Aristotle's writings hint at a broader consideration of justice, encompassing global concerns that transcend political boundaries. The resonance between Aristotle's principles and contemporary global issues, including poverty, environmental degradation, and human rights violations, is brought to light through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This alignment underscores the enduring relevance of Aristotle's philosophy and its potential to inform contemporary ethical paradigms. Furthermore, the article contemplates the influence of Aristotle's justice-centred ideas on international relations, envisioning its impact on diplomacy, cooperation, and conflict resolution. Acknowledging critiques and counterarguments that question the adaptability of Aristotle's theories to modern complexities, the article upholds the enduring applicability of his principles. Aristotle's emphasis on equilibrium and rectification offers a portal for addressing multifaceted global injustices, even in the intricate web of contemporary interdependence. The article culminates in the assertion that the primacy of global justice within Aristotle's political philosophy reverberates profoundly in the present day. The convergence of his principles with contemporary ethical frameworks, the potential implications on international diplomacy, and the adaptability to intricate global challenges substantiate the perpetual wisdom encapsulated in Aristotle's ideas. Embracing the essence of his philosophy, humanity is poised to forge a path toward a more just, harmonious, and equitable world. (shrink)

This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets—the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)—is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished (...) between two conceptions of ethics in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic. (shrink)

We argue that current constructive approaches to the special theory of relativity do not derive the geometrical Minkowski structure from the dynamics but rather assume it. We further argue that in current physics there can be no dynamical derivation of primitive geometrical notions such as length. By this we believe we continue an argument initiated by Einstein.

What follows is an investigation of the ontology of Franz Brentano with special reference to Brentano's later and superficially somewhat peculiar doctrine to the effect that the substances of the material world are three dimensional places. Taken as a whole, Brentano's philosophy is marked by three, not obviously compatible, trait. In the first place, his work is rooted in the metaphysics of Aristotle, above all in Aristotle's substance/accident ontology and in the Aristotelian theory of categories. In the second place, (...) Brentano embraced a Cartesian epistemology. He saw the source of all knowledge as residing in our direct awareness of our own mental phenomena and in our capacity to grasp evident incompatibilities in the realm of concepts.) Thirdly, he regarded the existence of an external world as at most probable, and denied outright the existence of a world similar to the world that is given in experience. Finally, and in some sense linking together these opposing strands, he propagated an idea of what he called "descriptive psychology", a discipline which would on the one hand yield exact knowledge of the structures and categories of mental life, and on the other hand provide an epistemologically sure foundation for other branches of philosophy. As we shall see, it is this psychological aspect of Brentano's philosophy which leads him to his conception of the substantiality of place. Surprisingly, however, the psychological considerations which underlie Brentano's thinking will be shown to raise a series of questions strictly ontological in nature, questions which are not without a systematic interest of their own. (shrink)

This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015b) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. 2016) and will then show how agency and intentionality (...) are construed differently on these different philosophical interpretations. I will then argue that a purely Helmholtzian is limited, in that it can account only account for agency in the context of perceptual inference. The cybernetic account cannot give a full account of action, since purposiveness is accounted for only to the extent that it pertains to the control of homeostatic essential variables. I will then argue that the enactive affordance-based account attempts to provide broader account of purposive action without presupposing goals and intentions coming from outside of the theory. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss how each of these three interpretations conceives of the sense agency and intentionality in different ways. (shrink)

The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information encoded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality than the percept to which it gives rise.

This Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy for 1966 is concerned to exhibit the basis of Kant's deontological moral theory and primacy-warranting of practical over theoretical reason. One would have thought this had been done often enough, but Warnock has apparently not benefited from past attempts. For his effort to undermine both of Kant's contentions and push in a utilitarian direction is based on an unsympathetic and unprobing manipulating of the key terms in the theory: freedom, reason, virtue. (...) For example, Warnock cites the historical influence of Rousseau on Kant in the matter of stressing the primacy of practical reason but fails to note the deeper connection between Kant's deontologism and Rousseau's sentimentalism: the link emerges when we realize that aesthetic beauty, which is the norm that Rousseau presses toward in his sentimentalism, is, like Kantian virtue, an embodiment of the good which has no purpose beyond itself. Warnock also fails to see that Kant was more than dimly aware of the fact that Reason is realized Freedom; and consequently his disparaging reference to Kant's rationalism is ill-conceived.--E. A. R. (shrink)

According to Action-First theorists, like Jonathan Dancy, reasons for action explain reasons for intentions. According to Intention-First theorists, like Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, reasons for intentions explain reasons for action. In this paper, I introduce and defend a version of the Action-First theory called “Instrumentalism.” According to Instrumentalism, just as we can derive, using principles of instrumental transmission, reasons to ψ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between ψ-ing and ϕ-ing), we can derive reasons (...) to intend to ϕ from reasons to ϕ (provided there’s some relevant instrumental relation between intending to ϕ and ϕ-ing). After providing some defense of Instrumentalism, I turn to two recent, important arguments for the Intention-First theory advanced by McHugh and Way, and I argue that neither of them succeed. I conclude that we should reject the Intention-First theory and that we have grounds for optimism about the Action-First theory. (shrink)

The central claim of this article is that narrative agency, which I will define as a subject’s capacity to make sense of herself as an ‘I’ over time and in relation to other ‘I’s, is a precondition for identity formation. I engage with two critiques of this claim: first, that narrative agency is limited by, rather than primary to, subordinating gender norms and, second, that a view of narrative agency as primary is committed to too ambitious a conception of the (...) communicability of narratives. I argue that the narrative model survives these two criticisms by emphasising its irreducibility, its inherent relationality and its generative potential. I then suggest some of the ways in which a concept of narrative agency might help feminist critical theory to posit mutual recognition and respect as productive criteria for progressive self and social transformation. (shrink)

This paper aims at the construction of a structural coupling between object-oriented philosophy and Whitehead’s philosophy of organism by making a case for the primacy of the ontological principle through the proposal of a social object hypothesis. The social object here differs from traditional renderings of sociology, which are centered on humans’ activity and personalities, by way of recuperating Tarde’s social theory of associations. This theory provides us with a non-anthropocentric reading of sociality. This hypothesis will be (...) furthered by the introduction of the systemic category of internal/external, or system/environment, as a self-enclosure feature of social objects. Equipped with these two notions, we will discuss Graham Harman’s paper “Whitehead and Schools X, Y, and Z,” while rerouting his assessments to our own social object hypothesis. The final idea is to propose an alliance through the conception of a macro-ontological approach to philosophy of organism. We intend to show that this is not only coherently feasible regarding Whitehead’s own categoreal scheme, but also meets the requirements of being a real object in object-oriented ontology’s directives. (shrink)

There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality. In another sense, to be rational is to be coherent, or to have the right structural relations hold between one’s mental states, independently of whether those attitudes are justified. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associated with a distinctive (...) set of requirements that mandate or prohibit certain combinations of attitudes, and it’s in virtue of violating these requirements that incoherent agents are irrational. I think the standard view is mistaken. The goal of this paper is to explain why, and to motivate an alternative account: rather than corresponding to a set of law-like requirements, structural rationality should be seen as corresponding to a distinctive kind of pro tanto rational pressure—i.e. something that comes in degrees, having both magnitude and direction. Something similar is standardly assumed to be true of substantive rationality. On the resulting picture, each dimension of rational evaluation is associated with a distinct kind of rational pressure—substantive rationality with (what I call) justificatory pressure and structural rationality with attitudinal pressure. The former is generated by one’s reasons while the latter is generated by one’s attitudes. Requirements turn out to be at best a footnote in the theory of rationality. (shrink)

Non-beneficial paediatric research is vital to improving paediatric healthcare. Nevertheless, it is also ethically controversial. By definition, subjects of such studies are unable to give consent and they are exposed to risks only for the benefit of others, without obtaining any clinical benefits which could compensate those risks. This raises ethical concern that children participating in non-beneficial research are treated instrumentally; that they are reduced to mere instruments for the benefit of science and society. But this would make the research (...) incompatible with the widely endorsed principle of the primacy of the human subject, which stipulates that the interests of the participating individual should prevail over the interests of science and society. This paper deals with this conflict. It analyses solutions to this problem developed in the literature, and shows that they are unsuccessful. Finally, it offers a new idea of how to reconcile the conduct of non-beneficial paediatric research with the PP. The paper argues for a new formula of the PP, and shows that it implies a specific non-comparative definition of the minimal risk threshold. (shrink)

A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. The problem is paradigmatic and can be traced to contemporary concepts of the functional role of the neural cell, known as the Neuron Doctrine. In the (...) absence of an alternative neurophysiologically plausible model, I propose a perceptual modeling approach, to model the percept as experienced subjectively, rather than modeling the objective neurophysiological state of the visual system that supposedly subserves that experience. A Gestalt Bubble model is presented to demonstrate how the elusive Gestalt principles of emergence, reification, and invariance can be expressed in a quantitative model of the subjective experience of visual consciousness. That model in turn reveals a unique computational strategy underlying visual processing, which is unlike any algorithm devised by man, and certainly unlike the atomistic feed-forward model of neurocomputation offered by the Neuron Doctrine paradigm. The perceptual modeling approach reveals the primary function of perception as that of generating a fully spatial virtual-reality replica of the external world in an internal representation. The common objections to this picture-in-the-head concept of perceptual representation are shown to be ill founded. Key Words: brain-anchored; Cartesian theatre; consciousness; emergence; extrinsic constraints; filling-in; Gestalt; homunculus; indirect realism; intrinsic constraints; invariance; isomorphism; multistability; objective phenomenology; perceptual modeling; perspective; phenomenology; psychophysical parallelism; psychophysical postulate; qualia; reification; representationalism; structural coherence. (shrink)

Kripke's theory of partial truth offers a natural solution of the Liar paradox and an appealing explanation of why the Liar sentence seems to lack definite content. It seems vulnerable, however, to...

A key question in the art debate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was whether color should be used for sculpture. Recent archaeological research had shown that the sculpture in ancient Greece was polychrome, but skepticism about applying paint to one’s own work was widespread among modern sculptors. Some scholars explain this reluctance as a consequence of racial prejudice: the Greek athlete was an image of white Europeans. This article will try to show that a re-reading of Johann Gottfried Herder’s (...) book on sculpture can give us a different and more probable explanation. Herder shared Roger de Piles’s view that the essence of sculpture was form, while color was most characteristic of painting. What set Herder apart from his predecessor, however, was his attempt to give the theory a scientific rationale. He found this in contemporary accounts of visually impaired persons’ relationship to the sensory world and not least in empiricist philosophy’s distinction between primary and secondary sensory properties. (shrink)

This paper argues for the primacy of language over vision as a means of communication. Words convey information more clearly, accurately, reliably, and profoundly than images do. Images by themselves give only impressions; they do not denote, unless accompanied by some sort or level of description. Also, any visual image, whether physical or mental, unless it is eidetic, must involve some degree of interpretation, interpolation, or description for it to be capable of conveying information, having meaning, or even being (...) intelligible. Pictorialism is the theory that mental imagery is visual, while descriptionalism holds that mental imagery is nonvisual. As an epistemology, pictorialism supports representationalism as a philosophy of art. The poverty and limitations of representational theories of art militate against pictorialism. Descriptionalism as an epistemology supports several versions of symbolist theories of art. The richness and versatility of symbolic interpretations of art works support descriptionalism. Pictorialism fails the test of consistency unless eidetic imagery exists. Any pictorialism that claims support from noneidetic imagery or invokes the photographic fallacy is in fact a crypto- or quasi-descriptionalism. Since the photographic fallacy denies eidetic imagery, it is invalid and misbegotten as a defense of pictorialism. The interplay between the richness of visual images and the precision of verbal descriptions is a key element in developing a comprehensive pedagogy of aesthetics. (shrink)

This essay explores elements of the relationship between feminist activism and feminist theory focused on language. I examine the autobiographies of two seventeenth century Quaker women who were activists, and then use the writings of Luce Irigaray to interpret their work. For both the Quaker autobiographers and the French feminist philosopher, the concrete oppression of women is connected to the primacy of the word in western culture. Drawing on these sources, I argue that given the masculine economy of (...) language, resisting the dominance of men can be profoundly related to resisting the unrivalled primacy of the written word. The discursive disruption called for by feminist theory can be perhaps most profoundly accomplished with embodied action, while the activist concerns of feminism achieve greater potency when social action is also used to subvert discourse. (shrink)

A fundamental issue in philosophy of perception is to understand the nature of experience and the relation of the experience with objects or states of affairs that is experienced. A prominent philosophical issue here is posed by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences, which are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception for the experiencer. The philosophical views in this matter can be grouped into three major positions on the basis of the nature of the subjective experience and relation of the subjective experience (...) with the object. These are the sense-data theories—which consider that the objects of perception are mental entities; the representative theories—according to which perception is a representation of the objects in the external world; and the naïve realist theories—which proclaim that the external objects are constitutive of the very perceptual experience and not a representation of it. Naïve realism claims it is the defence of common-sense notion regarding experience i.e. how experience seems to the experiencer upon introspective reflection on it. This position has a growing number of proponents in philosophy especially in the last two decades. But it also entails radical departure of established philosophical views regarding the nature of experience, the phenomenal character of experience, and the experiencer–object relation. In this paper, we critically examine naïve realism from two crucial aspects pertaining to it—the question of introspection being basis of naïve realist thesis, and the notion of primacy of perception over non-veridical forms of experiences. We find that there are significant problems which weaken the naïve realist thesis. (shrink)

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.

This article will explore the ways in which early twentieth century physics informs and sustains Gaston Bachelard’s writing on epistemology and time. By investigating the scientific underpinnings of Bachelard’s philosophy of time, this article will also establish a connection between his epistemological and temporal works that are underdeveloped in the secondary literature. This discussion will seek to prove an epistemological commitment, scattered throughout Bachelard’s work on science, in which all epistemological claims are beholden to the claims of modern science. It (...) will be demonstrated how this epistemological claim is implemented in Bachelard’s work on time—specifically, the ways in which relativity theory and microphysics influences his philosophy of time. Such an approach will bridge the gap between Bachelard’s epistemological writings and his work on time while simultaneously illustrating the ways in which physics influences his thinking. (shrink)

Why are we saddled with Eurocentric Interpretation, which results in the depiction of Nonwestern thought as religious, and bereft of serious moral theory, while the history of European thought is depicted as the content of secular reason? Interpretation as a mode of explanation is part and parcel with the dominant account of thought originating in Europe as the meaning of language. Interpretation is imperialistic. As it spreads, so too does the European outlook, rendering anything deviant inexplicable and mysterious. Orthodox (...) Indology, with its emphasis on linguistics and philology, is a product of this tradition. In contrast, the idea that language encodes thought as its meaning is controversial in the Chinese and Indian traditions. (shrink)

'Memory and Utopia' looks at the connection between memory and forgetfulness in Europe during the twentieth century. Drawing on oral history and feminist theory and practice, the book highlights how women struggled to be recognized as full subjects. The themes of utopia and desire in the 1968 movements of students, women and workers are explored. 'Memory and Utopia' examines the sense of belonging to Europe that has emerged in the last twenty years. The book analyses European identity as expressed (...) through identities based on gender, age and culture to explore an inclusive and non-hierarchical subjectivity. (shrink)

'Memory and Utopia' looks at the connection between memory and forgetfulness in Europe during the twentieth century. Drawing on oral history and feminist theory and practice, the book highlights how women struggled to be recognized as full subjects. The themes of utopia and desire in the 1968 movements of students, women and workers are explored. 'Memory and Utopia' examines the sense of belonging to Europe that has emerged in the last twenty years. The book analyses European identity as expressed (...) through identities based on gender, age and culture to explore an inclusive and non-hierarchical subjectivity. (shrink)

Knowledge, including historical knowledge, is dependent upon the procedure by which it is acquired. Nowell-Smith attempts to drive a logical wedge between the assertion of historical statements and the objects to which they refer. This distinction between assertion and referent, however, does not exist in the practice of history. In historical study there is no way to acquire knowledge except through the construction of theory. The brute sensory data which form an essential part of an understanding of the present (...) are not available to historians. As far as the epistemology of history is concerned, the real past has no influence on historical knowledge. Though truth may be the object of the historical enterprise, it cannot be obtained except through theory, and is, therefore, inseparable from the infrastructure of that enterprise. (shrink)