Measurement is said to be the basis of exact sciences as the process of assigning numbers to matter (things or their attributes), thus making it possible to apply the mathematically formulated laws of nature to the empirical world. Mathematics and empiria are best accorded to each other in laboratory experiments which function as what Nancy Cartwright calls nomological machine: an arrangement generating (mathematical) regularities. On the basis of accounts of measurement errors and uncertainties, I will (...) argue for two claims: 1) Both fundamental laws of physics, corresponding to ideal nomological machine, and phenomenological laws, corresponding to material nomological machine, lie, being highly idealised relative to the empirical reality; and also laboratory measurement data do not describe properties inherent to the world independently of human understanding of it. 2) Therefore the naive, representational view of measurement and experimentation should be replaced with a more pragmatic or practice-based view. (shrink)

This book is a state-of-the-art review on the Physics of Emergence. Foreword v Gregory J. Chaitin Preface vii Ignazio Licata Emergence and Computation at the Edge of Classical and Quantum Systems 1 Ignazio Licata Gauge Generalized Principle for Complex Systems 27 Germano Resconi Undoing Quantum Measurement: Novel Twists to the Physical Account of Time 61 Avshalom C. Elitzur and Shahar Dolev Process Physics: Quantum Theories as Models of Complexity 77 Kirsty Kitto A Cross-disciplinary Framework for the Description of (...) Contextually Mediated Change 109 Liane Gabora and Diederik Aerts Quantum-like Probabilistic Models Outside Physics 135 Andrei Khrennikov Phase Transitions in Biological Matter 165 Eliano Pessa Microcosm to Macrocosm via the Notion of a Sheaf (Observers in Terms of t-topos) 229 Goro Kato The Dissipative Quantum Model of Brain and Laboratory Observations 233 Walter J. Freeman and Giuseppe Vitiello Supersymmetric Methods in the Traveling Variable: Inside Neurons and at the Brain Scale 253 H.C. Rosu, O. Cornejo-Perez, and J.E. Perez-Terrazas Turing Systems: A General Model for Complex Patterns in Nature 267 R.A. Barrio Primordial Evolution in the Finitary Process Soup 297 Olof Gornerup and James P. Crutchfield Emergence of Universe from a Quantum Network 313 Paola A. Zizzi Occam's Razor Revisited: Simplicity vs. Complexity in Biology 327 Joseph P. Zbilut Order in the Nothing: Autopoiesis and the Organizational Characterization of the Living 339 Leonardo Bich and Luisa Damiano Anticipation in Biological and Cognitive Systems: The Need for a Physical Theory of Biological Organization 371 Graziano Terenzi How Uncertain is Uncertainty? 389 Tibor Vamos Archetypes, Causal Description and Creativity in Natural World 405 Leonardo Chiatti . (shrink)

Newton's bucket, Einstein's elevator, Schrödinger's cat – these are some of the best-known examples of thought experiments in the natural sciences. But what function do these experiments perform? Are they really experiments at all? Can they help us gain a greater understanding of the natural world? How is it possible that we can learn new things just by thinking? In this revised and updated new edition of his classic text _The Laboratory of the Mind_, James Robert Brown continues to (...) defend apriorism in the physical world. This edition features two new chapters, one on “counter thought experiments” and another on the development of inertial motion. With plenty of illustrations and updated coverage of the debate between Platonic rationalism and classic empiricism, this is a lively and engaging contribution to the field of philosophy of science. (shrink)

This book provides the reader with a detailed and captivating account of the story where, for the first time, physicists ventured into proposing a new force of nature beyond the four known ones - the electromagnetic, weak and strong forces, and gravitation - based entirely on the reanalysis of existing experimental data. Back in 1986, Ephraim Fischbach, Sam Aronson, Carrick Talmadge and their collaborators proposed a modification of Newton's Law of universal gravitation. Underlying this proposal were three tantalizing pieces of (...) evidence: 1) an energy dependence of the CP (particle-antiparticle and reflection symmetry) parameters, 2) differences between the measurements of G, the universal gravitational constant, in laboratories and in mineshafts, and 3) a reanalysis of the Eötvos experiment, which had previously been used to show that the gravitational mass of an object and its inertia mass were equal to approximately one part in a billion. The reanalysis revealed that, contrary to Galileo's position, the force of gravity was in fact very slightly different for different substances. The resulting Fifth Force hypothesis included this composition dependence and also added a small distance dependence to the inverse-square gravitational force. Over the next four years numerous experiments were performed to test the hypothesis. By 1990 there was overwhelming evidence that the Fifth Force, as initially proposed, did not exist. This book discusses how the Fifth Force hypothesis came to be proposed and how it went on to become a showcase of discovery, pursuit and justification in modern physics, prior to its demise. In this new and significantly expanded edition, the material from the first edition is complemented by two essays, one containing Fischbach's personal reminiscences of the proposal, and a second on the ongoing history and impact of the Fifth Force hypothesis from 1990 to the present. <. (shrink)

This is clearly an important anthology. Each contributor is a philosopher of considerable reputation and each article is a development of themes its author has expounded over a period of time. Quine examines two questions: the nature of the data of experience and measurement of theoreticity or distance from the data. Why does Quine, who rejects classical sense data, continue to raise questions about the location of "data?" Why supplant the old sensory atomism with a new sensory atomism? (...) An alternative would be to build a "first philosophy" on awareness of physical objects without recourse to "data." This approach would preserve one element of classical theories while rejecting another —precisely the opposite effect of Quine’s view. Goodman’s article is an attack upon some blithe assumptions about the helpfulness of invoking the relation of similarity to solve philosophical problems. The argument does not seem strong enough, however, to warrant the concluding claim that statements of similarity have henceforth been eliminated "from the philosopher’s dwindling kit." Variations in the viewpoints, etc., of perceivers need not affect similarities of objects but only which similarities are averted to. Parts of Goodman’s argument appear to assume the opposite. (shrink)

This paper addresses the doubts voiced by Wigner about the physical relevance of the concept of geometrical points by exploiting some facts known to all but honored by none: Almost all real numbers are transcendental; the explicit representation of any one will require an infinite amount of physical resources. An instrument devised to measure a continuous real variable will need a continuum of internal states to achieve perfect resolution. Consequently, a laboratory instrument for measuring a continuous variable in a (...) finite time can report only a finite number of values, each of which is constrained to be a rational number. It does not matter whether the variable is classical or quantum-mechanical. Now, in von Neumann’s measurement theory (von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, [1955]), an operator A with a continuous spectrum—which has no eigenvectors—cannot be measured, but it can be approximated by operators with discrete spectra which are measurable. The measurable approximant F(A) is not canonically determined; it has to be chosen by the experimentalist. It is argued that this operator can always be chosen in such a way that Sewell’s results (Sewell in Rep. Math. Phys. 56: 271, [2005]; Sewell, Lecture given at the J.T. Lewis Memorial Conference, Dublin, [2005]) on the measurement of a hermitian operator on a finite-dimensional vector space (described in Sect. 3.2) constitute an adequate resolution of the measurement problem in this theory. From this follows our major conclusion, which is that the notion of a geometrical point is as meaningful in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as it is in classical physics. It is necessary to be sensitive to the fact that there is a gap between theoretical and experimental physics, which reveals itself tellingly as an error inherent in the measurement of a continuous variable. (shrink)

The problem of how mathematics and physics are related at a foundational level is of interest. The approach taken here is to work towards a coherent theory of physics and mathematics together by examining the theory experiment connection. The role of an implied theory hierarchy and use of computers in comparing theory and experiment is described. The main idea of the paper is to tighten the theory experiment connection by bringing physical theories, as mathematical structures over C, the complex numbers, (...) closer to what is actually done in experimental measurements and computations. The method replaces C by C n which is the set of pairs, R n,I n, of n figure rational numbers in some basis. The properties of these numbers are based on those of numerical measurement outcomes for continuous variables. A model of space and time based on R n is discussed. The model is scale invariant with regions of constant step size interrupted by exponential jumps. A method of taking the limit n→∞ to obtain locally flat continuum-based space and time is outlined. Also R n based space is invariant under scale transformations. These correspond to expansion and contraction of space relative to a flat background. The location of the origin, which is a space and time singularity, does not change under these transformations. Some properties of quantum mechanics, based on C n and on R n space are briefly investigated. (shrink)

The strangeness of modern physics has sparked several popular books--such as The Tao of Physics--that explore its affinity with Eastern mysticism. But the founders of quantum mechanics were educated in the classical traditions of Western civilization and Western philosophy. In Nature Loves to Hide, physicist Shimon Malin takes readers on a fascinating tour of quantum theory--one that turns to Western philosophical thought to clarify this strange yet inescapable explanation of reality. Malin translates quantum mechanics into plain English, explaining its (...) origins and workings against the backdrop of the famous debate between Niels Bohr and the skeptical Albert Einstein. Then he moves on to build a philosophical framework that can account for the quantum nature of reality. He shows, for instance, how Platonic and Neoplatonic thought resonates with quantum theory. He draws out the linkage between the concepts of Neoplatonism and the more recent process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. The universe, Whitehead wrote, is an organic whole, composed not of lifeless objects, but "elementary experiences." Beginning with Whitehead's insight, Malin shows how this concept of "throbs of experience" expresses quantum reality, with its subatomic uncertainties, its constituents that are waves and also particles, its emphasis on acts of measurement. Once any educated person could explain the universe as a vast Newtonian web of cause and effect, but since quantum theory, reality again appears to be richer and more mysterious than we had thought. Writing with broad humanistic insight and deep knowledge of science, and using delightful conversations with fictional astronauts Peter and Julie to explain more difficult concepts, Shimon Malin offers a profound new understanding of the nature of reality--one that shows a deep continuity with aspects of our Western philosophical tradition going back 2500 years, and that feels more deeply satisfying, and truer, than the clockwork universe of Newton. (shrink)

An interesting case of the complex interaction between theory and experiment can be found in many experiments in quantum physics employing classical reasoning. It is expected that this practice would lead to quantitative inaccuracy, unless the measurements' results were averaged. Whether or not this inaccuracy is significant depends critically on the details of the particular experimental situation. The example of Millikan's photoelectric experiment, in which he obtained a precise value of Planck's constant, provides a good case for illustrating the (...) process of estimating the inaccuracy resulting from the classical-quantum discrepancy. In the case of Millikan's experiment, it seems that a significant inaccuracy was avoided because of fortunate coincidences. In general, in the absence of a careful analysis, it is impossible to say whether the use of classical reasoning interferes with the accuracy of a quantum-physical experiment. (shrink)

Modern physics, which had its beginnings in the inclined-plane experiments of Galileo, deals with the measurable aspects of the world about us. The laws and definitions of classical physics are, at least superficially, differential equations in which each variable represents the result of a particular kind of measurement. These variables are usually called physical quantites. Starting from a few general laws and definitions we can derive formally further relations between the physical quantities and their rates of change in (...) space and time. If the original definitions are self-consistent and the original laws accurate, the relations we derive from them should enable us to predict what the numerical result of a certain measurement will be whenever certain other measurements have yielded specified numerical results. (shrink)

One of the basic observations of the classical world is that physical entities are real and can be distinguished from each other. However, within quantum theory, the idea of physical realism is not well established. A framework to analyse how observations in experiments can be described using some physical states of reality was recently developed, known as ontological models framework. Different principles when imposed on the ontological level give rise to different theories, the validity of which can be tested (...) based on the statistics generated by these theories. Using the ontological models framework, we formulate a novel notion of classicality termed ontic-distinguishability, which is based upon the physical principles that in classical theories extremal states are physical states of reality and every sharp measurement observes the state of the system perfectly. We construct a communication task in which the success probability is bounded from above for ontological models satisfying the notion of ontic-distinguishability. Contrary to previous notions of classicality which either required systems of dimension strictly greater than two or atleast three preparations, a violation of ontic-distinguishability can be observed using just a pair of qubits and a pair of incompatible measurements. We further show that violation of previously known notions of classicality such as preparation non-contextuality and Bell’s local causality is a violation of ontic-distinguishability. (shrink)

I present philosophical reflections arising from a study of laboratory measurement methods in quantum physics. More specifically, I investigate three major methods of measuring kinetic energy, from the period during which quantum physics was developed and came to be widely accepted: magnetic deflection, electrostatic retardation, and material retardation. The historical material serves as a provocative focus at which many broader philosophical topics come together: the empirical testing of theories, the universal validity of physical laws, the interaction between theoretical (...) and experimental traditions, incommensurability, meaning and definition, realism and instrumentalism, the process of scientific change, and the unity of science. ;I begin the discussion by noting that the measurement methods in question were based on classical theory. Chapter 1 asks how the classical reasoning in measurements can be interpreted in quantum-mechanical terms, and concludes that only a "surface interpretation" is possible, since the classical methods involve many assumptions that conflict with quantum mechanics. Chapter 2 attempts to give a quantitative assessment of the inaccuracies that might result from using the "incorrect" classical theory in the design of measurement methods. Chapter 3 asks how we can know whether a measurement method is reliable, and investigates how different methods of measuring the same quantity can ground each other; this mutual grounding is also seen as a process of concept-formation. Chapter 4 argues that the customary quantum theories of measurement do not describe actual measurements well, and originate from an overly literal interpretation of the operator formalism of quantum mechanics. Chapter 5 examines how the classically reasoned measurement methods were incorporated into quantum physics; that history suggests a model of scientific development which can introduce fundamental changes while preserving much continuity with the old tradition. Chapter 6 develops a philosophical framework which allows a synthetic view of the concrete results presented in the earlier chapters: my work is an attempt to establish "conceptual coherence," creating and clarifying noncontradictory connections among the various conceptual activities that make up quantum physics. (shrink)

The path-integral approach to quantum theory of continuous measurements has been developed in preceding works of the author. According to this approach the measurement amplitude determining probabilities of different outputs of the measurement can be evaluated in the form of a restricted path integral (a path integral “in finite limits”). With the help of the measurement amplitude, maximum deviation of measurement outputs from the classical one can be easily determined. The aim of the present paper (...) is to express this variance in a simpler and transparent form of a specific uncertainty principle (called the action uncertainty principle, AUP). The most simple (but weak) form of AUP is δS≳ℏ, whereS is the action functional. It can be applied for simple derivation of the Bohr-Rosenfeld inequality for measurability of gravitational field. A stronger (and having wider application) form of AUP (for ideal measurements performed in the quantum regime) is |∫ ′ t″ (δS[q]/δq(t))Δq(t)dt|≃ℏ, where the paths [q] and [Δq] stand correspondingly for the measurement output and for the measurement error. It can also be presented in symbolic form as Δ(Equation) Δ(Path) ≃ ℏ. This means that deviation of the observed (measured) motion from that obeying the classical equation of motion is reciprocally proportional to the uncertainty in a path (the latter uncertainty resulting from the measurement error). The consequence of AUP is that improving the measurement precision beyond the threshold of the quantum regime leads to decreasing information resulting from the measurement. (shrink)

We present a holistic description of physical systems and how they relate to observations. The “theory” is established (geometrically) as a “classical random field theory.” The basic system variables are related to Lie group generators: the conjugate variables define observer parameters. The dichotomy between system and observer leads to acommunication channel relationship. The distortion measure on the channel distinguishes “classical” from “quantum” theories. The experiment is defined in terms that accommodate precision and unreliability. Information theory methods permit stochastic (...) inference (this includes “inverse scattering”) and prediction based on realistic data. (shrink)

A highly abstracted theory of measurement is synthesized from classical measurement theory, fuzzy set theory, generalized information theory, and predicate calculus. The theory does not require specific truth value concepts, nor does it specify what subsets of the reals can be observed, thus avoiding the usual fundamental difficulties. Problems such as the definition of systems, the significance of observations, numerical scales and observables, etc. are examined. The general logico-algebraic approach to quantum/classical physics is justified as a (...) special case of measurement theory. (shrink)

Earlier, we have studied computations possible by physical systems and by algorithms combined with physical systems. In particular, we have analysed the idea of using an experiment as an oracle to an abstract computational device, such as the Turing machine. The theory of composite machines of this kind can be used to understand (a) a Turing machine receiving extra computational power from a physical process, or (b) an experimenter modelled as a Turing machine performing a test of (...) a known physical theory T.Our earlier work was based upon experiments in Newtonian mechanics. Here we extend the scope of the theory of experimental oracles beyond Newtonian mechanics to electrical theory. First, we specify an experiment that measures resistance using a Wheatstone bridge and start to classify the computational power of this experimental oracle using non-uniform complexity classes. Secondly, we show that modelling an experimenter and experimental procedure algorithmically imposes a limit on our ability to measure resistance by the Wheatstone bridge.The connection between the algorithm and physical test is mediated by a protocol controlling each query, especially the physical time taken by the experimenter. In our studies we find that physical experiments have an exponential time protocol; this we formulate as a general conjecture. Our theory proposes that measurability in Physics is subject to laws which are co-lateral effects of the limits of computability and computational complexity. (shrink)

Earlier, we have studied computations possible by physical systems and by algorithms combined with physical systems. In particular, we have analysed the idea of using an experiment as an oracle to an abstract computational device, such as the Turing machine. The theory of composite machines of this kind can be used to understand (a) a Turing machine receiving extra computational power from a physical process, or (b) an experimenter modelled as a Turing machine performing a test of (...) a known physical theory T. Our earlier work was based upon experiments in Newtonian mechanics. Here we extend the scope of the theory of experimental oracles beyond Newtonian mechanics to electrical theory. First, we specify an experiment that measures resistance using a Wheatstone bridge and start to classify the computational power of this experimental oracle using non-uniform complexity classes. Secondly, we show that modelling an experimenter and experimental procedure algorithmically imposes a limit on our ability to measure resistance by the Wheatstone bridge. The connection between the algorithm and physical test is mediated by a protocol controlling each query, especially the physical time taken by the experimenter. In our studies we find that physical experiments have an exponential time protocol, this we formulate as a general conjecture. Our theory proposes that measurability in Physics is subject to laws which are co-lateral effects of the limits of computability and computational complexity. (shrink)

We have begun a theory of measurement in which an experimenter and his or her experimental procedure are modeled by algorithms that interact with physical equipment through a simple abstract interface. The theory is based upon using models of physical equipment as oracles to Turing machines. This allows us to investigate the computability and computational complexity of measurement processes. We examine eight different experiments that make measurements and, by introducing the idea of an observable indicator, we identify three (...) distinct forms of measurement process and three types of measurement algorithm. We give axiomatic specifications of three forms of interfaces that enable the three types of experiment to be used as oracles to Turing machines, and lemmas that help certify an experiment satisfies the axiomatic specifications. For experiments that satisfy our axiomatic specifications, we give lower bounds on the computational power of Turing machines in polynomial time using nonuniform complexity classes. These lower bounds break the barrier defined by the Church-Turing Thesis. (shrink)

I present results of recent work in the field of quantum optics and relate this work to discussions about the theory of quantum mechanics and God's divine action in the world. Experiments involving atomic decay, relevant to event uncertainty in quantum mechanics, as well as experiments aimed at elucidating the so–called Schrödinger’s–cat paradox, help clarify apparent ambiguities or paradoxes that I believe are at the heart of renewed attempts to locate God within our constructed physical theories and tend to narrow (...) the gaps proposed as an opening for divine action. Some problems arise because of imprecise use of nonmathematical language to force quantum mechanics into an intuitive “classical” framework. (shrink)

In this article, Savage’s theory of decision-making under uncertainty is extended from a classical environment into a non-classical one. The Boolean lattice of events is replaced by an arbitrary ortho-complemented poset. We formulate the corresponding axioms and provide representation theorems for qualitative measures and expected utility. Then, we discuss the issue of beliefs updating and investigate a transition probability model. An application to a simple game context is proposed.

We demonstrate in this paper that the probabilities for sequential measurements have features very different from those of single-time measurements. First, they cannot be modelled by a classical stochastic process. Second, they are contextual, namely they depend strongly on the specific measurement scheme through which they are determined. We construct Positive-Operator-Valued measures (POVM) that provide such probabilities. For observables with continuous spectrum, the constructed POVMs depend strongly on the resolution of the measurement device, a conclusion that persists (...) even if we consider a quantum mechanical measurement device or the presence of an environment. We then examine the same issues in alternative interpretations of quantum theory. We first show that multi-time probabilities cannot be naturally defined in terms of a frequency operator. We next prove that local hidden variable theories cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum theory for sequential measurements, even when the degrees of freedom of the measuring apparatus are taken into account. Bohmian mechanics, however, does not fall in this category. We finally examine an alternative proposal that sequential measurements can be modeled by a process that does not satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms of probability. This removes contextuality without introducing non-locality, but implies that the empirical probabilities cannot be always defined (the event frequencies do not converge). We argue that the predictions of this hypothesis are not ruled out by existing experimental results (examining in particular the “which way” experiments); they are, however, distinguishable in principle. (shrink)

The need for quantitative measurement represents a unifying bond that links all the physical, biological, and social sciences. Measurements of such disparate phenomena as subatomic masses, uncertainty, information, and human values share common features whose explication is central to the achievement of foundational work in any particular mathematical science as well as for the development of a coherent philosophy of science. This book presents a theory of measurement, one that is "abstract" in that it is concerned with highly (...) general axiomatizations of empirical and qualitative settings and how these can be represented quantitatively. It was inspired by, and represents a generalization and extension of, the last major research work in this field, Foundations of Measurement Vol. I, by Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky published in 1971. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to refute the hypothesis that the observer’s consciousness is necessary in the quantum mechanics measurement process. In order to achieve our target, we propose and investigate a variation of the Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment called “DAP”, short for “Dead-Alive Physicist”, in which a human being replaces the cat. This strategy enables us to logically disprove the consistency of the above hypothesis, and to oblige its supporters either to be trapped in solipsism or to (...) rely on an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the conscious observer plays the sole role of acknowledging the experimental results. Our analysis hence provides support to clarify the relationship between the observer and the objects of her/his experimental observation; this and a few other implications are discussed in the fourth section and in the conclusions. (shrink)

In 1773, the Scottish traveller Patrick Brydone published an account of visiting Mount Etna, in which he drew on three distinct categories of thought: the scientific, the aesthetic, and the cultural. He carried his barometer up the volcano to measure it; he was overwhelmed with awe on viewing the sunrise from its summit; and he carefully set his account in the context of different mythological and philosophical explanations of Etna, largely drawn from the writings of classical authors. In preceding (...) centuries, Thomas Burnet’s Theory of the Earth and Athanasius Kircher’s Mundus Subterraneus viewed mountains as laboratories for better understanding nature, for evoking a sense of eschatological awe, and as embedded in long traditions of cultural appreciation. Earlier still, Pietro Bembo in 1496 recounted his journey to the summit of Etna which wove together personal observation, classical insights, and aesthetic admiration. In an ancient example, the first-century anonymous Aetna poem urged readers to move beyond mythological explanations for volcanic activity and to instead enjoy true aesthetic pleasure in investigating the volcano and its causes for themselves. This article offers a close reading of these texts in order to demonstrate three key points. The first is that an intense aesthetic experience of volcanoes can be found in accounts predating the eighteenth-century articulation of the ‘natural sublime’. The second is that the compulsion to investigate and understand natural phenomena, as a key element of aesthetic appreciation, is also evident before the Enlightenment. Third, the article suggests that a sense of Etna as ‘classic ground’—as a feature which both intensified the viewer’s interest in its natural phenomena and produced an ‘interested’ aesthetic experience of its natural greatness—likewise extends back even to the ancient texts from which later travellers would draw their own cultural associations. (shrink)

Patrick Aidan Heelan’s The Observable offers the reader a completely articulated development of his 1965 philosophy of quantum physics, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity. In this previously unpublished study dating back more than a half a century, Heelan brings his background as both a physicist and a philosopher to his reflections on Werner Heisenberg’s physical philosophy. Including considerably broader connections to the contributions of Niels Bohr, Wolfgang Pauli, and Albert Einstein, this study also reflects Heelan’s experience in Eugene Wigner’s laboratory (...) at Princeton along with his reflections on working with Erwin Schrödinger dating from Heelan’s years at the Institute for Advanced Cosmology in Dublin. A contribution to continental philosophy of science, the phenomenological and hermeneutic resources applied in this book to the physical and ontological paradoxes of quantum physics, especially in connection with laboratory science and measurement, theory and model making, will enrich students of the history of science as well as those interested in different approaches to the historiography of science. University courses in the philosophy of physics will find this book indispensable as a resource and invaluable for courses in the history of science. (shrink)

Previous studies of auditory expectation have focused on the expectedness perceived by listeners retrospectively in response to events. In contrast, this research examines predictive uncertainty —a property of listeners' prospective state of expectation prior to the onset of an event. We examine the information-theoretic concept of Shannon entropy as a model of predictive uncertainty in music cognition. This is motivated by the Statistical Learning Hypothesis, which proposes that schematic expectations reflect probabilistic relationships between sensory events learned implicitly through exposure. Using (...) probability estimates from an unsupervised, variable-order Markov model, 12 melodic contexts high in entropy and 12 melodic contexts low in entropy were selected from two musical repertoires differing in structural complexity (simple and complex). Musicians and non-musicians listened to the stimuli and provided explicit judgments of perceived uncertainty (explicit uncertainty). We also examined an indirect measure of uncertainty computed as the entropy of expectedness distributions obtained using a classical probe-tone paradigm where listeners rated the perceived expectedness of the final note in a melodic sequence (inferred uncertainty). Finally, we simulate listeners' perception of expectedness and uncertainty using computational models of auditory expectation. A detailed model comparison indicates which model parameters maximize fit to the data and how they compare to existing models in the literature. The results show that listeners experience greater uncertainty in high-entropy musical contexts than low-entropy contexts. This effect is particularly apparent for inferred uncertainty and is stronger in musicians than non-musicians. Consistent with the Statistical Learning Hypothesis, the results suggest that increased domain-relevant training is associated with an increasingly accurate cognitive model of probabilistic structure in music. (shrink)

Among the many tensions and oppositions in play in the early twentieth century, one—the divide between classical and modern physics—has retrospectively overshadowed our understandings of the period. This paper investigates when and why physicists first started using the term ‘classical’ to describe their discipline. Beginning with Boltzmann and ending with the 1911 Solvay Congress, on a broad scale this story constitutes a powerful instance of the circulation of a rich cultural image. First deployed in understandings of literature, music, (...) art and schooling, the concept of the classical within the physics community came to be invested with a highly specific meaning, which in turn formed the basis for the widespread popularization of a new physical worldview after World War I. But on a finer scale, displaying the diverse, contrasting and controversial concepts of classical theory invoked by different physicists around 1900, and charting the emergence of our present understanding with the rise of relativity and quantum theory, reveals significant tussles over the meaning and value of different intellectual approaches. Here I use these tensions to investigate the interrelations between research programs and the broader, framing concepts with which physicists describe their experience of disciplinary change.Keywords: Energetics; Statistical mechanics; Relativity; Quantum theory; Classical physics; Ludwig Boltzmann. (shrink)

How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, Schrödinger and De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the situation? Of course, all these objections are levelled not against the correctness of the formulae, but against their interpretation. [...] The lesson to be learned from what I have told of the origin of quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of mathematical methods will not suffice to produce a satisfactory theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a (...) concept, unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the road. (Born [ 1954 ], pp. 8, 11) It is truly surprising how little difference all this makes. Most physicists use quantum mechanics every day in their working lives without needing to worry about the fundamental problem of its interpretation. (Weinberg [ 1992 ], p. 66) I endorse the view that it may be of no relevance to the acceptability of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory whether or not an informed observer can be uncertain about the outcome of a quantum measurement prior to its having occurred. However, I suggest that the very possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty has an essential role to play in both confirmation theory and decision theory in a branching universe. This is supported by arguments which do not appeal to van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. (shrink)

Sometimes conducting an experiment to ascertain the state of a system changes the state of the system being measured. Kahneman & Tversky modelled this effect with ‘support theory’. Quantum physics models this effect with probability amplitude mechanics. As this paper shows, probability amplitude mechanics is similar to support theory. Additionally, Viscusi's proposed generalized expected utility model has an analogy in quantum mechanics.

Love, fear, hope, calculus, and game shows-how do all these spring from a few delicate pounds of meat? Neurophysiologist Ian Glynn lays the foundation for answering this question in his expansive An Anatomy of Thought, but stops short of committing to one particular theory. The book is a pleasant challenge, presenting the reader with the latest research and thinking about neuroscience and how it relates to various models of consciousness. Combining the aim of a textbook with the style of a (...) popularization, it provides all the lay reader needs to know to participate in the philosophical debate that is redefining our attitudes about our minds. Drawing on the rich history of neurological case studies, Glynn picks through the building blocks of our nervous system, examines our visual and linguistic systems, and probes deeply into our higher thought processes. The stories of great scientists, like Ramon y Cajal, and famous patients, like Sperry's split-brained epileptics, illuminate the scientific issues Glynn selects as essential for understanding consciousness. Some might argue that his lengthy explorations of natural selection overemphasize evolutionary explanations of psychological phenomena, but they must also agree that evolutionary psychology has distanced itself mightily from social Darwinism in recent years and merits a reappraisal. The great consciousness debate may form the core of the 21st-century Zeitgeist; get ready for it with An Anatomy of Thought. -Rob Lightner From Publishers Weekly How do we know? What do we think? How could a philosophical problem-'the mind-body problem,' say-induce a headache? What can evolutionary theory, molecular biology, the history of medicine and experimental psychology tell us about the features of human consciousness, and (once again) how do we know? Glynn, a physician and Cambridge University professor, meticulously attempts to answer these questions and more, setting forth the results of all sorts of research relevant to our brains-from 19th-century dissections to Oliver Sacks-like case studies, work with monkeys and supercomputers, and the enduring puzzles of philosophy, which he rightly saves for near the end. After explaining evolution by natural selection and 'clearing away much dross,' Glynn lays out the experiments and theories that have shown 'how nerve cells can carry information about the body, how they can interact' and how sense organs work; demonstrates the 'mixture of parallel and hierarchical organization' in our brains and 'the striking localization of function within it'; considers where neuroscience is likely to go; and admits that, among the many fields of exciting research just ahead, 'we can be least confident of progress toward a complete, scientific explanation of our sensations and thoughts and feelings.' Other recent explaining-the-brain books have sometimes advanced simplistic, or implausibly grand, claims about the nature and features of consciousness in general. Instead, Glynn offers a patient, informative, well-laid-out researcher's-eye view of what we have learned, how we figured it out and what we still don't know about neurons, senses, feelings, brains and minds. (Apr.) Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Library Journal The nature of consciousness, which perennially troubles the minds of scientists and philosophers, is the subject of an ever-growing body of literature. Two of the latest entries approach the topic from different perspectives. Glynn, a professor of physiology and head of the Physiological Laboratory at Cambridge, offers a comprehensive summary of what we know about the brain-both its evolution and its mechanisms. Among the topics he covers are natural selection, molecular evolution, nerves and the nervous system, sensory perception, and the specific structures responsible for our intellect. Using the mechanisms involved in vision and speech as models, Glynn skillfully describes various neurological deficiencies that can lead to 'disordered seeing' and problems with the use of language. He carefully distinguishes what we know through experimental evidence from what we know through the observation of patients with neurological damage. He also describes some of the major theories that attempt to explain why these structures arose. While his book concentrates on the structures that make up the mind, Glynn is well aware that some physical events appear explicable only in terms of conscious mental events-a situation that conflicts with the laws of modern physics. Only briefly, however, does he consider the various approaches that have been taken to deal with the issues of mind/body and free will. In contrast, this is the primary focus of The Physics of Consciousness. After reviewing the fundamentals of classic physics, Walker (who has a Ph.D. in physics) summarizes elements of the new physics in which our knowledge of space, time, matter, and energy are all dependent on the moment of observation. Walker explores the meaning of consciousness as a characteristic of the observer. In this context both the observer and the act of measurement are critical. In essence, Walker leads his reader on a journey through his concept of a 'quantum mind,' which can both affect matter (including other minds) and can be affected by other distant matter/minds. To break up what would otherwise be an extremely dense text, Walker also relates the very touching story of the loss of his high-school sweetheart to leukemia. Indeed, it is his memory of their relationship that drives Walker to seek an understanding of ultimate reality. At times, he has a tendency to be dogmatic-as when he concludes, 'our consciousness, our mind, and the will of God are the same mind.' While An Anatomy of Thought is appropriate for most academic libraries, the Physics of Consciousness will be most accessible to readers with some knowledge of advanced physics. -Laurie Bartolini, Illinois State Lib., Springfield Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc. From Booklist The codiscoverers of natural selection-Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace-disagreed over the possibility of finding an evolutionary explanation for the human mind. Glynn here argues Darwin's side of the debate, tracing an eons-long path of development starting from simple amino acids floating in primal seas and extending through the erect hominids in which the powers of a massive brain first manifest themselves. Patiently adducing evidence of an evolutionary origin for the underlying molecular machinery, Glynn dissects the nerve centers that make possible speech and hearing, sight, and reading. Pressing deeper, he lays bare the cortical foundations of personality. But those who deal with the mind must attend also to the arguments advanced by philosophers. And it is when he turns from dendrites to syllogisms (especially the vexing mind-body paradox) that Glynn's empirical reasoning fails him. In the end, he concedes his perplexity in trying to conceive of an evolutionary origin for human consciousness. This concession may set the shade of Alfred Wallace to chortling, but it will draw readers into an honest confrontation with a profound enigma. Bryce Christensen. (shrink)

Analogue Gravity Phenomenology is a collection of contributions that cover a vast range of areas in physics, ranging from surface wave propagation in fluids to nonlinear optics. The underlying common aspect of all these topics, and hence the main focus and perspective from which they are explained here, is the attempt to develop analogue models for gravitational systems. The original and main motivation of the field is the verification and study of Hawking radiation from a horizon: the enabling feature is (...) the possibility to generate horizons in the laboratory with a wide range of physical systems that involve a flow of one kind or another. The years around 2010 and onwards witnessed a sudden surge of experimental activity in this expanding field of research. However, building an expertise in analogue gravity requires the researcher to be equipped with a rather broad range of knowledge and interests. The aim of this book is to bring the reader up to date with the latest developments and provide the basic background required in order to appreciate the goals, difficulties and success stories in the field of analogue gravity. Each chapter of the book treats a different topic explained in detail by the major experts for each specific discipline. The first chapters give an overview of black hole spacetimes and Hawking radiation before moving on to describe the large variety of analogue spacetimes that have been proposed and are currently under investigation. This introductory part is then followed by an in-depth description of what are currently the three most promising analogue spacetime settings, namely surface waves in flowing fluids, acoustic oscillations in Bose-Einstein condensates and electromagnetic waves in nonlinear optics. Both theory and experimental endeavours are explained in detail. The final chapters refer to other aspects of analogue gravity beyond the study of Hawking radiation, such as Lorentz invariance violations and Brownian motion in curved spacetimes, before concluding with a return to the origins of the field and a description of the available observational evidence for horizons in astrophysical black holes. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of quantum physics (QP) and some recent generalizations of this theory rest on the adoption of a rerificationist theory of truth and meaning, while most proposals for modifying and interpreting QP in a “realistic” way attribute an ontological status to theoretical physical entities (ontological realism). Both terms of this dichotomy are criticizable, and many quantum paradoxes can be attributed to it. We discuss a new viewpoint in this paper (semantic realism, or briefly SR), which applies both to (...) classical physics (CP) and to QP. and is characterized by the attempt of giving up verificationism without adopting ontological realism. As a first step, we construct a formalized observative language L endowed with a correspondence truth theory. Then, we state a set of axioms by means of L which hold both in CP and in QP. and construct a further language Lv which can express bothtestable andtheoretical properties of a given physical system. The concepts ofmeaning andtestability do not collapse in L and Le hence we can distinguish between semantic and pragmatic compatibility of physical properties and define the concepts of testability and conjoint testability of statements of L and Le. In this context a new metatheoretical principle (MGP) is stated, which limits the validity of empirical physical laws. By applying SR (in particular. MGP) to QP, one can interpret quantum logic as a theory of testability in QP, show that QP is semantically incomplete, and invalidate the widespread claim that contextuality is unavoidable in QP. Furthermore. SR introduces some changes in the conventional interpretation of ideal measurements and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. (shrink)

Quantum uncertainty relations have deep-rooted significance in the formalism of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations attracted a renewed interest for its applications in quantum information science. Following the discovery of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, Robertson derived a general form of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations for a pair of arbitrary observables represented by Hermitian operators. In the present work, we discover a temporal version of the Heisenberg–Robertson uncertainty relations for the measurement of two observables at two different times, where the dynamical (...) uncertainties crucially depend on the time evolution of the observables. The uncertainties not only depend on the choice of observables but also depend on the times at which the physical observables are measured. The time correlated two-time commutator dictates the trade-off between the dynamical uncertainties. We demonstrate the dynamics of these uncertainty relations for a spin-1/2 quantum system and for a quantum harmonic oscillator. We also present the dynamical uncertainty relation in terms of entropies, where the temporal entropic uncertainties are restricted by a time-dependent complementarity factor. The temporal uncertainty relations explored in this work can be experimentally verified with the present quantum technology. (shrink)

Consciousness is widely perceived as one of the most fundamental, interesting and difficult problems of our time. However, we still know next to nothing about the relationship between consciousness and the brain and we can only speculate about the consciousness of animals and machines. Human and Machine Consciousness presents a new foundation for the scientific study of consciousness. It sets out a bold interpretation of consciousness that neutralizes the philosophical problems and explains how we can make scientific predictions about (...) the consciousness of animals, brain-damaged patients and machines. Gamez interprets the scientific study of consciousness as a search for mathematical theories that map between measurements of consciousness and measurements of the physical world. We can use artificial intelligence to discover these theories and they could make accurate predictions about the consciousness of humans, animals and artificial systems. Human and Machine Consciousness also provides original insights into unusual conscious experiences, such as hallucinations, religious experiences and out-of-body states, and demonstrates how 'designer' states of consciousness could be created in the future. Gamez explains difficult concepts in a clear way that closely engages with scientific research. His punchy, concise prose is packed with vivid examples, making it suitable for the educated general reader as well as philosophers and scientists. Problems are brought to life in colourful illustrations and a helpful summary is given at the end of each chapter. The endnotes provide detailed discussions of individual points and full references to the scientific and philosophical literature."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Despite quantum theory’s remarkable success at predicting the statistical results of experiments, many philosophers worry that it nonetheless lacks some crucial connection between theory and experiment. Such worries constitute the Quantum Measurement Problems. One can broadly identify two kinds of worries: (1) pragmatic: it is unclear how to model our measurement processes in order to extract experimental predictions, and (2) realist: we lack a satisfying metaphysical account of measurement processes. While both issues deserve attention, the pragmatic worries (...) have worse consequences if left unanswered: If our pragmatic theory-to-experiment linkage is unsatisfactory, then quantum theory is at risk of losing both its evidential support and its physical salience. Avoiding these risks is at the core of what I will call the Pragmatic Measurement Problem. Fortunately, the pragmatic measurement problem is not too difficult to solve. For non-relativistic quantum theory, the story goes roughly as follows: One can model each of quantum theory’s key experimental successes on a case-by-case basis by using a measurement chain. In modeling this measurement chain, it is pragmatically necessary to switch from using a quantum model to a classical model at some point. That is, it is pragmatically necessary to invoke a Heisenberg cut at some point along the measurement chain. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, one can then strive for a wide-scoping measurement theory capable of modeling all (or nearly all) possible measurement processes. For non-relativistic quantum theory, this leads us to our usual projective measurement theory. As a bonus, proceeding this way also gives us an empirically meaningful characterization of the theory’s observables as (positive) self-adjoint operators. But how does this story have to change when we move into the context of quantum field theory (QFT)? It is well known that in QFT almost all localized projective measurements violate causality, allowing for faster-than-light signaling; These are Sorkin’s impossible measurements. Thus, the story of measurement in QFT cannot end as it did before with a projective measurement theory. But does this then mean that we need to radically rethink the way we model measurement processes in QFT? Are our current experimental practices somehow misguided? Fortunately not. I will argue that (once properly understood) our old approach to modeling quantum measurements is still applicable in QFT contexts. We ought to first use measurement chains to build up a case-by-case measurement framework for QFT. Modeling these measurement chains will require us to invoke what I will call a QFT-cut. That is, at some point along the measurement chain we must switch from using a QFT model to a non-QFT model. Past this case-by-case measurement framework, we can then strive for both a new wide-scoping measurement theory for QFT and an empirically meaningful characterization of its observables. It is at this point that significantly more theoretical work is needed. This paper ends by briefly reviewing the state of the art in the physics literature regarding the modeling of measurement processes involving quantum fields. (shrink)

Starting from logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics we reconstruct the logic of so-called no-signaling theories, where the correlations among subsystems of a composite system are restricted only by a simplest form of causality forbidding an instantaneous communication. Although such theories are, as it seems, irrelevant for the description of physical reality, they are helpful in understanding the relevance of quantum mechanics. The logical structure of each theory has an epistemological flavor, as it is based on analysis of (...) possible results of experiments. In this note we emphasize that not only logical structures of classical, quantum and no-signaling theory may be treated on the same ground but it is also possible to give to all of them a common ontological basis by constructing a “phase space” in all cases. In non-classical cases the phase space is not a set, as in classical theory, but a more general object obtained by means of category theory, but conceptually it plays the same role as the phase space in classical physics. (shrink)

A lot of attention has been devoted to the study of discoveries in high energy physics, but less on measurements aiming at improving an existing theory like the standard model of particle physics, getting more precise values for the parameters of the theory or establishing relationships between them. This paper provides a detailed and critical study of how measurements are performed in recent HEP experiments, taking examples from differential cross section measurements with the ATLAS detector at the LHC. This study (...) will be used to provide an elucidation of the concept of event used in HEP, in order to determine what constitutes an observation and what does not. It will highlight the essential place taken by theory-ladenness in order to produce observational facts, and will show how uncertainty and sensitivity estimates constitute an operational approach to robustness, inside the practice of science, avoiding potential circularity problem traditionally implied by theory-ladenness. This is in contrast to robustness analyses typically considered in the literature. A careful analysis of systematic uncertainty estimates and of statistical tests used to set empirical conclusions from the observations will however demonstrate that quantitative statements obtained from these statistical tests cannot be more than simple guiding arguments for the production of knowledge, but do not determine it. This indicates that the frontier between theory and observation is blurry and that the dichotomy theory-experiment should be revised. (shrink)

Astronomical observations of redshifts and the cosmic background radiation show that there is a local frame of reference relative to which the solar system has a well-defined velocity. Also, in cosmology the cosmological principle implies the existence of cosmic time and unique local reference frames at all spacetime points. On the other hand, in a fundamental postulate, the theory of special relativity excludes the possibility of the velocity of the Earth from entering into theories of local physics.The theory put forward (...) in this paper resolves this conflict between local physics and cosmology. The theory retains the essential ingredient of the mathematical structure of special relativity, namely covariance under the Lorentz symmetry group, but changes radically the interpretation of the physical significance of the Lorentz transformation. The theory is based on the postulate that in free space the fundamental interactions in physics are propagated with constant velocity with respect to the local rest frame. In Minkowski spacetime the local rest frame of reference defines a unique time axis and consequently a unique three-dimensional spatial hyperplane. One particularly important result of this is that the theory includes the classical notion of simultaneity. From the fundamental postulate it follows that the equations of local physics, when expressed in terms of the rest frame coordinate system, must be covariant under the Lorentz symmetry group. By the identification of the local rest frame with the (unique) cosmological local reference frame the two theories become mutually consistent.The effects of the motion of the Earth on laboratory experiments are discussed. It is pointed out that existing experimental data do not discriminate between the present theory and that of special relativity: a proposal for an experimental test is made. (shrink)

It is argued that a reformulation of classical measure theory is necessary if the theory is to accurately describe measurements of physical phenomena. The postulates of a generalized measure theory are given and the fundamentals of this theory are developed, and the reader is introduced to some open questions and possible applications. Specifically, generalized measure spaces and integration theory are considered, the partial order structure is studied, and applications to hidden variables and the logic of quantum mechanics are given.

Sorkin’s recent proposal for a realist interpretation of quantum theory, the anhomomorphic logic or coevent approach, is based on the idea of a “quantum measure” on the space of histories. This is a generalisation of the classical measure to one which admits pair-wise interference and satisfies a modified version of the Kolmogorov probability sum rule. In standard measure theory the measure on the base set Ω is normalised to one, which encodes the statement that “Ω happens”. Moreover, the Kolmogorov (...) sum rule implies that the measure of any subset A is strictly positive if and only if A cannot be covered by a countable collection of subsets of zero measure. In quantum measure theory on the other hand, simple examples suffice to demonstrate that this is no longer true. We propose an appropriate generalisation, the quantum cover, which in addition to being a cover of A, satisfies the property that if the quantum measure of A is non-zero then this is also the case for at least one of the elements in the cover. Our work implies a non-triviality result for the coevent interpretation for Ω of finite cardinality, and allows us to cast the Peres-Kochen-Specker theorem in terms of quantum covers. (shrink)

By analyzing a gedanken experiment designed to measure the distance l between two spatially separated points, we find that this distance cannot be measured with uncertainty less than (ll 2 P) 1/3 , considerably larger than the Planck scale lP (or the string scale in string theories), the conventional-wisdom uncertainty in distance measurements. This limitation to space-time measurements is interpreted as resulting from quantum fluctuations of space-time itself. Thus, at very short distance scales, space-time is “foamy.” This intrinsic foaminess of (...) space-time provides another source of noise in the interferometers. The LIGO/VIRGO and LISA generations of gravity-wave interferometers, through future refinements, are expected to reach displacement noise levels low enough to test our proposed degree of foaminess in the structure of space-time. (shrink)

The research has three objectives: 1) to study the concept of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 2) to study the concept of reality and knowledge in Buddhist philosophy, and 3) to analyze the concept of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in Buddhist philosophical perspective. This is documentary research. In this research, it was found that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle refers to the experiment of thought while studying physical reality on smaller particles than atoms where at the present no theory of Physics can clearly explain such (...) properties. In this respect, the mentioned principle is utilized to predict the pairs of a certain attribute of physics, position, and momentum, for instance. The accuracy of position, however, cannot be precisely yielded in advance by such a principle. In other words, it is impossible to measure the position and momentum of a quantum particle at the same time. In the study of the ultimate reality on the matter in the Buddhist philosophy, it showed that corporeality in nature is conditioned by cause and effect and thereby falling under the three common characteristics: 1) impermanence, 2) state of suffering, and 3) state of non-substantiality. In the study of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in the Buddhist philosophical perspective, this research was found that the processes in acquiring certain knowledge of Heisenberg and Buddhist philosophy are by one another in the sense that such knowledge is methodologically acquired through experience, rationality, and intuition because both see the Reality in the same manners, that is, the physical reality is viewed by Heisenberg as the thing that goes under changing state of wave-particle all the times, and the matter is seen by Buddhist philosophy as the impermanence and change depending upon its factors involved and thereby is not-self. However, in the different aspect, on the one hand, Buddhist philosophy utilizes the knowledge on the matter to develop the morality and ethics by which the cessation of suffering could be respectively made, but on the other hand, Heisenberg somehow applies the certain knowledge on physical objects into quantum technology to accommodate the physical comfortability in living life. Suggestions in the application of knowledge gained from this research into benefit were that while Buddhist philosophy can make use of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to provide certain help at the time of explanation of three common characteristics being done through the scientific method, science also can utilize knowledge gained from Buddhist philosophy to expand the framework of scientific knowledge which is aimed at studying only the physical objects to be able to study the mental objects through the integration of three epistemological methods as well. (shrink)

The evolution of the human mind through natural selection mandates that our conscious experiences are causally potent in order to leave a tangible impact upon the surrounding physical world. Any attempt to construct a functional theory of the conscious mind within the framework of classical physics, however, inevitably leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolution theory. Here, we derive several rigorous theorems that identify the origin of the latter impasse in the mathematical properties of ordinary (...) differential equations employed in combination with the alleged functional production of the mind by the brain. Then, we demonstrate that a mind--brain theory consistent with causally potent conscious experiences is provided by modern quantum physics, in which the unobservable conscious mind is reductively identified with the quantum state of the brain and the observable brain is constructed by the physical measurement of quantum brain observables. The resulting quantum stochastic dynamics obtained from sequential quantum measurements of the brain is governed by stochastic differential equations, which permit genuine free will exercised through sequential conscious choices of future courses of action. Thus, quantum reductionism provides a solid theoretical foundation for the causal potency of consciousness, free will and cultural transmission. (shrink)

Given an ontological model of a quantum system, a “genuine measurement,” as opposed to a quantum measurement, means an experiment that determines the value of a beable, i.e., of a variable that, according to the model, has an actual value in nature before the experiment. We prove a theorem showing that in every ontological model, it is impossible to measure all beables. Put differently, there is no experiment that would reliably determine the ontic state. This result shows that (...) the positivistic idea that a physical theory should only involve observable quantities is too optimistic. (shrink)

In the iconic measurements of atomic spin-1/2 or photon polarization, one employs two separate noninteracting detectors. Each detector is binary, registering the presence or absence of the atom or the photon. For measurements on a d-state particle, we recast the standard von Neumann measurement formalism by replacing the familiar pointer variable with an array of such detectors, one for each of the d possible outcomes. We show that the unitary dynamics of the pre-measurement process restricts the detector outputs (...) to the subspace of single outcomes, so that the pointer emerges from the apparatus. We propose a physical extension of this apparatus which replaces each detector with an ancilla qubit coupled to a readout device. This explicitly separates the pointer into distinct quantum and (effectively) classical parts, and delays the quantum to classical transition. As a result, one not only recovers the collapse scenario of an ordinary apparatus, but one can also observe a superposition of the quantum pointer states. (shrink)

The difference between the measurement bases of classical and quantum mechanics is often interpreted as a loss of reality arising in quantum mechanics. In this paper it is shown that this apparent loss occurs only if one believes that refined everyday experience determines the Euclidean space as the real space, instead of considering this space, both in classical and quantum mechanics, as a theoretical construction needed for measurement and representing one part of a dualistic space conception. (...) From this point of view, Einstein's program of a unified field theory can be interpreted as the attempt to find a physical theory that is less dualistic. However, if one rgards this dualism as resulting from the requirements of measurements, one can hope for a weakening of the dualism but not expect to remove it completely. (shrink)

Euclidean geometry, statics, and classical mechanics, being in some sense the simplest physical theories based on a full-fledged mathematical apparatus, are well suited to a historico-philosophical analysis of the way in which a physical theory differs from a purely mathematical theory. Through a series of examples including Newton’s Principia and later forms of mechanics, we will identify the interpretive substructure that connects the mathematical apparatus of the theory to the world of experience. This substructure includes models of experiments, models (...) of measurement, and modular connections with partial theories. It evolves during the life of a theory as physicists learn how to apply it in various contexts. It should nevertheless be regarded as an integral part of a genuine physical theory since the theory would otherwise degenerate into pure mathematics. (shrink)

The kinds of models discussed in this paper function as measuring instruments. We will concentrate on two necessary steps for measurement: (1) the search of a mathematical representation of the phenomenon; (2) this representation should cover an invariant relationship between the properties of the phenomenon to be measured and observable accociated attributes of a measuring instrument. Therefore, the measuring instrument should function as a nomological machine. However, invariant relationships are not necessarily ceteris paribus regularities, but could also (...) occur when the influence of the environment is negligible. Then we are able to achieve accurate measurements outside the laboratory. (shrink)

Quantum theory does not only predict probabilities, but also relative phases for any experiment, that involves measurements of an ensemble of systems at different moments of time. We argue, that any operational formulation of quantum theory needs an algebra of observables and an object that incorporates the information about relative phases and probabilities. The latter is the (de)coherence functional, introduced by the consistent histories approach to quantum theory. The acceptance of relative phases as a primitive ingredient of any quantum theory, (...) liberates us from the need to use a Hilbert space and non-commutative observables. It is shown, that quantum phenomena are adequately described by a theory of relative phases and non-additive probabilities on the classical phase space. The only difference lies on the type of observables that correspond to sharp measurements. This class of theories does not suffer from the consequences of Bell's theorem (it is not a theory of Kolmogorov probabilities) and Kochen–Specker's theorem (it has distributive “logic”). We discuss its predictability properties, the meaning of the classical limit and attempt to see if it can be experimentally distinguished from standard quantum theory. Our construction is operational and statistical, in the spirit of Copenhagen, but makes plausible the existence of a realist, geometric theory for individual quantum systems. (shrink)

We argue, in light of Collapse Model interpretation of quantum theory, that the fundamental division between the quantum and classical behaviors might be analogous to the division of thermodynamic phases. A specific relationship between the collapse parameter $$(\lambda )$$ and the collapse length scale ( $$r_C$$ ) plays the role of the coexistence curve in usual thermodynamic phase diagrams. We further claim that our functional relationship between $$\lambda$$ and $$r_C$$ is strongly supported by the existing International Germanium Experiment (IGEX) (...) collaboration data. This result is preceded by a brief discussion of quantum measurement theory and the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) model applied to the free wavepacket dynamics. (shrink)