In this article, we present and analyse the concept of Digital Twin (DT) linked to distinct types of objects (artefacts, natural, inanimate or living) and examine the challenges involved in creating them from a fundamental neuroethics approach that emphasises conceptual analyses. We begin by providing a brief description of DTs and their initial development as models of artefacts and physical inanimate objects, identifying core challenges in building these tools and noting their intended benefits. Next, we describe attempts to build (...) DTs of model living entities, such as hearts, highlighting the novel challenges raised by this shift from DTs of inanimate to DTs of living objects. Against that background, we give an account of contemporary research aiming to develop DTs of the human brain by building "virtual brains", e.g. the simulation engine The Virtual Brain (TVB) as it is carried out in the European Human Brain Project. Since the brain is structurally and functionally the most complex organ in the human body, and our integrated knowledge of its functional architecture remains limited in spite of recent neuroscientific advances, the attempts to create virtual copies of the human brain are correspondingly challenging. We suggest that a clear scientific theoretical structure, conceptual clarity and transparency regarding the methods and goals of this technological development are necessary prerequisites in order to make the project of constructing virtual brains a theoretically promising and socially beneficial scientific, technological and philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Nel presente testo si propone un approccio alla neuroetica che si prefigge di attribuirle uno specifico ambito d’indagine in quanto esplorazione di ciò che apprendiamo su noi stessi e sul nostro “funzionamento”, grazie principalmente alle neuroscienze. In altre parole, si tratta di un nuovo genere di antropologia che si occupa dell’intersezione di diverse discipline la quale acquista sempre maggiore centralità nel dibattito contemporaneo a motivo della forte naturalizzazione delle indagini sugli esseri umani. L’oggetto di studio – alla luce di questa (...) particolare caratterizzazione della neuroetica – non sarà quindi ciò che possiamo fare, bensì ciò che sappiamo o riteniamo di sapere in modo affidabile. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar las consecuencias prácticas de una autocomprensión positivista de la neuroética aplicada. Esta ética se ocupa de los impactos éticos y sociales derivados de la utilización de los hallazgos neurocientificos, en especial de las neurotecnologías. La intención es mostrar que para realizar esta tarea la neuroética debe superar el paradigma neuropositivista dominante que solo le conduce a la disolución del ámbito moral y, en el terreno práctico, al silencio cómplice ante los problemas (...) surgidos en la aplicación de las neurociencias. Para este fin daremos los siguientes pasos. En primer lugar, analizaremos los rasgos básicos de toda ética aplicada y desde ellos el origen y los objetivos de la neuroética aplicada. En segundo lugar, veremos cómo las investigaciones neuroéticas confunden el ámbito social con el ámbito moral, eliminando así de entrada toda perspectiva ética. Por último, ejemplificaremos las consecuencias prácticas de esta disolución en el caso de las políticas públicas, analizando el papel que puede cumplir y no cumple la neuroética aplicada frente al neuropoder generado por las neurotecnologías. (shrink)

En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...) de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity. (shrink)

In questo articolo analizzo la produzione scientifica nell’ambito della neuroetica entro la ricerca italiana. Vengono analizzate lo status della ricerca attuale e, attraverso alcune recenti pubblicazioni, le direzioni che tale disciplina sta seguendo anche negli ambiti giuridici e nella comprensione delle forme di vita degli animali non umani.

Reseña. Neuroética: relaciones entre mente/cerebro y moral/ética.

Riassunto: Neuroeconomia e neuroetica sono settori delle neuroscienze cognitive che studiano i correlati neurali di aspetti distinti, sebbene strettamente interconnessi, del processo decisionale. Mentre la neuroeconomia studia i meccanismi cerebrali che guidano verso la massimizzazione dell’utilità economica personale, la neuroetica integra tali conoscenze con quelle fornite dalle neuroscienze sociali per affrontare domande tipiche dell'etica e della filosofia morale. Gli studi oggi disponibili in questo ambito vengono qui discussi al fine di mettere a confronto l’ipotesi secondo cui le scelte economiche individuali (...) e socio-morali sono supportate da un unico circuito cerebrale con differenti input specifici per dominio rispetto a quella che prevede basi cerebrali specifiche per la scelta in ambito socio-morale. In linea con il primo dei due modelli, i dati presenti in letteratura sembrano confermare l’esistenza di un singolo sistema cerebrale associato ai diversi tipi di scelta, indipendentemente dal contesto decisionale individuale vs. socio-morale. Parole chiave: Decision-making; Neuroeconomia; Neuroetica; Extended Common Currency Schema; Social Valutation Specific Schema From Neuroeconomy to Neuroethics: Towards a Neuroscience of Individual and Socio-Moral Decisions: Neuroeconomics and neuroethics are subfields of cognitive neuroscience that address the neural correlates of distinct, although strongly intertwined, facets of decision-making. While neuroeconomics investigates the neural mechanisms underlying the maximization of personal economic utility, neuroethics integrates such knowledge with that provided by social neurosciences, in order to address typical questions in ethics and moral philosophy. We review the available research to contrast the hypothesis that both individual economic and socio-moral choices rely on a common brain network receiving domain-specific inputs and the claim that a specific brain network underpins choices in a socio-moral context. In line with the former model, currently available evidence supports the existence of a single brain network associated with both choice types, regardless of the economic individual vs. socio-moral decisional context. Keywords : Decision-making; Neuroeconomics; Neuroethics; Extended Common Currency Schema; Social Valutation Specific Schema. (shrink)

The present article intends to analyze the repercussions that neuroethics, as a growing discipline of neurosciences, has in the field of philosophy and moral education. These repercussions concern the evidence of a biological or neuronal support that determines both ethical behavior and moral reasoning. Faced with this situation, there are two main opposing positions: on the one hand, that which conceives that morality has to become a matter of sociobiologists; from another, the one that maintains that morality is irreducible to (...) neuronal chemistry, so it continues to demand a philosophical commitment. (shrink)

En el siglo XXI nace la neurociencia de la ética con la pretensión de ser un nuevo saber , capaz de descubrir las bases cerebrales de la conducta moral. Desde ellas algunos neurocientíficos se proponen fundamentar una ética universal. El artículo 1) analiza críticamente ese proceso de fundamentación, 2) recurre para profundizar en él a la paradoja de la cooperación humana, y 3) hace un balance de las aportaciones de la neurociencia a la ética y de sus posibilidades de fundamentar (...) una ética universal. (shrink)

This is the first part of a two-tier overview article on fundamentality in metaphysics and the philosophy of physics. It provides an introduction to the notion of fundamentality in metaphysics, as well as to several related concepts. The key issues in the contemporary debate on the topic are summarised, making systematic reference to the most relevant literature. In particular, various ways in which the fundamental entities and the fundamental structure of reality may be conceived are illustrated and discussed. (...) A final brief section looks at the methodological issue of naturalism, paving the way for the survey of fundamentality in the philosophy of physics, which is carried out in the second part. (shrink)

Whole brain emulation aims to re-implement functions of a mind in another computational substrate with the precision needed to predict the natural development of active states in as much as the influence of random processes allows. Furthermore, brain emulation does not present a possible model of a function, but rather presents the actual implementation of that function, based on the details of the circuitry of a specific brain. We introduce a notation for the representations of mind state, mind transition functions (...) and transition update functions, for which elements and their relations must be quantified in accordance with measurements in the biological substrate. To discover the limits of significance in terms of the temporal and spatial resolution of measurements, we point out the importance of brain region and task specific constraints, as well as the importance of in-vivo measurements. We summarize further problems that need to be addressed. (shrink)

RESUMENEste trabajo analizará cuáles son las posibles consecuencias que los descubrimientos de la neurociencia pueden tener sobre la reflexión ética en torno al deporte. Siguiendo los trabajos en neuroética de Jonathan Haidt y Joshua Greene, parece ser que nuestro comportamiento moral está basado en una serie de mecanismos automáticos neuronales de carácter emotivo que acontecen en nuestros cerebros. Estos mecanismos podrían ser útiles a la hora de explicar el comportamiento de los hinchas deportivos, sin embargo, convertirían en inútiles los (...) esfuerzos de la ética del deporte por establecer el principio del fair play como regulador ético de la práctica deportiva. Este trabajo ofrecerá dos contra-argumentos que mostrarán que, primero, nuestro comportamiento no está determinado por ciertos mecanismos automáticos que acontecen en el cerebro y, segundo, de hecho, la configuración de nuestro cerebro facilitaría en ciertos casos la posibilidad de que los hinchas desarrollen un comportamiento más ético. Por lo tanto, las metas de la ética del deporte no se ven socavadas completamente por los descubrimientos de las neurociencias.PALABRAS CLAVEÉTICA DEL DEPORTE, NEUROÉTICA, HINCHA DEPORTIVO, JUEGO LIMPIOABSTRACTThis work shall analyze whether or not the recent studies on neuroethics and neighbour disciplines have a critical impact on the ethical reflection on sports. Given Jonathan Haidt’s and Joshua Greene’s works on neuroethics, our moral behaviour seems to be mainly rooted in emotive mechanisms within our brain. If this is true, then sports supporters’ behaviour can easily be explained by appealing to such emotive brain mechanisms. However, they will turn the efforts to apply the moral principle that is supposed to regulate the sporting world—the fair play principle—into useless efforts. I shall give two counter-arguments that will show, firstly, that supporters’ misbehaviour cannot be totally explained by pointing out to several neural—natural—mechanisms, and, secondly, that our brains’ make-up can, nevertheless, make sports supporters more willing to abide by the fair play principle. Therefore, sport ethics’ aims are not undermined by neuroscientific knowledge.KEYWORDSSPORTS ETHICS, NEUROETHICS, SPORTS SUPPORTER, FAIR PLAY PRINCIPLE. (shrink)

Neuroética y Neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación moral.

Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation presents the basic tools for the identification, analysis, and evaluation of common arguments for beginners. The book teaches by using examples of arguments in dialogues, both in the text itself and in the exercises. Examples of controversial legal, political, and ethical arguments are analyzed. Illustrating the most common kinds of arguments, the book also explains how to evaluate each kind by critical questioning. Douglas Walton shows how arguments can be reasonable under the right dialogue conditions by (...) using critical questions to evaluate them. The book teaches by example, both in the text itself and in exercises, but it is based on methods that have been developed through the author's thirty years of research in argumentation studies. (shrink)

La neuroética nace oficialmente a comienzos del siglo XXI, gracias al avance de las neurociencias, como ética aplicada vinculada a la bioética, pero también como neuroética autónoma. Como ética aplicada, aborda cuestiones cercanas a la bioética. Como neuroética autónoma, se enfrenta a problemas clásicos de la filosofía desde una perspectiva neurocientífica en sentido amplio. Dos cuestiones serán centrales en ella: diseñar un marco para seleccionar, interpretar e integrar los datos de las neurociencias acerca de la moralidad, y (...) trazar el método -o métodos- adecuados para el nuevo saber. Curiosamente, en ambos casos la mayor parte de los neuroéticos dice inscribirse en posiciones naturalistas, pero realmente procede de forma no-naturalista. El artículo se propone analizar los distintos lados de la neuroética y sacar a la luz el método que realmente siguen los neuroéticos, que desmiente al naturalismo. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo intentaré comparar dos momentos en la producción teórica de Nancy Fraser: sus análisis contemporáneos del capitalismo como orden institucional y su marco categorial previo, basado en dualismo de redistribución y reconocimiento. Destacaré tres grandes rupturas en su evolución intelectual: en el diagnóstico del presente, en la comprensión del capitalismo como tal y en la propuesta política.In this paper I will try to compare two periods in Nancy Fraser's theoretical evolution: her analysis of contemporary capitalism as an (...) institutional social order and her previous categorial framework, based on the dualims of redistribution and recognition. I will highlight three major ruptures in her intellectual development: in the diagnosis of present times, in the understanding of capitalism as such and in political proposal. (shrink)

ENRIQUE BONETE: Neuroética práctica, Desclée de Brouwer, 2011, 192 pp.; JOSÉ MANUEL GIMÉNEZ AMAYA y SERGIO SÁNCHEZ-MIGALLÓN: De la Neurociencia a la Neuroética, Navarra, EUNSA 2010, 192 pp.; KATHINKA EVERS: Neuroética. Cuando la materia se despierta, Argentina- España, Katz, 2011, 208 pp.

In this chapter, a generic definition of fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis is sought and its applicability examined. Most discussions of fundamentality are focused on a mereological understanding of the hierarchical structure of reality, which may be combined with an atomistic, object-oriented metaphysics. But recent work in structuralism, for instance, calls for an alternative understanding and it is not immediately clear that the conception of fundamentality at work in structuralism is commensurable with the mereological conception. However, it is proposed (...) that once we understand fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis, these two as well as further conceptions of fundamentality can all be treated on a par, including metaphysical infinitism of the ‘boring’ type, where the same structure repeats infinitely. (shrink)

One of our great contemporary scientists presents ten insights that illuminate what every thinking person needs to know about what the world is and how it works. Nobel Prize winner Frank Wilczek's Fundamentals is built around a simple but profound idea: the models of the world we construct as children are practical and adequate for everyday life, but they do not bring in the surprising and mind-expanding revelations of modern science. To do that, we must look at the world anew, (...) combining clear thinking with an openness to wonder. This "born again" world is in many ways larger, fuller, and much stranger than it appears. Through an exploration of space, time, matter, and ideas--and equipped with facts, questions, and brilliant speculations--Wilczek guides us through the past, present, and future of fundamental science. Readers will emerge with an expanded vision of our universe. Author Bio: Frank Wilczek won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 2004 for work he did as a graduate student. He was among the earliest MacArthur fellows, and has won many awards both for his scientific work and his writing. He is the author of A Beautiful Question, The Lightness of Being, Fantastic Realities, Longing for the Harmonies, and hundreds of articles in leading scientific journals. His "Wilczek's Universe" column appears regularly in the Wall Street Journal. Wilczek is the Herman Feshbach Professor of Physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, founding director of the T. D. Lee Institute and chief scientist at the Wilczek Quantum Center in Shanghai, China, and a distinguished professor at Arizona State University and Stockholm University. (shrink)

What justifies the allocation of funding to research in physics when many would argue research in the life and social sciences may have more immediate impact in transforming our world for the better? Many of the justifications for such spending depend on the claim that physics enjoys a kind of special status vis-a-vis the other sciences, that physics or at least some branches of physics exhibit a form of fundamentality. The goal of this paper is to articulate a conception of (...) fundamentality that can support such justifications. I argue that traditional conceptions of fundamentality in terms of dynamical or ontic completeness rest on mistaken assumptions about the nature and scope of physical explanations. (shrink)

Introduction -- Part I: The good life -- Hedonism : its powerful appeal -- Is happiness all that matters? -- Getting what you want -- Problems for the desire theory -- Part II: Doing the right thing -- Morality and religion -- Natural law theory -- Psychological egoism -- Ethical egoism -- Consequentialism : its nature and attractions -- Consequentialism : its difficulties -- The kantian perspective : fairness and justice -- The kantian perspective : autonomy and respect -- The (...) social contract tradition : theory and attractions -- The social contract tradition : problems and prospects -- Ethical pluralism and absolute moral rules -- Ethical pluralism : prima facie duties and ethical particularism -- Virtue ethics -- Feminist ethics -- Part III: The status of morality -- Ethical relativism -- Moral nihilism -- Ten arguments against moral objectivity. (shrink)

Metaphysical foundationalists argue that without fundamental facts, we cannot explain why there exist any dependent facts at all. Thus, metaphysical infinitism, the view that chains of ground can descend indefinitely without ever terminating in a level of fundamental facts, allegedly exhibits a kind of explanatory failure. I examine this argument and conclude that foundationalists have failed to show that infinitism exhibits explanatory failure. I argue that explaining the existence of dependent facts in terms of further dependent facts ad (...) infinitum is unproblematic by arguing for the plausibility of a ground-theoretic version of the Hume-Edwards Principle, which states that if each fact in a plurality of facts has a ground, then the plurality itself has a ground. (shrink)

El presente monográfico de Recerca. Revista de Pensament i Anàlisi, titulado «Neuroética y neuroeducación: repensando la relación entre las neurociencias y las ciencias sociales», está formado por ocho artículos de investigación y cuatro recensiones, a través de los cuales se estudian de forma actualizada las relaciones entre las neurociencias y las ciencias sociales. Dentro de las múltiples relaciones que se generan en la conjunción interdisciplinaria de estas dos materias, se destacan especialmente la neuroética y la neuroeducación; sin embargo, (...) temáticamente se acogen perspectivas como la neuropolítica, o la relación entre emoción y razón desde las neurociencias, entre otras. (shrink)

Nihilism is the thesis that no composite objects exist. Some ontologists have advocated abandoning nihilism in favor of deep nihilism, the thesis that composites do not existO, where to existO is to be in the domain of the most fundamental quantifier. By shifting from an existential to an existentialO thesis, the deep nihilist seems to secure all the benefits of a composite-free ontology without running afoul of ordinary belief in the existence of composites. I argue that, while there are (...) well-known reasons for accepting nihilism, there appears to be no reason at all to accept deep nihilism. In particular, deep nihilism draws no support either from the usual arguments for nihilism or from considerations of parsimony. (shrink)

Previously published: Seventh edition. Boston: Prentice Hall, 2010.

The notion of fundamentality, as it is used in metaphysics, aims to capture the idea that there is something basic or primitive in the world. This metaphysical notion is related to the vernacular use of “fundamental”, but philosophers have also put forward various technical definitions of the notion. Among the most influential of these is the definition of absolute fundamentality in terms of ontological independence or ungroundedness. Accordingly, the notion of fundamentality is often associated with these two other technical (...) notions. (shrink)

Introducción al número 13 de Recerca. Revista de Pensament i Anàlisi.

The distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties should be familiar from discussions of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: two otherwise exactly similar individuals, Castor and Pollux, might share all their qualitative properties yet differ with respect to their non-qualitative properties—for while Castor has the property being identical to Castor, Pollux does not. But while this distinction is familiar, there has not been much critical attention devoted to spelling out its precise nature. I argue that the class of non-qualitative (...) properties is broader than it is often taken to be. When properly construed, it will not only include properties such as being identical to Castor, which somehow make reference to particular individuals, it will also include more general properties such as identity, composition, set membership, as well as various peculiarly ontological properties. Given that some of these more general properties help to explain objective similarity, we have reason to believe that there are fundamental non-qualitative properties. (shrink)

The concept of a reason is now central to many areas of contemporary philosophy. Key theses in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and the philosophy of the emotions, among others, have come to be framed in terms of reasons. And yet, despite their centrality, theorists seem to take inconsistent things for granted about how reasons work, what kinds of things can be reasons, what reasons favor, and more. Somehow reasons have come to be both indispensable and impenetrable. -/- (...) The Fundamentals of Reasons offers a comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of reasons. Focusing on the twin roles of reasons in explanation and deliberation, the book not only emphasizes what has made reasons central across philosophy but it also explores why philosophers have such incompatible pictures about what reasons are and how they work. Working from the inside out, Howard and Schroeder identify contentious assumptions about not only the internal structure of reasons but also their relationship to other important concepts, and then show how these contentious assumptions shape the many downstream applications of reasons in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and beyond. -/- This mildly opinionated exploration of key questions about the significance and nature of reasons helps the reader to navigate this important part of the philosophical landscape and to get clearer about why reasons seem important and what their import, ultimately, is. (shrink)

Reseña de la obra: Adela Cortina : Neuroética y Neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación moral, Madrid, Tecnos. ISBN: 978-84-309-5321-9.

A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. But a puzzle arises. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim (...) that the fundamental just is the foundational. It is tempting to resolve the puzzle by rejecting the first or second claim, perhaps because it is obscure how the third claim might plausibly be challenged. But I develop a new analysis of fundamentality which challenges the third claim by allowing for an entity to be fundamental without being foundational. The analysis, roughly, is that an entity is fundamental just in case not all facts about it are grounded in facts about other entities. The possibility of fundamentality without foundations not only provides for a novel resolution to the puzzle, but has applications to some live debates: for example, it undermines Jonathan Schaffer's modal argument for priority monism. (shrink)

I argue that the skeptical force of a disagreement is mitigated to the extent that it is fundamental, where a fundamental disagreement is one that is driven by differences in epistemic starting points. My argument has three steps. First, I argue that proponents of conciliatory policies have good reason to affirm a view that I call “instrumentalism,” a view that commends treating our doxastic inclinations like instrumental readouts. Second, I show that instrumentalism supplies a basis for demanding conciliatory (...) requirements in superficial disagreements but not in fundamental disagreements. Third, I argue that the frequently invoked “independence” principle, which arguably would require significant conciliation in fundamental disputes, is unmotivated in light of the explanatory power of instrumentalism. The most plausible conciliatory view, then, is a weak conciliationism that features instrumentalism rather than independence as the central principle, and that therefore gives us a principled basis for thinking that fundamental disagreements should occasion less doxastic revision than shallow disagreements. (shrink)

La Neuroética necesita un marco de ética filosófica desde el que interpretar, integrar y criticar el progreso neurocientífico en el ámbito moral. Este artículo intenta: 1) Mostrar en qué medida este marco es necesario. 2) Abordar la cuestión del método adecuado para construirlo. 3) Compilar los principales tópoi de las neurociencias que el marco debería interpretar e integrar. 4) Mostrar cómo la ética del discurso puede ser un marco adecuado para la neuroética. 5) Señalar algunas insuficiencias de ese (...) marco y sugerir para superarlas una ética de la razón cordial. (shrink)

In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from (...) the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's “translate-and-deflate” methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think that questions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one. (shrink)