A moralised conception of freedom is based on a normative theory. Understanding it therefore requires an analysis of this theory. In this paper, I show how republican freedom as non-domination is moralised, and why analysing this concept therefore involves identifying the basic components of the republican theory of justice. One of these components is the non-moralised pure negative conception of freedom as non-interference. Republicans therefore cannot keep insisting that their freedom concept conflicts with, and is superior (...) to, this more basic concept. I demonstrate how we can use pure negative freedom to formulate the republican theory more precisely. This exercise is more fruitful than the common focus on the alleged conflict between the two freedom concepts. (shrink)

In defending toleration against its many critics, Respecting Toleration has both conceptual and normative aims. Conceptually, I defend and explain the coherence of political toleration. This involves, in part, highlighting a distinction between two forms of toleration; one of which always involves objection, and one which does not. Normatively, I defend a particular understanding of toleration as the best way of accommodating contemporary diversity. In brief, the state should be guided by an active ideal of neutrality, and citizens must at (...) minimum engage in forbearance tolerance with each others’ differences. In this paper, I respond to four main lines of criticism. The first is that my understanding of toleration – in which objection is not always necessary – is too broad, and that my non-moralised understanding of forbearance tolerance requires additional context. Second, my discussion of neutrality runs together the distinction between an active/passive state with a large/small state; wrongly fails to distinguish between mere preferences and deeply held beliefs; and is really a concern about equality. Third, my freedom-based justification for toleration is too limited; and may, in fact, enable recognition rather than resist it. Fourth, my rejection of inter-citizen respect for difference is too quick. (shrink)

Coercion is by its very nature hostile to the individual subjected to it. At the same time, it often is a necessary evil: political life cannot function without at least some instances of coercion. Hence, it is not surprising that coercion has been the topic of heated philosophical debate for many decades. Though numerous accounts have been put forth in the literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the question what exactly being subjected to coercion does to an individual (...) that makes it so hostile to his person. This paper develops an analysis of the subjective aspect of coercion whereby this hostility is explained. It is argued that coercion is not just a matter of interference with one's agency, but also affects one's morality. Because coercion is a form of subjugation it does more than merely limit one's freedom, it constitutes an affront to one's dignity as well. A new account of coercion is developed that pays particular attention to the subjectivity inherent in coercion. This account takes a middle ground in the ongoing debate between advocates of moralised and non-moralised conceptualisations of coercion. The paper closes by applying this account to two prominent issues in the literature on coercion: the use of coercion claims in attempts to avoid being held responsible for one's actions, and the coercíveness of the law. (shrink)

The idea of coercion is one that has played, and continues to play, at least two importantly distinct moral-theoretic roles in our thinking. One, which has been the focus of a number of recent influential treatments, is a primarily deontic role in which claims of coercion serve to indicate relatively weighty prima facie wrongs and excuses. The other, by contrast, is a primarily axiological or eudaimonic role in which claims of coercion serve to pick out instances of some distinctive kind (...) of pro tanto human bad (such as unfreedom or interpersonal subjection). I argue that this turns out not to be a simple case of one idea put to two different uses, but rather a case of two subtly distinct ideas in need of separate philosophical treatment. Moreover, although often relatively neglected, the primarily eudaimonic idea of coercion is of enduring importance to both liberal-perfectionist and socialist political moralities, as well as to personal ethics. This paper aims to elucidate it and to examine its relationship to its better-theorised deontic cousin. In addition, the paper seeks to show how a better understanding of these aspects of the concept can enable us to resolve certain important and long-standing theoretical disagreements, such as the dispute over whether coercion is an ‘essentially moralised’ concept and the dispute over whether (genuine) offers can be coercive. (shrink)

The moral potential of works of art, for good or ill, has been recognised from philosophical antiquity: on the assumption that the moral effects of art are invariably negative, Plato advised the exclusion of artists from any rationally ordered state. Arguably, however, the problem of the moral status of art has become yet more acute in contexts of post-Romantic and other modern artistic exploration of moral ambiguity, and even of some apparent contemporary celebration of the immoral and amoral. Indeed, some (...) tension between commitment to liberal-democratic openness and freedom, on the one hand, and fear about the potential literary and artistic corruption of the young, on the other, is evident in latter-day moralistic trends in children’s literature. However, in the light of some basic exploration of conceptual relationships between the artistic, the aesthetic and the moral, this paper argues that such moralising trends in particular and arguments for artistic censorship in general are mostly wrongheaded and unsustainable. (shrink)

The moral potential of works of art, for good or ill, has been recognised from philosophical antiquity: on the assumption that the moral effects of art are invariably negative, Plato advised the exclusion of artists from any rationally ordered state. Arguably, however, the problem of the moral status of art has become yet more acute in contexts of post-Romantic and other modern artistic exploration of moral ambiguity, and even of some apparent contemporary celebration of the immoral and amoral. Indeed, some (...) tension between commitment to liberal-democratic openness and freedom, on the one hand, and fear about the potential literary and artistic corruption of the young, on the other, is evident in latter-day moralistic trends in children’s literature. However, in the light of some basic exploration of conceptual relationships between the artistic, the aesthetic and the moral, this paper argues that such moralising trends in particular and arguments for artistic censorship in general are mostly wrongheaded and unsustainable. (shrink)

One striking feature of apocalyptic readings of Paul—and the Protestant dogmatics that follows after such a Paulinism—is the ‘widescreen’ portrayal of Sin as Power. This account stresses the ‘three-agent drama’ of salvation and the bondage of human persons to anti-God forces. It resists moralising interpretations of human sins in favour of a starker moral cosmology. In this way, it seems to leave ‘ethics’ and ‘freedom’ in suspension. Contrast the approach of the moral theologian Oliver O’Donovan. Here, sin is (...) a case study in the difference of perspectives between dogmatics and ethics. Dogmatics, ‘making sin exceedingly sinful, quickly resorts to apocalyptic largeness of scale’. Ethics is concerned instead with ‘possible’ sins. It describes sin in phenomenological rather than ultimate terms—something to be avoided in the next moment of free agency. This article distils the theological commitments each intends to secure, observes what each risks, and seeks to determine what is at stake. It draws them together in a synthetic moral ontology, but also looks further, to an integrative account that can inform moral discernment. To this end, the final section observes how subsequent work in Pauline studies converges with discussions about structural sin in Catholic social thought. (shrink)

Different from the autonomy of understanding in cognition and the autonomy of practical reason in praxis, the heautonomy in the judgement of taste is reflexive. The reflexivity consists not only in the fact that the power of judgement legislates to its own usage but also, and more importantly, it legislates to itself through its own operative process. This normativity, based on the self-referential structure of pure aesthetic judgement and the a priori principle of subjective, internal purposiveness, can be regarded as (...) a self-discovering and self-flourishing principle that organically grows out of the aesthetic experience and, at the same time, regulates its growth in return. In this scenario, aesthetic freedom can be identified as a third kind of freedom different from Kant’s transcendental freedom and practical freedom – a flexible and living freedom with spontaneous legislation, but not bound by any determinate laws. (shrink)

Health promotion efforts are commonly directed towards encouraging people to discard ‘unhealthy’ and adopt ‘healthy’ behaviours in order to tackle chronic disease. Typical targets for behaviour change interventions include diet, physical activity, smoking and alcohol consumption, sometimes described as ‘lifestyle behaviours.’ In this paper, I discuss how efforts to raise awareness of the impact of lifestyles on health, in seeking to communicate the need for people to change their behaviour, can contribute to a climate of ‘healthism’ and promote the moralisation (...) of people’s lifestyles. I begin by summarising recent trends in health promotion and introducing the notion of healthism, as described by Robert Crawford in the 1980s. One aspect of healthism is moralisation, which I outline and suggest is facilitated by efforts to promote health via information provision and educational strategies. I propose that perceived responsibility plays a role in mediating the tendency to moralise about health and behaviour. Since I argue that states ought to avoid direct and indirect moralisation of people’s health-related behaviour, this suggests states must be cautious with regard to the use of responsibility-indicating interventions to promote health. (shrink)

The author defines moralisation as cultural processes marked by a rise in moralistic argumentation to a degree which raises questions and doubts of a philosophical and sociological nature. This is developed on in detail in the sections “The moralisation of the world and suffering,” “The moralisation of everyday life and history,” “The moralisation of knowledge” and “The moralisation of human nature.” The closing section of the article, “Moralisation and morality,” focuses on the relation between the described moralistic approach and the (...) changes broadly-understood moral awareness is undergoing in the contemporary world. (shrink)

The concept of moralisation of health behaviours was introduced in social psychology to describe the attribution of moral properties to habits and conditions like smoking or being a vegetarian. Moral properties are powerful motivators for people and institutions, as they may trigger blame, stigma, and appraisal, as well as the polarisation of interest and scientific hype. Here I extend the concept and illustrate how medicines and treatments can be seen as if they had moral properties, too, when they come to (...) be regarded as good or bad in the moral sense, and not just in the instrumental sense of benefiting or harming health. I propose the hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) controversy of 2020 as an example of moralisation of a medicine. HCQ and chloroquine are anti-malarial drugs, whose off-label use for Covid-19 was hotly discussed in the early months of the pandemic, both in the media and within the scientific community, and eventually dismissed when robust evidence came out. The point of the paper is to show that moralisation of health products and treatments may influence individual and institutional decisions in significant ways, and also affect research. For these reasons, it should be carefully monitored and critically assessed. (shrink)

In this study, Worsley argues that it is rational to believe in a loving God in the face of evil. Beginning with a critique of Alvin Plantinga, he shows that human freedom is highly complex, and so depends upon complex structures in nature. These are both necessary for freedom but also sufficient for natural evil. He offers close analysis of the evolution of the human brain. The book develops a parallel argument that human evil stems from the evolution (...) of personality. (shrink)

La paix partout menacée est souvent en butte à l’intégrisme religieux qui prétend défendre des valeurs morales « au nom de Dieu », là où il bafoue l’humanité. C’est pourquoi, il est temps de moraliser Dieu : assurer à chacun la possibilité de croire ou de ne pas croire, ne pas introduire de hiérarchie au sein du polythéisme et inviter les croyants à se demander ce qu’ils font de leur foi. Car, en l’espèce, si les actes valent mieux que les (...) paroles, aucun Dieu ne peut (par la voix de ses prêtres, de ses pasteurs ou de ses imams) exiger des fidèles qu’il tuent, massacrent et sèment la terreur. Comme le montre cet article, seule une éthique débarrassée de l’obscurantisme et de l’intolérance peut prétendre à l’universel et à la solidarité. (shrink)

La paix partout menacée est souvent en butte à l’intégrisme religieux qui prétend défendre des valeurs morales « au nom de Dieu », là où il bafoue l’humanité. C’est pourquoi, il est temps de moraliser Dieu : assurer à chacun la possibilité de croire ou de ne pas croire, ne pas introduire de hiérarchie au sein du polythéisme et inviter les croyants à se demander ce qu’ils font de leur foi. Car, en l’espèce, si les actes valent mieux que les (...) paroles, aucun Dieu ne peut (par la voix de ses prêtres, de ses pasteurs ou de ses imams) exiger des fidèles qu’il tuent, massacrent et sèment la terreur. Comme le montre cet article, seule une éthique débarrassée de l’obscurantisme et de l’intolérance peut prétendre à l’universel et à la solidarité. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : Many philosophers and psychologists think that moral norms have a different nature as rules from convention: while we are obliged to respect moral norms because of what they are in themselves, our respect for conventions depends on our attitude toward a particular social context. I question this distinction between moral norms and conventions and argue that conventions depend on social context because the context structures the agents’ expectations, sets reference points for the assessment of gains and losses, and (...) helps the observer to infer the presence and the seriousness of harms. (shrink)

À propos de : Pascal Engel, Les Vices du savoir. Essai d’éthique intellectuelle, Marseille, Agone, coll. « Banc d’essais », 2019, 612 p. Dans The Ethics of Belief, le mathématicien et philosophe anglais William Clifford affirme : « on a tort, partout, toujours et qui que l’on soit, de croire quoi que ce soit sur la base de données insuffisantes ». En dépit de cette sentence peu nuancée, Clifford pose un véritable problème : celui des liens entre normes épistémiques et (...) normes morales. Les croy... (shrink)

There are arguments for determinism. Admittedly, this is opposed by the fact of everyday experience of autonomy. In the following, it is argued for the compatibility of determinism and autonomy. Taking up considerations of Donald MacKay, a fatalistic attitude can be refuted as false. Repeatedly, attempts have been made to defend the possibility of autonomy with reference to quantum physical indeterminacy. But its statistical randomness clearly misses the meaning of autonomy. What is decisive, on the other hand, is the possibility (...) of knowledge, which opens up opportunities for planning, freedom of choice and ultimately 'self-choice'. Results of neurobiological research, especially Benjamin Libet's and more recently John-Dylan Haynes', seem to refute this: Actions are unconsciously initiated before conscious decision. But, as Libet has also shown, consciousness always has the possibility of a veto – and thus also of knowledge-driven action control. Ultimately, the idea of possible self-choice can thus become the determining condition. Only such a form of rational self-determination establishes a spiritual identity and at the same time represents the maximum of autonomy possible for human beings. (shrink)

The lack of consensus in stating what Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) exactly means has led some people to argue that the concept is too vague to offer guidance, while others suggest forgetting about theorising and instead focusing entirely on the development of practical applications such as codes of conduct, standards and reporting initiatives. This article argues that the discussion on CSR as a whole has reached this impasse because it ignores two major underlying problems. First, the fact that CSR is (...) an ideological notion: the definition and use of ‘CSR’ depends on the moral and practical views of the people and organisations involved. Secondly, the debate on CSR lacks a thorough discussion about the nature and role of the firm, the main actor when it comes to accepting and implementing CSR. After explaining our standpoint, this article winds up with the implications of this reframing for the CSR debate, for the efforts to define it and for the efforts to apply it. (shrink)

The lack of consensus in stating what Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) exactly means has led some people to argue that the concept is too vague to offer guidance, while others suggest forgetting about theorising and instead focusing entirely on the development of practical applications such as codes of conduct, standards and reporting initiatives. This article argues that the discussion on CSR as a whole has reached this impasse because it ignores two major underlying problems. First, the fact that CSR is (...) an ideological notion: the definition and use of ‘CSR’ depends on the moral and practical views of the people and organisations involved. Secondly, the debate on CSR lacks a thorough discussion about the nature and role of the firm, the main actor when it comes to accepting and implementing CSR. After explaining our standpoint, this article winds up with the implications of this reframing for the CSR debate, for the efforts to define it and for the efforts to apply it. (shrink)

Aimed at a wide audience, this book in the general area of practical ethics consists of seven independent and humorous philosophical analyses of common moral situations, occurrences, and confrontations. The introduction discusses the idea of moralising; Cohen explains what it is, why moral philosophers tend to avoid it, and why it seems a particularly worthwhile enterprise for the book. Throughout its discussions, the book is accessible to readers at any stage of philosophic interest. The author distinguishes between moral encounters (...) and more mundane concerns, an aspect that separates this book from other practical ethics works. Contents: Introduction; Too Busy: A Note on Wasting Time; The Derogatory Erstwhile Fact, or Calling a Spade a Spade; Justification/Explanation and Treatment, or Putting the Shoe on the Other Foot; Vicarious Pride; 'Women's' Gymnastics; Vocations and Vocations; The Last Word. (shrink)

Dans le contexte de laïcisation des espaces publics, les émissions de « libre antenne » radiophonique pour adolescents témoignent d'une dissolution de la parole experte au profit d'une parole commune ou doxique et de ce que l'on appellera un « programme communicationnel ». Ce dernier s'avère bien plus consistant que ce que l'on veut bien souvent accorder au monde des médias, puisqu'il est porteur sinon d'un ordre moral, au moins de « valeurs » sur la sexualité et les relations amoureuses.In (...) the context of secularization of public spaces, issues of "free air" radio show for teenagers dissolution of the word expert in favor of a common word or doxic and that the we call a "communicational program." This is much more substantial than what we often want to give the media world, since otherwise carries a moral, at least "values" on sexuality and relationships. (shrink)

The democratic age -- A brief history of human liberty -- The twisted path -- Illiberal democracy -- The Islamic exception -- Too much of a good thing -- The death of authority -- The way out -- The 51st state.

Historical introduction -- Human being -- Identity and human incompletion in Sartre -- Identity and human incompletion in Aquinas -- Human understanding -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Sartre -- The subjective nature of objective understanding in Aquinas -- Human freedom -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Sartre -- Freedom, choice, and the indetermination of reason in Aquinas -- Human fulfillment -- The possibility of human happiness in Sartre -- The possibility of (...) human happiness in Aquinas. (shrink)

Edwards’s views on the nature of the human will demonstrate his unique ability to unite philosophical rigor and theological fervor. Edwards was a staunch defender of the Reformed doctrines of absolute divine sovereignty and meticulous providence, but he was also a proponent of the intellectual tools and methods of early modern philosophy (and of John Locke in particular). His ultimate statement of his doctrinal position, Freedom of the Will, is the masterful result of these dual commitments.