Perioperative nurses assist in organ procurement surgery; however, there is a dearth of information of how they encounter making conscientious objection requests or refusals to participate in organ procurement surgery. Organ procurement surgical procedures can present to the operating room ad hoc and can catch a nurse who may not desire to participate by surprise with little opportunity to refuse as a result of staffing, skill mix or organizational work demands. This paper (...) that stems from a larger doctoral research study exploring the experiences of perioperative nurses participating in multi‐organ procurement surgery used a grounded theory method to develop a substantive theory of the nurses’ experiences. This current paper aimed to highlight the experiences of perioperative nurses when confronted with expressing a conscientious objection towards their participation in these procedures. A number of organizational and cultural barriers within the healthcare organization were seen to hamper their ability in expressing a conscience‐based refusal, which lead to their reluctant participation. Perioperative nurses must feel safe to express a conscientious objection towards these types of surgical procedures and feel supported in doing so by their respective hospital organizations and not be forced to participate unwillingly. (shrink)

Because complex organs taken from unequivocally dead people are not suitable for transplantation, human death has been redefined so that it can be certified at some earlier stage in the dying process and thereby make viable organs available without legal problems. Redefinitions based on concepts of "brain death" have underpinned transplant practice for many years although those concepts have never found universal philosophical acceptance. Neither is there consensus about the clinical tests which have been held sufficient to diagnose the irreversible (...) cessation of all brain function – or as much of it as is deemed relevant – while the body remains alive. For these reasons, the certification of death for transplant purposes on "brain death" grounds is increasingly questioned and there has been pressure to return to its diagnosis on the basis of cardiac arrest and the consequent cessation of blood circulation throughout the body. While superficially a welcome return to the traditional and universally accepted understanding of human death, examination of the protocols using such criteria for the diagnosis of death prior to organ removal reveals a materially different scenario in which the circulatory arrest is not certainly final and purely nominal periods of arrest are required before surgery begins. Recognizing the probably unresolvable conflict between allowing enough time to pass after truly final circulatory arrest for a safe diagnosis of death and its minimization for the sake of the wanted organs, Verheijde and colleagues follow others in calling for the abandonment of the "dead donor rule" and the enactment of legislation to permit the removal of organs from the dying, without pretence that they are dead before that surgery. While it may be doubted whether such a "paradigm change" in the ethics of organ procurement would be accepted by society, their call for its consideration as a fully and fairly informed basis for organ donation is to be applauded. (shrink)

A provocative question has emerged since the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on assisted dying: Should Canadians who request, and are granted, an assisted death be considered a legitimate source of transplantable organs? A related question is addressed in this paper: is controlled organ donation after assisted death (cDAD) more or less ethically-problematic than standard, controlled organ donation after circulatory determination of death (cDCDD)? Controversial, ethics-related dimensions of cDCD that are of relevance to this research question are explored, (...) and morally-relevant distinctions between cDAD and cDCD are identified. In addition, a set of morally-relevant advantages of one practice over the other is uncovered, and a few potential, theoretical issues specifically related to cDAD practice are articulated. Despite these concerns, the analysis suggests a counterintuitive conclusion: cDAD is, overall, less ethically-problematic than cDCDD. The former practice better respects the autonomy interests of the potential donor, and a claim regarding irreversibility of cessation of the donor’s circulatory function in the cDAD context can be supported. Further, with cDAD, there is no possibility that the donor will have negative sensory experiences during organ procurement surgery. Although the development of appropriate policy-decision and regulatory approaches in this domain will be complex and challenging, the comparative ethical analysis of these two organ donation practices has the potential to constructively inform the deliberations of relevant stakeholders, resource persons and decision makers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Organ Transplant AllocationPat Milmoe McCarrick (bio)The introduction of the antibiotic, cyclosporin, which enhances the success rate of transplantation surgery, has resulted in the steady growth of organ transplantation since the mid-1980s. This growth increasingly focuses ethical interest on both the procurement and the allocation of human organs. Not everyone who might benefit from organ transplants can receive them since the number of patients in (...) need of organs far exceeds the number of organs available. Each year the waiting list for transplants increases by 20 percent, but the number of donated organs has remained stable for the past five years (Lawry 1994).Organ transplantation surgery performed on rock stars, sports heroes, politicians, and television celebrities brings questions about the fair allocation of scarce resources to the attention of everyone. Abigail Trafford, editor of Washington Post Health, wonders whether "new livers for hard livers" can be deserved when not enough organs are available for everyone who needs them. Writing about the dilemma of just allocation of organs, she calls famous recipients "poster patients" or "health care celebrities of medical catastrophe" (Trafford 1994). Personal responsibility—the viewpoint that "medical treatment should not be an entitlement program for profligate living"—is an emerging moral consideration according to Trafford. Deciding whose standards and values should apply to the allocation of organs raises many questions. Popular arguments for keeping the current criteria for allocation include: these patients are sick and therefore should be treated, regardless of the cause of their illness; former substance abusers should be able to benefit from their present abstention; physicians should treat anyone who is ill; and although many human illnesses may be caused by individual behavior, such behavior is not always used as a reason to deny care (Trafford 1995).Prior to 1984, when the government established regulations governing organ transplantation, organs routinely were given to the patients of the surgeons who excised them (Prottas 1994). In an effort to achieve a more equitable method of distribution, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (Pub. [End Page 365] L. No. 98-507, amended by Pub. L. No. 100607 and Pub. L. No. 101-616), which established a national Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) to improve the effectiveness of organ procurement, organ distribution, and transplant activities. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) received the federal government contract to be the OPTN.UNOS and its 66 regional organ procurement organizations (OPOs) around the nation have carried out the mandate since 1986. It requires hospitals that receive Medicare or Medicaid funds and perform transplants to belong to the network and to allocate organs according to network policies. UNOS maintains the national computer registry to match donor organs with individual recipients. In distributing organs, UNOS is required by law to use a fair and equitable system based on accepted medical criteria. UNOS regularly reevaluates its policies to ensure that organ donation and recipient selection meet criteria of efficiency and equity (UNOS Update 11 (8), 1995).At the end of June 1995, 278 transplant centers were in operation in the United States: almost all of them (247 centers) transplanted kidneys; 167 did hearts; 119, pancreases; 114, livers; 93, heart-lung; 88, lungs; 26, intestines; and only 19 centers performed pancreas islet cell transplants (UNOS Update 11 (8): 28, 1995). The number of patients waiting for organ transplants in July 1995 totalled 41,075: 29,274 were waiting for a kidney transplant; 4,937, liver; 3,298, heart; 1,816, lung; 1,223 kidney-pancreas; 240, pancreas; and 211, heart-lung (UNOS Update 11 (8): 40-41, 1995).OPOs are located in different geographic areas across the country, each with different organ needs, lengths of waiting lists, or with lists in areas with large older populations making it more difficult to find suitable donors. Black recipients often wait longer due to complex reasons including sensitization or rarer blood and antigen types (UNOS 11 (8): 31-32, 1995). When an organ becomes available, the OPO involved identifies a potential recipient from the UNOS list and offers it to the patient's surgeon. If no match can be made locally, the organ is next offered within a UNOS region, and finally, to... (shrink)

When successful solid organ transplantation was initiated almost 40 years ago, its current success rate was not anticipated. But continuous efforts were undertaken to overcome the two major obstacles to success: injury caused by interrupting nutrient supply to the organ and rejection of the implanted organ by normal host defense mechanisms. Solutions have resulted from technologic medical advances, but also from using organs from different sources. Each potential solution has raised ethical concerns and has variably resulted in (...) societal acclaim, censure, and apathy. Transplant surgery is now well accepted, and the list of transplant candidates has grown far quicker than the availability of organs. More than 30,000 patients were awaiting organs for transplantation at the end of March 1993. While most organs came from donors declared dead by brain criteria, the increasing shortage of donated organs has prompted a reexamination of prior restrictions of donor groups. Recently, organ procurement from donors with cardiac death has been reintroduced in the United States. This practice had been mostly abandoned by the U.S. and some, though not all, other countries. Transplantation has been more successful using organs procured from heart-beating, "brain dead" cadavers than organs from non-heart-beating cadavers. However, recent advances have led to success rates with organs from non-heart-beating donors that may portend large increases in organ donation and procurement from this source. (shrink)

Abstract:This symposium includes thirteen personal narratives from people who have received at least one organ transplant from a living or deceased donor. These narratives foster better understanding of the experiences of life-saving organ recipients and their families, including post-transplant difficulties experienced—sometimes requiring multiple transplants. This issue also includes three commentaries by Macey L. Levan, Heather Lannon, and Vidya Fleetwood, Roslyn B. Mannon & Krista L. Lentine. Dr. Levan is a living kidney donor and associate professor of surgery (...) and population health. She writes and teaches on organ transplant and has expertise and experience in governance at the federal level as a member of the board of directors for the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Dr. Lannon is a social worker and transplant advocate. Her work and interest in the topic were inspired by her husband who needed a heart transplant. Dr. Fleetwood is a surgeon specializing in liver transplantation, pancreas transplantation, kidney transplantation, as well as living donor nephrectomy. Dr. Mannon is a nephrologist and professor of medicine, pathology and microbiology. Her work focuses on understanding and improving long-term kidney transplant outcomes for patients, donors, and caregivers. Dr. Lentine is a nephrologist specializing in treatment of adult patients with kidney disease. She is a researcher and co-chaired the international work group that developed guidelines for living donor kidney transplantation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Experiences of the Live Organ Donor: Lessons Learned Pave the FutureDianne LaPointe RudowIntroductionThe experience of a live organ donor is multi–faceted and is as unique as each person who agrees to take a risk to save another. Factors include: type of organ donated (kidney vs. liver), relationship to the recipient (related—biological or non–biological vs. non–related), decision–making and motivation for donation, support systems available within and outside (...) of the transplant program, and outcomes of the donation for both recipient and donor. The variety of experiences is apparent in the narratives within this special issue. I want to thank the authors of each story for sharing their experiences of the live donation process. As difficult as it must have been to write, it was difficult for someone like me, a transplant professional who is a strong advocate for quality donor care, to hear. But with each success and failure of transplantation, we can learn in the hopes of improving things for the next.Despite the fact that the field of transplantation is over 50 years old and the first kidney donors were live donors, viewing the field of live donation as a subspecialty of transplantation is a new concept (LaPointe Rudow, 2011). Live donation is, in fact, as specialized as lung transplant, liver transplant, transplant infectious disease, and kidney transplant. All of those subspecialties have clinicians and researchers with expertise in the area. Live donation experts exist and teams of live donor professionals staff most transplant programs today. Additionally regulatory bodies, professional societies, and advocacy groups strive to improve the care of the live organ donor (Medicare Conditions of Participation, 2007; Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, 2011; National Kidney Foundation 2011). Many years have been spent perfecting the surgical procedure and refining the proper testing to ensure that donation is safe for the donor. Live donation is, however, more than a surgery; in recent years, transplant professionals acknowledge that the psychosocial impact of donation on donors, whether positive or negative, can be significant but it is not yet completely understood.Much debate has occurred as to the components of the psychosocial evaluation, length and type of follow up, and the role of the independent live donor advocate (Amsterdam Forum, 2005; Ommen et al. 2011; Pruett et. al. 2006; Schroder et. al. 2008; Simpson & Pomfret 2012). The ethical concepts of paternalism and autonomy are in tension as we attempt to justify live donation. Perhaps nowhere else is ethical deliberation more vigorous than in the debate regarding whether informed consent for live donation is attainable, driven largely by the plight of the patient and the consequent vulnerability of the donor in an effort to help the patient. These quandaries are illustrated in the compelling narratives of this special issue. [End Page 45]Narrative ThemesBased on an analysis of the narratives, I will present a series of dominant themes that emerged from the stories; these will be exemplified by illustrative quotations from the live donor’s narratives.Live Donation has Psychological Effects on the DonorThere are many psychological effects of live donation both pre–and post–donation. The narratives describe feelings such as “I felt like a hero,” “feelings of anxiety, anger and ambivalence,” “it’s the best thing I ever did,” “I would do it all over again,” “a sense of loss,” and feelings of “suicidal thoughts.” The dichotomy of feelings expressed demonstrates the uniqueness of the live donor experience. One donor has nothing but good things to report regarding his or her experience while another feels lasting ill emotional affects requiring ongoing counseling even though the recipient has done well.Pre–donation psychological issuesTraditionally, the psychosocial evaluation explores the pre–donation emotional and family stressors to ensure that there are no issues or underlying psychiatric disorders that will make donation high risk for psychological complications. All donors writing the narratives were found to be suitable donors. That being said, there is no standardized approach to the psychological evaluation. Organ Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN)/United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) (Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, 2011) have policies and guidelines and the Centers for Medicare Conditions of Participation (COP) (Medicare Conditions of... (shrink)

Cadaver organs should be automatically availableThe shortage of donor organs and tissue for transplantation constitutes an acute emergency which demands radical rethinking of our policies and radical measures. While estimates vary and are difficult to arrive at there is no doubt that the donor organ shortage costs literally hundreds of thousands of lives every year. “In the world as a whole there are an estimated 700 000 patients on dialysis . . .. In India alone 100 000 new patients (...) present with kidney failure each year” . Almost “three million Americans suffer from congestive heart failure . . . deaths related to this condition are estimated at 250 000 each year . . . 27 000 patients die annually from liver disease . . .. In Western Europe as a whole 40 000 patients await a kidney but only . . . 10 000 kidneys”1 become available. Nobody knows how many people fail to make it onto the waiting lists and fail to register in the statistics. “As of 24th November 2002 in the United Kingdom 667 people have donated organs, 2055 people have received transplants, and 5615 people are still awaiting transplants.”2Conscious of the terrible and unnecessary tragedy that figures like these represent I have been advocating for more than 20 years now some radical measures to stem this appalling waste of human life. The measure which is the subject of Hamer and Rivlin’s paper 3 concerns the automatic availability of all cadaver organs—a measure, which I first advocated publicly in 1983.4THE AUTOMATIC AVAILABILITY OF DONOR ORGANSWe need to begin by being clear about just what it is I propose and why. At the moment in the United Kingdom we …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Back to the Future:Obtaining Organs from Non-Heart-Beating CadaversRobert M. Arnold (bio) and Stuart J. Youngner (bio)Organ Transplantation requires viable donor organs. This simple fact has become the Achilles' heel of transplantation programs. Progress in immunology and transplant surgery has outstripped the supply of available organs. Between 1988 and 1991, for example, the number of transplant candidates on waiting lists increased by about 55 percent, while the number (...) of donors increased only about 16 percent.1 By the end of March 1993, more than 30,000 potential recipients awaited transplantation (United Network for Organ Sharing Database (UNOS) 1993). Every day six of these patients die prior to receiving a heart or liver transplant, while patients needing kidney transplants must tolerate a lower quality of life on dialysis (Grenvik 1992; Evans, Orians, and Ascher 1992).This scarcity is likely to get worse. As transplantation becomes more successful, it is being offered to sicker and older patients. Attempts to transplant other solid organs, such as small bowel and pancreas, will only fuel the demand for donors. However, the current source of organs is unlikely to grow. Most organs come from patients who have been declared dead by neurologic criteria (commonly referred to as "brain dead" or heart-beating cadaver donors (HBCDs) because their hearts are beating at the time of procurement). Estimates of the potential pool of HBCDs have been revised downward from 20,000-27,000 to roughly 10,000-12,000 (Nathan et al. 1991). Improvements in automobile safety and handgun legislation will likely lead to further reductions. Moreover, the rate of procurement from HBCDs has remained relatively flat despite extensive public awareness campaigns and legislation requiring hospitals to routinely request donation from families of dead patients (Caplan et al. 1992).If organ transplantation is going to continue to flourish, alternative [End Page 103] sources of organs must be found. Recently the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) proposed procuring organs from patients who have been declared dead by traditional cardiopulmonary rather than brain-oriented criteria after they or their families have decided to forgo life-sustaining treatment—hereafter referred to as the Pittsburgh protocol (UPMC Policy 1993). These patients are typically referred to as non-heart-beating cadaver donors (NHBCDs) because their hearts are no longer beating at the time of organ procurement.Although NHBCDs were a major source of transplantable kidneys prior to the institution of death by neurologic criteria, their usefulness was limited by "warm ischemia time." This term refers to the injury to tissues that occurs when the blood supply is interrupted and before the organs are cooled and reperfused. Under the Pittsburgh protocol, therapy is withdrawn in the operating room where a waiting surgical team removes organs immediately after death is declared. By controlling the place and time of death, it has been possible to minimize warm ischemia time and thus solve the technical problems previously associated with procurement from NHBCDs.The potential contribution of NHBCD organs is significant. Nathan (1992), using data from Delaware Valley Transplant Program, concludes that the use of severely brain injured, but not "brain dead" patients, would increase the donor pool by 20-25 percent. Moreover, unpublished data from the Pittsburgh organ procurement organization, the Center for Organ Recovery and Education (CORE), suggests that these organs, particularly kidneys, function as well as those procured from HBCDs (Broznick 1993).This volume is devoted to the ethical, psychosocial, and public policy implications of procuring organs from non-heart-beating cadaver donors after a discussion to forgo life-sustaining treatment. The genesis of this volume was a project in which we invited leading experts in transplantation, ethics, and public policy to use the Pittsburgh protocol as a starting point for exploring a broad range of issues associated with attempts to procure organs from NHBCDs. The issues raised by NHBCDs turned out to have important implications about the fundamental conceptual and moral assumptions underlying organ procurement.Although each of the papers in this volume can be read separately, we intend the volume to be read as a whole. Many of the latter pieces on the ethical implications of the policy are best understood in light of the earlier background papers... (shrink)

This essay appreciatively and critically engages the late Robert Veatch’s extensive and important contributions to transplantation ethics, in the context of his overall ethical theory and his methods for resolving conflicts among ethical principles. It focuses mainly on ways to obtain and allocate organs from deceased persons, with particular attention to express donation, mandated choice, and presumed consent/routine salvaging in organ procurement and to conflicts between medical utility and egalitarian justice in organ allocation. It concludes by examining (...) the unclear relations between Veatch’s ideal moral theory and his nonideal moral theory, especially in organ allocation. (shrink)

Background Consent policies for post-mortem organ procurement (OP) vary throughout Europe, and yet no studies have empirically evaluated the ethical implications of contrasting consent models. To fill this gap, we introduce a novel indicator of governance quality based on the ideal of informed support, and examine national differences on this measure through a quantitative survey of OP policy informedness and preferences in seven European countries. -/- Methods Between 2017–2019, we conducted a convenience sample survey of students (n = (...) 2006) in Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Slovenia (SI) and Spain (ES), asking participants about their donation preferences, as well as their beliefs and views about the policy in place. From these measures, we computed indices of informedness, policy support, and fulfilment of unexpressed preferences, which we compared across countries and consent systems. -/- Results Our study introduces a tool for analyzing policy governance in the context of OP. Wide variation in policy awareness was observed: Most respondents in DK, DE, AT and BE correctly identified the policy in place, while those in SI, GR and ES did not. Respondents in opt-out countries (AT, BE, ES and GR) tended to support the policy in place (with one exception, i.e., SI), whereas those in opt-in countries (DE and DK) overwhelmingly opposed it. These results reveal stark differences in governance quality across countries and consent policies: We found a preponderance of informed opposition in opt-in countries and a general tendency towards support–either informed or uninformed–in opt-out countries. We also found informed divergence in opt-in countries and a tendency for convergence–either informed or uninformed–among opt-out countries. -/- Conclusion Our study offers a novel tool for analyzing governance quality and illustrates, in the context of OP, how the strengths and weaknesses of different policy implementations can be estimated and compared using quantitative survey data. (shrink)

Background Requirements for organ donation after cardiac or imminent death have been introduced to address the transplantable organs shortage in the United States. Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) increasingly use the Internet for organ donation consent. Methods An analysis of OPO Web sites available to the public for enrollment and consent for organ donation. The Web sites and consent forms were examined for the minimal information recommended by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (...) for informed consent. Content scores were calculated as percentages of data elements in four information categories: donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, donation promotion, and informed consent. Results There were 60 Web sites for organ donation enrollment serving the 52 states. The median percent (10 percentile-90 percentile) content scores of the Web sites for donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, and donation promotion were 33% (20–47), 79% (57–86), and 75% (50–100), respectively. The informed consent score was 0% (0–33). The content scores for donor knowledge and informed consent were significantly lower than donor consent reinforcement and donation promotion for all Web sites (P < .05). The content scores for the four categories were similar among the 11 regions of the United Network for Organ Sharing. Conclusion The Web sites and consent forms for public enrollment in organ donation do not fulfill the necessary requirements for informed consent. The Web sites predominantly provide positive reinforcement and promotional information rather than the transparent disclosure of organ donation process. Independent regulatory oversight is essential to ensure that Internet enrollment for organ donation complies with legal and ethical standards for informed consent. (shrink)

Dear editorOrgans transplantation is the solution for many end stage insufficiencies, but organ shortage is still matter of debate. As a consequence, organ procurement (OP) remains currently the best way to provide organs in western countries. Besides, the news of the death of a loved one, especially when he is young and dies in violent circumstances, can be a devastating event for families. In those conditions, the process of donation request from the coordinators may be difficult and (...) requires experience and “tact”. Despite these precautions, refusals are not rare.An 18 year-old-patient was transported in shock after a car accident to our hospital. Emergent laparotomy was performed for mesenteric and hepatic trauma requiring liver packing. She also presented a cervical and cerebral trauma with a fast deterioration of the neurological status. A tentorial herniation was quickly suspected. The family had been contacted and the severity of the situation explained without mentioning brain. (shrink)

Presumed consent to organ donation looks increasingly unlikely to be a palatable option for increasing organ procurement in the UK following the publication of the report into events at Alder Hey and elsewhere. Yet, given that the alternative to increasing the number of cadaveric organs available is either to accept a greater number of live donations, or accept that people will continue to die for the want of an organ, public policy makers remain obliged to consider (...) other means of increasing the procurement rate.In this paper, we meet the main objections to mandated choice . We have modified the traditional approach to mandated choice to take into account the force of the objection that mandated donation is preferable, by accepting that people can and do make bad decisions about organ donation and proposing that all accompanying public education and information about cadaveric donation should be directed in favour of donation. (shrink)

: Although "brain death" and the dead donor rule—i.e., patients must not be killed by organ retrieval—have been clinically and legally accepted in the U.S. as prerequisites to organ removal, there is little data about public attitudes and beliefs concerning these matters. To examine the public attitudes and beliefs about the determination of death and its relationship to organ transplantation, 1351 Ohio residents ≥18 years were randomly selected and surveyed using random digit dialing (RDD) sample frames. The (...) RDD telephone survey was conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews. The survey instrument was developed from information provided by 12 focus groups and a pilot study of the questionnaire. Three scenarios based on hypothetical patients were presented: "brain dead," in a coma, or in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Respondents provided personal assessments of whether the patient in each scenario was dead and their willingness to donate that patient's organs in these circumstances. More than 98 percent of respondents had heard of the term "brain death," but only one-third (33.7%) believed that someone who was "brain dead" was legally dead. The majority of respondents (86.2%) identified the "brain-dead" patient in the first scenario as dead, 57.2 percent identified the patient in a coma as dead (Scenario 2), and 34.1 percent identified the patient in a PVS as dead (Scenario 3). Nearly one-third (33.5%) were willing to donate the organs of patients they classified as alive for at least one scenario, in seeming violation of the dead donor rule. Most respondents were not willing to violate the dead donor rule, although a substantial minority was. However, the majority of respondents were unaware, misinformed, or held beliefs that were not congruent with current definitions of "brain death." This study highlights the need for more public dialogue and education about "brain death" and organ donation. (shrink)

With the case of Belgium as a negative example, this paper will evaluate the legitimacy of using mentally incompetents as organ sources. The first section examines the underlying moral dilemma that results from the necessity of balancing the principle of respect for persons with the obligation to help people in desperate need. We argue for the rejection of a radical utilitarian approach but also question the appropriateness of a categorical prohibition. Section two aims to strike a fair balance between (...) the competing interests at stake and to define the conditions under which organ harvest from mentally incompetents might be morally acceptable. To this end, we morally assess the main requirements that have been put forward to allow organ removal from incompetent donors. We conclude that the current Belgian legislation is far too permissive and that national regulations that do not permit the harvest of non-regenerable organs from mentally incompetents in exceptional circumstances are too restrictive. On the basis of this discussion, we propose a number of guiding principles for decision-making in this area. (shrink)

The dead donor rule (DDR) governs procuring life-prolonging organs. They should be taken only from deceased donors. Miller and Truog have proposed abandoning the rule when patients have decided to forgo life-sustaining treatment and have consented to procurement. Organs could then be procured from living patients, thus killing them by organ procurement. This proposal warrants careful examination. They convincingly argue that current brain or circulatory death pronouncement misidentifies the biologically dead. After arguing convincingly that physicians already cause (...) death by withdrawing treatment, they claim no bright-line differences preclude organ removal from the living. The argument fails for those who accept the double effect doctrine or other grounds for distinguishing forgoing life support from active, intentional killing. If the goal is determining irreversible loss of somatic function, they correctly label current death pronouncement a “legal fiction.” Recognizing a second, public policy meaning of the term death provides grounds for maintaining the DDR without jeopardizing procurement. (shrink)

Families play an essential role in deceased organ procurement. As the person cannot directly communicate his or her wishes regarding donation, the family is often the only source of information regarding consent or refusal. We provide a systematic description and analysis of the different roles the family can play, and actions the family can take, in the organ procurement process across different jurisdictions and consent systems. First, families can inform or update healthcare professionals about a person’s (...) donation wishes. Second, families can authorize organ procurement in the absence of deceased’s preferences and the default is not to remove organs, and oppose donation where there is no evidence of preference but the default is to presume consent; in both cases, the decision could be based on their own wishes or what they think the deceased would have wanted. Finally, families can overrule the known wishes of the deceased, which can mean preventing donation, or permitting donation when the deceased refused it. We propose a schema of 4 levels on which to map these possible family roles: no role, witness, surrogate, and full decisional authority. We conclude by mapping different jurisdictions onto this schema to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the consent system for organ donation and some important nuances about the role of families. This classificatory model aims to account for the majority of the world’s consent systems. It provides conceptual and methodological guidance that can be useful to researchers, professionals, and policymakers involved in organ procurement. (shrink)

Over 90% of the organs transplanted in China before 2010 were procured from prisoners. Although Chinese officials announced in December 2014 that the country would completely cease using organs harvested from prisoners, no regulatory adjustments or changes in China’s organ donation laws followed. As a result, the use of prisoner organs remains legal in China if consent is obtained. We have collected and analysed available evidence on human rights violations in the organ procurement practice in China. We (...) demonstrate that the practice not only violates international ethics standards, it is also associated with a large scale neglect of fundamental human rights. This includes organ procurement without consent from prisoners or their families as well as procurement of organs from incompletely executed, still-living prisoners. The human rights critique of these practices will also address the specific situatedness of prisoners, often conditioned and traumatized by a cascade of human rights abuses in judicial structures. To end the unethical practice and the abuse associated with it, we suggest to inextricably bind the use of human organs procured in the Chinese transplant system to enacting Chinese legislation prohibiting the use of organs from executed prisoners and making explicit rules for law enforcement. Other than that, the international community must cease to abet the continuation of the present system by demanding an authoritative ban on the use of organs from executed Chinese prisoners. (shrink)

Several European countries are approving legislative reforms moving to a presumed consent system in order to increase organ donation rates. Nevertheless, irrespective of the consent system in force, family's decisional capacity probably causes a greater impact on such rates. In this contribution we have developed a systematic methodology in order to analyse and compare European organ procurement laws, and we clarify the weight given by each European law to relatives' decisional capacity over individual's preferences (expressed or not (...) while alive) regarding the destination of his or her organs after death. In this sense, the results constitute the first comprehensive and comparative legislative mapping on European transplantation laws. (shrink)

The shortage of organs for transplantation by its nature prompts ethical dilemmas. For example, although there is an imperative to save human life and reduce suffering by maximising the supply of vital organs, there is an equally important obligation to ensure that the process by which we increase the supply respects the rights of all stakeholders. In a relatively unexamined practice in the USA, organs are procured from unrepresented decedents without their express consent. Unrepresented decedents have no known healthcare wishes (...) or advance care planning document; they also lack a surrogate. The Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 sends a mixed message about the procurement of organs from this patient population and there are hospitals that authorise donation. In addition, in adopting the RUAGA, some states included provisions that clearly allow organ procurement from unrepresented decedents. An important unanswered question is whether this practice meets the canons of ethical permissibility. The current Brief Report presents two principled approaches to the topic as a way of highlighting some of the complexities involved. Concluding remarks offer suggestions for future research and discussion. (shrink)

The assumption that procuring more organs will save more lives has inspired increasingly forceful calls to increase organ procurement. This project, in contrast, directly questions the premise that more organ transplantation means more lives saved. Its argument begins with the fact that resources are limited and medical procedures have opportunity costs. Because many other lifesaving interventions are more cost‐effective than transplantation and compete with transplantation for a limited budget, spending on organ transplantation consumes resources that could (...) have been used to save a greater number of other lives. This argument has not yet been advanced in debates over expanded procurement and could buttress existing concerns about expanded procurement. To support this argument, I review existing empirical data on the cost‐effectiveness of transplantation and compare them to data on interventions for other illnesses. These data should motivate utilitarians and others whose primary goal is maximizing population‐wide health benefits to doubt the merits of expanding organ procurement. I then consider two major objections: one makes the case that transplant candidates have a special claim to medical resources, and the other challenges the use of cost‐effectiveness to set priorities. I argue that there is no reason to conclude that transplant candidates’ medical interests should receive special priority, and that giving some consideration to cost‐effectiveness in priority setting requires neither sweeping changes to overall health priorities nor the adoption of any specific, controversial metric for assessing cost‐effectiveness. Before searching for more organs, we should first ensure the provision of cost‐effective care. (shrink)

In defending what he calls ‘full-blooded Epicureanism’, James Stacey Taylor argues that the dead cannot be harmed or wronged.1 This has implications for a range of bioethical issues pertaining to death, including posthumous organ procurement. Taylor claims that respecting the autonomy of persons requires that their desires regarding the treatment of their postmortem bodies be given due consideration while these persons are alive. It is not obvious what this means in practical terms, though Taylor says that respect for (...) autonomy requires that these wishes be recorded with the intention that they be followed. Yet if respect for autonomy only applies to the wishes of premortem persons, and if there are no posthumous harms or wrongs, then it is not clear why it would matter morally whether one's wishes about what to do with one's organs were fulfilled or thwarted after one's death.Most of us have an interest in what happens to our bodies not just during our lives but also after our deaths. Personal sovereignty and autonomy give persons a right to control what happens to their bodies, and since the body …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13.1 (2003) 51-52 [Access article in PDF] Congress Considers Incentives for Organ Procurement Alexander S. Curtis [Tables]During the 108th Congressional session, several bills pertaining to ethical incentives for organ donation likely will be introduced. In some cases, they will be similar to bills before the 107th Congress (see Table 1). Bills in both the House of Representatives and the Senate address (...) the establishment and maintenance of donor registries, financial reimbursements for medical and nonmedical expenses incurred by qualifying donors, the presentation of commemorative medals, and tax credits.A bill entitled "Gift of Life Congressional Medal Act" (introduced last year by Senate majority leader Bill Frist (R-TN) as Senate Bill 325), and its corresponding bill of the same title (passed in the House of Representatives last year as H.R. 708), would establish a congressional commemorative medal honoring "any organ donor, or the family or family member of any organ donor." The medal is to be designed and struck with "suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions" by the Secretary of the Treasury. The eligible donor or donor's family member would be presented with the medal by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. This bill would establish qualifying donations as those of human kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, pancreases, or any other organ, but excludes corneas and eyes.Another bill, introduced by Representative Michael Bilirakis (R-FL) entitled "Organ Donation Improvement Act" (H.R. 624), would award grants or contracts to states, transplant centers, and qualified organ procurement organizations for the purpose of providing travel, subsistence, and incidental nonmedical expenses to individuals who make living donations. In order to receive reimbursement, the donating individuals must reside in states other than the states in which the intended recipients reside and the annual income of those receiving the organs cannot exceed $35,000. The bill also would appropriate $15,000,000 to make grants to states and public and nonprofit entities for the purpose of carrying out studies, public education demonstrations, and outreach activities "designed to increase the number of organ donors within the state." The bill would be effective from time of enactment through 2005. [End Page 51]Two other bills proposed within the House of Representatives in 2002 called for amendment to the Internal Revenue Code. The "Gift of Life Tax Credit Act (introduced as H.R. 1872 by Representative James Hansen (R-UT)) and the "Help Organ Procurement Expand Act" (introduced as H.R. 2090 by Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ)) present a refundable credit to individuals or to the estates of those who agree either to be living donors or to donate their organs upon death. The "Gift of Life Tax Credit Act" refunds $10,000 to the estates of eligible individuals "for the taxable year which includes the date of the individual's death." The "Help Organ Procurement Expand Act" offers a refund of $2,500 to qualified persons. Donations of kidneys, livers, pancreases, islet cells, lungs, and intestines are accepted, however several conditions restrict permissible donors. The "Gift of Life Tax Credit Act" requires that the legally competent individual's death not be due to a suicide and that the intention to donate was clearly declared. The "Help Organ Procurement Expand Act" prohibits donations from individuals who were killed with physician assistance, died as a result of a suicide, have been indicted or convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor offense, or are actively under criminal investigation for a possible felony offense. The "Help Organ Procurement Expand Act" also restricts procuring organs from unborn children or human fetuses and under circumstances in which the living donor would be subject to "unacceptable levels of medical risk of death or permanent debilitation." Alexander S. Curtis is a research assistant at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC. He received his bachelor's degree from Miami University.... (shrink)

: The supply of organs for transplant remains inadequate to meet the needs of waiting patients, in spite of many programs and approaches to increase rates of donation. Over the years there have been numerous proposals to introduce schemes that would move toward the outright sale of organs. Three articles in this issue of the Journal propose methods for increasing organ supply—two by moving toward a market approach and the third by advocating a change in social culture. All three (...) suffer from shortcomings, including the endorsement and encouragement of the exploitation of those who may offer organs. Although the shortage of organs must be addressed, the social price of a market in organs is too high, and proposals to encourage a rethinking of social responsibility are unlikely to be effective. (shrink)

A number of bioethicists have been critical of the power of the family to “veto” a patient’s decision to posthumously donate her organs within opt-in systems of organ procurement. One major objection directed at the family veto is that when families veto the decision of their deceased family member, they do something wrong by violating or failing to respect the autonomy of that deceased family member. The goal of this paper is to make progress on answering this objection. (...) I do this in two stages. First, I argue that the most plausible interpretation of what happens when a person registers as an organ donor in an opt-in system is that she gives her consent to the state to posthumously remove her organs for transplantation purposes. Call this the Authorization Account. Second, given the Authorization Account, I argue by analogy that when families veto an individual’s decision to donate and the individual’s organs are not in the end removed, neither the doctors nor the family violate the individual’s autonomy in any morally objectionable sense. Call this the Nonremoval Thesis. I argue that since the Nonremoval Thesis is true, we do not violate or fail to respect the autonomy of registered donors when we fail to remove their organs because their family has objected. (shrink)

Organ procurement organization (OPO) staff play an essential role in the facilitation of organ donation as they guide family members and loved ones of dying patients through the donation process. Throughout the donation process, OPO staff must assume the role of a dual advocate, considering both the interests of the donor (which often include the wishes of the donor’s family) and the interests of potential recipient(s). The benefits of this role are well established; however, minimal literature exists (...) on the ways this role can cause moral distress in OPO staff, who frequently face scenarios in which adhering to the wishes of a donor family may compromise donation potential but failing to honor donor family requests may result in further emotional burden for the family. Given the frequency with which these ethically complex situations exist during donation, OPO staff are at heightened risk for experiencing moral distress and burnout, yet they are seldom acknowledged in the existing moral distress literature. As a result, it is unclear whether the current practices available to mitigate moral distress are beneficial for this population. (shrink)

The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, (...) and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation. (shrink)

Most people accept that if they can save someone from death at very little cost to themselves, they must do so; call this the ‘duty of easy rescue.’ At least for many such people, an instance of this duty is to allow their vital organs to be used for transplantation. Accordingly, ‘opt-out’ organ procurement policies, based on a powerfully motivated responsibility to render costless or very low-cost lifesaving aid, would seem presumptively permissible. Counterarguments abound. Here I consider, in (...) particular, objections that assign a moral distinctiveness to the physical boundaries of our bodies and that concern autonomy and trust. These objections are singled out as they seem particularly pertinent to the stress I place on a distinctive benefit of the particular policy I defend. An opt-out system, resting not on the authority of ‘presumed consent’ but on the recognition of a duty to one another, has the prospect of prompting people to understand more richly the ways in which they are both physically embodied and communally embedded. (shrink)

In December 2015, Wales became the first country in the UK to move away from an opt-in system in organ procurement. The new legislation introduces the concept of deemed consent whereby a person who neither opt in nor opt out is deemed to have consented to donation. The data released by the National Health Service in July 2017 provide an excellent opportunity to assess this legislation in light of concerns that it would decrease procurement rates for living (...) and deceased donation, as well as sparking an increase in family refusals. None of these concerns have come to pass, with Wales experiencing more registered donors, fewer family refusals and more living donations. However, as the number of actual donors has dropped slightly from a high level, the situation must be monitored closely in the years to come. (shrink)

Advancements in scientific research and technological development influence the practice of organ donation and organ transplantation. Many SRTD governance discourses put forward the need for multi-stakeholder engagements. We posit that staff employed by organ procurement organizations have a stake in the discussions around SRTD applicable to ODOT because SRTD is one factor that shapes ODOT and because staff are involved in ODOT education and awareness raising while acting as a nexus between donors and the public. Therefore, (...) we performed a content analysis of eight semi-structured in-depth interviews with staff of one Canadian organ procurement organization to ascertain the views that staff had on the use of SRTD in ODOT in general; specific SRTD envisioned to be used in the future in ODOT namely xenotransplantation, embryonic and non-embryonic stem cells, cloning, bionic/artificial organs, and 3-D printed organs; and the emerging ability of SRTD applicable in ODOT to enhance bodily abilities beyond the normal. We found that staff had views on the topics covered in this study, and staff acknowledged that they do not possess sufficient knowledge to be able to engage meaningfully in governance discussions of the SRTD covered and to educate others on these SRTDs. We recommend implementing continuous education for the staff on SRTD envisioned to be applied in ODOT as a capacity-building measure to enable their participation in the governance discussions of these SRTDs and to enhance their ability to educate others on ODOT applicable SRTD. (shrink)

Its critics to the contrary, the “gift of life” metaphor is not to be blamed for the indebtedness and guilt that organ recipients often experience. It is certainly misused, however, both by post‐transplant caregivers, who exploit it to manipulate recipients' behavior, and by the organ procurement system, which has failed to understand that the decision to give the gift of life must be approached communally.

In almost all opt-in systems of postmortal organ procurement, if the deceased has not made a decision about donation, his relatives will be asked to make it. Can this decision power be justified? I consider three possible justifications. (1) We could presume the deceased to have delegated this power to his relatives. (2) It could be argued that, if the deceased has not made a decision, a proxy decision has to be made in his best interests. (3) The (...) relatives could have a standing of their own because they are singled out from the parties whose interests are being affected by the decision by the special relation they had to the deceased. None of these arguments turns out to be convincing. (shrink)

Altruism and solidarity are concepts that are closely related to organ donation for transplantation. On the one hand, they are typically used for encouraging people to donate. On the other hand, they also underpin the regulations in force in each country to different extents. They are often used indistinctly and equivocally, despite the different ethical implications of each concept. This paper aims to clarify to what extent we can speak of altruism and solidarity in the predominant models of (...) class='Hi'>organ donation. It also raises the ethical question of whether these categories are adequate as a basis for such models, bearing in mind that organs are a scarce resource and that a shortage of them may mean that fewer lives are saved or improved. (shrink)

Must we obtain a patient’s consent before posthumously removing her organs? According to the consent requirement, in order to permissibly remove organs from a deceased person, it is necessary that her prior consent be obtained. If the consent requirement is true, then this seems to rule out policies that do not seek and obtain a patient’s prior consent to organ donation, while at the same time vindicating policies that do seek and obtain patient consent. In this paper, however, I (...) argue that once we recognize the difference between consent, on the one hand, and wishing or desiring, on the other, we will see that obtaining consent before organ removal is neither necessary nor sufficient to respect patient autonomy in organ procurement. (shrink)

: Free-market libertarians have long supported incentives to increase organ procurement, but those oriented to justice traditionally have opposed them. This paper presents the reasons why those worried about justice should reconsider financial incentives and tolerate them as a lesser moral evil. After considering concerns about discrimination and coercion and setting them aside, it is suggested that the real moral concern should be manipulation of the neediest. The one offering the incentive (the government) has the resources to eliminate (...) the basic needs that pressure the poor into a willingness to sell. It is unethically manipulative to withhold those resources and then offer payment for organs. Nevertheless, the poor have been left without basic necessities for 20 years since the passage of the prohibition on incentives. As long as the government continues to withhold a decent minimum of welfare, liberals should, with shame, cease opposing financial incentives for organ procurement. (shrink)

BackgroundIn December 2014, China announced that only voluntarily donated organs from citizens would be used for transplantation after January 1, 2015. Many medical professionals worldwide believe that China has stopped using organs from death-row prisoners.DiscussionIn the present article, we briefly review the historical development of organ procurement from death-row prisoners in China and comprehensively analyze the social-political background and the legal basis of the announcement. The announcement was not accompanied by any change in organ sourcing legislations or (...) regulations. As a fact, the use of prisoner organs remains legal in China. Even after January 2015, key Chinese transplant officials have repeatedly stated that death-row prisoners have the same right as regular citizens to “voluntarily donate” organs. This perpetuates an unethical organ procurement system in ongoing violation of international standards.ConclusionsOrgan sourcing from death-row prisoners has not stopped in China. The 2014 announcement refers to the intention to stop the use of organs illegally harvested without the consent of the prisoners. Prisoner organs procured with “consent” are now simply labelled as “voluntarily donations from citizens”. The semantic switch may whitewash sourcing from both death-row prisoners and prisoners of conscience. China can gain credibility only by enacting new legislation prohibiting use of prisoner organs and by making its organ sourcing system open to international inspections. Until international ethical standards are transparently met, sanctions should remain. (shrink)

Organ donation after brain death has been practiced in China since 2003 in the absence of brain death legislation. Similar to international standards, China’s brain death diagnostic criteria include coma, absence of brainstem reflexes, and the lack of spontaneous respiration. The Chinese criteria require that the lack of spontaneous respiration must be verified with an apnea test by disconnecting the ventilator for 8 min to provoke spontaneous respiration. However, we have found publications in Chinese medical journals, in which the (...) donors were declared to be brain dead, yet without an apnea test. The organ procurement procedures started with initiating “intratracheal intubation for mechanical ventilation after brain death,” indicating that a brain death diagnosis was not performed. The purpose of the intubation was not to resuscitate the patient but rather was directly related to facilitating the explantation of organs. Moreover, it was unmistakably stated in two of these publications that the cardiac arrest was induced in these patients without brain death determination by cold St. Thomas cardioplegic solution or other cold myocardial protection solutions. This means that the condition of these donors neither met the criteria of brain death nor that of cardiac death. In other words, the “donor organs” may well have been procured in these cases from living human beings. Thus, brain death definition is abused in China by some individuals for organ harvesting, and a systematic investigation is needed to clarify the situation of organ donation after brain death in China. (shrink)

Goal: To assess public knowledge and attitudes towards the family’s role in deceased organ donation in Europe. -/- Methods: A systematic search was conducted in CINHAL, MEDLINE, PAIS Index, Scopus, PsycINFO, and Web of Science on December 15th, 2017. Eligibility criteria were socio-empirical studies conducted in Europe from 2008 to 2017 addressing either knowledge or attitudes by the public towards the consent system, including the involvement of the family in the decision-making process, for post-mortem organ retrieval. Screening and (...) data collection were performed by two or more independent reviewers for each record. -/- Results: Of the 1482 results, 467 studies were assessed in full-text form, and 33 were included in this synthesis. When the deceased has not expressed any preference, a majority of the public support the family's role as a surrogate decision-maker. When the deceased expressly consented, the respondents' answers depend on whether they see themselves as potential donors or as a deceased's next-of-kin. Answers also depend on the relationship between the deceased and the decision-maker(s) within the family, and on their ethnic or cultural background. -/- Conclusions: Public views on the authority of the family in organ donation decision-making require further research. A common conceptual framework and validated well-designed questionnaires are needed for future studies. The findings should be considered in the development of Government policy and guidance regarding the role of families in deceased organ donation. (shrink)

In 2015 Robert Veatch published the second edition of his Transplantation ethics, this time together with Lainie Ross. The chapters on postmortem organ procurement distinguish between ‘giving’ and ‘taking’ systems, and argue that ‘taking’ systems may promise a greater yield of organs for transplantation, but inevitably violate a requirement of respect for the deceased's autonomy. That argument has been very influential, and is also representative of a way of thinking that is widespread in the literature and in public (...) debate. In this paper I contend that it is conceptually flawed in a number of important respects. These concern the understanding of both the concept of ‘consent’ and the requirement of respect for autonomy, the role of the relatives in any procurement system, and the factors that actually determine the extent to which a system respects autonomy, under any interpretation of that requirement. (shrink)

The possibility of organ transplantation has created new problems for medical ethics as well as clinical medicine. One of them, organ procurement, is tried to be solved mainly by two systems. Many countries have adopted the ‘optin system’, which aims to raise awareness and make the individuals donate their organs by their own will. The other system, ‘optout’ or ‘presumed consent’, which considers all members of society as potential donors, was adopted by some countries. In this system, (...) individuals should state that they do not wish to donate their organs; otherwise they are considered as donors. By trying to ground our argument with various justifications, we claim that optout system for organ procurement is a fairer option regarding the right to access to healthcare needed, and therefore it should be implemented instead of optin. (shrink)

In 2015 Robert Veatch published the second edition of his Transplantation ethics, this time together with Lainie Ross. The chapters on postmortem organ procurement distinguish between ‘giving’ and ‘taking’ systems, and argue that ‘taking’ systems may promise a greater yield of organs for transplantation, but inevitably violate a requirement of respect for the deceased's autonomy. That argument has been very influential, and is also representative of a way of thinking that is widespread in the literature and in public (...) debate. In this paper I contend that it is conceptually flawed in a number of important respects. These concern the understanding of both the concept of ‘consent’ and the requirement of respect for autonomy, the role of the relatives in any procurement system, and the factors that actually determine the extent to which a system respects autonomy, under any interpretation of that requirement. (shrink)

In this paper I problematise quite a simple assertion: that the two major frameworks used in assessing consent to post-mortem organ donation, presumed consent and informed consent, are procedurally similar in that both are ‘default rules.’ Because of their procedural common characteristic, both rules do exclude marginalized groups from consent schemes. Yet this connection is often overlooked. Contract theory on default rules, better than bioethical arguments, can assist in choosing between these two rules. Applying contract theory to the question (...) of post-mortem organ donation suggests that the default rule should be one that goes against the wishes of the stronger party in consent decisions. (shrink)

Several bioethicists have recently discussed the complexity of defining human death, and considered in particular how our definition of death affects our understanding of the ethics of vital organ procurement. In this brief paper, we challenge the mainstream medical definition of human death—namely, that death is equivalent to total brain failure—and argue with Nair-Collins and Miller that integrated biological functions can continue even after total brain failure has occurred. We discuss the implications of Nair-Collins and Miller’s argument and (...) suggest that it may be necessary to look for alternative biological markers that reliably indicate the death of a human being. We reject the suggestion that we should abandon the dead-donor criteria for organ donation. Rather than weaken the ethical standards for vital organ procurement, it may be necessary to make them more demanding. The aim of this paper is not to justify the dead donor rule. Rather, we aim to explore the perspective of those who agree with critiques of the whole brain and cardiopulmonary definitions of death but yet disagree with the proposal that we should abandon the dead-donor rule. We will consider what those who want to retain the dead-donor rule must argue in light of Nair-Collins and Miller’s critique. (shrink)