Second edition of the introductory guidebook to the basic principles of constructing sound arguments and criticising bad ones. Non-technical in approach, it is based on 186 examples, which Douglas Walton, a leading authority in the field of informal logic, discusses and evaluates in clear, illustrative detail. Walton explains how errors, fallacies, and other key failures of argument occur. He shows how correct uses of argument are based on sound strategies for reasoned persuasion and critical responses. This edition takes into (...) account many developments in the field of argumentation study that have occurred since 1989, many created by the author. Drawing on these developments, Walton includes and analyzes 36 new topical examples and also brings in work on argumentation schemes. Ideally suited for use in courses in informal logic and introduction to philosophy, this book will also be valuable to students of pragmatics, rhetoric, and speech communication. (shrink)

A pragmatic approach to business ethics is argued for in this volume, which demonstrates the usefulness of the approach by applying it to a variety of issues. These issues are broad and far-reaching and include the relations between rational and moral//ethical decision-making, the limits of loyalty to employers, the impact of trust on business and the role of commercial public opinion polling during elections. The author also covers advertising, tobacco promotion, manufacture and marketing of armaments, concentration and (...) taxation of wealth, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. (shrink)

A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will argues that the kind of free will required for moral responsibility and just desert is libertarian free will. It is a source of great controversy whether such a libertarian view is coherent and whether we should believe that we have such free will. This book explains and defends Robert Kane¿s conception of libertarian free will while departing from it in certain key respects. It is argued that a suitably modified Kanean model (...) of free will can be shown to be conceptually coherent. In addition, it is argued that while we lack sufficient epistemic grounds supporting belief in the existence of libertarian free will, we may still be justified in believing in it for moral reasons. As such, the book engages critically with the works of a growing number of philosophers who argue that we should jettison belief in the existence of desert-grounding free will and the practices of praise and blame and reward and punishment which it supports. (shrink)

The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so-called ‘demarcation problem’, is one of the most high-profile, perennial, and intractable issues in the philosophy of science. It is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical policy questions and practical decisions. This essay develops a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem: it argues that while there are some core principles that we can use in distinguishing between science and non-science, (...) particular judgments and decisions about something's scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns. (shrink)

This chapter has three aims. Firstly, it elaborates the so-called pragmatic approach to fictionalism. By evoking some classical pragmatic theories of fictive utterances, it gives an account of pragmatic properties responsible for the difference between serious and fictive utterances. The authors argue for the thesis that the pragmatic approach can be applied plausibly to all kinds of fictionalism, that is from instrumentalism to figuralism. Secondly, the authors investigate some consequences of the suggested account for (...) fictionalist theories in general. They show that some more or less known difficulties of fictionalist theories become more serious if one accepts the pragmatic approach. The chapter discusses two of them, namely the problem of entirely fictional discourses and the apparent contradiction between hermeneutic fictionalism and first person authority. Thirdly, the authors investigate the consequences of the pragmatic approach for mental fictionalism in particular. At the end of the paper, they argue that once the pragmatic approach is applied to mental fictionalism, the well-known problem of cognitive suicide becomes especially nagging. They suggest it is highly questionable that mental fictionalism is worth to endorse in the light of these serious difficulties. (shrink)

This paper begins by reviewing dominant themes in current teaching of professional ethics in engineering education. In contrast to more traditional approaches that simulate ethical practice by using ethical theories to reason through micro-level ethical dilemmas, this paper proposes a pragmatic approach to ethics that places more emphasis on the practical plausibility of ethical decision-making. In addition to the quality of ethical justification, the value of a moral action also depends on its effectiveness in solving an ethical dilemma, (...) cultivating healthy working relationships, negotiating existing organizational cultures, and achieving contextual plausibility in everyday professional practice. This paper uses a cross-cultural ethics scenario to further elaborate how a pragmatic approach can help us rethink ethical reasoning, as well as ethics instruction and assessment. This paper is expected to be of interest to educators eager to improve the ability of engineers and other professional students to effectively and appropriately deal with the kinds of everyday ethical issues they will likely face in their careers. (shrink)

I propose an approach that expands philosophical views of scientific change, on the basis of an analysis of contemporary biomedical research and recent developments in the philosophy of scientific change. Focusing on the establishment of the exposome in epidemiology as a case study and the role of data as a context for contrasting views on change, I discuss change at conceptual, methodological, material, and social levels of biomedical epistemology. Available models of change provide key resources to discuss this type (...) of change, but I present the need for an approach that models transfer, alignment, and influence as key processes of change. I develop this as a pragmatic approach to scientific change, where processes might change substantially depending on specific circumstances, thus contributing to and complementing the debate on a crucial epistemological issue. (shrink)

Pragmatic approaches to genetic testing are discussed and appraised. Whilst there are various schools of pragmatism, the Deweyan appraoch seems to be the most appreciated in bioethics as it allows a historical approach indebted to Hegel. This in turn allows the pragmatist to specify and balance principles in various contexts. There are problems with where to draw a line between what is referred to here as the micro- and macro-level of doing bioethics, unless one is simply to be (...) classified as a principlist. Whilst most discussions on genetics occur at a macro level, most specifying must be done also at a micro level – the clinical encounter. Whilst pragmatism encourages us to understand better social and scientific factors and puts into perspective statements like ‘playing God’, doubts are raised about the ‘consensus’ process and how one can put aside fundamental values such as the moral status of the embryo on which there is general disagreement. If those doing pragmatism do not endorse these values, there seems to be little ground for process and compromise with those who do. It seems therefore that pragmatism cannot ignore values, even those which are not endorsed by everyone. (shrink)

The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so-called ' demarcation problem', is one of the most high-profile, perennial, and intractable issues in the philosophy of science. It is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical policy questions and practical decisions. This essay develops a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem: it argues that while there are some core principles that we can use in distinguishing between science and (...) non-science, particular judgments and decisions about something's scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns. (shrink)

Physical scientists were driven during the late twenties to abandon a fundamental idea that had reigned since the time of Issac Newton To obtain a rationally coherent and practically useful theory of all physical phenomena they turned to a pragmatic approach The core idea was that the basic physical theory was no longer directly about a physical world that was conceived to exists apart from anyone s knowledge of it Rather the theory was regarded as being directly about (...) certain of our knowings This switch appears to be exactly what is needed to establish a rationally coherent theoretical foundation for the science of consciousness For it converts the immediate objects of psychological and physical theories into things of the same kind namely human experiencings rather than things of disparate kinds separated by an unbridgable conceptual gap Within this pragmatic quantum approach certain particular aspects of human brain structure entail the existence of macroscopic quantum e ects that are linked to our conscious experiences Moreover our conscious thoughts have causal e ects that can both enhance our prospects of survival and work e ectively against thermal noise in the creation of the brain states that guide our behaviour.. (shrink)

Artificial agents are progressively becoming more present in everyday-life situations and more sophisticated in their interaction affordances. In some specific cases, like Google Duplex, GPT-3 bots or Deep Mind’s AlphaGo Zero, their capabilities reach or exceed human levels. The use contexts of everyday life necessitate making such agents understandable by laypeople. At the same time, displaying human levels of social behavior has kindled the debate over the adoption of Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’. By means of a comparative analysis of the literature (...) on robots and virtual agents, we defend the thesis that approaching these artificial agents ‘as if’ they had intentions and forms of social, goal-oriented rationality is the only way to deal with their complexity on a daily base. Specifically, we claim that this is the only viable strategy for non-expert users to understand, predict and perhaps learn from artificial agents’ behavior in everyday social contexts. Furthermore, we argue that as long as agents are transparent about their design principles and functionality, attributing intentions to their actions is not only essential, but also ethical. Additionally, we propose design guidelines inspired by the debate over the adoption of the intentional stance. (shrink)

It is argued that it is not sufficient to consider only the sentences included in the explanans and explanandum when determining whether they constitute an explanation, but these sentences must always be evaluated relative to a knowledge situation. The central criterion on an explanation is that the explanans in a non-trivial way increases the belief value of the explanandum, where the belief value of a sentence is determined from the given knowledge situation. The outlined theory of explanations is applied to (...) some well-known examples and is also compared to other theories of explanation. (shrink)

A number of influential biologists are currently pursuing efforts to restore previously extinct species. But for decades, philosophers of biology have regarded “de-extinction” as conceptually incoherent. Once a species is gone, it is gone forever. We argue that a range of metaphysical, biological, and ethical grounds for opposing de-extinction are at best inconclusive and that a pragmatic stance that allows for its possibility is more appealing.

The disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992) occurs when decision makers prefer option x (versus y) when knowing that event A occurs and also when knowing that event A does not occur, but they refuse x (or prefer y) when not knowing whether or not A occurs. This form of incoherence violates Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle, one of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision making. The phenomenon was attributed to a lack of clear reasons for accepting an (...) option (x) when subjects are under uncertainty. Through a pragmatic analysis of the task and a consequent reformulation of it, we show that the effect does not depend on the presence of uncertainty, but on the introduction of non-relevant goals into the text problem, in both the well-known Gamble problem and the Hawaii problem. (shrink)

Taking user’s role and features as milestones for an approach on scientific representation has become a growing trend. We shall investigate the implications that pragmatics bring in the relevant debate. Proponents of pragmatic approaches support that questions such as ‘how an object represents another’ or ‘which features of a certain object represent the target of the representation and in what way’ can be answered only within the given context of representation’s use. Thus, attention is drawn to the intentionality (...) of the representation, in contrast to the semantic tradition, according to which the representational function is based on morphic relations between the representation and the represented object. Given that scientific representations surrogate objects and phenomena in our studies, they should reproduce aspects, relations and interactions of them, possessing the appropriate features. Therefore, we support that user’s intention is not enough to build the representational relation on it. We claim that a) a sustainable and successful theory of scientific representations cannot be grounded on pragmatics b) pragmatic approaches undermine the objectivity of the knowledge inferred by representations c) the important role of the cognizing subject in a theory of scientific representation can be rescued without the burden coming with pragmatic approaches. (shrink)

This commentary critically evaluates Showler’s pragmatic approach to moral status, which integrates moral individualism and moral relationalism to address the moral complexities surrounding non-human entities, especially social robots. Showler proposes a unified methodology that delineates distinct roles for each theory—moral coordination problems for moral individualism and moral transformation for moral relationalism. However, my commentary identifies key methodological ambiguities and potential conflation of moral status determination with broader ethical reasoning. It argues for clearer application guidelines and further theoretical refinement (...) to enhance the framework’s robustness and practical applicability, suggesting this model as an interesting starting point for further debates on moral status. (shrink)

This research is part of a more extensive programme that deals with intercultural ethics from different perspectives. All of them share a common inspiration sprung from UNESCO’s Intercultural Ethics Project. The main goal of this paper consists in offering pragmatic/theoretical tools in order to analyse a cultural and political issue which is currently very important in Spain: the confrontation between those promoting Spanish national culture and those promoting the Basque one. I approach this confrontation in terms of discursive (...) praxis, reaching the conclusion that only if both groups are capable of self-understanding will they be capable of reciprocal-understanding, and only then will it be possible to maintain peace in our country. (shrink)

This research is part of a more extensive programme that deals with intercultural ethics from different perspectives. All of them share a common inspiration sprung from UNESCO’s Intercultural Ethics Project. The main goal of this paper consists in offering pragmatic/theoretical tools in order to analyse a cultural and political issue which is currently very important in Spain: the confrontation between those promoting Spanish national culture and those promoting the Basque one. I approach this confrontation in terms of discursive (...) praxis, reaching the conclusion that only if both groups are capable of self-understanding will they be capable of reciprocal-understanding, and only then will it be possible to maintain peace in our country. (shrink)

Nina Emery and Christopher Hill proposed a pragmatic approach toward the debate about counterpossibles—i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The core of this approach is to move the burden of the problem from the notion of truth value into the notion of assertion. This is meant to explain our pre-theoretical intuitions about counterpossibles while claiming that each and every counterpossible is vacuously true. The aim of this paper is to indicate a problematic aspect of this view.

This research is part of a more extensive programme that deals with intercultural ethics from different perspectives. All of them share a common inspiration sprung from UNESCO’s Intercultural Ethics Project. The main goal of this paper consists in offering pragmatic/theoretical tools in order to analyse a cultural and political issue which is currently very important in Spain: the confrontation between those promoting Spanish national culture and those promoting the Basque one. I approach this confrontation in terms of discursive (...) praxis, reaching the conclusion that only if both groups are capable of self-understanding will they be capable of reciprocal-understanding, and only then will it be possible to maintain peace in our country. (shrink)

What are scientific models? Philosophers of science have been trying to answer this question during the last three decades by putting forward a number of different proposals. Some say that models are best understood as abstract Platonic objects or fictional entities akin to Sherlock Holmes, while others focus on their mathematical nature and see them as set theoretical structures. Although each account has its own strengths in offering various insights on the nature of models, several objections have been raised against (...) these views which still remain unanswered, making the debate on the ontology of models seem unresolvable. The primary aim of this paper is to show that a large part of these difficulties stems from an inappropriate reading of the main question on the ontology of models as a purely metaphysical question. Building on Carnap, it is argued that the question of the ontology of scientific models is either an internal theoretical question within an already accepted linguistic framework or an external practical question regarding the choice of the most appropriate form of language in order to describe and explain the practice of scientific modelling. The main implication of this view is that the question of the ontology of models becomes a means of probing other related questions regarding the overall practice of scientific modelling, such as questions on the capacity of models to provide knowledge and the relation of models with background theories. (shrink)

This reply focusses on three aspects: advantages and disadvantages of our proposed ‘cooperative entry certificates’ for the countries of origin, for the migrants, and for the host countries. It analyzes in what respects our proposal can be improved based on the valuable points made by the commentators. In addition, the question of how to deal with winners and losers within the three groups is discussed.

Using classical American pragmatism, the authors provide a philosophical framework for rethinking the nature of the corporation--how it is embedded in its natural, technological, cultural, and international environments, emphasizing throughout its pervasive relational and moral dimensions. They explore the relationship of this framework to other contemporary business ethics perspectives, as well as its implications for moral leadership in business and business education.

Recent contributions to the philosophy of the social sciences have motivated ontological commitments using appeals to the social sciences (_naturalized_ social ontologies). These arguments rely on social scientific realism about the social sciences, the view that our social scientific theories are approximately true. I apply a distinction formulated in metaontology between ontologically loaded and unloaded meanings of existential quantification to argue that there is a pragmatic approach to naturalized social ontology that is minimally realist (it treats existence claims (...) as true or false) but that is ontologically austere. I argue that the extant arguments may be construed in terms of this pragmatic approach. The result is an approach to social ontology that is deflationist about naturalized social ontology. (shrink)

Contemporary literature investigating the significant impact of technology on our lives leads many to conclude that ethics must be a part of the discussion at an earlier stage in the design process i.e., before a commercial product is developed and introduced. The problem, however, is the question regarding how ethics can be incorporated into an earlier stage of technological development and it is this question that we argue has not yet been answered adequately. There is no consensus amongst scholars as (...) to the kind of ethics that should be practiced, nor the individual selected to perform this ethical analysis. One school of thought holds that ethics should have pragmatic value in research and design and that it should be implemented by the engineers and/or scientists themselves, while another school of thought holds that ethics need not be so pragmatic. For the latter, the ethical reflection can aim at a variety of goals, and be carried out by an ethicist. None of the approaches resulting from these lines of thinking have been adopted on a wide-scale basis. To that end, the approach presented here is intended to bridge the gap between these schools of thought. It is our contention that ethics ought to be pragmatic and to provide utility for the design process and we maintain that adequate ethical reflection, and all that it entails, ought to be conducted by an ethicist. Thus, we propose a novel role for the ethicist—the ethicist as designer—who subscribes to a pragmatic view of ethics in order to bring ethics into the research and design of artifacts—no matter the stage of development. In this paper we outline the series of steps that a pragmatic value analysis entails: uncovering relevant values, scrutinizing these values and, working towards the translation of values into technical content. In conclusion, we present a list of tasks for the ethicist in his/her role as designer on the interdisciplinary team. (shrink)

Reviews the non-fiction book 'Rethinking Business Ethics, A Pragmatic Approach,' by Sandra B. Rosenthal and Rogene A. Buchholz.

This paper introduces Nymity’s Privacy Risk Optimization Process (PROP), a process that enables the implementation of privacy into operational policies and procedures, which embodies in Privacy by Design for business practices. The PROP is based on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) concept that risk can be positive and negative; and further defines Risk Optimization as a process whereby organizations strive to maximize positive risks and mitigate negative ones. The PROP uses these concepts to implement privacy into operational policies and (...) procedures. This paper was produced by Nymity and the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada. It was presented by Terry McQuay, President of Nymity, at Privacy by Design: The Definitive Workshop, in Madrid, Spain, on November 2nd, 2009. The workshop was hosted by Dr. Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, and Yoram Hacohen, Head of the Israeli Law, Information and Technology Authority. (shrink)

A new framework-based approach to teaching and analyzing business ethics cases is set out. Using the framework, students are encouraged to adopt two different perspectives: business as usual and a more obviously moral point of view. Subsequently, they are prompted to craft a synthesis or compromise. Several pedagogical benefits flow from adopting the approach, including the cultivation of moral tolerance and improvements in the structure and scope of written action justifications. In addition, the framework enables students to relate (...) ethical theories to the cases in a systematic way, thereby addressing a long-standing concern of business ethics educators. (shrink)

There are many cases of conduct for which responsibility can plausibly be ascribed to a group, in addition to any responsibility ascribable to the group's constituent members. It is important to be able to make such ascriptions because without them we are unable to assign responsibilities for many sorts of humanly-caused harms for which responsibility cannot reasonably be ascribed to individuals alone. Two recent theories of collective responsibility advance our understanding of why it is important to be able to hold (...) groups accountable, but they apply only to a limited spectrum of groups, and rely on the plausibility of importing unnecessary individualistic assumptions into discussions of collective responsibility. ;I argue that we can justify ascription of collective responsibility without engaging in difficult metaphysical or ontological disputes. In particular, in order legitimately to ascribe collective responsibility we need not demonstrate that groups are capable of exhibiting intentions, or that groups can be considered 'moral persons'. We may reasonably consider organized groups to take action, and we may justly blame or praise them, when their members engage in what I call 'joint purposive behavior', as when an automobile manufacturer knowingly markets faulty vehicles. I argue, further, that certain unorganized groups, or 'random collectivities', can justly be blamed for promoting values and attitudes conducive to harmful behavior, as when a hate group advocates violent actions against minorities, or praised as groups for promoting values that encourage laudable behavior. ;I argue that most objections to collective responsibility rely on various misunderstandings of what it means for a group to be collectively responsible, notably, the belief that if a group is responsible its members cannot also be individually responsible, and the belief that collective responsibility 'distributes' among the individuals in the responsible group. In addition, I argue that large-scale environmental problems such as global warming lend themselves to a collectivist analysis, and that a view of collective responsibility that balances the harm-prevention and fault-finding purposes of responsibility ascription may help us to resolve such problems. (shrink)

This paper defends a pragmatical approach to vagueness. The vagueness-adaptive logic VAL is a good reconstruction of and an excellent, instrument for human reasoning processes in which vague predicates are involved. Apart from its proof-theory and semantics, a Sorites-treating model based on it is presented, disarming the paradox. The paper opens perspectives with respect to the construction of theories by means of vague predicates.

The introduction of Western healthcare, via colonialism, into Africa facilitated a confrontation of indigenous and exogenous “medical” knowledge as well as the attendant praxis. Although colonialism has been expunged from the shores of Africa, the epistemic and ideological frictions it introduced into the sphere of healthcare linger and raise different dilemmas. Against this background, this paper explores pragmatic and ethical approaches that may help engage these tensions in the context of drug development based on validated traditional phytomedicines.