While the French Jesuits were scandalized at God's moral necessity to elect the best, Des Bosses was right in defending the Théodicée drawing the attention to the contemporary Spanish theology. In fact, Optimism is not the invention of Leibniz', but of the two Sevillan Jesuits' Diego Ruiz de Montoya and Diego Granado . It will be argued that Optimism has two roots, both of them closely connected with the Posttridentinian Theology: 1) the moralization of modal categories, 2) a universe integrating (...) Nature, Grace and Incarnation. In the latter regard, Optimism is a legitimate child of Molinism, viz. in respect to the ,scientia media‘ being the basis of its concept of World, to the ,total decree‘ as a certain mode of this world being realized. As a result, the Théodicée depends on Jesuit theology to an extent which still has to be acknowledged. (shrink)

La nozione di “ sensus communis ” è una delle nozioni più importanti e allo stesso tempo complesse dell’intera filosofia kantiana. Tale complessità è dovuta alla diversità di significati che essa acquisisce nel corso degli scritti kantiani, i quali non dedicano mai una analisi precipua a questo concetto. Recenti studi, come quelli di Zhengmi Zhouhuang e di Serena Feloj, hanno contribuito a focalizzare l’attenzione su tale nozione, sulla sua importanza e sulle difficoltà ad essa connesse. Proprio a partire dalla discussione (...) di queste interessanti analisi, vorrei proporre una lettura epistemologica del “senso comune”, che tenga conto della molteplicità delle connotazioni che tale nozione di volta in volta assume, senza per questo perdere di vista l’unità e la sistematicità del sistema delle facoltà. Questa nozione a mio giudizio può essere identificata con la stessa facoltà di giudizio: facoltà che nell’esperienza estetica esprime pienamente la sua eautonomia, essendo a sé stessa sia oggetto sia legge. In questa senso la trattazione del “ sensus communis ” rende più che mai evidente l’importanza e la ricchezza teorica dell’approfondimento delle condizioni trascendentali che ha luogo nella terza Critica. (shrink)

This essay examines the way in which the modal concept of necessity was discussed and analyzed in some eleventh- and early twelfth-century sources, such as Peter Damian’s De divina omnipotentia, Anselm of Canterbury’s Cur deus homo and several anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione that were presumably composed in the first two decades of the twelfth century by logicians connected to William of Champeaux’s and Peter Abelard’s milieu. My aim is to offer a comparison of these different sources with respect (...) to their use of the Boethian distinction between two types or kinds of necessity, namely, the “absolute” or “simple” necessity that is involved in statements like “God is necessarily immortal” or “it is necessary for humans to be animals”, and the “conditional” or “temporal” necessity that is at stake when we say, for instance, that someone necessarily walks when he is walking. (shrink)

Quite contrary to the mainstream history of ideas, Spanish intellectuals play an important part in the 17 th century dispute about natural law, physical evidence and the principle of induction. Optimism as taught by Antonio Perez and Martin Esparza in Salamanca and Rome has given rise to a sophisticated theological debate of a subject that was to demand philosophers' attention for centuries to come. The features of empirism brought forward by Bernardo Aldrete and Antonio Bernaldo de Quiros will stimulate the (...) research on Hume's scholastic reading. (shrink)

The concept of transition appears to be linked, in Marxist theory, to a dialectical conception of the historical process, insofar as it presents itself as a necessity resulting from the development of the conditions posed by the old society. In the work of Louis Althusser, who in the mid-1960s imposed himself on the French Marxist debate with positions critical of any residue of the philosophy of history in dialectical materialism, the role of transition appears as problematic as ever. However, in (...) the second half of the 1970s, the French philosopher led a battle in defence of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, linked to that of transition. This article aims to make this apparent contradiction intelligible. An attempt will thus be made to hold together the mechanism of structuration, which prohibits the idea of a dialectical transition to communism, and the opposition to the abandonment of the perspective of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the urgency of the fight against euro-communism. Only the idea of coercive action on the elements of the structure will be able to replace the dialectical necessity in its function of giving foundation to the preservation of the reference to the dictatorship in the revolutionary process. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to explain why the practical aspects of Kantian metaphysics are obviously the main achievement of his Copernican Revolution. More than that, though: they are the key for understanding the Critical Philosophy itself. Setting off with some remarks on the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper delves into the critique of Practical Reason and ends with the Ceritique of Judgment, thus showing the interconnection of the three masterpieces within a new understanding of human reason as a (...) living organism. (shrink)

In this essay, I consider some logical treatises and commentaries from the first decades of the 12th century (many of which are still unedited) which contain a discussion on modalities and modal logic. After presenting a short catalogue of these sources and a description of their common features, I shall focus on some definitions of the modal term “necessarium” which are provided in them. As we will see, Abelard and logicians of his time advanced three different characterizations of this term: (...) necessity was either defined in terms of unavoidability (ineuitabilitas), or in terms of immutability and omnitemporality (impermutabilitas, sempiternitas), or again in terms of absolute necessity as opposed to conditioned one (necessitas absoluta vs. determinata). I argue that the temporal understanding of necessity in terms of omnitemporality, inherited from ancient sources and extensively used by Abelard and others in the first years of the twelfth-century, started to disappear in texts datable from around the 1120, perhaps due to several difficulties that were related to this definition when applied in logical contexts. I also discuss how the notion of necessitas determinata was used by Abelard’s contemporaries to qualify the modal status of present and past events, which were generally believed to be necessary only in a “weak” and harmless sense that did not prevent them from being contingent. -/- . (shrink)

This essay is a constructivist account of the role of desires in practical reasoning.

resumo Há razões de ordem estritamente lógica para que Wittgenstein tenha postulado no Tractatus a existência de um sujeito transcendental. Sem esse sujeito, o Tractatus não teria como lidar com a constituição do sentido proposicional. É ele o responsável pela associação entre nomes e objetos e pela efetuação de operações lógicas como a negação, a quantificação e a atribuição numérica. palavras-chave Wittgenstein – lógica – sujeito transcendental – linguagem – sentido – proposição.