A theology aims to explain the nature of God. A metatheology investigates more fundamental issues concerning how to structure such an intellectual endeavor. This book examines where it is best to start the project of theology in the hope of offering a defensible metatheory from which a complete and elegant theology can be developed.

Philosophy and theology have always been, in some measure, a matter of rewriting the past. This can be done with more or less objectivity, more or less insight, however. Of late, the job has not been done at all well with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard. His legacy is in danger of being coopted by modem nihilists. I argue in this paper that Kierkegaard’s understanding of truth, subjectivity, and paradox promises, in reality, a middle way between the metaextremes (...) of foundational ism and nihilism. He is, in this sense, anti-modem. (shrink)

Philosophy and theology have always been, in some measure, a matter of rewriting the past. This can be done with more or less objectivity, more or less insight, however. Of late, the job has not been done at all well with respect to the work of Søren Kierkegaard. His legacy is in danger of being coopted by modem nihilists. I argue in this paper that Kierkegaard’s understanding of truth, subjectivity, and paradox promises, in reality, a middle way between the metaextremes (...) of foundational ism and nihilism. He is, in this sense, anti-modem. (shrink)

What sense, if any, does it make to speak of God? This question, of such vital importance to religious commitment, occupies an important place in discussion among Anglo-American philosophers of religion whose orientation is logical analysis. ‘Metatheological scepticism’ is the view that denies the intelligibility of religious discourse, derived from a theory of meaning which holds that a sentence has cognitive significance only if it makes a statement that is conclusively verifiable on empirical grounds. Dr Heimbeck’s argument for the cognitive (...) nature of religious discourse is twofold. First, he shows that such discourse can qualify as cognitively significant without having to satisfy the verification requirement. Secondly, he shows that it does in fact satisfy such a requirement because it is firmly rooted in the empirical realm. Originally published in 1969, this book, for teachers and students of philosophy of religion, is both easily comprehensible and highly readable, although the discussion of philosophical and theological points is conducted at an advanced level. (shrink)

Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg in their book The Mystical Mind suggest that their neurotheology is both a metatheology and a megatheology. In this commentary I question whether neurotheology is comprehensive enough and suggest that it needs to and possibly can take into account the moral and social dimensions of religion. I then propose an alternative metatheology and megatheology: evolutionary theology grounded in the science of biocultural evolution and focusing on ultimate reality as creatively immanent in natural (...) and human history. Neurotheology and evolutionary theology may complement one another. Evolutionary theology accounts for both the neurology of the brain and culturally evolved ideas and practices of particular religions and their theologies. Hence it seems more comprehensive than neurotheology. However, because ultimate reality in evolutionary theology is immanent in the world of space and time, of baseline experience, it cannot account for the mystic experience of absolute unitary being. In accounting for this transcendent experience and its reality, neurotheology is more comprehensive. However, neither theology can account for how transcendent ultimate reality, experienced by the mystic as absolute unitary being, gives rise to the changing world experienced as baseline reality. (shrink)

Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg's The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience presents a core theory regarding the neurophysical nature of mystical experience; extensions of this theory, focusing upon near‐death experiences and the nature of religion itself; and buttressing arguments proposing that genetically based neurophysical “operators” within the brain compel human beings to think in certain ways. On the basis of this work, the authors pose a “metatheology,” suggesting that certain brain operations may underlie all the (...) religions of the world. The core theory, its extensions, and related arguments are discussed in turn, concluding with commentary on the authors’ constructive theology. (shrink)

Many assumptions believe that classical Islamic theology is no longer relevant in the contemporary era, either because its discussion tends to be theocentric and far from the progress of humanism or because it is considered no longer relevant to answer contemporary issues such as secularism, pluralism, globalization, or neo-atheism. Departing from these problems, efforts have emerged for new readings of classical theology by paying more attention to the context and needs of the times. Among these efforts is the renewal of (...) theology by highlighting its methodological aspects, as was done by a contemporary Moroccan theologian and philosopher, Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This study attempts to describe and analyze the style of renewal of theology from the perspective of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This research is a character study using qualitative methods, in which the existing data is analyzed critically. This article shows that Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s style of renewal of ‘ilm al-kalām focuses on efforts to reform the methodology of classical kalam by reforming the method of dialogue science (munaẓarah) through contemporary linguistic and logical tools, rearranging analogy patterns (qiyas), and building a logic of kalam based on the principle’s logic and morality as well as the amalgamation of theoretical aspect and practical aspect. The significance of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s renewal in contemporary Islamic theology lies in the theorizing of concepts in classical theology with a contemporary approach as well as the construction of the methodology of contemporary Islamic theology to answer ever-evolving theological issues. (shrink)

It is difficult to reconcile claims about the Father's role as the progenitor of Trinitarian Persons with commitment to the equality of the persons, a problem that is especially acute for Social Trinitarians. I propose a metatheological account of the doctrine of the Trinity that facilitates the reconciliation of these two claims. On the proposed account, ‘Father’ is systematically ambiguous. Within economic contexts, those which characterize God's relation to the world, ‘Father’ refers to the First Person of the Trinity; within (...) theological contexts, which purport to describe intra-Trinitarian relations, it refers to the Trinity in toto-thus in holding that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father we affirm that the Trinity is the source and unifying principle of Trinitarian Persons. While this account is solves a nagging problem for Social Trinitarians it is theologically minimalist to the extent that it is compatible with both Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism, and with heterodox Modalist and Tri-theist doctrines as well. Its only theological cost is incompatibility with the Filioque Clause, the doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son—and arguably that may be a benefit. (shrink)

What sense, if any, does it make to speak of God? This question, of such vital importance to religious commitment, occupies an important place in discussion among Anglo-American philosophers of religion whose orientation is logical analysis. ‘Metatheological scepticism’ is the view that denies the intelligibility of religious discourse, derived from a theory of meaning which holds that a sentence has cognitive significance only if it makes a statement that is conclusively verifiable on empirical grounds. Dr Heimbeck’s argument for the cognitive (...) nature of religious discourse is twofold. First, he shows that such discourse can qualify as cognitively significant without having to satisfy the verification requirement. Secondly, he shows that it does in fact satisfy such a requirement because it is firmly rooted in the empirical realm. Originally published in 1969, this book, for teachers and students of philosophy of religion, is both easily comprehensible and highly readable, although the discussion of philosophical and theological points is conducted at an advanced level. (shrink)

Neurotheological approaches provide an important bridge between scientific and religious perspectives. These approaches have, however, generally neglected the implications of a primordial form of spiritual healing—shamanism. Cross‐cultural studies establish the universality of shamanic practices in hunter‐gatherer societies around the world and across time. These universal principles of shamanism reflect underlying neurological processes and provide a basis for an evolutionary theology. The shamanic paradigm involves basic brain processes, neurognostic structures, and innate brain modules. This approach reveals that universals of shamanism such (...) as animism, totemism, soul flight, animal spirits, and death‐and‐rebirth experiences reflect fundamental brain operations and structures of consciousness. The shamanic paradigm can contribute to a reconciliation of scientific and religious perspectives by providing a universalistic biopsychosocial framework that explicates the biological underpinnings of spiritual experiences and practices and provides a basis for neurotheology and evolutionary theology approaches. (shrink)

Helm criticizes contemporary—largely analytic—work in philosophy of religion which closes off dispute or objection by a simple appeal to "the grammar of religious language" or to "what the believer would say." "The argument of this book is that such approaches involve an important error in philosophical method, for they rest on the mistaken assumption that the ‘religious believer’ has an unmistakable identity, and that ‘religious language’ is a distinct, homogeneous form of language". The issue is methodological because it focuses on (...) "the conceptual imperialism that has plagued accounts of religious belief". Helm believes that philosophical models will more adequately and less dogmatically reflect the pluralism and complexity of religion if we separate religion or theology from metareligion or metatheology. Thus, Part I of the book argues for this distinction and for the interpenetration of meta- and object-languages, in order to reject what are presented as straightforward appeals to an uncontroversial univocity in the logic or language of religious belief. Part II illustrates the inadequacy of such appeals by describing four prominent models of religious belief: 1) the probability model, based on empirical data or natural analogies ; 2) the self-authentication model, based on the intuitively grasped character of a document ; 3) the regulative model, based on morality ; and 4) the acquaintance model, based on immediate awareness and a free or unconstrained interpretation. Part III suggests how each of these four paradigm theories might respond to the two basic questions in Flew’s "falsificationist challenge": What would falsify p? and What reasons would induce A to change his mind as to the truth of p? The variety of the responses is intended to reinforce Helm’s contention that philosophers must give over question-begging methodologies which surreptitiously impose favored models on religious belief.—C.A.C. (shrink)

Watts wishes to engage in a "metatheology" whereby Christianity is looked at from the standpoint of Hindu myth. Viewed in this way, the Christian emphasis on the value of individuality and the absolute separation of creature and Creator is seen as the supreme example of God's maya, the act whereby the Absolute believes itself to be finite and individual. Watts believes that this approach can lead to a mutual enrichment of the two religious traditions. Through most of the book (...) he claims merely to be comparing the Hindu and Christian world-myths; in the end, however, he suggests that the comparison may also have philosophic significance. Though he explicitly denies having written a scholarly book, Watts is often both provocative and perceptive.—P. F. L. (shrink)