The book presents the results of the joint annual conference of the four Operations Research Societies DGOR, GM\OR, \GOR and SVOR, held in Vienna in 1990.

A study in the logic of theory change, examining the properties of maxichoice contraction and revision operations.

This paper extends earlier work by its authors on formal aspects of the processes of contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition and revising a theory to introduce a proposition. In the course of the earlier work, Gardenfors developed general postulates of a more or less equational nature for such processes, whilst Alchourron and Makinson studied the particular case of contraction functions that are maximal, in the sense of yielding a maximal subset of the theory (or alternatively, (...) of one of its axiomatic bases), that fails to imply the proposition being eliminated. In the present paper, the authors study a broader class, including contraction functions that may be less than maximal. Specifically, they investigate "partial meet contraction functions", which are defined to yield the intersection of some nonempty family of maximal subsets of the theory that fail to imply the proposition being eliminated. Basic properties of these functions are established: it is shown in particular that they satisfy the Gardenfors postulates, and moreover that they are sufficiently general to provide a representation theorem for those postulates. Some special classes of partial meet contraction functions, notably those that are "relational" and "transitively relational", are studied in detail, and their connections with certain "supplementary postulates" of Gardenfors investigated, with a further representation theorem established. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with formal aspects of the logic of theory change, and in particular with the process of shrinking or contracting a theory to eliminate a proposition. It continues work in the area by the authors and Peter Gärdenfors. The paper defines a notion of safe contraction of a set of propositions, shows that it satisfies the Gärdenfors postulates for contraction and thus can be represented as a partial meet contraction, and studies its properties (...) both in general and under various natural constraints. (shrink)

Examines the link between nonmonotonic inference relations and theory revision operations, focusing on the correspondence between abstract properties which each may satisfy.

Describes and discusses the rather special behaviour of one of the postulates in the AGM account of theory change.

This thesis consists in six articles and a comprehensive summary. • The pourpose of the summary is to introduce the AGM theory of belief change and to exemplify the diversity and significance of the research that has been inspired by the AGM article in the last 25 years. The research areas associated with AGM was divided in three parts: criticisms, where we discussed some of the more common criticisms of AGM. Extensions where the most common extensions and variations (...) of AGM are presented and applications where we provided an overview of applications and connections with other areas of research. • Article I elaborates on the connection between partial meet contractions [AGM85] and kernel contractions [Han94a] in belief change theory. Also both functions are equivalent in belief sets, there are notequivalent in belief bases. A way to define incision functions from selection functions and vice versa is presented. It is explained under which conditions there are exact correspondences between selection and incision functions so that the same contraction operations can be obtained by using either of them. • Article II proposes an axiomatic characterization for ensconcement-based contraction functions, belief base functions proposed byWilliams and relates this function with other kinds of base contraction functions. • Article III adapts the Fermé and Hansson model of Shielded Contraction [FH01] as well as Hansson et all Credibility-Limited Revision [HFCF01] for belief bases, to join two of the many variations of the AGM model [AGM85], i.e. those in which knowledge is represented through belief bases instead of logic theories, and those in which the object of the epistemic change does not get the priority over the existing information as it is the case in the AGM model. • Article IV introduces revision by comparison a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of propositions. Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. The method uses reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of information. Two kinds of semantics for this idea are proposed and a logical characterization of the new model is given. • Article V focuses on the extension of AGM that allows change for a belief base by a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. In [FH94], Fuhrmann and Hansson presented an axiomatic for Multiple Contraction and a construction based on the AGM Partial Meet Contraction. This essay proposes for their model another way to construct functions: Multiple Kernel Contraction, that is a modification of Kernel Contraction,proposed by Hansson [Han94a] to construct classical AGM contractions and belief base contractions. • Article VI relates AGM model with the DFT model proposed by Carlos Alchourrón [Alc93]. Alchourrón devoted his last years to the analysis of the notion of defeasible conditionalization. His definition of the defeasible conditional is given in terms of strict implication operator and a modal operator f which is interpreted as a revision function at the language level. This essay points out that this underlying revision function is more general than AGM revision. In addition, a complete characterization of that more general kind of revision that permits to unify models of revision given by other authors is given. (shrink)

Traditional theories construe approximate truth or truthlikeness as a measure of closeness to facts, singular facts, and idealization as an act of either assuming zero of otherwise very small differences from facts or imagining ideal conditions under which scientific laws are either approximately true or will be so when the conditions are relaxed. I first explain the serious but not insurmountable difficulties for the theories of approximation, and then argue that more serious and perhaps insurmountable difficulties for the theory (...) of idealization force us to sever its close tie to approximation. This leads to an appreciation of lawlikeness as a measure of closeness to laws, which I argue is the real measure of idealization whose main purpose is to carve nature at its joints. (shrink)

Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may (...) be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon. (shrink)

***Translated a Korean-language book to English with Dr. Chang-Seong Hong*** Venerable Hyun-Eung's Enlightenment and History is the first book of Buddhist philosophy of history published in South Korea; possibly the first of its kind in the world. In this book of telling points and clear visions, Hyun-Eung discusses East Asian Buddhist traditions in light of Western-philosophical perspectives and presents his views on the theory and praxis in contemporary Buddhism in a way that Western readers can easily understand. East Asian (...) Buddhist philosophy has had little introduction to English-speaking societies compared with the philosophies of other traditions in Buddhism. This book provides penetrating insight into such major issues of East Asian Mahayana Buddhism as enlightenment, compassion, emptiness, and sudden enlightenment in the Zen traditions. Hyun-Eung s approach is creative, clear, logical, and methodologically modernized. Hyun-Eung s Buddhist philosophy of history is not a mere product of armchair philosophy. He wrote most essays in this book during the 1980 s while South Korea was undergoing serious political turmoil as it tried to overthrow a government backed by military generals. This book presents a philosophy that evolved from his contemplations on the real issues of South Korean society. Defining the ideal form of life as the life of bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism, Hyun-Eung summarizes the theme of this book as follows: My book Enlightenment and History is a collection of essays that interpret Buddhist doctrines under a new light. In particular, this book interprets bodhisattva as the combination of bodhi (enlightenment) and sattva (life, history), and defines the life of bodhisattva as enlightenment s becoming history and history s becoming enlightenment. This is the representative of all the new interpretations in this book. Also, I classify the issue of fact judgments on how to understand facts and phenomena as the area of bodhi (enlightenment) and the issue of value judgments on how to live life as the area of sattva (history), and thereby I make their logical differences clear. However, at the same time, I claim that harmonizing these two areas into one area of life is the model of a nice and practical life, which is the bodhisattva that Mahayana Buddhism praises. From Introduction. (shrink)

The theory of Yin and Yang and the Five Movements is based on the concept of cyclical time. This ancient cosmological model postulates that when expansive energy reaches its apex, mutual life-saving relations prevail over mutually conflictual societal relations, and that this cycle repeats. This cosmic change model was first presented in ancient Korea and China, by Hado-Nakseo, via numerological configurations and symbols. The Hado diagram was drawn by a Korean thinker, Bok-hui (?-BC3413), also known as Great Empeor (...) Fuzi or Fu-hsi in Chinese mythology. Confucius once recognized him as the father of I Ching (Book of Changes). The Eastern cosmology was further developed by King Wen and the Duke of Zhou and compiled by Confucius (BC551?-BC 479) during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period. Nakseo diagram was first discovered by the famous King Wu of China, who founded the Xia dynasty. In contrast to the harmonious mathematical matrix of Hado, Nakseo symbolizes the conflictual and dynamic expansion of the universe. In the Nakseo world, masculine energy is structurally greater than feminine energy, continuously breeding disequilibrium and conflict. The Yin and Yang model suggests that everything in the universe exists as a combination of opposing dynamics. At any given time, one of the two dynamics grows while the other declines. When Yang energy is at its peak, Yin energy is at its nadir; then, a reversal occurs; and envetually the whole cycle repeats. It would thus be logical to express that when conflictual energy has reached its apex harmonious energy begins to wax. It can be argued that since the state of disequilibrium within the universe represented by Nakseo cannot indefinitely sustain its dynamic of expansion, harmonious international relationships eventually come to pervade the world. This argument represents a unique applicationof the concept of Yin and Yang logic to international arms race and arms control. This cyclical dynamics can explain the long-term process of arms build-up followed by eventually by nuclear standoff and subsequent nuclear arms control regimes as NPT, CTBT, MTCR, SALT, START, PSI and etc. One can boldly claim that Yin and Yang logic offers a clue to creating a theory of structural peace by discovering a constructivist element in the model. The esoteric matrixes of ancient Korea and China thus provide humanity with an new vision for nuclear disarmament and a sustainable peace. (shrink)

Hsun K'uang was one of the thinkers of the Warring States period, and he occupies an important place in the history of Chinese thought. He was also an outstanding Chinese logician. He broadened the realm of logical theory and applied logic to the ideological struggle in his time. This article will be devoted to a review of the outline and characteristics of the logical thought advanced in his famous article "Cheng-ming p'ien" [Correct Nomenclature].

Customary discussions of quantum measurements are unrealistic, in the sense that they do not reflect what happens in most actual measurements even under ideal circumstances. Even theories of measurement which discard the projection postulate tend to retain two unrealistic assumptions of the von Neumann theory: that a measurement consists of a single physical interaction, and that the topic of every measurement is information wholly contained in the quantum state of the object of measurement. I suggest that these unrealistic assumptions (...) originate from an overly literal interpretation of the operator formalism of quantum mechanics. I also suggest, following Park, that some issues can be clarified by distinguishing the sense of the term ''''measurement'''' occurring in the quantum-mechanical operator formalism, and the sense of ''''measurement'''' that refers to actual processes of gaining information about the physical world. (shrink)

The paper surveys some recent work on formal aspects of the logic of theory change. It begins with a general discussion of the intuitive processes of contraction and revision of a theory, and of differing strategies for their formal study. Specific work is then described, notably Gärdenfors'' postulates for contraction and revision, maxichoice contraction and revision functions and the condition of orderliness, partial meet contraction and revision functions and the condition of relationality, and finally the operations (...) of safe contraction and revision. Verifications and proofs are omitted, with references given to the literature, but definitions and principal results are presented with rigour, along with discussion of their significance. (shrink)

The paper surveys some recent work on formal aspects of the logic of theory change. It begins with a general discussion of the intuitive processes of contraction and revision of a theory, and of differing strategies for their formal study. Specific work is then described, notably Gärdenfors' postulates for contraction and revision, maxichoice contraction and revision functions and the condition of orderliness, partial meet contraction and revision functions and the condition of relationality, and finally the operations (...) of safe contraction and revision. Verifications and proofs are omitted, with references given to the literature but definitions and principal results are presented with rigour along with discussion of their significance. (shrink)

The postulate of Recovery, among the six postulates for theory contraction, formulated and studied by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson is the one that has provoked most controversy. In this article we construct withdrawal functions that do not satisfy Recovery, but try to preserve minimal change, and relate these withdrawal functions with the AGM contraction functions.

An investigation of what might be called the logical formalization of the process of theory change due to anomalies is presented. By anomaly, we mean an observed fact falling into the explanatory scope of a theory that does not agree with the theory prevision. A classical approach to restore the explicative power of a theory faced with an anomaly is to propose new, tentative auxiliary hypotheses which, along with part of the old set of auxiliary (...) hypotheses, are able to solve the anomaly. After laying down some conclusions about the structure of such process, we propose a multi-modal and non-monotonic logical framework able to represent some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Due to the necessity of accommodating incompatible tentative hypotheses, this framework incorporates a weak form of paraconsistency. As a case study, we analyze the anomalous behaviour of the planet Uranus that threatened the Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and gave rise to the discovery of Neptune. (shrink)

Ever since [4], systems of spheres have been considered to give an intuitive and elegant way to give a semantics for logics of theory- or belief- change. Several authors [5, 11] have considered giving up the rather strong assumption that systems of spheres be linearly ordered by inclusion. These more general structures are called hypertheories after [8]. It is shown that none of the proposed logics induced by these weaker structures are compact and thus cannot be given a (...) strongly complete axiomatization in a finitary logic. Complete infinitary axiomatizations are given for several intuitive logics based on hypertheories that are not linearly ordered by inclusion. (shrink)

Ever since [4], systems of spheres have been considered to give an intuitive and elegant way to give a semantics for logics of theory- or belief- change. Several authors [5, 11] have considered giving up the rather strong assumption that systems of spheres be linearly ordered by inclusion. These more general structures are called hypertheories after [8]. It is shown that none of the proposed logics induced by these weaker structures are compact and thus cannot be given a (...) strongly complete axiomatization in a finitary logic. Complete infinitary axiomatizations are given for several intuitive logics based on hypertheories that are not linearly ordered by inclusion. (shrink)

The logic of change formulated by K. Świętorzecka, has its motivation coming from the Aristotelian theory of substantial change which is undrstood as a transformation consisting in the disappearing and becoming of individual substances. The transition: becoming/disapearing (and conversely) is expressed in by the primitive operator C, to be read: it changes that …, and it is mapped by the progressively expanding language. We are interested in attributive changes of individual substances. We consider a formalism with (...) two non-normal and not mutually definable operators of possible and necessary change, inspired by Aristotelian distinction of accidental and essential attributes. From we adopt the idea that temporal concepts are defined via change operators, and the idea of an expanding language. In what follows, We axiomatise our new logic and describe its semantics, giving the proof of its completeness. We compare our formalism with selected modal logics. (shrink)

The book focuses on the modern understanding of human life-forms as constructs that followed an evolutionary history. The author thus finds science confronted with two questions: firstly, how the transgression of the virtual threshold between natural and cultural history was possible, secondly, how the socio-cultural constructs were able to develop in the course of history the way they did. The discussion concentrates on the problem of determining a processual logic in the development of societal structures as well as in (...) the development of cognition. The focus of attention is the historico-genetic reconstruction of cognition. The book was originally published in German as Historisch-genetische Theorie der Kultur (Weilerswist 2000: Velbrück). (shrink)

I explore how the nature, scope, and limits of the knowledge obtained in orbital dynamics has changed in recent years. Innovations in the design of spacecraft trajectories, as well as in astronomy, have led to new logics of theory-testing—that is, new research methodologies—in orbital dynamics. These methodologies—which combine resonance overlap theories, numerical experiments, and the implementation of space missions—were developed in response to the discovery of chaotic dynamical systems in our solar system. In the past few decades, they have (...) replaced the methodology that dominated orbital research in the centuries following Newton's Principia. As a result, the kind of knowledge achieved by orbital research has changed: we can know how orbiting bodies in chaotic systems behave, but only over sufficiently short time scales; and we can reliably measure those temporal limitations, using Lyapunov time. (shrink)

ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE has tended to define itself squarely against the kinds of so-called metaphysical approaches that have characterized so-called continental philosophy in the line of descent from Husserl. Indeed, Husserl’s project of phenomenological enquiry was the target of criticism by Frege—and later by Gilbert Ryle—which pretty much set the agenda for subsequent debate. That project seemed to them some form of argument that reveals his basically psychologistic approach, one that purported to address issues of truth, validity, rational warrant, (...) and so forth, but which fell far short of the logical rigor attained by thinkers in the analytic tradition. Thus Husserl might claim—like Descartes and Kant before him—to be raising questions about the a priori forms of human knowledge and experience, forms that were given or necessarily presupposed in every possible act of cognition. Moreover, he might claim to have advanced beyond Kant in distinguishing more clearly between formal and transcendental logic, or judgments whose necessity follows from the ground rules of this or that logically binding system of thought, and judgments that result from a rigorous reflection on the genesis and structure of human understanding in general. However these claims counted for little with Husserl’s critics in the other, that is, post-Fregean analytical camp. What they chiefly objected to in Husserl’s project was the approach via thoughts and ideas in the mind of some perceiving or reasoning subject, even though Husserl was very often at pains to reject any merely empirical or psychologistic construal of his claims. To their way of thinking, all this talk about transcendental truth- and validity-conditions was just another variant of the bad old Cartesian-Kantian retreat to consciousness as the last court of appeal in epistemological matters. Only by rejecting that entire line of thought—that is to say, by adopting a strictly analytical or logico-semantic approach—could philosophy at last break free of its attachment to naive, subject-centered, or metaphysical notions of meaning and truth. (shrink)

This article examines various (in my view) failed or problematic attempts to overcome the limits of logical empiricism in epistemology and philosophy of science. It focuses on Quine's influential critique of that doctrine and on subsequent critiques of Quine that challenge his appeal to the scheme/content dichotomy as a third residual 'dogma' of empiricism (Davidson) or his espousal of a radically physicalist approach that rejects the possibility of quantifying into modal contexts (Marcus). I endorse these criticisms as valid on their (...) own terms but argue that they have taken rise within a context of debate that is artificially narrowed through its failure to engage with developments in the 'other' (continental) tradition, among them Husserlian phenomenology and the critical epistemology of thinkers like Bachelard and Canguilhem. I suggest that these provide a promising alternative to some of the more extreme relativist positions adopted in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science. Above all they offer a means of relating historical approaches concerned with the scientific 'context of discovery' to analytic approaches that typically address logical, conceptual, or procedural issues in the 'context of justification'. (shrink)

Belief Revision is a well-established field of research that deals with how agents rationally change their minds in the face of new information. The milestone of Belief Revision is a general and versatile formal framework introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, known as the AGM paradigm, which has been, to this date, the dominant model within the field. A main shortcoming of the AGM paradigm, as originally proposed, is its lack of any guidelines for relevant change. To remedy (...) this weakness, Parikh proposed a relevance-sensitive axiom, which applies on splittable theories; i.e., theories that can be divided into syntax-disjoint compartments. The aim of this article is to provide an epistemological interpretation of the dynamics of splittable theories, from the perspective of Kuhn's inuential work on the evolution of scientific knowledge, through the consideration of principal belief-change scenarios. The whole study establishes a conceptual bridge between rational belief revision and traditional philosophy of science, which sheds light on the application of formal epistemological tools on the dynamics of knowledge. (shrink)

The classical qualitative theory of belief change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson has been widely known as being characterised by two packages of postulates. While the basic package consists of six postulates and is very weak, the full package that adds two further postulates is very strong. I revisit two classic constructions of theory contraction, viz., relational possible worlds contraction and entrenchment-based contraction and argue that four intermediate levels can be distinguished that play - or ought (...) to play - important roles within qualitative belief revision theory. Levels 3 and 4 encode two ways of interpreting the idea of imperfect discrimination of the plausibilities of possible worlds or propositions. (shrink)

I argue that the lived experience we, the human species, are going through in 2020 is no longer an epoch of changes but a change of epoch. Post-pandemic is becoming meaningless in a change of epoch. My argument is based on the history of the colonial matrix of power rather than in particular thematic histories which, in this case, will be the history of pandemics and the history of the economy. Both are working together, globally now, and entangled (...) in the colonial matrix of power, which can not be found in the origin of the universe, in Babylon or in Greece. It did not exist until the 16th century in the Atlantic, the Black and the White, the North and the South. The logic of coloniality is the logic of the invisible and it is by understanding its historical foundation, its unfolding and the radical transformations in the past two decades, that the signs of the change of epoch can be perceived and understood. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the question of whether Newtonian mechanics can be derived from relativity theory. Physicists agree that classical mechanics constitutes a limiting case of relativity theory. By contrast, philosophers of science like Kuhn and Feyerabend affirm that classical mechanics cannot be deduced from relativity theory because of the incommensurability between both theories; thus what we obtain when we take the limit c in relativistic mechanics cannot be Newtonian mechanics sensu stricto. In (...) this paper I focus on the alleged change of reference of the term mass in the transition from one theory to the other. Contradicting Kuhn and Feyerabend, special relativity theory supports the view that the mass of an object is a characteristic property of the object, that it has the same value in whatever frame of reference it is measured, and that it does not depend on whether the object is in motion or at rest. Thus mass preserves the reference through the change of theory, and the existence of a Newtonian limit of relativity theory provides a good example of the rationality of theory change in mathematical physics. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos' "methodology of scientific research programs" and Alasdair MacIntyre's "tradition-constituted enquiry" are two sustained attempts to overcome the assumptions of logical empiricism, while saving the appearance that theory-change is rational. The key difference between them is their antithetical stand on the issue of incommensurability between large-scale theories. This divergence generates other areas of disagreement; the most important are the relevance of the historical record and the presence of decision criteria that are common to rival programs. I show (...) that Lakatos' rejection of the incommensurability thesis and dismissal of actual history are motivated by the belief that neither are compatible with the rationality of theory-change. If MacIntyre can deny the necessity of dispensing with the historical record, and show that incommensurability and the consequent absence of shared decision criteria are compatible with rationality in theory-change, then Lakatos' argument will lose its force, and MacIntyre will better honor the intention to take seriously the historicality of science. I argue that MacIntyre can dissolve tensions between incommensurability and rationality in theory-change if he is able, first, to distinguish a sense of the incommensurability thesis that preserves genuine rivalry between theories, and second, to show that the possibility of rationality in theory-change depends not on the presence of common decision criteria, but on the fact that traditions can fail by their own standards. After reconstructing and examining the argument, I conclude that the notion of a tradition's "internal failure" is coherent, but that it leaves crucial questions about the epistemology and ontology of traditions that must be answered if MacIntyre's proposal is to constitute a genuine improvement on Lakatos. (shrink)

The problems that surround iterated contractions and expansions of beliefs are approached by studying hypertheories, a generalisation of Adam Grove's notion of systems of spheres. By using a language with dynamic and doxastic operators different ideas about the basic nature of belief change are axiomatised. It is shown that by imposing quite natural constraints on how hypertheories may change, the basic logics for belief change can be strengthened considerably to bring one closer to a theory of (...) iterated belief change. It is then argued that the logic of expansion, in particular, cannot without loss of generality be strengthened any further to allow for a full logic of iterated belief change. To remedy this situation a notion of directed expansion is introduced that allows for a full logic of iterated belief change. The new operation is given an axiomatisation that is complete for linear hypertheories. (shrink)

A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing (...) this, we attend to some central philosophical issues in the theory of belief change, such as the choice of a representation for belief states and the meaning of an idealized rational agent. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown how the DRT (Discourse Representation Theory) treatment of temporal anaphora can be formalized within a version of Montague Semantics that is based on classical type logic.

This paper shows how the dynamic interpretation of natural language introduced in work by Hans Kamp and Irene Heim can be modeled in classical type logic. This provides a synthesis between Richard Montague's theory of natural language semantics and the work by Kamp and Heim.

To sentential language we add an operator C to be read as ‘it changes that…’ and present an axiomatic system in the frame of classical logic to catch some meaning of the term ‘change’. A typical axiom is e.g.: CA implies, a basic rule is: from A it may be inferred (theorems do not change). So this system is not regular. On the semantic level we introduce stages (of the development of some world, of some agents’ convictions (...) or of some argumentation) at which a sentence may be true or false. It turns out that with the help of C, an operator N can be defined whose intuitive meaning is ‘on the next occasion…’ and which behaves like A.N. Prior’s F (and also like the T operator of G.H. von Wright’s read ‘… and next…’). In a book by Świetorzecka (2008) cited below, the philosophical background is described which is the Aristotelian theory of substantial change. The author of this book shows also some metalogical properties of this logic. The aim of this text now is to present a formal extraction of Świetorzecka (2008) with a shortened axiomatisation and to describe some metalogical results. (shrink)

Philosophers of science discuss whether theory selection depends on aesthetic judgments or criteria, and whether these putatively aesthetic features are genuinely extra-epistemic. As examples, judgments involving criteria such as simplicity and symmetry are often cited. However, other theory selection criteria, such as fecundity, coherence, internal consistency, and fertility, more closely match those criteria used in art contexts and by scholars working in aesthetics. Paying closer attention to the way these criteria are used in art contexts allows us to (...) understand some evaluative and developmental practices in scientific theory selection as genuinely aesthetic, enlarging the scope of the goals of science. (shrink)