The article deals with the entrenchment of the institute of criminal liability of a legal person in the Lithuanian criminal law. Upon approval of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter also referred to as the CC) on 26 September 2000, the criminal liability of a legal person was provided almost in every fifth (at present—in every second) article of the Special Part of the CC. Although criminal liability has been increasingly applied to legal persons (e.g., in 2011, (...) if compared to 2005, almost three times as much punishments were imposed), however, almost 90 percent of the articles of the CC providing also for criminal liability of a legal person are “dead”. One doubt arises with regard to social legitimacy of such lawmaking and the quality thereof in the sense of juridical technique. (shrink)

The author of the paper considers the influence of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court as the only official entity entitled to interpret the Constitution on the criminal procedure. The paper contains the review the following three trends of impact of the constitutional jurisprudence: influence on the legislature in criminal procedure law, influence on the practice of implementation of criminal procedural law and on the science of criminal procedural law. The paper mostly relies on the works by professionals in the (...) field of constitutional law, including publications by prof. dr. Juozas Žilys, the first Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and the former dean of the Law Faculty of Mykolas Romeris University, as the area of criminal procedure has so far included only several publications, the direct objective of which was to study issues on the constitutionalisation of criminal procedure. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the constitutional foundations of the finance system of the Republic of Lithuania. Constitutional jurisprudence pays due respect to the issues of budget system, and to interpret and analyse tax problems. The main purpose of this paper is to analyse separate institutes of the financial system of Lithuania, reflected in the main law of the country – the Constitution, and how these norms are interpreted in the constitutional doctrine. Notably, although the main analysed provisions are entrenched in (...) the Chapter XI “Finances and state budget,” the paper is not restricted only on the analysis of these norms, but also provides a complex analysis of other connected norms and their interpretation in the constitutional jurisprudence. (shrink)

The article focuses on the new institute of the Lithuanian law of constitutional justice procedure – the dissenting opinion of a Constitutional Court justice as it is consolidated in the Law on the Constitutional Court. It is argued that the current statutory regulation is defective in essence because it creates preconditions for diminishing the quality of both the final act of the Constitutional Court (especially when the dissenting opinion is to be filed by the judge rapporteur) and the dissenting opinion (...) under preparation. The narrative is half-normative and half-behavioural: the institute is analysed in the context of established procedural practice of the Constitutional Court as an extremely collegial institution (also due to the statutory regulation), as well as in the context of the current condition of the public discourse in Lithuania. Namely, statutory regulation allows filing a dissenting opinion (which is not distinguished from the concurring opinion) within three working days after the public announcement of the decision (ruling, conclusion) of the Constitutional Court. Consequently, it is hardly possible to argue that the justice who filed the opinion did not do this in view of the immediate reaction to the decision by the media, the society, or the establishment, and even that he or she did not do this because such reaction took place. Also, the three-day period mentioned above puts any justice ready to file a dissenting (or concurring) opinion into the position where he or she simultaneously needs to participate in the collegial activity of the Court in deciding cases, as well as to write the dissenting (concurring) opinion. In the article, the legislative proposal is presented that the Law on the Constitutional Court should be amended so as to allow for a relatively long time span between the adoption of the decision (ruling, conclusion) and its announcement to the public at large. However, it is not suggested that the general mode of collectivism as dictated by the Law and as implemented in the established practice of the Constitutional Court shall be abandoned. By this article, the author continues his research on the matter as commenced in his two earlier articles (of 2011 and 2012). (shrink)

Constitution is an exclusive legal document, and its interpretation is a process – a continuous work of explanation of its content, the end and qualitative perfection of which may only be considered taking into account the limits of intellectual potential of the particular time. The interpretation of constitution is a permanent process, which is influenced and determined by plenty of conceptual factors. Firstly the supreme juridical power of the constitution as well as its integrity determines the opportunities of its interpreter (...) and applier. Integrity of the constitution is considered to be the legal, philosophical, logical integrity of its norms, which determines an obligation of its interpreter to perceive this legal act as an integral unit, i.e. not only as a catalogue of particular values, but also as a balance of these values. All the constitutional expressis verbis provisions are equal in its’ juridical power, that is why they do not negate each other, on the contrary – each of them only complement others’ content. Besides, it is important to mention that exceptional juridical power of the constitution determines its interpretational self-sufficiency. Constitution can not be interpreted invoking the content of the acts of lower juridical power. (shrink)

The constitution’s standing as a legal act of the highest power not only ensures its exclusive status in the legal system but also determines the hierarchic certainty of all norms within that system. The explicit character of the constitution does not preclude it from ensuring the hierarchical functionality of the legal system. This latter function requires that the limitation “problem” of explicitness be addressed by interpreting the constitution as a systemic document. Applying the constitution, therefore, requires a continuous effort in (...) comprehending it. The official doctrine of constitutional judicial institutions reflects the standard for understanding the constitution. This standard becomes the sole source, not only de jure, but significantly de facto, for determining the legality of legal acts. The constitution, as the prime and foremost law in a country, determines the functionality of the entire system of legal norms. As a legal source, it takes on the role of the material arbiter of final legality. The constant need to ensure the functioning of the system of legal norms hence informs yet another necessity–to apprehend and understand the constitution and the norms and principles established within. A few factors induce this perpetual need for interpretation, those being (a) the abstractness of constitutional norms, (b) “competition” among constitutional norms, (c) the integral and systemic nature of the constitution, and (d) the problem of legislative/regulative omission in the constitution. (shrink)

In societies of high legal culture, criminal law is regarded as a protective and repressive measure of the state, as an imperative of crime and inevitable punishment (as a strict rule). Therefore, the article attempts to show the fact that the entirety of the provisions and norms of criminal law, consolidated in a modern democratic state under the rule of law (or, at least, a state that is attempting to become such a state), allows for the assertion that the purpose (...) of criminal law is coordination or, at least, the balance of the interests of conflicting subjects—the victim and the culprit, the culprit and the state. Thus, by means of criminal law, one can try to attain legal concord in seemingly irreconcilable situations. The reality of such striving is confirmed by court practice and statistics in criminal justice. The article analyses the origin of the reconciliation function, essentially a new aspect of criminal law. A position is formed that the fundamentals of such a function of criminal law are “laid” by the provisions of the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania that the striving of the Nation is an open, just and harmonious civil society and a state under the rule of law. For the implementation of these provisions, one makes use of the possibilities of penal law-making and respectively corrects the penal policy. (shrink)

The article deals with the criteria upon which the powers of the Seimas (the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) and the Government are delimited in the constitutional jurisprudence of Lithuania. It analyses how the Constitutional Court construes the principle of separation of powers as entrenched in the Constitution and evaluates the meaning of the provision of the Constitution that corresponding ‘relations are regulated by law’. If the Constitution provides that certain relations are regulated by means of a law, such (...) relations may be regulated only by means of a legal act, which takes the form of a law, and it is, therefore, not permissible to regulate such relations by Government resolutions or other acts of the executive. The most important elements of legal relations must be regulated (established) by means of a law, whereas Government resolutions might establish the procedure for the implementation of such laws. Rulings of the Constitutional Court reveal that once the powers of a specific branch of state power have been directly established in the Constitution, an institution of state power may not assume the said powers fr om another state institution. It may not transfer or waive them; and such powers may not be amended or limited by means of a law. The question remains, whether the provision of the Law on the Diplomatic Service wh ereby the candidacy of a diplomatic representative must be reviewed by the Seimas Committee on Foreign Affairs in advance is not in conflict with the Constitution. (shrink)

This publication analyzes the issue of depersonalization in the field of constitutional substantiation of judicial resolutions, judgements, verdicts and rulings (hereinafter, judicial procedural decisions). Electronic databases are the primary source of information about judicial procedural resolutions for judges, reporters, as well as for the public-at-large. As for judicial practice, the data regarding parties of a case is depersonalised in these databases. Personal names are either replaced with initials, or a message “depersonalized data” is included. The constitutional substantiation for such a (...) ruling by a judicial council is sought by means of this publication. (shrink)

The constitutional right to self-expression, used by societies professing democratic values (Constitution, Article 25), is a highly important feature for forming the political will of the citizenry. A broad, multi-sided public discussion on all issues of public interest is only possible with the existence of an appropriate amount of freedom of information. A strong mechanism for disseminating information that operates between citizens and the parliament is able to generate a sphere for discussion and mutual influence which are essential for indirect (...) democracy. A discussion’s depth, quality and comprehensiveness constitute important factors which determine the correctness of choices made by citizens and politicians. Mainly, it is the free press which fosters communication between political parties and citizens. The role of the “watchdog” is fundamental to revealing the circumstances under which politicians or other public persons make different political and administrative decisions. This is what permits the identification of motives for rulings and the circumstances under which they were approved. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the general principles established in the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights while applying and interpreting the Article 3 of the First Protocol of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which provides: „The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.“ Article 3 of (...) the First Protocol enshrines a fundamental principle for effective political democracy, and is accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system. It refers not only to positive obligation of the Contracting State to organize democratic elections, but also guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and the right to stand for election, although this is not explicitly stated in it. These rights are not absolute; there is room for “implied limitations” and Contracting States are given a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere. However, these limitations must be such that the rights in question were not curtailed to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness, should be imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim and should not be disproportionate. (shrink)

The article discusses the certain features of the constitutional doctrine of human rights developed by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania which were influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the role of the European Convention on Human Rights as a legal source in the system of sources of constitutional law. The intersection of the jurisprudences, which came into being due to different assessments of the legal regulation in cases where the same legal act was recognized by (...) the Constitutional Court being in compliance with the Constitution and the European Court of Human Rights recognized that the application of the said act was a cause of the violation of a certain person’s rights protected by the Convention (or vice versa) is one of the most important questions and raises many theoretical and practical problems. Different assessment of the legal acts made by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to their compliance with the Conventionshould not be regarded as such an essential circumstance which could lead to possible repeated review of such legal act at the Constitutional Court, such intersection of the jurisprudences, should be solved by ordinary courts while following the doctrine that in cases where legal acts contain the legal regulation which competes with that established in the international treaty, the international treaty should be applied. (shrink)

The article underlines the significance of social rights as important constitutional rights of a human being and emphasises the peculiarities of their nature from the point of view of not only national, but also international law. The article presents an analysis of the constitutional doctrine of the protection of guarantees of social rights, which has been formulated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in the course of considering the issues of reduction of social guarantees—pensions and remuneration, which (...) were determined by the economic crisis. In the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence the personal right to social security has been construed in the most broad and comprehensive terms. The human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution have been treated as constituting an integrated and harmonious system, and social rights have been interpreted not only as certain obligations of the state to the public, which inter alia are determined by the social purpose of the state, but also as a person’s individual rights, for which judicial defence is guaranteed. Such concept of the said rights has also been influenced by international law, inter alia the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Social rights, while being an object of regulation of international law, have been forming the European doctrine of guarantees of these rights and have influenced the concept of these rights in national law. The main attention in the article is devoted to the analysis of the doctrine formulated in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in relation to the correction (limitation) of social rights (payment of pensions and remuneration) under the conditions of economic crisis. In the article the period of formation of this doctrine is divided into two stages: the period of 2002–2006, when the Constitutional Court had to decide regarding the compliance of the legal acts whereby social guarantees had been constricted with the Constitution, and which was caused by the consequences of the so-called Russian economic crisis for the economic development of the state of Lithuania; and the period from 2009 to date, during which the Constitutional Court has been forming the constitutional doctrine of limitation of social rights, which was conditioned by the outcomes of the global economic crisis for the economy of the state of Lithuania. The article raises a question as to whether the constitutional doctrine being formed by the Constitutional Court in relation to the limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis may be assessed as an independent one or whether it still remains to be a separate case of limitation of rights within the general doctrine of limitation of human rights. On the basis of the analysis of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, a conclusion is drawn that the criteria established in the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis are even stricter than the universally recognised criteria for the limitation of human rights in the law of human rights, therefore, it is possible to assess the doctrine of limitation of social rights under the conditions of economic crisis, as formulated by the Constitutional Court during 2009–2012, which is the continuation of the previous doctrine, as an independent doctrine, the basis of which, undoubtedly, remains to be formed by the general principles of limitation of human rights recognised in the law of human rights. The article is not only confined to the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, it also provides examples of construction of the doctrine of social rights (inter alia those influenced by the economic crisis) by certain other constitutional courts. (shrink)

Lietuvos, kaip ir kitų Europos valstybių, teisės aktai numato bendrovės visuotinio akcininkų susirinkimo sprendimų teisėtumo užtikrinimo priemonę – tokių sprendimų pripažinimo negaliojančiais institutą. Civiliniame kodekse išvardijami teisiniai šio instituto taikymo pagrindai. Kita vertus, visuotinio akcininkų susirinkimo sprendimų pripažinimo negaliojančiais pagrindų sistemos skirtingose valstybėse skiriasi. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama pateikti bendrą įstatymo numatytų bendrovės visuotinio akcininkų susirinkimo sprendimų pripažinimo negaliojančiais pagrindų Lietuvos teisėje apžvalgą, minėtų pagrindų sistemą lyginant su užsienio valstybių teisiniu reglamentavimu.

The present article analyses the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the execution of foreign policy in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. It should be noted that the matters of foreign policy were on the brink of constitutional regulation for a long time. The powers of institutions of the state in the field of foreign relations were established laconically by the Constitutions of first and second “waves” of establishment of constitutionalism. It was argued that the choices of decisions and (...) the execution of foreign policy were determined by political reasons and the law could only fix the results of that policy. That is why these constitutions should be seen as establishing quantitative characteristics of action of the state institutions in the field of foreign policy. As a result of the changes in the concept of the Constitution and the general recognition of the relevance of constitutional regulation from the middle of the twentieth century the constitutional acts began to define not only the powers of certain state institutions in the field of the foreign policy but also the objectives and principles of this policy. These objectives and principles are qualitative parameters of the action of state institutions, which are mandatory constitutional requirements to all subjects engaged in foreign policy. From a qualitative standpoint, the powers of the state institutions can be exercised only by taking the constitutional objectives into account and by respecting the Constitution. The Constitution establishing both qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the execution of foreign policy becomes an actual basis of this policy. It is unlawful to execute foreign policy without complying with its objectives and constitutional principles. The institutions of constitutional review have the powers to determine the constitutionality of legal acts related to the execution of foreign policy. Constitutional regulations previous to the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania of 1992 only defined the powers of state institutions, i.e. the quantitative parameters of their action. The Lithuanian Constitution of 1992 also established the constitutional objectives and principles of foreign policy. This area of constitutional regulation has been enhanced by the participation of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union. The author suggests analysing this matter as an autonomous constitutional principle and not only as a case of participation in international organisations or an integral element of the principle of geopolitical orientation. Constitutional objectives and principles of foreign policy, as well as the other provisions of the Constitution regarding the exercise of foreign policy, are interpreted in constitutional jurisprudence. In cases concerning the constitutionality of international treaties, laws and other legislative acts directly related to the exercise of foreign policy, the Constitutional Court reveals the content and meaning of the qualitative and quantitative constitutional parameters of foreign policy. Despite the fragmented nature of the case law one can see the precise contours of the foreign policy system. (shrink)

U ovom radu nastojim da čitaoce uvedem u problemsku oblast konceptualne analize pravnih pojmova i njene metodologije. Pokušavam da, na prilično bazičnom nivou, objasnim šta je konceptualna analiza, na koji način se ona obavlja i zašto je ona važna za teoriju prava. Takođe nastojim i da objasnim na koji način je konceptualna analiza povezana sa drugim oblastima filozofije, kao što su metafizika i epistemologija. Zatim, objašnjavam poduhvat u koji se konceptualna jurisprudencija upušta – da opiše ona svojstva po kojima (...) se stvari koje jesu pravo razlikuju od stvari koje nisu pravo, koja svojstva prvopomenute stvari čine pravom. Pritom sam to objašnjenje ilustrovao, nadam se, jasnim primerima. Takođe sam dao objašnjenje i procenu tri različita metodološka pristupa. Na kraju sam razmotrio praktički značaj konceptualne jurisprudencije. | Ovaj je prijevod izvorno objavljen u knjizi Bojan Spaić i Damir Banović, Problemi savremene pravne i političke filozofije. (shrink)

The article deals with the constitutional right of a person to apply to court. While construing this constitutionally entrenched right of a person, one analyses the doctrine of the right of a person to apply to court, which was formed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. The right of a person to court is entrenched expressis verbis in Paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the Constitution whereby the person whose constitutional rights or freedoms are (...) violated shall have the right to apply to court. The doctrine of the Constitutional Court derives this right also from the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law. The right of a person to court is inseparable from other norms and principles of the Constitution, which are equality of rights, the right to compensation of damage, the right to a proper court process, etc. (shrink)

Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty set out that in carrying out the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions adopted under Article 87 of the Treaty, the officials authorized by the EU Commission were empowered inter alia to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 (...) and 82 of the Treaty has expanded Commission’s powers stating that Commission can by decision order an inspection to be conducted in any other premises, land and means of transport, including the homes of directors, managers and other members of staff of the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned. Such an expansion of the investigative powers of the Commission raises a question of the balance between effectiveness of the EU competition law and a person’s right to privacy, which is guaranteed to everyone by the Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Nevertheless this right is not absolute and the conditions for the possible limitations of the exercise of it are enshrined in paragraph 2 of the same article. For this reason the aim of this article is to find out whether Commission’s power to carry out searches in private homes meet the requirements set in Article 8(2) of the Convention, i.e., whether the Commission’s power to conduct such searches could be justified under the ECHR Article 8(2). In this study, the authors analyse the Commission’s extended investigative powers, clarify what is covered by the concept of “privacy”, evaluate the requirements set in Article 8(2) of the Convention, analyse conditions of exercising Commission’s extended investigative power and thus qualify if the latter satisfies the requirements set in Article 8(2) of the ECHR. (shrink)

The article discusses the problems of development of women’s political rights in Lithuania in the legal historical aspect starting from the 16th century, when some property and individual rights were enshrined in the first codifications of the laws of the Great Duchy of Lithuania. The aim of the article is to show that women’s struggle for political equality and suffrage at the end of the 19th and at the turn of the 20th century correlates with the movement for re-establishment of (...) the independent State of Lithuania. As a result in Lithuania equal suffrage and political rights were ensured from the very beginning of independence. In 1905 the Great Seimas of Vilnius recognized the principles of equality of women and men and declared the principles of equal general election to the Seimas (parliament); women’s suffrage, as one of the elements of legal equality, became constitutionally entrenched already in the first temporary Constitution of the State of Lithuania in 1918. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century women’s rights have been further developed, moreover, the first woman was elected as President of the Republic in the national elections in May 2009. (shrink)

Lithuania had a different experience in legal regulation of private property. There were periods when right to private ownership was denied and on the other hand – the periods when right to private ownership was respected and protected. Authors wanted to review today’s status of rights to private property in retrospective. The main purpose of the article is to reveal functions of private property in Lithuania. The article analyzes peculiarities of legal regulation of private property in Lithuania during different stages (...) of the state’s development. The authors have analyzed the social significance of the right to private property, how it changed and how it has been reflected in Lithuanian legislation and the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, paying a particular attention to entrenchment of the right to private property in the Constitution of Lithuania. The authors evaluate the compliance of the national legal regulation and Article 1 of the First Protocol with the European Convention on Human Rights, and the case law of the European Court of Justice. (shrink)

The article offers a concise view on the problems related to the compatibility of the religious clauses in the Polish Constitution with the principles and standards of the European Union and with the constitutional regulations of other individual member states. The author particularly demonstrates to what extent Poland is different or even unable to enter this community and fully participate in the integration of the continent. In the first part of the article, the author studies the content of the Polish (...) basic law provisions on religion, in the second—the corresponding European Union regulations and similar rules in force in the individual nations of the continent. The article concludes that the constitutional provisions on religious matters demonstrate that regulations in the Polish basic statute are not more confessional than those established in other European Union countries. (shrink)

The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 10 September 2009 which repealed the proclaimed early elections to the Chamber of Deputies because of their alleged unconstitutionality fully manifests unjustifiability of the interference by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. The decision directly interfered with the process of democratic re-establishment of the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, the Court´s intervention was only made possible by violating a number of constitutionally prescribed rules. Finally, the respective ruling could not be (...) issued without a “creative approach” on the part of the Constitutional Court towards the rules governing procedures before the Court. The approach eventually resulted in the violation of principles of fair trial – before a body that should guarantee them. The paper analyses in detail various individual aspects of the case, from general issues of the division of power and contents of the mandate of deputies to individual procedural stages before the Constitutional Court. (shrink)

The constitutional system of the Czech Republic, which is established on the principles of a parliamentary form of government, takes into account the possibility of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The Chamber of Deputies is a chamber to which the government is accountable and this is the chamber in which the major part of the authority of Parliament is concentrated. Parliamentary systems have been also structured according to whether a certain amount of balance (...) of power is preserved between parliament and the government. A typical characteristic of every parliamentary form of government is the possibility for a vote of confidence in the government by parliament, meaning a dependency of the government on the will of parliament. Some parliamentary systems counterbalance this relationship with a greater or lesser possibility for the government of dissolving that chamber of parliament, which votes confidence in it. This makes it possible for the government to be able to more significantly fulfil the role of political leader in a given country and it can actively initiate and form a political state. (shrink)

The Czech Republic today belongs to the minority of European republics whose presidents are elected indirectly. It is a paradox that, even when direct election of the President has stable support not only of the majority of Czech society but also of the majority of parliamentary parties, this issue is constantly only discussed. Should direct election gain passage in the Czech Republic, there are formally better preconditions for this than there were in the past. With regard to the fact that (...) a change in the manner of the election of the Head of State hides in itself the potential to impact the functioning of the whole constitutional system, it is worth it to follow how this problem conceived in the Czech Republic. This article is devoted to the standing of the President of the Republic in the contemporary Czech constitutional system and to considerations about direct election from the year 1918 to the present. Attention is also devoted to the difficulties which it is necessary to come to terms with during a potential change in the manner of the election of the President if the current balance of powers between the constitutional organs is to remain preserved. (shrink)

Unwritten constitutional conventions also known as lex non scripta, are under permanent scholarly scrutiny. This does not happen only in the Anglo-Saxon scholarly tradition. When analyzing the issues of unwritten law, a considerable number of representatives of this tradition, starting with W. Blackstone and finishing with contemporary British and American scholars, also talk about the existence of constitutional conventions. It should also be noted that issues pertaining to unwritten law and issues of conventions in particular, are often mentioned and analyzed (...) in the works of scholars of the Roman-Germanic legal tradition. Italian, French, German and Czech scholars take account of constitutional conventions, analyze their features and hold discourse on their future. However, in the course of scholarly debate, the issues of constitutional conventions have been dealt with in a fairly controversial manner. Even though individual scholars recognize constitutional conventions, the variety of opinions and conceptions is too large to form a uniform understanding. (shrink)

T. G. Masaryk and M. Romeris are certainly prominent personalities and great names in history. It would be hard to understand the Czech nation and the development of the state of Czechoslovakia without T. G. Masaryk’s philosophical views on person, nation, state, and his political activity; and it would be hard to understand certain aspects of the interwar Lithuania’s legal and political development without M. Romeris’ scientific heritage. These are the personalities, who have left a significant inheritance due to their (...) scientific, political and social activities. (shrink)

The main subject of the present research is the enforcement of the European Union law in the domestic legal order. This topic was chosen considering the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and especially its declaration No. 17 on primacy of EU law. This article will explain the meaning of primacy of the European Union law and the resulting problems in some EU Member States, as well as possible solutions (...) to tackle the problems. The primacy of the European Union law over the national law was recognised as one of the constitutive principles of the European Union. The article includes relevant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that deal with the rules concerning the legal requirements of the primacy of the European Union law in the EU primary law. The European Court of Justice has developed the meaning of the principle of primacy, which means that the European Union law should take precedence over national law (even over constitutional provisions) and should there be any conflicts between EU law and national law, every national court is obliged to apply the law of the European Union. The main issue of this article is analysing the principle of primacy of the European Union law over the Lithuanian law. (shrink)

The extent to which the legal doctrine addresses manifestations of constitutionalism has been constantly growing. However, the majority of research in constitutionalism focuses on the analysis of the power of the Constitution and the fundamental principles entrenched in it whereas ordinary branches of law, including civil procedure, affected by the constitutional law remains outside the scope of a deeper analysis. The author of the present paper is convinced that certain aspects of the impact of constitutional justice on such branches as, (...) in particular, civil procedure deserve deeper interest. The modest scope of the paper precludes an extensive analysis of the role of the Constitution as a fundamental binding Act and today’s abundant doctrine of Lithuania’s Constitutional Court in civil procedure. Therefore, the present paper is confined to an analysis of individual aspects of direct application of the Constitution and the doctrine of the Constitutional Court. The article analyses the power of the Constitution and its impact on the civil procedure as an Act laying down the fundamental principles binding the legislator in adopting procedural instruments and principles to be followed by courts and as a remedy for violations of rights or a tool to address loopholes and collisions of law. Courts of general jurisdiction perform the control of legitimacy of legal Acts by checking their compliance with the Constitution in individual cases and by applying to the Constitutional Court for repeal of anticonstitutional norms or by applying the Constitution as an Act of direct effect to eliminate loopholes, interpret statutes and deal with collisions of legal norms. The author believes that the fact that the courts of general jurisdiction frequently raise questions of incompliance of legal Acts with the Constitution and decisively apply to the Constitutional Court evidences a high level of legal culture and legal consciousness of the judges. That fact may also serve as a precondition for the growth of confidence in the judiciary as judicial procedures may contain no uncertainties as to the constitutionality of the statutes to be followed in litigation. (shrink)

The Swiss Confederation is characterised by a long constitutional evolution that can be divided into several important periods: the Old Swiss Confederacy (13–14 C.), Helvetica (1798–1848), Mediation (1803–1814), Restoration (1815–1830), Regeneration (1830–1848) and development since 1874. It can be stated that Switzerland adopted a modern, democratic constitution early; this state is the oldest democratic republic in Europe. In 1874, many amendments to the effective Constitution were made and a lot of gaps in legal regulation came to light, which led to (...) the opinion that in order to remove those shortcomings, a few specific amendments were no longer sufficient; therefore, it was decided to make substantial changes to the Constitution. The new Constitution was approved by the people and the cantons in the referendum of 18 April 1999 and came into effect on 1 January 2000. The most significant features of this Constitution include the entrenchment of the principles of democracy, federalism, and of the state of law and social welfare. Pursuant to the principle of division of governmental powers, the governing of the state is carried out by the following federal institutions: the Federal Assembly, the Bundesrat and the Federal Court. (shrink)

The very idea of the draft European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty was reexamined after the failed French and Dutch referendums and the Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Reform Treaty) was drafted and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after it’s ratification by all 27 member states. The traditional notion of a Constitution as a national legal document establishing the social contract and a moral minimum for a particular socially unified group still prevails in legal and political thinking. (...) Indeed, the European Union has some constitutional elements, but absence of the so called ‘European demos’ prevents us from recognizing the founding treaties as a real ‘European constitution’ in the proper sense of the word. The author agrees with the decision to exclude the term ‘Constitution’ from the title and contents of the new Reform Treaty. The author also suggests that softer terms, like ‘European constitutional order’ and ‘European Constitutionalism’ might better reflect the scope of contemporary European integration than the term of ‘a Constitution for Europe’. A rethinking of the ‘constitutional core’ of the Lisbon Treaty was inspired following the so-called Lisbon judgments of Czech, Latvian and German constitutional courts. (shrink)

In Latin America there are two models of constitutions - the liberal and the most stable Constitution of the Argentine Nation, drafted in 1853, (which was discussed in our previous article) and one of the most radical, comprehensive and unstable – the Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1917. Although both of them were constructed under the model of the US constitution with the influence of Spanish and French constitutionalism and local national traditions, the Argentine constitutionalism has developed on (...) the grounds of the American legal system, as the Mexican one still could not break with the civil law tradition. (shrink)

It is important that from a wider scientific perspective the basics of the conceptual comprehension of impeachment entrenched in the 1992 Lithuanian Constitution be related not only to (a) the nine explicit provisions whereby impeachment relations are regulated directly (Item 5 of Article 63, Article 74, Paragraph 2 of Article 86, Item 5 of Article 88, the first sentence of Paragraph 1 of Article 89, Item 4 of Paragraph 3 of Article 105, Paragraph 3 of Article 107, Item 5 of (...) Article 108, Article 116), but also to (b) the general constitutional principles (especially, the principle of protection of the rights and freedoms of a person), as well as to (c) the precedents of preparation, arrangement, suspension or continuation of impeachment proceedings (in cases of A. Butkevičius, R. Paksas or L. Karalius) and to (d) comparative international aspects, which are perceived not only in the US Constitution, but also in the European Convention on Human Rights which is no longer compatible (and clashing as regards the issue of consequences of impeachment) with the former. According to the European Court of Human Rights (judgment of 6 January 2011 in the case Paksas v. Lithuania), the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits irreversible (termless) limitation (grounded on impeachment) of the passive electoral right to be a Member of Parliament. It is also important to perceive (three) abstract procedural grounds of application of this institute to a certain official—a gross violation of the Constitution, breach of the oath and in case it transpires that a crime has been committed (Article 74 of the Constitution), and the factual (“concrete actions”—see Item 4 of Paragraph 3 of Article 105) grounds qualified according to the former, while due to the factual grounds the “impeachment case” is instituted. The notion “impeachment case” used in Item 4 of Paragraph 3 of Article 105 of the Constitution deserves special scientific attention. This notion indirectly means that: (a) prior to the application to the Constitutional Court by the Seimas, an impeachment case is (must be) instituted, which in itself means that impeachment and initiation and consideration thereof are distinguished by peculiarity in substantive procedure; (b) the Constitutional Court neither institutes this case nor “takes it over” (considers it), but in “its own” case of constitutional justice verifies those factual and procedural grounds, which are necessary in “the other” (impeachment) case instituted in the Seimas. The essence of the institute of impeachment cannot be properly perceived in the constitutional notions of “impeachment”, “case”, “proceedings“, if these notions are assessed only in the explicit provisions of Article 74 of the Constitution, i.e. they are not related to the logic of substantive and procedural arrangement and “intertwining” of the three provisions of the Constitution (Article 74, Item 4 of Paragraph 3 of Article 105 and Paragraph 3 of Article 107) as well as to the purpose of these provisions. On the grounds of the said three provisions of the Constitution, it is possible to assume that the essence of the institute of impeachment lies in a specific official accusation (of violations of special law) against the officials who have acquired (or who hold) certain constitutional powers and of bringing such officials to constitutional liability under the procedure for specific parliamentary impeachment proceedings and constitutional justice proceedings, i.e. deprivation (discontinuation) of constitutional powers under multi-level procedure for conditionally dual proceedings, in which the parliamentary proceedings and the constitutional justice proceedings are inter-connected and supplementeach other. (shrink)

Under Article 63 of the Constitution, a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is one of the grounds for discontinuation of the powers of the Member of the Seimas. The Constitution does not reveal expressis verbis as to what is a gross violation of the law on election. The establishment of this is within the discretion of the legislator. While defining what a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is, the legislator is (...) bound by the norms and principles of the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not define expressis verbis as to what a gross violation of the law on election is, the fact that, under Item 6 of Article 63 of the Constitution, the powers of a Member of the Seimas shall cease on this ground, implies at least several things: first, not every violation of the law on election can be regarded as a gross one, thus, if the law on election has not been grossly violated, it is not permitted on this ground to recognise that the Member of the Seimas lost his mandate, or that the powers of the Member of the Seimas ceased; second, only such violations may be regarded as gross ones, upon commission of which there appear reasonable doubts whether during the election the genuine will of the voters was expressed, whether their will was not distorted to the extent that the results of the election do not reflect the genuine will of the voters and the mandates of Members of the Seimas have been distributed unfairly. (shrink)

The article deals with the doctrine of the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic formulated in the Constitutional Court ruling of 10 January 1998. Attention is focused on the arguments of the Constitutional Court upon which this doctrine is based–these are the arguments regarding the expression of no-confidence in the Prime Minister and the new empowerment of the Government (after more than a half of the ministers are changed). In the (...) opinion of the author, some of such arguments are subject to discussion. The constitutional regulation regarding the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic is inexhaustive and unclear. Although the wording of the provisions of the Constitution regarding the returning of the powers of the Government after the elections of the Seimas and after the elections of the President of the Republic is almost the same, there is one essential difference: the Constitution provides that after the elections of the Seimas the Government must return its powers to the President of the Republic and must resign, whereas the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after the elections of the President of the Republic as well. (shrink)

There are some problems in the implementation of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The legislator should make more efforts for implementing the concept of the provisions of the Constitution provided in the reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The Statute of the Seimas should be supplemented with provisions obligating structural sub-units of the Seimas to carry out permanent and systemic analysis of reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. It would allow timely to prepare proposals how to (...) amend still unchallenged legal regulation which, however, from the constitutional standpoint is doubtful. One should consider whether the norm of Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, which allows one to challenge the compliance of a legal act with the Constitution on the grounds of the procedure for adoption regardless of any terms expired after the adoption of a law or other legal act, should be amended. It is to be presumed that the principles of legal certainty and legal security entrenched in the Constitution, as well as other constitutional provisions, imply a certain reasonable period of time within which the subjects provided for in the Constitution may apply to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to investigate whether a law or other legal act is not in conflict with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. This period of time should not be a long one, for example, half a year or a year since the official publishing of the law; this term should be a prescriptive one–after it has finished, it would not be allowed to challenge the compliance of a law or other legal act with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. In order to speed up the consideration of cases at the Constitutional Court, one would have to change the procedure of consideration of cases in this Court in essence. (shrink)

The article describes the main publications of emigrant press during the period of 1945-1990. These publications reflect a significant contribution to the academic research of the constitutional development problematics of an independent Republic of Lithuania in 1918-1940, made by the emigrants who escaped Soviet aggression by going to the West. Among emigrants these topics were mostly analysed and described at the time when any possibilities of objective academic research in Lithuania were widely limited by Soviet ideology and politics. Exceptional attention (...) of emigrant authors was attracted by the democratic constitutional structure of Lithuania, established by the Constituent Assembly. The article describes the academic research made by emigrants on the main constitutional acts established by the Constituent Assembly, such as the resolution of the 15th of May, 1920, ascertaining the fact of reconstructing the independence of the state of Lithuania, as well as the Constitution of Lithuania of August the 1st, 1922. (shrink)