Medical necessity (claiming that a medical intervention or care is – at minimum – reasonable, appropriate and acceptable) depends on empirical evidence and on the interpretation of that evidence. Evidence and its interpretation define the standard of care. This commentary argues that both the evidence base and its interpretation are currently weak gatekeepers. Empirical meta-research suggests that very few medical interventions have high quality evidence in support of their effectiveness and very few of them also have (...) relatively thorough assessments of their potential harms. Therefore, evidence on the risk-benefit ratios carries almost always very large uncertainty. Arbitration about medical necessity is thus left to the interpretation process. Professional guidelines are notoriously unreliable and biased in this regard. Regulatory approval ends up being the key arbitrator, but over the years the regulatory process has been subverted. Regulatory approval currently does not mean that an intervention has a favourable risk-benefit ratio, but simply that it can be marketed, sold and made profit from. The process leads to a tragedy of commons where the final victim is society at large: medical necessity is invoked as an alibi for medicine to absorb societal resources. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of medical necessity as it relates to mental health care rationing, arguing that the normal functioning model of medical necessity is insufficient because it fails to cohere with an important aim and function of mental health care, which is to provide support for individuals in abusive or otherwise difficult personal relationships.

The concept of medical necessity plays a central role in many healthcare systems, including Canada's, by helping determine which healthcare services will receive funding. Despite its significance in health policy frameworks, medical necessity has proven to be notoriously difficult to define and operationalise. A shift toward a more personalised and genetically‐informed approach to the provision of healthcare seems likely to heighten associated policy challenges. One of the stated goals of personalised medicine is to save healthcare systems (...) money by facilitating the use of less and more effective treatments. However, any cost saving potential may ultimately be thwarted by physicians' legal and ethical obligations, given that physicians will inevitably be required to implement and define the bounds of genetically‐informed medical necessity for their patients. (shrink)

Recent medical innovations like ‘omics’ technologies, mobile health (mHealth) applications or telemedicine are perceived as part of a shift towards a more preventive, participatory and affordable healthcare model. These innovations are often regarded as ‘disruptive technologies’. It is a topic of debate to what extent these technologies may transform the medical enterprise, and relatedly, what this means for medical ethics. The question of whether these developments disrupt established ethical principles like respect for autonomy has indeed received increasing (...) normative attention during the past years. Yet, more fundamental ethical considerations of a possible disruption of the concept of ‘medical necessity’ (and the potential ensuing clinical ramifications) have been limited if not absent. It is our modest – though morally and practically relevant – aim to address this objective in this article, by exploring how the current wave of allegedly disruptive innovation is invoking a resurgence of this concept and related debates on ‘the’ goal(s) of medicine. (shrink)

The concept of medical necessity is often used to explain or justify certain decisions—for example, which treatments should be allowed under certain conditions—as though it had an obvious, agreed-upon meaning as well as an inherent normative force. In introducing this special issue of Clinical Ethics on medical necessity, we argue that the term, as used in various discourses, generally lacks a definition that is clear, non-circular, conceptually plausible, and fit for purpose. We propose that future work (...) on this concept should address three main questions: what medical necessity is (i.e., what makes something medically necessary, as opposed to something else); what the concept does (what ‘work’ is it doing when invoked in different settings); and what should follow, normatively, from the fact that something is indeed medically necessary (on some plausible conception). (shrink)

The nature of health care, a multifaceted system of reimbursements, subsidies, levels of care, and trade-offs between economics, values and social goods, makes it both a problematic area of policy and critical to the well-being of society. In the United States, provision of health care is not a right as in some countries, but occurs as a function of a complex set of cross-subsidized mechanisms that, according to some analysts, exclude from coverage those who may be in the most need (...) of it. Accordingly, this article examines some of the issues involved in making decisions on how to justly expand health insurance. (shrink)

The nature of health care, a multifaceted system of reimbursements, subsidies, levels of care, and trade-offs between economics, values and social goods, makes it both a problematic area of policy and critical to the well-being of society. In the United States, provision of health care is not a right as in some countries, but occurs as a function of a complex set of cross-subsidized mechanisms that, according to some analysts, exclude from coverage those who may be in the most need (...) of it. Accordingly, this article examines some of the issues involved in making decisions on how to justly expand health insurance. (shrink)

New and proposed medical technologies continually challenge our vision of what constitutes appropriate medical treatment. As scholars and consumers grapple with the meaning of innovation, one common critical theme to surface is that it constitutes undesirable medicalization. But we are embodied creatures who can often benefit from medical knowledge; in addition, rejection of medicalization may be in some cases based on an untenable appeal to nature. Harnessing the power of medicine for women’s welfare requires us to rethink (...) the goals of medicine as well as implement fundamental reforms. (shrink)

„Medizinische Notwendigkeit“ (MedN) ist der zentrale Steuerungsbegriff für die Finanzierung medizinischer Versorgung in der deutschen Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung. Trotz seiner scheinbaren Objektivität und Bestimmtheit durch ärztliche Expertise ist der Begriff alles andere als eindeutig definiert. In diesem ersten von fünf geplanten Aufsätzen zur Begriffsklärung von MedN aus medizintheoretischer, -ethischer, rechtlicher und (sozial)medizinischer Perspektive geht es um eine Systematisierung der aktuellen Kontroversen. Damit soll eine Fundierung für Detaildebatten gelegt werden, die bisher fehlt. Geklärt werden sollen die begriffliche Struktur, Funktion, Kontextualität und Missverständlichkeit (...) von MedN sowie die grundsätzlichen Grenzen einer Begriffsanalyse für die anstehenden normativen Fragen medizinischer Leistungssteuerung. (shrink)

Should mental health insurance cover only disorders found in DSM‐IV, or should it be extended to treatment for ordinary shyness, unhappiness, and other responses to life's hard knocks?

Imagine that we are considering whether our healthcare system (or insurer) should fund treatment or procedure X. One factor that may be cited is that of so-called ‘medical necessity’. The claim would be that treatment X should be eligible for funding if it is medically necessary, but ineligible if this does not apply. Similarly, (and relevant to the debates in this special issue), if considering whether a particular treatment should be ethically and/or legally permitted, we may wish to (...) distinguish between cases where the treatment is medically necessary, and those were it is not. But what do we mean by this concept? Here I will propose and briefly defend one plausible and practical definition. (shrink)

This issue considers the ethics of a healthcare provider intervening into a patient’s genitalia, whether by means of cutting or surgery or by ‘mere’ touching/examination. Authors argue that the permissibility of such actions in the absence of a relevant medical emergency does not primarily turn on third-party judgments of expected levels of physical harm versus benefit, or on related notions such as extensiveness or invasiveness; rather, it turns on the patient’s own consent. To bolster this argument, attention is drawn (...) to the status of the genitals as ‘intimate’ anatomy—a status that is not fully erased by being in a medical context. In this editorial, we draw on the work of Talia Mae Bettcher on ‘intimate agency’ to explore why unconsented interventions into the genitalia may constitute a distinctive sort of personal violation compared to unconsented contact with various other parts of the human body. In their feature article, Marit van der Pijl and colleagues1 argue it is unethical for healthcare providers to perform unconsented episiotomies on persons in labour. In particular, they suggest that, outside of certain rare emergencies in which, for example, the person giving birth is incapacitated1 and the procedure cannot be delayed until consent becomes possible without introducing a significant risk of serious harm (call these ‘medically necessary’2 procedures), ‘presumed consent’ is the incorrect standard to apply. Instead, they stress that, especially when a proposed intervention involves a person’s genital, sexual or reproductive organs, the need to obtain their explicit consent in advance of proceeding must be honoured. As the authors note, the broader social significance of our genitalia—widely regarded as ‘private’ anatomy—is not erased by being in a medical context (see also 2–4). Boundaries must still be observed. Ethically, this ‘leaves a very small margin for error because invasion of these body parts …. (shrink)

Interventions are medically necessary when they are vital in achieving the goal of medicine. However, with varying perspectives comes varying views on what interventions are (un)necessary and, thus, what potential treatment options are available for those suffering from the myriad of conditions, pathologies and disorders afflicting humanity. Medical necessity's teleological nature is perhaps best illustrated in cases where there is debate over using contentious medical interventions as a last resort. For example, whether it is appropriate for those (...) suffering from body integrity dysphoria to receive healthy limb amputations. This paper explores how one's perception of medicine's goal underpins whether interventions are necessary or unnecessary, using the controversial topic of therapeutic amputation as an example. By contrasting ‘classical’ amputations with their more contentious counterparts, it highlights how the idea of medical necessity influences and restrains clinical decision-making. The paper starts by giving an account of body integrity dysphoria, focusing on the debate concerning elective amputation's justifiability. It then introduces Georges Canguilhem's vitalist theory of health, paying particular attention to his emphasis on adaptability. Then, this paper uses his theory as a lens through which to evaluate the appropriateness of therapeutic amputation as a medically necessary procedure. Ultimately, the paper highlights how the label of medical necessity is withheld from potential therapeutic interventions because they fail to conform to pre-established ideas of medicine's purpose and that by doing so, potential harm befalls those who are left with no effective treatments and must look for solutions in the non-clinical world. (shrink)

Genetic intervention is on the near horizon for the treatment of substance abu se. Genetic intervention involves a reprogramming of a person’s own genetic instructions so that that person will no longer have the physical craving for the drug of choice. Unlike pharmacologic intervention, genetic intervention will change the genetic identity of the person, albeit slightly. The legal issue is whether one has a fundamental right to this medical procedure. A fundamental right is one that the government cannot deny (...) without a compelling interest. The case law indicates that the right o f medical necessity applies when the person’s affliction is serious, there are no reasonable or effective alternatives, the person did not intentionally cause the condition, and the treatment is effective for the long term. Unlike the medical marijuana ph enomenon, genetic intervention is per se anti - drug, unrelated to illegal, recreational drug use, and on its face has a medical use. Legal doctrines to date though not directly on point are conceptually compatible with the existence of a fundamental right of medical necessity for genetic intervention. (shrink)

A number of countries and states prohibit surrogacy except in cases of “medical necessity” or for those with specific medical conditions. Healthcare providers in some countries have similar policies restricting the provision of clinical assistance in surrogacy. This paper argues that surrogacy is never medically necessary in any ordinary understanding of this term. The author aims to show first that surrogacy per se is a socio-legal intervention and not a medical one and, second, that the intervention (...) in question does not treat, prevent, or mitigate any actual or potential harm to health. Legal regulations and healthcare-provider policies of this kind therefore codify a fiction—one which both obscures the socio-legal motivations for surrogacy and inhibits critical examination of those motivations while mobilizing normative connotations of appeals to medical need. The persisting distinction, in law and in moral discourse, between “social” and “medical” surrogacy, is unjustified. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBased on the case of Rosa, a nine‐year‐old girl who was denied a therapeutic abortion, this article analyzes the role played by the social in medical practice. For that purpose, it compares the different application of two similar pieces of legislation in Costa Rica, where both the practice of abortion and sterilization are restricted to the protection of health and life by the Penal Code. As a concept subject to interpretation, a broad conception of medical necessity could (...) enable an ample use of the therapeutic exception and a liberal use of both surgeries. The practice of therapeutic sterilization has been generalized in Costa Rica and has become the legitimate way to distribute contraceptive sterilization. In contrast, therapeutic abortion is very rarely practiced. The analysis carried out proposes that it is the difference in social acceptance of abortion and sterilization that explains the different use that doctors, as gatekeepers of social morality, make of medical necessity. (shrink)

Currently, many women who are expecting to give birth have no option but to attempt vaginal delivery, since access to elective planned caesarean sections (PCS) in the absence of what is deemed to constitute ‘clinical need’ is variable. In this paper, we argue that PCS should be routinely offered to women who are expecting to give birth, and that the risks and benefits of PCS as compared with planned vaginal delivery should be discussed with them. Currently, discussions of elective PCS (...) arise in the context of what are called ‘Maternal Request Caesarean Sections’ (MRCS) and there is a good deal of support for the position that women who request PCS without clinical indication should be provided with them. Our argument goes further than support for acceding to requests for MRCS: we submit that healthcare practitioners caring for women with uncomplicated pregnancies have a positive duty to inform them of the option of PCS as opposed to assuming vaginal delivery as a default, and to provide (or arrange for the provision of) PCS if that is the woman's preferred manner of delivery. (shrink)

This article defends the public funding of abortion in the Canadian health care system in light of objections by opponents of abortion that the procedure should be denied public funding. Abortion opponents point out that women terminate their pregnancies most often for social reasons, that the Canadian health care system only requires funding for medically necessary procedures, and that abortion for social reasons is not medically necessary care. I offer two lines of response. First, I briefly present an argument that (...) characterizes abortion sought for social reasons as medically necessary care, directly contesting the anti-abortion position. Second, and more substantially, I present a justice argument that shows that even if abortion is not regarded as medically necessary care, the reasons that typically motivate women to seek abortion are sufficiently weighty from the moral perspective that it would be unjust to deny them public funding. I finish by drawing the more general conclusion that health care funding decisions should be guided by a broader concept of necessary care, rather than by a narrow concept of specifically medical necessity. A broad concept of necessary care has been debated in health care policy in the Netherlands, and I suggest that such a concept would be a more just and defensible guide for funding decisions than the concept of medical necessity. (shrink)

The discovery and invention of new medical applications may be considered blessings to humankind. However, some applications which might be the only remedy for certain diseases may contain ingredients or involve methods that are not in harmony with certain cultural and religious perspectives. These situations have raised important questions in medical ethics; are these applications completely prohibited according to these perspectives, and is there any room for mitigation? This paper explores the concept of darurah and its deliberation in (...) the formulation of fatwas on medicine issued by the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia. Darurah has explicitly been taken into consideration in the formulation of 14 out of 45 fatwas on medicine thus far, including one of the latest fatwas regarding uterine donation and transplantation. These fatwas are not only limited to the issues regarding the use of unlawful things as remedies. They include issues pertaining to organ transplantation, management of the corpse and treatment of brain dead patients. While deliberation of darurah in medicine may vary from issue to issue, darurah applies in a dire situation in which there are no lawful means to prevent harm that may be inflicted upon human life. Nevertheless, other aspects must also be taken into the deliberation. For example, consent must be obtained from the donor or his next of kin to conduct a cadaveric organ transplantation. (shrink)

Debate has raged in Canada recently over whether in vitro fertilization should be funded through public health insurance. Such a move would require that the provinces classify IVF as a medically necessary service. In this paper, I defend the position I have taken publicly—especially in Ontario, my own province—that IVF is not medically necessary. I contend that, by funding IVF on grounds of medical necessity, governments like Ontario's violate their commitments to equality and fairness, and cause harm. They (...) do the last by suggesting that the lives of people who forgo procreation, and perhaps have children in other ways, will be stunted. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to argue for the necessity of an ethics of the practice of the specialist-technologist in medicine. In the first part I sketch three stages of medical ethics, each with a particular viewpoint regarding the technology of medicine. I focus on Brody's consideration of the physician's power as a example of contemporary medical ethics which explicitly excludes the specialist-technologist as a locus of development of medical ethics. Next, the philosophy of Heidegger (...) is examined to suggest an approach to the problem, and, finally, some of Levinas' contributions regarding the other are introduced to suggest a preliminary approach to a medical ethics of the specialist-technologist. (shrink)

An issue in current animal welfare ethics is the use of animals in medical education. At stake is the conflict of pain and suffering of the animals vs. the benefit to the students. The educator's role is to balance these two concepts. If the animals do suffer, this has to be justified by clearly establishing the necessity of their use. Neither this justification nor the methods for making the decision are clear. Addressed in this discussion are the arguments (...) for and against animal use, alternatives, and proposals for the resolution of the controversy. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there are strong reasons for preserving the concept of race in both medical and sociological contexts. While I argue that there are important reasons to conceive of race as picking out distinctions among populations that are both legitimate and important, the notion of race that I advocate in this paper differs in fundamental ways from traditional folk notions of race. As a result, I believe that the folk understanding of race needs either to (...) be revised or eliminated altogether. (shrink)

I introduce a distinction between health need and medical need, and raise several questions about their interaction. Health needs are needs that relate directly to our health condition. Medical needs are needs which bear some relation to medical institutions or processes. I suggest that the question of whether medical insurance or public care should cover medical needs, health needs, or only needs which fit both categories is a political question that cannot be resolved definitionally. I (...) also argue against an overly strict definition of medical need on the grounds that this presupposes, wrongly, that medical intervention should always be a last resort. (shrink)

This classic essay on the responsibilities of a doctor was first published in New York in 1769. It remains a perfect gift for a young doctor just starting out or for one who is older and wiser. This classic will be an inspiration to any who read its timeless message.

Medical classification systems aim to provide a manageable taxonomy for sorting diagnoses into their proper classes. The question, this paper wants to critically examine, is how to correctly systematise diseases within classification systems that are applied in a variety of different settings. ICD and DSM , the two major classification systems in medicine and psychiatry, will be the main subjects of this paper; however, the arguments are not restricted to these classification systems but point out general methodological and epistemological (...) challenges of classifying diseases for differing purposes. Deciding what qualifies as a disease to be included into a classification system as well as choosing a specific validator for correctly systematising diseases is complicated because the broad applicability of medical classification systems simultaneously appears as aim and challenge. Drawing upon the case study of classifying Alzheimer’s disease, this paper will address three dilemmas in designing ‘good’ medical classification systems. They are due to general epistemological problems of medicine, such as the relationship between individual manifestations of diseases and the necessity of building groups in order to scientifically elucidate causes of diseases. Moreover, they involve pragmatic issues of designing usable classifications that allow for easily discriminating between classes of diseases, restricting, however, the completeness of disease representations. This paper wants to trace how the choice of certain validators is unavoidably value-laden and deeply intertwined with epistemological assumptions of how different uses relate to each other, resulting either in a prioritisation of (constrained) coherence or of (vague) pluralistic connectibility. (shrink)

Many hold that distributing healthcare according to medical need is a requirement of equality. Most egalitarians believe, however, that people ought to be equal on the whole, by some overall measure of well-being or life-prospects; it would be a massive coincidence if distributing healthcare according to medical need turned out to be an effective way of promoting equality overall. I argue that distributing healthcare according to medical need is important for reducing individuals' uncertainty surrounding their future (...) class='Hi'>medical needs. In other words, distributing healthcare according to medical need is a natural feature of healthcare insurance; it is about indemnity, not equality. (shrink)

Circumcision is often claimed to be simpler, safer and more cost-effective when performed in the neonatal period as opposed to later in life, with a greater benefit-to-risk ratio. In the first part of this paper, we critically examine the evidence base for these claims, and find that it is not as robust as is commonly assumed. In the second part, we demonstrate that, even if one simply grants these claims for the sake of argument, it still does not follow that (...) neonatal circumcision is ethically permissible absent urgent medical necessity. Based on a careful consideration of the relevant evidence, arguments and counterarguments, we conclude that medically unnecessary penile circumcision—like other medically unnecessary genital procedures, such as ‘cosmetic’ labiaplasty—should not be performed on individuals who are too young (or otherwise unable) to provide meaningful consent to the procedure. (shrink)

The goal of military medicine is to conserve the fighting force necessary to prosecute just wars. Just wars are defensive or humanitarian. A defensive war protects one's people or nation. A humanitarian war rescues a foreign, persecuted people or nation from grave human rights abuse. To provide medical care during armed conflict, military medical ethics supplements civilian medical ethics with two principles: military-medical necessity and broad beneficence. Military-medical necessity designates the medical means (...) required to pursue national self-defense or humanitarian intervention. While clinical-medical necessity directs care to satisfy urgent medical needs, military-medical necessity utilizes medical care to satisfy the just aims of war. Military medicine may therefore attend the lightly wounded before the critically wounded or use medical care to win hearts and minds. The underlying principle is broad, not narrow, beneficence. The latter addresses private interests, while broad beneficence responds to the collective welfare of the political community. (shrink)

The field of medicine provides an important window through which to examine the encounters between religion and science, and between modernity and tradition. While both religion and science consider health to be a ‘good’ that is to be preserved, and promoted, religious and science-based teachings may differ in their conception of what constitutes good health, and how that health is to be achieved. This paper analyzes the way the Islamic ethico-legal tradition assesses the permissibility of using vaccines that contain porcine-derived (...) components by referencing opinions of several Islamic authorities. In the Islamic ethico-legal tradition controversy surrounds the use of proteins from an animal (pig) that is considered to be impure by Islamic law. As we discuss the Islamic ethico-legal constructs used to argue for or against the use of porcine-based vaccines we will call attention to areas where modern medical data may make the arguments more precise. By highlighting areas where science can buttress and clarify the ethico-legal arguments we hope to spur an enhanced applied Islamic bioethics discourse where religious scholars and medical experts use modern science in a way that remains faithful to the epistemology of Islamic ethics to clarify what Islam requires of Muslim patients and healthcare workers. (shrink)

Clinical evidence suggests that many patients undergo surgery that they would decline if fully informed. Failure to communicate the relevant risks, benefits, and alternatives of a procedure violates medical ethics and wastes medical resources. Integrating shared decision-making, a method of communication between provider and patient, into medical decisions can satisfy physicians' ethical obligations and reduce unwanted procedures. This article proposes a three-step process for implementing a nationwide practice of shared decision-making: create model integration programs; provide legal incentives (...) to ease the transition; and incorporate shared decision-making into medical necessity determinations. (shrink)

. Our ideas of disease try to explain it, and they aim at facilitating cures. In the process, they become entwined in sociocultural networks that have totalizing effects. Disease, however, counters this totalizing effect by revealing to us that our lives are fragments. Unless we engage this fragment character of disease and of our lives, we cannot properly understand disease or deal with it. HIV/AIDS clarifies these issues in an extraordinarily powerful fashion. Medical, legal, commercial, political, and institutional approaches (...) to disease overlook the fragment character of disease in favor of totalizing world- views. A theology of disease is necessary in order to maintain the focus on fragments. Unless we recognize this fragment character, we do not really understand our lives, and we do not really understand either disease or healing. (shrink)

Evangelicals are unconditionally opposed to active euthanasia. Indirect euthanasia is seen as simply belonging to the risks inherent in any medical intervention. Passive euthanasia is accepted if used in order to save the dignity of the dying and is seen as merely ceasing to interfere with an irreversible dying process. The basis of evangelical ethics is the Bible supplemented by science and experience as a kind of natural law. Even though natural law comes under Biblicial revelation, its acceptance is (...) the reason for the similarity of the Evangelical and the Roman-Catholic position of Evangelicals. Evangelicals stress the necessity of a better counseling and investment for the deadly ill patient. (shrink)

Health professionals communicate with each other about medication information using different forms of documentation. This article explores knowledge and power relations surrounding medication information exchanged through documentation among nurses, doctors and pharmacists. Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in 2010 in two medical wards of a metropolitan hospital in Australia. Data collection methods included participant observations, field interviews, video‐recordings, document retrieval and video reflexive focus groups. A critical discourse analytic framework was used to guide data analysis. The written medication chart was (...) the main means of communicating medication decisions from doctors to nurses as compared to verbal communication. Nurses positioned themselves as auditors of the medication chart and scrutinised medical prescribing to maintain the discourse of patient safety. Pharmacists utilised the discourse of scientific judgement to guide their decision‐making on the necessity of verbal communication with nurses and doctors. Targeted interdisciplinary meetings involving nurses, doctors and pharmacists should be organised in ward settings to discuss the importance of having documented medication information conveyed verbally across different disciplines. Health professionals should be encouraged to proactively seek out each other to relay changes in medication regimens and treatment goals. (shrink)

The biomedicalist conceptualization of disablement as a personal medical tragedy has been criticized by disability studies scholars for discounting the difference between disability and impairment and the ways disability is produced by socio-environmental factors. This paper discusses prospects for partnerships between disability studies teaching/research and medical education; addresses some of the themes around the necessity of critical disability studies training for medical students; and examines a selection of issues and themes that have arisen from disability education (...) courses within medical schools globally. The paper concludes that providing there is a commitment from senior management, universities are well positioned to apply both vertical and horizontal approaches to teaching disability studies to medical students. (shrink)

As medical technology has advanced, the question of medical futility has become a topic of intense debate both within the medical community and within society as a whole. However, a unanimous definition thereof is yet to be decided—some commentators are sceptical as to whether an agreement will ever be reached—and this continues to lead to difficulties, tension, and even legal action when a treating physician disagrees with a patient and/or a patient’s family regarding care and treatment options. (...) Although living in a pluralistic society presents one of the major reasons as to why, despite 30 years of intense discussion, no consensus has been made; the issue of medical futility will always be complex as it is, by nature, multifaceted, and numerous elements—including possible risks, evidence of the probability of benefit, the wishes of the patient (and family), professional standards, and cost—interact. Nevertheless, the global medical community has seen the development of two distinctly different approaches to medical futility: one in which the autonomy of patients is of paramount importance in the decision whether or not to pursue a treatment; and one in which beneficence and primum non nocere—first do no harm—are almost entirely the clinician’s prerogative, and whereby he/she has a duty to refuse any treatment for which the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits for the patient. Recently, however, there has been a rejection of this dichotomous view of medical futility and the apparent “power struggle” between physician and patient, and a positive movement towards a more collaborative decision-making process that highlights the necessity of communication, aiming to result in the obtainment of the best possible outcome for each patient as an individual. (shrink)

Clinical emergencies necessitate immediate action to avert the danger to the patient's life or health. Emergency patients might be in greatest need of novel therapies, and even presumed willing to assume some risk, but research into emergency conditions should be conducted under commonly accepted principles that fulfil the scientific, ethical, and legal criteria. Such criteria already exist in the US, but are still under development in Europe.This article introduces criteria upon which trials in emergency settings may be ethically and legally (...) justified in Europe. Based on both legal texts and professional guidelines, the author has established seven conditions for emergency research, of which informed consent and its substitutes, as well as the conditions of direct benefit requirement and necessity, are considered most problematic and therefore analysed more closely. Other conditions include absence of alternative methods, scientific validity, and approval by an ethics committee. (shrink)

The article explores the role of the Spartan example in Guicciardini's political thought, giving a particular attention to his early writings. Examining a series of medical metaphors Guicciardini uses in the analysis of the state, the author uncovers Plutarch as their main source. It is argued that Plutarch, and his description of Lacedaemon, exercised a major influence in the formation of Guicciardini's political ideas. The author focuses on the crucial issue of the usage of “Lycurgus’ knife,” while answering two (...) key questions: (1) the feasibility of constituting a republic modelled on Sparta; (2) the legitimacy of the use of force in the cases of extreme necessity. On (2), Guicciardini's views are compared with Machiavelli's, and the difference in their understanding of necessità pointed out. (shrink)

Pain medication is one of the responses to the mercy argument that utilitarian ethicists use for justifying active euthanasia on the grounds of prevention of cruelty and appeal to beneficence. The researcher reinforces the significance of pain medication in meeting this challenge and considers it the most preferred response among various other responses. It is because of its realism and effectiveness. In exploring the mechanism and considerations related to pain medication, the researcher briefly touches the Catholic ethical position on the (...) issue, a position that cannot be ignored in the development of contemporary bioethics. The researcher particularly deliberates on the contemporary Islamic discourse on the issue; by furthering the debate in line with the Islamic legal maxims and general guidance from the primary sources of Islamic law and ethics. The resolution on the issue is sought by synthesizing the views and legal maxims (al-Qawaid al-Fiqhiyyah) on the issue, which in conclusion provide justification for pain medication by considerably regarding pain as necessity and pressing need. However, such resolution allows pain medication to the limit and proportion that removes the pain and prohibits overdosing the patient with medication that may directly cause the death. (shrink)

“It is less a matter of happiness and unhappiness than of darkness and light: one does not consist in a pure and simple privation of the other.” In contrast to Condillac, Diderot begins with the recognition of the mutually reflexive character of the state of suffering, which is independent of an alternation of pleasure and pain. Or rather, the painful state is spontaneously devalued without any invocation of a hypothetical state of constant happiness. The emergence of an affirmation of physical (...) pain belongs to the condition of the living being and assumes an immediate conceptualization of suffering, even in the imaginary state of an eternal suffering. For Diderot, questioning the meaning of existence goes hand in hand with this innate and unconditioned positing of an unhappy state. Such a postulate makes it more difficult to maintain the stereotypical view that the materialist attitude is one of indifference. Recognizing the necessary laws of matter and identifying disorders as rational productions does not amount to saying that whatever turns out to be necessary is in fact allowable. Matter conditions the constitution of morality, feelings, and thoughts. The human being, however, displays signs of revolt, as well as a capacity to adjust to his deficient states by drawing on the universal tendency of living beings to complicate the necessity of determining what is preferable and rejecting what is painful. To persevere in one’s being, and thereby lay down conditions for an assent to existence, is thus to weaken the pessimism of a blind necessitarianism. The establishment of a natural and material axiology then allows one to grasp the metaphysical implications of this medically grounded vitalism. (shrink)

In one common type of hybrid war states intervene on behalf of insurgents who represent a repressed identity group, but without ‘putting boots on the ground’. Such cases may be regarded as hybrids which contain elements of both ‘old’ and ‘new wars’. In ‘old wars’ victory in combat is sought and non-combatants do not need to be targeted. ‘New wars’ are identity conflicts in which civilians on the opposing side themselves become the hated objects of attack. This poses problems for (...) an intervening state which would not wish to tolerate such behaviour. One question to ask is whether the state owes the insurgents medical assistance if they require it. While they have a prima facie claim as combatants, their bad behaviour, it is argued, leads them to forfeit it. In ‘old wars’ civilians expect those fighting on their behalf to avoid attacks on enemy non-combatants, and states will wish insurgents to do likewise. Were military medics to treat insurgents who breach the laws of armed conflict and return them to service and probable re-offending they would arguably be accomplices. Medics should not be placed in this position for their role is not only ‘to conserve the fighting strength’ and to mitigate the horrors of war but also to facilitate its being fought justly. For, were they not to be deployed to treat wounded civilians and prisoners when possible, more suffering would ensue than necessity required, contrary to the cardinal principle of jus in bello. But similarly, if they allowed this sort of suffering to occur by treating lawless insurgents who go on to cause it, then the same principle is breached. Therefore, they should not be deployed when this would happen. (shrink)

The problem of disease definition is related to theproblem of proving that a certain agent is thenecessary cause of a certain disease. Natural kindterms like ‘rheumatoid arthritis’ and ‘AIDS’ refer toessences which are discoverable rather thanpredeterminate. No statement about such diseases isa priori necessarily true. Because theories onnecessary causes involve natural kind semantics,Koch's postulates cannot be used to falsify or verifysuch theories. Instead of proving that agent A is thenecessary cause of disease D, we include A in atheoretical definition of (...) D, take this to representthe real meaning of ‘D’, and discard thepretheoretical definition. This is illustrated byKoch's own attempt to prove he had discovered thenecessary cause of tuberculosis. Methodologicalarguments about disease causation require a clear viewof our use of diagnostic terms. Medical lexicographersshould do more to provide such a view. (shrink)

Las redes sociales asociadas al conocimiento resultan de interés tanto a los estudios en Ciencia Tecnología y Sociedad, como al desenvolvimiento del pensamiento de la complejidad que se desarrolla en el país. Su análisis explica la naturaleza social de la producción científica y la existencia del capital social, cuyas características se vinculan con la satisfacción y resolución de las necesidades sociales dentro de la población cubana. Se muestra una red, conformada en torno a la Publicación Archivo Médico de Camagüey, durante (...) los años 2003, 2004 y dos bimestres del 2005 sobre el desenvolvimiento de las co autorías dentro de ella. Delineando en qué forma los investigadores se relacionaron entre sí, para valorar algunos de sus resultados. Se describen, los grupos esenciales de investigación y sus principales fortalezas. Constituye una herramienta de trabajo, al exponer los cambios que están ocurriendo en torno a la Universidad Médica Camagüeyana The social networks associated to human knowledge are useful to the studies in Science Technology and Society. Their analysis explains the social nature of the scientific production and the existence of social resources, which link the satisfaction and resolution of the social necessities inside the Cuban population. The characteristics of this networks conformed in Archivo Médico de Camagüey publication on the development of co authorship from 2003 to 2005 were presented in this article. The researchers were related to each other in this work to value in which way they function together and analyze some of their results. The essential groups of investigation and their main strengths were also described. It constitutes a work tool for further research works, to considering the changes that are happening about the scientific knowledge production in Camagüey University of Medicine. (shrink)