This paper examines the ethics of contemporary managerial compensation in the context of executive stock options. Economic considerations would dictate that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate the effect of overall stock market movements which are beyond the control of the executive. However, in practice, most executive stock options are not adjusted to control for these outside factors. Agency considerations are the most likely culprit. Adjusting for the influence of outside factors, such as a generally rising (...) stock market, from executive stock options sets a higher bar for managers to reach. Furthermore, traditional accounting standards permitted firms that did not adjust options to avoid reporting options as expenses. This presents CEOs and boards of directors with a major ethical dilemma. On the one hand, their duty to their shareholders and stakeholders dictates that executive stock options should be adjusted to eliminate outside noise from unrelated movements in the overall stock market. However, financial statements are presented in the language of accounting. If the overwhelming majority of the users of a language define a particular item in one way, then to deviate from the norm implies that the recipient of such a deviant statement may not properly interpret the statement. Likewise, if the standard practice is for firms to use unadjusted options and thus under-report expenses, to deviate from this industry norm risks that users of financial statements would not properly interpret the financial statements, with perhaps negative consequences for the shareholders. In short, if "everyone else does it," then it could be wrong for an individual firm to deviate from the norm as that would harm the shareholders. (shrink)

Shareholders with standard monetary preferences will give a manager incentives to increase firm profits, which can be achieved with equity grants. When shareholders are socially responsible, in the sense that they also value corporate social performance, it is not clear which incentives the manager should receive. Yet, in a standard principal–agent model, we show that the optimal contract is surprisingly simple: it consists in giving equity holdings to the manager. This is notably because the stock price will incorporate expected profits (...) as well as the social performance of the firm, to the extent that it is valued by shareholders. Consequently, equity holdings give the manager incentives to jointly maximize the profits and the social performance of the firm according to shareholders’ preferences. To facilitate alignment of interests, more socially responsible firms will optimally hire more socially responsible managers. We conclude that neither the shareholder primacy model nor equity-based managerial compensation is necessarily inconsistent with the attainment of social objectives. (shrink)

Investors with standard monetary preferences will give a fund manager incentives to increase firm profits, which can be achieved through a share in profits via carried interest. When investors have social preferences, it is not clear which incentives the manager should receive. We explore this puzzle by applying an agency theory perspective to impact investing, a practice where investors seek both financial returns and a measurable social or environmental impact. Using an inductive, qualitative approach, we identify and describe the ethical (...) tensions and challenges faced by fund managers to structure and implement impact-based variable compensation schemes. Our results indicate that economic incentives tied to non-financial objectives are useful to alleviate goal incongruity between principals and agents during fund creation but have the potential to lead to perverse effects during the fund lifecycle, where managers may exploit subjective non-financial metrics to maximize personal wealth. We introduce the concept of impact fidelity, a conceptual equivalent of fiduciary duty, to ensure that investment decisions reflect the asset owner’s impact preferences. (shrink)

Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, (...) ecological, and existential costs of economic incentives, by discussing how relying on increasing levels of executive compensation may have an adverse effect on managerial performance in a broad sense. Specifically, we argue that one-dimensional economic incentives may destroy existential, social, and systemic values that influence the manager’s commitment to ensure responsible business conduct, and have negative spillover effects that may reduce the manager’s performance. There are well-documented findings that demonstrate that reliance on sources of extrinsic motivation (such as economic incentives) may displace intrinsic motivation. Our perspective is a holistic one, in the sense that we will explore the influence of sources of extrinsic motivation on the manager’s intrinsic commitment to different types of values. We will in particular investigate how it may influence the manager’s ethical reflection and behavior or lack thereof. (shrink)

The topic of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation has been a focus of interest for many years. The purpose of this article is to explore the ethical dimensions of various generally accepted theories of CEO renumeration. We argue that a contractarian approach, based on the Kantian ethical framework, can be used to augment the existing contingent pay models.While the neoclassical economic model of the firm views the maximization of the shareholders'' wealth as the sole responsibility of top management, a (...) contractarian approach regards the balancing of various stakeholders'' interests as the primary task of top management. Ethical problems emerge when there are divergent, yet equally justifiable interests which compete in order to channel organizational resources to meet their own needs. In this situation, given the inherent ambiguities and ever present possibilities of multiple perspectives, it may not always be feasible to provide a categorical answer to the question of whether the CEO''s decisions are ethical. We suggest that a broad interpretation of the neoclassical theory of the firm, one that is grounded in Kantian and contractarian ethics, can serve as a basis for a reconciliation of different theories of executive compensation. (shrink)

We link the corporate governance literature in financial economics to the agency cost perspective of corporate social responsibility to derive theoretical predictions about the relationship between corporate governance and the existence of executive compensation incentives for CSR. We test our predictions using novel executive compensation contract data, and find that firms with more shareholder-friendly corporate governance are more likely to provide compensation to executives linked to firm social performance outcomes. Also, providing executives with direct incentives for CSR (...) is an effective tool to increase firm social performance. The findings provide evidence identifying corporate governance as a determinant of managerial incentives for social performance, and suggest that CSR activities are more likely to be beneficial to shareholders, as opposed to an agency cost. (shrink)

What, if anything, is wrong with high executive compensation? Is the common “lay reaction” of indignation and moral outrage justified? In this paper, my main goal is to articulate in a more systematic and philosophical manner the egalitarian responses to these questions. In order to do so, I suggest that we take some insights from recent debates on two versions of egalitarianism: a distributive one, according to which no one should be worse off than others because of unfair distributions (...) of goods and resources, especially ones based on matters of luck or arbitrary factors, and a relational one, which maintains that egalitarian justice requires members of a society to relate to one another as equals. Drawing on recent attempts to highlight the tricky nature of managerial authority, I argue that high inequalities in pay are not simply a distributional matter but should also be analyzed through a relational lens. I also attempt to show that relational egalitarians are well-equipped to question the now dominant “incentives” view of CEO compensation. (shrink)

The readability of 10-K reports, in terms of linguistic complexity, determines the usefulness of information disclosure for stakeholders, particularly individual investors. Since investors largely depend on the financial communication in 10-K reports, firms have an ethical and legal responsibility to present disclosures in a language investors can understand. However, motivated by self-interest, managers obfuscate such disclosures to mask their own actions and hide unfavourable information. Building on the managerial obfuscation hypothesis grounded in stakeholder-agency and ethical-sensitivity theories, I hypothesize and (...) empirically test the relationship between board gender diversity and the readability of narrative disclosure in 10-K reports. Based on a relatively large sample of Russell 3000 firms for the years 2002–2018, I find a significant positive impact of BGD on 10-K reports’ readability, which in turn improves firm performance. Channel analysis reveals that the findings are driven by female independent directors, and their representation on audit and compensation committees; however, board activity does not appear to drive this relationship. Finally, I find that although gender discrimination in the appointment of directors spurs complex readability, the BGD-readability relationship is consistent in gender-biased and non-discriminant firms. I also check the robustness of our main empirical results in several ways. My study has important regulatory and managerial implications in that corporate governance is an important determinant of the readability of disclosure documents. (shrink)

The Chinese government capped executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to address income inequality and promote a more equitable distribution of wealth. This study investigates whether regulating top executives' pay alters their motivation for corporate green innovation (GI) initiatives. Using data from 2006 to 2018 for Chinese-listed SOEs, the regression analysis and difference-in-difference methods revealed that government restrictions on executive compensation negatively affect GI. Furthermore, the types of SOE results show that the negative effect of pay restrictions on (...) GI exists only in local SOEs, as opposed to central SOEs. Moreover, high managerial shareholding positively moderates this negative effect, demonstrating that the adverse effects of compensation restrictions are mitigated by the convergence of interests between managers and stakeholders. These findings are robust to instrumental variables and other robustness tests. This study provides policy recommendations for the government to boost its assistance in GI and establish new environment-related incentives that motivate managers to promote GI and inspire enterprises to deploy sustainable environmental initiatives. (shrink)

While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial reporting and operational outcomes. This is somewhat surprising given the critical role CFOs play in the financial reporting process of a firm. Using managerial power theory and the theory of power and self-focus :635–658, 2013), we predict that powerful CFOs employ a two-part strategy to (...) camouflage excessive incentive compensation above what efficient contracting would dictate. First, powerful CFOs use their power and influence to negotiate shorter incentive pay duration to maximize the present value of their performance—based compensation. Second, when their incentive equity compensation vests, we suggest that CFOs manage earnings to further enhance their personal income. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find higher levels of income-increasing accrual-based earnings management and real transactions management, a potentially unethical practice, in firms with powerful CFOs who have short pay durations. We discuss the implications of our analysis in the context of mitigating CFO power and managing the ethical environment “tone at the top.”. (shrink)

Following the design of the author, reforms of the UN would consist of four rules. The first rule: Payments from the global community should correspond with the services provided by the UN. - For this purpose it is necessary to develop a system of compensation in which payment would be made only for the completion of a concrete service. Such a system would in effect serve as a continuous audit and guarantor of quality service at all times visible to (...) the entire public. The second rule: Servantura not dictatorship - The author has created a word "servantura" and has given it the following meaning: the performance of administrative service, guided by (1) ethical conduct, (2) democratic norms, (3) the newest scientific knowledge, (5) safe technology, (6) justice, (7) equality of people and (8) the priority of human life. On an idea of the author, servantura is a global managerial philosophy with a system of global service in which each decision should be in accordance with the wishes and the will of the entire global community, not of a separate group of nations, or a single nation, or person. The third rule: Noncommercial services. Commercialization of the UN should be considered a crime. Further commercial use of the UN should be stopped, as it will lead to aglobal catastrophe. The fourth rule: Without enemies or competitors, Full transparency and a strict prohibition of secrecy and privacy in the UN must be established. i.e. openness, publicity and a strict international prohibition on any secret structures or secret activities within the UN. (shrink)

In this article, we examine how firms design executive compensation in light of their risk environment. Prior literature shows that corporate environmental responsibility (CER) of a firm inversely affects firm risk. We argue that firms with better CER performance benefit from the reduced firm risk, and therefore are more likely to provide greater managerial risk‐taking incentives to encourage the risk‐averse managers to undertake risk‐increasing but positive net present value (NPV) investments. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that a (...) firm’s CER rating is positively associated with its CEO risk‐taking incentives (vega) in the following year. We also document cross‐sectional variations in the CER‐vega relationship, that is, a weaker association in the controversial industries. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the role of CER on executive compensation design from the perspective of risk management. (shrink)

This study examines determinants of chairman compensation in a supervisory board setting and, specifically, the relationship between chairman and CEO compensation. Using a sample of publicly listed firms in Sweden, the study indicates that chairman compensation—despite its fixed nature—is reflective of firm performance via a positive relationship to CEO compensation. As CEO compensation is set before chairman compensation, we argue that the chairman may be inclined to conspire with the CEO in earnings management efforts (...) at the expense of monitoring on behalf of investors. Supporting our cronyism argument, we find evidence that the gap between chairman and CEO compensation is less at firms where the chairman had previously served in the executive management team. The close ties between the chairman and CEO compensation add to the understanding of the relative success of the managerial power theory versus the agency theory in explaining CEO compensation. (shrink)

Macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations. Based on a sample of 2,091 US firms, we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of CEO compensation. Our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing CEO incentive schemes. It adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard (...) and CEO compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the CEO in an asymmetric and non-linear reward system will be inclined to prioritize his/her own cash flow at the expense of fulfilling an assumed agency role. The policy conclusion for remuneration committees and board of directors is to filter out macroeconomic influences on performance to be rewarded whenever an asymmetric compensation scheme has been opted for. (shrink)

After the 2008 financial panic, long-term compensation measures have gained favor as a way to limit managerial opportunism and excessive risk-taking. These measures, which may become mandatory for systemically important institutions, include restriction of stock grants for a period of years, and, in the event of performance reversals, divestment of deferred stock and clawbacks of bonus compensation. These measures are considered uncontroversial enough that some have suggested that all public companies, not just systemically important firms, should adopt (...) them. In this Article, I argue that the benefits of long-term compensation have been overstated while the potential downsides have been largely ignored. Restricted periods for equity grants must be large compared to the executive’s tenure in order to have a significant effect upon behavior overall, and mandatory clawback provisions end up transferring what would have been bonus pay into salary. Furthermore, to the extent that long-term compensation does affect behavior, these consequences are not necessarily good. I show that given fairly reasonable assumptions of executive risk aversion, the information content of long-term and short-term price signals, and managerial control over the timing of project execution and disclosure, a long-term focus can have significant negative effects. (shrink)

The hundreds of millions of floating people in China who leave their hometown for a new city to improve their standard of living constitute an important phenomenon, but as yet the ethical predicaments they face, such as low compensation equity and high social exclusion, have attracted little attention. With a national sample of 125,626 floating people in China, this study investigated how and when compensation equity influences prosocial behavior through the lens of justice theory. This study found that (...) floating people’s compensation equity positively influences prosocial behavior, and this relationship is mediated by subjective well-being. This study also supported that multilevel social exclusion, including the perception of social exclusion and provincial social exclusion strength, positively moderates the relationship between compensation equity and SWB. Moreover, the perception of social exclusion and provincial social exclusion strength moderate the mediating effect of SWB between compensation equity and prosocial behavior. Theoretical contributions and managerial implications are further discussed. (shrink)

This paper examines whether independent directors who have social ties to management (inside directors) can effectively perform their fiduciary duty to monitor management on behalf of shareholders. Ex ante, it is not clear whether social ties will enhance or obstruct the quality of board performance. Theory suggests that directors who are socially tied to management are ineffective and would make decisions favoring management. However, social ties can increase trust and information sharing between management and independent directors, improving directors' ability and (...) effectiveness in governing the company (Westphal, J. D.: 1999, The Academy of Management Journal 42(1), 7-24). To examine these contradicting predictions I use social network analysis and construct proxies for social ties between management and independent board members. Using these proxies, I first demonstrate that social ties are associated with higher managerial compensation. Further analyses reveal that these results are driven by social ties that include members of the compensation committee. Conversely, I demonstrate that financial reporting quality is improved when social ties exist. Specifically, I find that the likelihood of material weaknesses in internal controls and the likelihood of financial restatements are lower in companies with social ties. I further observe that this improved quality of financial reporting holds only when social ties include members of the audit committee. I conclude that ethically, socially tied independent directors should disqualify themselves from serving on compensation committees where social independence is essential. However, in tasks where collaboration with management is essential, directors with social links to each other can be of added value to shareholders. (shrink)

This article considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law, corruption, and culture in setting fund manager fees. With better legal conditions, fixed fees are lower, carried interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share distributions are more likely. Countries with lower levels of corruption have lower fixed fees and higher performance fees, and are less likely to have clawbacks and cash-only distributions. Hofstede's measure of power distance is negatively (...) related to fixed fees and the use of cash-only distributions, but positively related to performance fees and clawbacks. Overall, the data strongly indicate that corruption, culture, and legal settings are much more significant in determining fees than fund manager characteristics and/or market conditions. (shrink)

This paper presents a comparative analysis of three American and three European corporate failures. The first part of the analysis is based on a theoretical framework including six areas of ethical climate; tone at the top; bubble economy and market pressure; fraudulent financial reporting; accountability, control, auditing, and governance; and management compensation. The second and third parts consider the analysis of these cases from fraud perspective and in terms of firm-specific characteristics and environmental context. The research analyses shed light (...) on the fact that, despite major differences between Europe and U.S. in terms of political institutions, laws and regulations as well as managerial practices, there are significant similarities between six groups. The analysis also demonstrates that, the ethical dilemma has been coupled with ineffective boards, inefficient corporate governance and control mechanisms, distorted incentive schemes, accounting irregularities, failure of auditors, dominant CEOs, dysfunctional management behavior and the lack of a sound ethical tone at the top. Significant similarities were also observed in the analysis from the fraud triangle perspective. However, there are several major differences between the six corporate failure cases particularly with regard to ownership structure, coverage in media, and legal, regulatory and governance frameworks. This research study may have several academic and practical contributions, particularly because of multidisciplinary, international features, and comparative analyses used in the paper. (shrink)

Executives of many publicly held firms agree to compensation packages that create immense exposure to their employer’s stock. Corporate boards, aspiring to motivate executives to make value-maximizing decisions, often tie an executive’s earnings to stock price performance through stock or option awards. However, this engenders a significant ethical dilemma for many executives who are uncomfortable with sizable, firm-specific risk and desire to reduce it through hedging activities. Recent research has shown that executive hedging has become more prevalent. In essence, (...) managers are unwinding the acute economic incentive to act in the best interest of the owners. This appears to violate the spirit of the compensation contract and from a normative standpoint, is not how executives should act. In this article, we describe how some executives are acting in regard to this issue (descriptive ethics), how they should act (normative ethics) and how they can be helped to get from what they are doing, to what they should be doing (prescriptive ethics). (shrink)

The market failures approach to business ethics has recently garnered substantial critical attention (see, e.g., Cohen and Peterson 2019; Moriarty 2020; Steinberg 2017; Hsieh 2017; von Kriegstein 2016; Smith 2018; Endorfer and Larue 2022; Singer 2018). Though precursors of this view can be found in the literature (e.g., McMahon 1981; Friedman 1970), it was Joseph Heath (2004, 2006, 2014, 2023) who developed the approach and gave it its name. The market failures approach (henceforth: MFA) is concerned with the ethical obligations (...) of managers of firms (Heath 2014, 69). Roughly, it holds that managers ought not to conduct their businesses in a way that exploits market failures. “Market failure” is a technical term, meaning any failure of the conditions of the first fundamental welfare theorem, sometimes called the “Pareto conditions” (see Arrow 1951). The theorem states that if the Pareto conditions hold, then the market equilibrium will use society’s scarce resources efficiently, meaning that no one could be made better-off without making anyone else worse off. Efficiency, according to Heath (2014, chapter 7), is the implicit morality of the market. We coordinate much of our shared activity using markets, Heath claims, because of their ability to produce efficient results. Markets are good forms of social organization, according to Heath, because they are the best way to promote our values given empirical facts about the frailties of human psychology and the informational constraints that we face. As such, managers ought not compromise the very conditions that justify a market economy by profiting from breakdowns in the market’s efficiency. Managers are permitted to maximize profits, so long as they do not violate the market’s norm of efficiency in so doing. This is because the fundamental justification for the profit motive is that it is necessary for the operation of the price system which is essential to the efficiency properties of markets. In this paper, I will argue that the MFA is more general than even Heath himself claims. The MFA describes the professional obligations of managers, but the view I develop, the generalized market failures approach, describes the obligations of all market participants. Since efficiency is the implicit morality of the market, it binds not just managers, but all market participants, including consumers, investors and workers. Market participants are permitted to maximize the benefit they gain from market interactions, as long as they do so in a way that does not take advantage of any market failures. Generalizing the MFA in this way has three benefits: first, we gain a unified understanding of the ethics of non-managerial market roles; second, we will develop an even better understanding of the duties of managers; finally, it gives us the resources to respond to some familiar objections to the MFA found in the literature. In the next section, I will further motivate the MFA and explain how this motivation can be easily generalized to other market roles. Importantly, one can avoid benefiting from a market failure in two distinct ways: by avoiding transactions that exploit market failures or by transacting in such markets and then remediating the harm done, by compensating those negatively affected by the market failure. This section concludes by discussing how the remediation duties are to be split between the transacting parties and how to identify the parties to whom compensation is owed. In section 3, I use the tools of the generalized MFA to develop a unified ethics of consumption, investment and labor, respectively. This is the basis of a grand abductive argument for the generalized MFA. The view is strongly supported by the fact that it provides attractive and unifying explanations of our obligations in domains as variegated as carbon offsetting, CEO compensation, the reparations white Americans owe to black Americans and occupational licensure. Section 4 briefly concludes. (shrink)

This study aims to examine the perceptions of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic staff in English local government on the ethical nature of their treatment at work, and its mediating effect on their Public Service Motivation. This is a particular imperative in a sector which itself delivers social justice within a strong regulatory system designed to ensure workplace equality and therefore is expected to be a model employer for other organisations. Employees place great importance on their fair treatment by their (...) employers and, in particular, the endeavour of managerial authority to implement equality at work based on their discretionary powers. 2580 valid responses were collected from 15,000 questionnaires sent to staff in five local councils in England. Our analyses show that BAME employees have a significantly stronger PSM than their white colleagues; however, this has been eroded by their perception of unfair treatment: being underpaid allied with a lack of effort from management to ensure an equal work environment, to be specific, to prevent discrimination, bullying, and racism at workplace. Most importantly, the perceived exertion made by management to ensure an equal work environment has a significantly strong mediating effect on PSM and a compensational effect on perceived lower pay. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

The present study investigated the lasting effects of sickness presenteeism on well-being and innovative job performance in the demanding Chinese work context compounded with the precarities of the post-pandemic business environment. Adopting the conservation of resources theory perspective, especially its proposition of compensation of resources, we incorporated social resources at work as joint moderators in the presenteeism–outcomes relationship. We employed a panel design in which all variables were measured twice with 6 months in between. Data were obtained from 323 (...) Chinese employees working in diverse industries in Taiwan. We found that after controlling for the baseline level of well-being, presenteeism did not have a lasting effect on employees' exhaustion. However, presenteeism did have a negative lasting effect on employees' innovative behavior 6 months later. Moreover, we found a significant three-way interaction of presenteeism, supervisory support, and collegial support on employees' innovative job performance, after controlling for the baseline level of performance. Specifically, when working under illness, employees displayed the best innovative performance with high levels of both supervisory and collegial support, the worst performance with both support being low, and the intermediate when any one of the support being high. This can be taken as the preliminary evidence to support the COR proposition of resource caravans, showing that supervisory support and collegial support compensated for each other as critical resources in alleviating the impact of working under sickness on employees' innovative performance. Theoretical implications of the findings are discussed, taking into account the macro-cultural context of the East Asian Confucian societies. We also reflected on the managerial implications of the lasting damages of sickness presenteeism and benefits of mobilizing social resources on employees' well-being and performance. (shrink)

This book presents a detailed economic analysis of professional football at club level, using a combination of economic reasoning and statistical and econometric analysis. Most of the original empirical research reported in the book is based on English club football. A wide range of international comparisons help emphasize both the broader relevance as well as the unique characteristics of the English experience. Specific topics include: the links between football clubs' financial strength and competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome; the determinants (...) of professional footballers' compensation; measuring the football manager's contribution to team performance, the determinants of managerial change, and its effects on team performance; patterns of spectator demand for attendance; predicting match results, betting on football, and the market in football clubs' company shares. The book concludes with an extended discussion of the major economic policy issues currently facing football's legislators and administrators worldwide. (shrink)

Shareholders assume risk by investing. Sollars and Tuluca (2018) argue that while this does not justify a managerial policy of shareholder wealth maximization, it does justify compensating shareholders at the oftencalculated cost of equity—the cost that investors require given the level of risk they assume. Here, I show that this can be unfair if the cost of equity is unfair. I then show how shareholder wealth maximization as a managerial imperative is better justified on other grounds.

This article raises the issue of growing inequalities in remuneration in Australia at a time of severe economic recession. The salary packages of the CEOs and senior managers of large Australian companies have been increased substantially in recent years often in spite of poor performance of the companies. At the same time real wages have either stagnated or, according to some researchers, have fallen in the same period. In addition unemployment has risen to unprecedented high levels (above 11%).The ethics of (...) such growing differentials are rarely addressed in the literature on compensation. It is mooted that the lack of ethical scrutiny affects staff morale and performance by non-managerial employees adversely. It tends to make a mockery of the philosophy of performance-based pay and the concept of appointment and promotion on the basis of merit. Without suggesting a widespread breakdown in norms and standards in Australia this article does question the quality of Australian management and raises the issue of appropriate corrections. Studies about the need for a new direction in management education and into the role of the Boards of Directors, their competence and functions have been conducted and others are in train. These suggest a preference for piecemeal reforms while, perhaps, more drastic measures are required. (shrink)

Historically the professions have maintained a commitment to what MacIntyre calls the “internal goods of practice” as opposed to the external goods of practice associated with monetary compensation and activities directly related to monetary compensation. This paper argues that the growing financialization of the economy has fostered a climate of managerial control exemplified in the proliferation of auditing and procedures associated with auditing. Accordingly professionals, whose organizational function includes responsibility for the internal goods, are thereby frustrated in (...) so far as they have been forced to become preoccupied with performance indicators and the goals of financial efficiency imposed by hierarchies founded on managerial expertise rather than professional achievement and competence. A reaffirmation of professional commitment to the internal goods may well require a communitarian approach that entails a reorganization of society around the common good rather than the efficiency ethos that has displaced it. (shrink)

AbstractBoardroom backscratching, or cronyism, is an unethical practice where CEOs conspire with directors to receive remuneration beyond performance- and market-related factors. Premised on the theory of planned behavior, this study investigates whether CEO generalist experience magnifies the likelihood of boardroom backscratching. Using 9482 firm-year observations spanning 1999–2018, our analysis shows that firms with greater CEO generalist managerial experience are more likely to engage in boardroom backscratching, via both cash- and equity-based compensation. We provide further evidence that backscratching firms (...) with CEOs that possess greater generalist experience tend to overinvest, particularly via non-capital expenditure, as a channel for empire building and private rent extraction. We also find that a higher portion of female independent directors sitting on the board and the compensation committee mitigates the positive relationship between CEO generalist managerial experience and boardroom backscratching, which we attribute to greater ethicality of, and increased monitoring exercised by, female independent directors. (shrink)

Dialogic spaces for kindness in higher education, located in the ‘critical corridor talk’ of informal leaders positioned quietly in the background in many universities, are a form of moral Resistance in an era excessively dominated by the values of some of the harsher exponents of economic rationalism. This is a secret language of dialogic resistance, to be found under the radar, tucked away in the blindspots of formally recognised Communication. It stoically challenges an arguably unhealthy obsession with efficient management, Market/marketisation (...) and economic proficiency at any cost that is, in some institutions, promoted by the harder managerial taskmasters symbolically represented in the concept of ‘homo economicus’. This chapter argues that such ‘understage’ dialogic spaces for kindness are emerging slowly but with progressively firm resistance to challenge unhealthy forms of managerial Instrumental/instrumentalism in some low Trust/trustworthiness/self-trust situations in a stratified UK higher education system. The accumulation of such spaces is occurring almost invisibly, in a subtle, persistent manner, like a soft, repetitive reminder of the need for human values, gently but relentlessly aiming to compensate for and wash away the mistakes, confusion and suffering bound up in poor management. This theoretical chapter, informed by empirical data, discusses the need to recognise this quiet form of understated kindness as a pre-eminent but under-recognised quality, currently marginalised in a higher education system more overtly focused on self-promotion, targets, outputs and League tables than on the Well-being of staff and students. Drawing from leadership data and Autoethnography observations, I argue that this informal, resistant academic critique is gradually questioning economically-driven ‘command and control’ Managerialism. The Critical Corridor Talk model proposed here and elsewhere builds on Barnett’s concept of ‘critical being’, to theorise the ways in which academic staff find relief from hard-nosed forms of management by sharing moments of truthful dialogic Communication, kindness and Empathy for colleagues in the ‘critical corridor talk’ of informal distributed leadership networks. ‘NegativeNegative capability’ is a form of self-reflexive Resistance against the ‘false necessity’ of performative goals demanded by neoliberalist economic management. Resistant informal leadership challenges the manufactured performativity of higher education environments where some in power overstep the acceptable roles of good management. Yet to foster Trust/trustworthiness/self-trust, such resistant leadership needs to ensure it continually practises both kindness and correct moral principles itself. (shrink)

Are the employees working in different countries and enjoying healthy compensation truly loyal to their organization? Our study attempts to answer this question by examining the role of perception of politics on the affective commitment of expatriates in the Sultanate of Oman. Following the axiom of equity theory, the relationships between the perception of politics (POP) to affective commitment (AC) and Islamic work ethics (IWE) to affective commitment (AC) was tested. The moderating role of Islamic work ethics was also (...) examined in the POP-AC relationship. Responses from 146 employees were collected following a simple random sampling technique. Employees working in different organizations at various managerial levels were approached for data collection. Descriptive statistics, correlation, and regression tests were applied to test hypotheses using SPSS-22.0 and SmartPLS-4. Results confirmed the positive relationship between Islamic work ethics to affective commitment and the negative relationship between perception of politics to affective commitment. Moreover, the negative relationship between the perception of politics with affective commitment was weaker when Islamic work ethics were high. Practical implications of the study are presented based on the results. (shrink)

The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law by President Obama in July 2010, included two significant corporate governance mandates: “say‐on‐pay” shareholder voting and the frequency of such votes among all publicly traded companies. The say‐on‐pay rule requires publicly traded companies subject to proxy rules to offer their shareholders an advisory, or nonbinding, vote at least once every three years on the compensation packages of the most highly compensated executives. The actual data for the first (...) five years of say‐on‐pay voting indicates one intractable conclusion: that shareholder say‐on‐pay voting has not verified what many shareholder activists originally believed, i.e., that the majority of shareholders held similar opinions about business executives being significantly overpaid for their managerial performances. During its first five years in effect, the results of say‐on‐pay voting indicate that shareholders are overwhelmingly satisfied with executive compensation packages, as a 92 percent average shareholder say‐on‐pay approval result (i.e., exceeding 70 percent) among companies listed in the Russell 3000 Index attests. (shrink)

The U.S. doctrine of employment-at-will, modified legislatively for protected groups, is being less harshly applied to managerial personnel. Comparable compensation is not otherwise available in the U.S. to workers displaced by technology. Nine pairs of arguments are presented to show how fundamentally management and labor disagree about a company's responsibility for its former employees. These arguments, born of years of labor-management debate, are kaleidoscopic claims about which side has what power. Ultimately, however, not even both together can solve (...) without creative public intervention the emerging problem of massive technological unemployment — the other side of the corporate dream of profit without payrolls. (Originally published as "Displaced Workers: Whose Responsibility?" in Social Policy and Conflict Resolution, eds. T. Attig, D. Callen, and R.G. Frey, Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy VI, 1984.). (shrink)

Over the last generation, American Business Ethics has focused excessively on the process of managerial decision-making while ignoring the collective impact of these decisions and avoiding other approaches that might earn the disapproval of corporate executives. This narrowness helped the field establish itself during the 1980s, when American management, under pressure from finance and heightened competition, was unreceptive to any limitations on its autonomy. Relying, however, on top-down approaches inspired by Aristotle, Locke, and Kant, while ignoring the consequentialism of (...) Mill and Rawls, made the field totally reliant upon the good will of these same corporate executives for generating any impact. Trends in employee compensation, finance, regulation, government procurement, and taxpayer subsidies suggest that Business Ethics has failed to significantly influence corporate behavior, a result that would have not surprised the realists of the post-war generation of Business and Society scholars. If Business Ethics is to prove relevant in the contemporary world, the field needs to acknowledge past failures and develop new approaches. The decline of American economic hegemony coupled to the increased internationalization of the discipline may create the opportunity to do so. (shrink)

Recent research suggests that committing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) can induce moral licensing among employees, resulting in unethical behaviors. We extend this line of research and develop a theoretical framework to study how CSR influences managerial decision-making in crisis management. We test this theory in the context of product recall remediation. We examine under what circumstances CSR induces morally consistent or morally dubious recall remedial decisions and factors moderating this effect. We focus on two product recall remedial decisions (...) that differ in ambiguity—full versus partial compensation and proactive versus passive recall. We predict and show that a company’s strong prior CSR performance increases the likelihood of full compensation but decreases the likelihood of a proactive recall. This finding suggests that CSR can induce moral licensing behavior at the highest corporate level when a decision is morally difficult to diagnose. Further analysis reveals that consumer harm and institutional ownership moderate the relationship between CSR and these two remediation strategies. Together, our findings provide important insights into when CSR leads to moral licensing in crisis remediation and how the link can be mitigated, and thus shed light on when CSR yields consistent and meaningful ethical business decisions. (shrink)

Invisible work is neither defined nor recognized as labor and is not compensated as such. Studies show that manifestations of invisible work at home flow into the marketplace. What is lacking is systematic conceptualization and measurement of invisible work in the labor market built upon women’s and men’s knowledge and experiences. In this study, I address this lacuna using mixed-method sequential analysis. Twelve group interviews of employed women and men of varied socioeconomic locations in Israel yielded diverse expressions of invisible (...) practices in the workplace and their gendered meanings. Based on that knowledge, a typology of invisible work types was deduced, and an instrument was developed and distributed through a survey to a representative sample of the Israeli labor force. Regression analyses revealed that women and other disadvantaged groups do more invisible work at work than men and more advantaged groups do, regardless of occupation and managerial position. Beyond that, there are varied relations between labor market position and performing invisible work, across different types of practices. The study develops a typology of invisible work as a heuristic device contributing to office housework theory. I argue that invisible work should be conceived as an integral part of the labor market that needs to be considered when studying gender inequality. (shrink)

This study examines whether and how the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, which allows executives to reduce the sensitivity of their equity-based compensation to the firm’s stock price performance, affects firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We find a significant and negative relationship between the presence of managerial hedging opportunities and firms’ CSR performance. The effect of managerial hedging opportunities on CSR performance is more pronounced for CEOs with greater personal hedging needs. Additionally, the effect is (...) weakened if firms limit corporate insiders from trading exchange-listed options. Overall, this study suggests that allowing managers to delink their equity-based compensation from firm stock price performance through hedging their personal portfolios can lead to unexpected consequences for firms’ CSR performance. (shrink)

When subordinates have suffered an unfairness, managers sometimes try to compensate them by allocating something extra that belongs to the organization. These reactions, which we label as managerial Robin Hood behaviors, are undertaken without the consent of senior leadership. In four studies, we present and test a theory of managerial Robin Hoodism. In study 1, we found that managers themselves reported engaging in Robin Hoodism for various reasons, including a moral concern with restoring justice. Study 2 results suggested (...) that managerial Robin Hoodism is more likely to occur when the justice violations involve distributive and interpersonal justice rather than procedural justice violations. In studies 3 and 4, when moral identity was low, both distributive and interpersonal justice violations showed similar relationships to managerial Robin Hoodism. However, when moral identity was high, interpersonal justice violations showed a strong relationship to managerial Robin Hoodism regardless of the level of distributive justice. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to connect managerial behavior on the “agent-steward” scale to managerial moral development and motivation. I introduce agent- and steward-like behavior: the former is self-serving while the latter is others-serving. I suggest that managerial moral development and motivation may be two of the factors that may predict the tendency of managers to behave in a self-serving way (like agents) or to serve the interests of the organization (like stewards). Managers at low levels (...) of moral development are more likely to behave like agents, while managers at higher levels of moral development are more likely to behave like stewards. I also argue that managers at the highest level of moral development may serve the interests of people other than the firm’s owners and thereby transfer wealth from the firm’s owners to third parties. Moral motivation is likely to be a factor that moderates the proposed relationships. Finally, I develop propositions that address the role of material incentives in controlling behavior of managers at different levels of moral development. (shrink)

While mitigation and adaptation will help to protect us from climate change, there are harms that are beyond our ability to adapt. Some of these harms, which may have been instigated from historical emissions, plausibly give rise to duties of compensation. This chapter discusses several principles that have been discussed about how to divide climate duties—the polluter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle, the ability to pay principle, and a new one, the polluter pays, then receives principle. The chapter (...) introduces several challenges to these principles from the literature, before discussing which policies and institutions might be relevant to compensation, whether internationally (e.g. the Green Climate Fund) or intergenerationally (e.g. Broome and Foley’s World Climate Bank). It also describes some recent successful climate cases which require both the Dutch government and a private firm to act in accordance with climate targets to avoid potential rights-violations. Finally, it discusses one of the most important international concepts with respect to compensation: the Loss & Damage pillar of climate policy. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship of various trait emotions to the ethical choices of 189 college students who completed a managerial decision-making task as part of an in-basket exercise in a laboratory setting. Prior research regarding emotion influences on ethical decision-making and linkages between emotions and cognition informed hypotheses about how different types of emotions impact ethical choices. Findings supported our expectations that positive and negative emotions classified as active would be more strongly related to interpersonally-directed ethical choices than (...) to organizationally-directed ones, and that passive emotions would be less related to ethical choices than active emotions. Implications for ethical decision-making research and organizational practices are discussed. (shrink)

Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between (...) apologetic compensation and non-apologetic compensation. Apologetic compensation, I argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer of money, goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic compensation is sufficient for moral repair. (shrink)

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue discussing the usefulness of philosophy in managerial practice. We present the papers included in this special issue and identify keynote directions for further research. The initial intention of the call for papers was to promote this topic on research agendas by offering a platform for discussing if, why, and how philosophy can complement and enhance management practice. Now that this special issue has been published, we see a broader significance: (...) the arguments explored here are a starting point for more in-depth studies of the connections that can occur between specific philosophical concepts, theories, methods on the one hand, and concrete managerial practices on the other. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:If an employee is committed to his firm—if he is “attached” or “bound” to it—then his firm may be able to obtain a discount on his labor. This paper asks: Is it wrong for firms to do so? If we understand just or fair pay solely in terms of voluntary agreements between employers and employees, the answer seems to be ‘no.’ Against this, I argue that, in some cases, it is ‘yes.’ In particular, it is wrong for firms to try (...) to obtain discounts on their committed employees’ labor when their employees reasonably expect that they will not try to obtain them. In the process, I probe the limits of exploitation and question the relevance of contribution to fairness in compensation. (shrink)

The purpose of the research is to develop a new methodological basis for identifying, analyzing and solving problems of international corporations export-import activities and to ground the directions for ensuring their business excellence. The approach originality provides introduction of a conceptual model that aims to eliminate the negative symptoms of international corporations export-import activities based on the results of comprehensive market research, effectiveness of export-import activities and calculation of the integrated indicator of business excellence. The leading corporations of Slovakia and (...) India in the production of bi-axially oriented polypropylene (BOPP) films were the primary basis for this study. The results of the research showed the need to implement a system of managerial innovation for reasoning the directions of ensuring international corporations business excellence. This is achieved because of using logically formalized methods and provides the improvement of organizational and structural interaction of management entities in the process of solving export-import activity problems. Important factors for ensuring business excellence are also the optimization of export and import costs, as well as an increase in export revenue for Slovak companies, and an increase in market share and cost optimization for Indian companies. The practical value of the obtained results is to develop a set of managerial innovations that can improve the efficiency of export-import activities and improve international corporations business. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of the meaning and measure of enforceability. While we have long debated what restraints should govern the conduct of our social life, we have paid relatively little attention to the question of what it means to make a restraint enforceable. Focusing on the enforceability of legal rights but also addressing the enforceability of moral rights and social conventions, Mark Reiff explains how we use punishment and compensation to make restraints operative in the (...) world. After describing the various means by which restraints may be enforced, Reiff explains how the sufficiency of enforcement can be measured, and he presents a unified theory of deterrence, retribution, and compensation that shows how these aspects of enforceability are interconnected. Reiff then applies his theory of enforceability to illuminate a variety of real-world problem situations. (shrink)

There is a need of further research to understand how social capital in the organization can be fostered. Existing literature focuses on the design of reciprocity norms, procedures and stability employment practices as the main levers of social capital in the workplace. Complementary to these mechanisms, this paper explores the impact of ethical managerial behaviour on the development of social capital. We argue that a managerial behaviour based on the true concern for the well-being of employees, as well (...) as their motivational and ethical development, can be particularly important for the generation of social capital in the organization. It is suggested that manager's behaviour should be based on three principles: following examplary behaviour, helping the employees to value the consequences of their actions in other persons, and not betraying employee's trust. When the manager conforms to those principles, he can ease the process through which employees develop associability and identification-based trust with the firm, the two main components of 'Organizational Social Capital'. Bringing ethics into the debate of social capital creation seems to us fundamental, as social capital in the firm is likely to be influenced by the ethical and motivational development of its members. (shrink)