Integration (interaction among parts of an entity) is suggested to be necessary for individuality (contra, Metaphysics and the Origin of Species). A synchronic species is an integrated individual that can evolve as a unified whole; a diachronic lineage is a non-integrated historical entity that cannot evolve. Synchronic species and diachronic lineages are consequently suggested to be ontologically distinct entities, rather than alternative perspectives of the same underlying entity (contra Baum (1998), Syst. Biol. 47, 641–653; de (...) Queiroz (1995), Endless Forms: Species and Speciation, pp. 57–75; Genes, Categories and Species). Species concepts usually refer to either one or the other entity; for instance, the Biological Species Concept refers to synchronic species, whereas the Cladistic Species Concept refers to diachronic lineages. The debate over species concepts has often failed to recognise this distinction, resulting in invalid comparisons between definitions that attempt to delineate fundamentally different entities. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La biología evolucionista no ha logrado definir un concepto de especie que satisfaga a todos sus colaboradores. El presente panorama crítico de las principales propuestas y sus respectivas dificultades apunta, por un lado, a ilustrar los procesos de formación de conceptos en las ciencias empíricas y, por otro, a socavar la visión parateológica del conocimiento y la verdad que inspiró inicialmente a la ciencia moderna y prevalece aún entre muchas personas educadas. El artículo se divide en dos partes. La (...) primera atiende al concepto biológico (o genético) de especie adoptado por Theodosius Dobzhansky y Ernst Mayr alrededor de 1940, así como a las alternativas introducidas para superar sus limitaciones. La segunda parte estudia la tradición “cladista” fundada por Willi Hennig (1950) y sus ramificaciones. Varios conceptos de especie que no era fácil integrar en estos dos grupos se omitieron en aras de la coherencia y la brevedad de la exposición.ABSTRACT: Evolutionary biology has not suceeded in defining a concept of species that will satisfy all researchers. This critical survey of the main proposals and their respective difficulties tends, on the one hand, to throw light on the processes of concept formation in the empirical sciences, and, on the other, to undermine the paratheological vision of knowledge and truth that initially inspired modern science and still prevails among many educated persons. The article is divided into two parts. The first part concerns the biological (or genetical) concept of species which was adopted by Theodosius Dobzhansky and Ernst Mayr ca. 1940 and some alternatives which were subsequently introduced to overcome its limitations. The second part deals with several branches of the cladist tradition founded by Willi Hennig (1950). Various concepts of species that could not be easily integrated in either group were omitted for the sake of coherence and brevity. (shrink)

With the rise and public accessibility of AI-enabled decision-support systems, individuals outsource increasingly more of their decisions, even those that carry ethical dimensions. Considering this trend, scholars have highlighted that uncritical deference to these systems would be problematic and consequently called for investigations of the impact of pertinent technology on humans’ ethical decision-making. To this end, this article conducts a systematic review of existing scholarship and derives an integrated framework that demonstrates how intelligent decision-support systems (IDSSs) shape humans’ (...) ethical decision-making. In particular, we identify resulting consequences on an individual level (i.e., deliberation enhancement, motivation enhancement, autonomy enhancement and action enhancement) and on a societal level (i.e., moral deskilling, restricted moral progress and moral responsibility gaps). We carve out two distinct methods/operation types (i.e., processoriented and outcome-oriented navigation) that decision-support systems can deploy and postulate that these determine to what extent the previously stated consequences materialize. Overall, this study holds important theoretical and practical implications by establishing clarity in the conceptions, underlying mechanisms and (directions of) influences that can be expected when using particular IDSSs for ethical decisions. (shrink)

The introduction claims that there might exist an evolutionary bridge from possible genres in nature to human cultural genres. A sub-hypothesis is that basic life-conditions, partly common for animals and humans, in the long run can generate so-called life-genres. To investigate such hypotheses a framework of interrelated key communicational concepts is outlined in the second, main part. Four levels are suggested. Signs are seen as elements in utterances. Further, sufficiently similar utterances can be perceived as kinds of utterances (...) or genres. Genres are kinds of communication in a species' life-world. Utterance and genre are the framework’s key concepts. Both are seen as products and processes and as constituted by five reciprocal aspects: form, content, act, time, and space, the necessary elements to initiate and interpret communication. A model illustrates this integrative principle. Part three dwells with the idea of life-genres, and part four exemplifies and problematises how a chimpanzee’s ‘begging’ for meat, a fish’s nest-making, and kinds of birdsongs, could be seen as possible life-genres. The last, short part gives a brief summary, highlights challenges, and reflects over the framework’s relevance for biosemiotics. (shrink)

Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept x should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of concepts x1, x2, … xn. This article focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, and that this reveals a quite general dilemma, one that poses a defeasible presumption (...) against many eliminative pluralisms about various scientific concepts. The article ends by outlining a novel integrative alternative in defence of species. 1) Introduction 2) The species Concept, the Category ‘Species’, and the ‘Species’ Category Problem 3) What Are Eliminative Pluralism about species, and the Arguments for It? 4) Evaluation of Arguments 4.1 Splitting? 4.2 Lumping? 4.3 The eliminative pluralist’s dilemma 5) More General Lessons6Species Cohesion: An Integrative Alternative7Conclusion. (shrink)

This response shows how the socio-relational framework of expressive behaviors may be used to understand and predict social psychological processes, beyond sex differences in the expression of emotion. I use this opportunity to elaborate on several key concepts on the epigenesis of evolved social behaviors that were not fully addressed in the target article. These are: evidence of a natural history of masculine and feminine specialization (sect. R1); phenotypic plasticity and range of reactivity of social behaviors (sect. R2); (...) exploitive and protective functions of social behaviors (sect. R3); and the role of cognition in some affective responses (sect. R4). I conclude by highlighting (in sect. R5) future directions for psychological research from a socio-relational basis. (shrink)

Scientific advances in health care have been disproportionately distributed across social strata. Disease burden is also disproportionately distributed, with marginalized groups having the highest risk of poor health outcomes. Social determinants are thought to influence health care delivery and the management of chronic diseases among marginalized groups, but the current conceptualization of social determinants lacks a critical focus on the experiences of people within their environment. The purpose of this article was to integrate the literature on marginalization and situate the (...) concept in the framework of social determinants of health. We demonstrate that social position links marginalization and social determinants of health. This perspective provides a critical lens to assess the societal power dynamics that influence the construction of the socio‐environmental factors affecting health. Linking marginalization with social determinants of health can improve our understanding of the inequities in health care delivery and the disparities in chronic disease burden among vulnerable groups. (shrink)

The phylogenetic species concept is applied for the first time to a major radiation of birds, the birds-of-paradise (Paradisaeidae) of Australasia. Using the biological species concept, previous workers have postulated approximately 40–42 species in the family. Of these, approximately 13 are monotypic and 27 are polytypic with about 100 subspecies. Phylogenetic species are irreducible (basal) clusters of organisms (terminal taxa) that are diagnosably distinct from other such clusters. Within the context of this concept, approximately 90 (...) class='Hi'>species of paradisaeids are postulated to have diversified within Australasia. The phylogenetic species concept more accurately describes evolutionary diversity within the family and provides a better theoretical and empirical framework for analysing speciation, historical biogeography and patterns of morphological, behavioral and ecological diversification within this group than does the biological species concept. (shrink)

The concept of individuality as applied to species, an important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology, is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion. Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very different types of pluralism have been advocated with respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An often unrecognized distinction between grouping and ranking components of any (...) class='Hi'>species concept is necessary. A phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic sense, and a ranking criterion based on those causal processes that are most important in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal processes can include actual interbreeding, selective constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread use of the biological species concept is flawed for two reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a result of a diversity of processes which result in shared selective environments and common developmental programs. These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect an underlying unity that the biological species concept can not. (shrink)

Evolutionary epistemology has experienced a continuous rise over the last decades. Important new theoretical considerations and novel empirical findings have been integrated into the existing framework. In this paper, I would like to suggest three lines of research that I believe will significantly contribute to further advance EE: ontogenetic considerations, key ideas from cognitive biology, and the framework of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. EE, in particular the program of the evolution of epistemological mechanisms, seeks to provide a (...) phylogenetic account of the generation of cognitive processes underlying knowledge creation. Traditionally, EE and EEM have been oriented towards an account of evolutionary theory that mainly drew from the tenets of the Modern Synthesis. The Modern Synthesis largely dismisses ontogenetic processes and considers them irrelevant for evolutionary explanations. If anything, the role of development in evolution is believed to be that of a constraint. There is, however, ample evidence for a tight intertwinement of developmental and evolutionary processes. Organisms employ their cognitive apparatus to interact with the environment in order to achieve a fully functioning perceptual and cognitive nervous system. Also, ontogeny provides generative potentials to enable variations that natural selection can act upon. EEM’s agenda may, therefore, strongly benefit from bringing together ontogenetic and phylogenetic approaches. To grapple with this challenge, an alternative vision of the evolutionary theory termed Extended Evolutionary Synthesis could be used. This extended evolutionary theory explores relationships between the processes of individual development and phenotypic change during evolution and can provide a more suitable framework for EEM to draw from. In recent years, cognitive biology has gained momentum as an independent research field. Cognitive biology builds on the concepts of EEM and understands knowledge as a biogenic phenomenon. Its main objective is also the formulation of substantiated interrelations between cognition and evolution but it focuses on cognitive functionality at all levels of biological organization. It thus employs a “vertical” approach that encompasses nested hierarchies which span from single molecules, cells, and tissues to the organismal level, communities, and societies. In contrast to cognitive biology, EEM is here understood to adopt a “horizontal” approach that focuses on phylogenetic explanations of cognition and knowledge acquisition. Linking EEM with the key ideas of cognitive biology could make EEM’s research program stronger as it can more easily accommodate phylogenetic and ontogenetic questions within a hierarchical, multilevel perspective. This is of particular importance for a more comprehensive account of cognition since living systems are subject to context-dependent causal influences from different organizational levels. In addition to EEM, there is a second program of EE. This program has been labeled evolutionary epistemology of theories and understands the increase in human knowledge, such as scientific theories, as naturalistic accounts of evolution. Both, EEM and EET initially drew from the core concepts of the Modern Synthesis. Several scholars have severely criticized the analogies made between EET and the Neo-Darwinian key processes of evolution. In particular processes of random mutation, the rate of variation, natural selection as the unique driving force, and the adaptationist agenda are believed to reveal disanalogies. In contrast to the Modern Synthesis, the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis not only recognizes developmental processes but also ecological interactions and systems dynamics as well as social and cultural evolutionary reciprocity as important evolutionary processes. Concepts of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis are therefore expected to be more fruitful for re-conceptualizing parallels between scientific theorizing and biological evolution. (shrink)

Historiography is becoming more critical of the typology/ population dichotomy introduced by Ernst Mayr. Therefore, one should look again at the problem of species in non-Darwinian theories: neo-Lamarckism and orthogenesis, and consider the possibility that this problem was overly simplified. What can be seen in both of them is the existence of a tension between the idea of evolution and the essence of species. In neo-Lamarckism, this tension was resolved by recognizing species as static entities which changed (...) only when triggered by external stimulus. In orthogenesis, evolution was seen as constant phenomena and species – as naturally changeable entities. However, orthogeneticists assumed that not only species, but also whole phyletic lines had essences that constrained their further evolution. Thus, in both cases we can see interpretation of species in tune with essentialism, but essentialism is widely differently integrated with each of these concepts of evolution. (shrink)

The debate over the ethics of radically, technologically altering the capacities and traditional form of the human body is rife with appeals to and dismissals of the importance of the integrity of the human species. Species-integrist arguments can be found in authors as varied as Annas, Fukuyama, Habermas, and Agar. However, the ethical salience of species integrity is widely contested by authors such as Buchanan, Daniels, Fenton, and Juengst. This article proposes a Phenomenological approach to the question (...) of species-integrity, arguing in favor of a phenomenon of species-recognition that carries an ethical pull. Building on Husserl’s Phenomenological account of empathy and the lived-body, as well as Schopenhauer’s concept of compassion as an ethical urphenomenon, I develop a “Phenomenological species concept” , which I argue has the ethical significance that biological species concepts do not. The PSC reorients the debate over human alteration and species integrity. (shrink)

Global ethics has recently emerged as a popular concept among researchers in the field of international management and is of immediate concern among managers of multinational enterprizes (MNEs). This paper presents an integrative framework covering a range of factors and issues relevant to multinationals with respect to ethical decision making. The paper provides an overview of the existing literature on the topic, and framework is aimed at providing the managers of multinationals with a basis for relating and synthesizing (...) the perspectives and prescriptions that are available for incorporating ethics into the strategic decision-making process. (shrink)

The pbenomenon of European integration has received a great deal ofattention from political scientists in the wake of the mid-1980s 'relaunch' ofthe European Union. However, political science's theoretical consideration of West European integration has from the outset failed to include news media as a factor in EU politics. This oversight is linked to the general dismissal of the public and public debate as irrelevant to the integration project. Yet because media have several critical functions in politics - as an information-source, (...) agendasetter, and legitimator - political science treatment of the EU now needs to account for the role of news media. Turning to concepts in normative media theory, the article proposes a framework within which to consider media and suggests empirical analysis of media coverage of the European Union. Such analysis would complement political science study of the democratisation and legitimation of the EU, while acknowledging public discourse as an element crucial to the future course of European integration. (shrink)

In this paper, I will conduct three interrelated analyses. First, I will develop an analysis of various concepts in the history of biology that used to refer to individual-level phenomena but were then reinterpreted by the Modern Synthesis in terms of populations. Second, I argue that a similar situation can be found in contemporary biological theory. While different approaches reflect on the causal role of developing organisms in evolution, proponents of the Modern Synthesis avoid any substantial change by reinterpreting (...) and explaining individual-level phenomena from a population perspective. Finally, I will approach this debate by advocating the statistical reading of natural selection, which holds that explanations by natural selection are statistical. I will argue that the above historical conceptual reinterpretations belong to a new explanatory strategy developed by the Modern Synthesis based on population thinking. The reinterpretation of concepts at the individual level is part of the explanatory framework of the Modern Synthesis and the empty role of development within this framework. Moreover, the statistical perspective adopted here allows for the integration of two explanatory models: population-statistical and individual-causal. Finally, I will argue that this pluralistic framework can help to define the explanatory scope of the different biological approaches in order to achieve a coherent integration of development into evolution without rejecting population thinking. (shrink)

The Simplicity and Power (SP) theory (Wolff 2003a) provides support for Pothos's proposals by illustrating how the effect of “rules” and “similarity” may be achieved within an integrated model that makes no explicit provision for either concept. The theory is described here in outline with simple examples to show how rules and similarity can emerge as properties of the system in learning, reasoning, categorization, and the parsing of language.

How can we make businesspeople more concerned about the truth of the information they spread or allow to circulate? In this age of ‘fake news’, ‘business bullshit’ and ‘post-truth,’ the issue is of the utmost importance, especially for business trustworthiness in the internet economy. The issue is related to a kind of epistemic responsibility, that consists in accounting for one’s own epistemic wrongdoings, such as making a third party believe something false. Despite growing interest in epistemic misbehavior in the literature (...) of business ethics, the question of epistemic responsibility has been neglected. The aim of this paper is therefore to address this gap, by proposing a notion of epistemic responsibility for business, that may help regulate undesirable epistemic behavior, such as the spreading of false information. To define this notion of epistemic responsibility, I have introduced the concept of epistemic fault. Being epistemically responsible consists in being disposed to account for alleged epistemic faults. This notion of epistemic fault relies on a theoretical framework which combines a typology of eight ‘epistemic values’, a normative stance regarding these values, and a dispositional approach to epistemic virtues and vices. I use this theoretical framework to integrate the various accounts of epistemic virtues and vices found in the literature into a single explanatory scheme. Combined with the notion of epistemic responsibility itself, such an integrative framework should facilitate the practical application of an operational epistemic ethics in business, i.e., the development of virtuous epistemic practices. (shrink)

A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of (...) gene flow that are central to the view we discuss. We conclude by tracing four broader implications for the study and conceptualization of species. (shrink)

Social-emotional competences are critical for positive development and significantly predict educational and occupational attainment, health, and well-being. There is however a lack of consensus about the number of core competences, and how these are defined and operationalized. This divergence in approach challenges future research as well as the scientific usefulness of the construct. In an effort to create an integrative framework, this focused review evaluates different approaches of conceptualizing and assessing social-emotional competences. Building on shared conceptions, an integrative taxonomy (...) “DOMASEC” is introduced, specifying core domains and manifestations of social-emotional competences that bridge across frameworks focusing on social and emotional learning, personality traits and self-determination theory. Core domains include intrapersonal, interpersonal and task-oriented competencies, differentiating between affective, cognitive, and behavioral manifestations of competences across these domains. It is argued that the integrative taxonomy facilitates the conceptual specification of key constructs, that it helps to better organize the multitude of terms and definitions used, and to guide the conceptualization and operationalization of social-emotional competences and their various facets. (shrink)

Since cognitive neuroscience aims at giving an integrated account of mind and brain, its ontology should include both neural and cognitive entities and specify their relations. According to what we call the standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience, the aim of cognitive neuroscience should be to establish one-to-one mappings between neural and cognitive entities. Where such entities do not yet closely align, this can be achieved by reforming the cognitive ontology, the neural ontology, or both. In order to (...) assess the limits and the possibilities of the SOFCN, we will examine a paradigmatic case study: the concept of Broca’s area, which indicates an alleged mapping between the left inferofrontal gyrus and the production of language. We review evidence showing that such a mapping does not hold, thus calling into question either the status of Broca’s area or the validity of the SOFCN. We then propose some strategies for addressing the issue and suggest that it may be solved within the SOFCN by adopting both of the following strategies: first, more accurately defining the relevant neural structures and second, switching the focus of neural ontology from structures to events, individuated by a where conjoint with a how. (shrink)

Robert Rosen’s relational biology and biosemiotics share the claim that life cannot be explained by the laws that apply to the inanimate world alone. In this paper, an integrated account of Rosen’s relational biology and Peirce’s semiosis is proposed. The ultimate goal is to contribute to the construction of a unified framework for the definition and study of life. The relational concepts of component and mapping, and the semiotic concepts of sign and triadic relation are discussed (...) and compared, and a representation of semiotic relations with mappings is proposed. The role of the final cause in two theories that account for what differentiates living beings, natural selection and relational biology, is analyzed. Then the presence of the final cause in Peirce’s semiosis is discussed and, with it, the similarities and differences between the theories of Rosen and Peirce are deepened. Then, a definition of a semiotic relation in an organism is proposed, and Short’s definition of interpretation is applied. Finally, a method to identify and analyze semiotic actions in an organism is proposed. (shrink)

This paper extends previous attempts at understanding the nature of organizational integrity and its increasingly important role for companies which, after all, bear a moral and societal responsibility. Interpretations of organizational integrity in business ethics literature incorporate aspects ranging from the behavior of managers and employees to corporate structures and incentive systems. We argue that virtue ethics builds an indispensable framework for understanding the origin of the concept of integrity and transfer these findings to an organizational level. Hence, we (...) first define organizational integrity, and second operationalize it in a closed three-step process, consisting of morally sound corporate commitments, their transparent institutionalization within the company, and their implementation into actions. We consider the main goal of organizational integrity to be of a preventative investment nature. Organizational integrity is a company investment that translates into avoiding fines for potential violations of the law or ethical missteps, as well as an investment in the company’s reputation. In turn, organizational integrity can protect a company from disruptions that can threaten its existence. Defining and operationalizing the concept of organizational integrity provides the foundation for future scientific research and the basis for developing practical guidance for organizations and managers. (shrink)

In a previous paper, an integrated account of Rosen’s relational biology and Peirce’s semiosis has been proposed. Both theories have been compared and basic concepts have been posited for the definition of a unified framework for the study of biology, as well as a method for the identification and analysis of the presence of signs in an organism. The analysis of the existence of semiotic actions in an organism must, without a doubt, begin by considering each of (...) the rules that constitute the genetic code as a candidate for a semiotic relation. Transcription and translation, which constitute protein synthesis, are the basis of the specificity that the organism needs to maintain itself in its environment and reproduce, and the precondition of the existence of any other possible semiosis. Applying the concepts and method of the aforementioned work, this paper analyzes which of the biological processes involved in protein synthesis correspond to semiotic actions and the type of the signs identified, according to Peirce’s classification of icons, indices and symbols. The results of this work demonstrate the theoretical consistency and the practical utility of integrating the theories of Rosen and Peirce, offer a way to identify other signs in an organism, and support a critical analysis of code biology and protosemiosis, two accounts that deny the possibility of explaining the signs in an organism with Peirce’s semiosis. (shrink)

Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or well-being for (...) them. However, existence value can be based on a restricted version of the preference satisfaction theory, which is not vulnerable to the skeptical arguments about the link between preference satisfaction and well-being. The second objection is that even if preference satisfaction can be linked to well-being, understanding existence value in terms of individual preference satisfaction is incoherent, because existence value reflects disinterested preferences that involve no benefits to the individual. However, the fact that existence value may involve disinterested preferences does not threaten the coherence of the concept, but suggests that it does not fit smoothly into the “utilitarian” or “welfarist” framework it is commonly considered within. A pluralistic normative approach based on prima facie duties can be an alternative to standard utilitarian-style approaches for considering existence value in concrete cases involving a risk of species extinction, such as through deep sea mining. (shrink)

The role of property theory as a framework for analysis and regulation of body parts has become a debate of topical importance because of the emergence of biomedical technologies that utilise body parts, and also because the application of the concept of property, even with respect to historically and traditionally accepted forms of property, raises serious challenges to the property analyst. However, there is another reason for the topicality of property in relation to body parts: a proprietary approach confers (...) on a claimant the advantage of continuing control that is tellingly lacking in non-property frameworks underpinned, for instance, by consent, negligence, privacy and unjust enrichment rules. In some circumstances, such as an unauthorised blood test performed on a blood sample obtained with consent, the continuing control provided by property law might be the only chance a claimant has to obtain a remedy. Economy of space, however, requires that only a prolegomenon on body parts and property theory is given below. Thus, the analysis begins by providing in outline a framework for comprehensive analysis of body parts within the realm of property theory; thereafter, the author engages with the normative question of whether body parts or rights exercisable over body parts could be admitted into the category of property. (shrink)

The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of (...) distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory. (shrink)

Based on the conception of life and semiosis as co-extensive an attempt is given to classify cognitive and communicative potentials of species according to the plasticity and articulatory sophistication they exhibit. A clear distinction is drawn between semiosis and perception, where perception is seen as a high-level activity, an integrated product of a multitude of semiotic interactions inside or between bodies. Previous attempts at finding progressive trends in evolution that might justify a scaling of species from primitive (...) to advanced levels have not met with much success, but when evolution is considered in the light of semiosis such a scaling immediately catches the eye. The main purpose of this paper is to suggest a scaling of this progression in semiotic freedom into a series of distinct steps. The elleven steps suggested are: 1) molecular recognition, 2) prokaryote-eukaryote transformation, 3) division of labor in multicellular organisms, 4) from irritability to phenotypic plasticity, 5) sense perception, 6) behavioral choice, 7) active information gathering, 8) collaboration, deception, 9) learning and social intelligence, 10) sentience, 11) consciousness. In light of this, the paper finally discusses the conceptual framework for biosemiotic evolution. The evolution of biosemiotic capabilities does not take the form of an ongoing composition of simple signs into composite wholes. Rather, it takes the shape of the increasing subdivision and control of a primitive, holophrastic perception-action circuit already committed to “proto-propositions” reliably guiding action already in the most primitive species. (shrink)

Philosophical understanding of experimental scientific practice is impeded by disciplinary differences, notably that between philosophy and sociology of science. Severing the two limits the stock of philosophical case studies to narrowly circumscribed experimental episodes, centered on individual scientists or technologies. The complex relations between scientists and society that permeate experimental research are left unexamined. In consequence, experimental fields rich in social interactions have received only patchy attention from philosophers of science. This paper sketches a remedy for both the symptom and (...) its root cause. An empirical study of social interactions in an established field of biomedicine grounds a robust account of success in experimental practice. The core idea is the concept of collaboration, of participants working together on a common project toward a shared goal. The interactive social integument of experimental research is both examined and enacted in a study integrating socio-historical research and philosophical investigation. The two approaches are used in concert to explicate the concept of scientific objectivity. Their joint explication of this contested epistemic ideal demonstrates that philosophical and sociological approaches can work together toward a social epistemology of scientific practice. The explication is in three stages. First, a minimal framework for investigating collaborative activities is established. Social action is understood and evaluated in terms of the connection between shared goals that participants hope to accomplish together, and the coordinated means by which they try to do so. This connection is explicated as participation, a relation mediating between a group and its members, which includes minimal constraints of instrumental rationality. Second, this framework is fleshed out via empirical study of scientific practices. The focal case examines the intersection of immunology and stem cell research in mid-20th century biomedicine, tracing the key social interactions within and among laboratory groups, as the field of blood stem cell research emerged in the 1960s and advanced throughout the next four decades. The study yields a robust empirical result. Participants consistently recognize two aspects of scientific success: construction of improved models of blood cell development, and formation of new boundaries among scientific groups. In the third and final stage, this result is generalized to other experimental episodes and shown to fit with recent accounts of models in scientific practice. The generalized result approximates a familiar normative view of scientific knowledge. An epistemic ideal of scientific objectivity in practice is then derived from this robust general result, using the minimal constraints on rational participation. The derivation is analogous to specification of ends in moral philosophy; given the means taken and assuming some hope of success, what must the goal of scientific inquiry be like? The aim of science so conceived corresponds to a classic conception of scientific objectivity: knowledge independent of epistemic criteria specific to particular persons or groups. This result weaves together sociological and philosophical accounts of science, explicating the epistemic ideal of objectivity in relation to social aspects of scientific practice. This undercuts the entrenched dualism between normative, vs. descriptive approaches to scientific knowledge. Socio-historical study of science does not deflate, but vindicates, scientific objectivity. Philosophy and sociology are recast as collaborating participants in articulating social epistemology of science. (shrink)

This is what I hope is an illuminating, and to a certain degree, novel exposition of Montague Grammar. It is against many standard interpretations, and perhaps even against things Montague himself says at times. However, it makes more sense of how his various commitments fit together in a systematic way. Why, for instance, is it called "Montague Grammar" rather than "Montague Semantics," and what role does his commitment to Fregeanism plays in his conception of language? It is clear that he (...) is committed to the idea that function application is the fundamental mode of semantic composition, and that he is committed to an intensional framework. However, intensions have, since Carnap, been understood as nearly conceptually equivalent to functions from possible worlds to sets of individuals. But, in truth, possible worlds semantics is just dressed up extensional semantics. There are just more objects to go around to serve as inputs for functions, whatever we think of their ontological status. That is, possible worlds semantics is really a semantic reduction of intensional semantics achieved by expanding our ontological commitments. It would be difficult to make sense of Montague's strong commitment to Fregean semantics, if his notion of intension was that of Carnap's. According to my interpretation, Montague's notion of intension must be distinct from the version adopted by possible world semantics. Montague took seriously the idea that intensional semantics was something quite different from extensionalist semantics. The first was not reducible to the second semantically speaking. Just as Frege believed that meaning consisted of both sense and reference, so too did Montague. However, just as Frege also believed, Montague thought that sense and reference were systematically related. As I illustrate, interpreting Montague as adopting a different notion of intension can also resolve the apparent problem of distinguishing the difference in meaning between intensional equivalents. It might also enable us to draw a distinction in epistemic logic between an agent having contradictory beliefs and believing contradictions. (shrink)

This study develops a biosemiotic framework for a descriptive phenomenology. We incorporate the set utterance-genre-lifeworld in biosemiotic theory by paralleling it with the Peircean-Uexküllean notions of sign, habit, and Umwelt (respectively). This framework for empirical semiotic studies aims to complement the concepts of affordance and scaffold, as applied in studies on learning.The paper also contributes to bridging Bakhtinian-Hallidayian-Habermasian views on utterance, genre, and lifeworld with biosemiotics. We exploit the possibility that biosemiotics offers to bring together hermeneutic and (...) phenomenological analysis. We relate these views to integrated levels in a systemic framework for communication. Signs are seen as inter-dependent construction elements in utterances. Repeated use of utterances in shifting contexts generates shared recognizable kinds of communication, or genres. ‘Life-genre’ is used in a zoo-communication context, to avoid anthropocentrism. Life-genre serves animals’ life-functions. Genres make up a systemic network of communicational resources, along with the related concepts of event, affordance, and scaffold. Utterance, genre, and lifeworld have five aspects, constituting an integrative approach to communication: form, content, act, time, and space. Semiosis and positioning are processes that connect aspects and levels. Levels, aspects, and processes make up the framework as a system.While biosemiotics supports a phenomenological notion of life-genre, in turn, this notion also contributes to the development of the former, bridging a gap between organisms’ sign experience on a micro-level and organisms’ phenomenal lifeworld/Umwelt. Comparisons of lifeworld and Umwelt reveal that, although not identical, these are sufficiently similar to be perceived as an overall macro-level for signs and communication. Starting from a construal of utterance and genre as dynamic, dialogical, and reciprocal, genre is positioned as meso-level, mediating between signs in utterances and the lifeworld/Umwelt level. We propose genres, understood as semiotic scaffoldings built through affordances, as an analytical concept to capture meso-level phenomena. Scaffolding is determined by both ongoing events and (pre-)available genres. Events are manifestations of these scaffolding processes.Identifying animal and educational communication as two particularly relevant fields for future applications, we compare key socio-semiotic concepts to the notions of sign, habit, and Umwelt. The notions affordance and scaffolding are particularly important to think of learning as continuous with adaptation.An overall aim is to broaden as well as finetune semiotic phenomenology as a platform for empirical analyses of communication. We conclude by exemplifying and summarizing how the framework facilitates this. (shrink)

There is a lack of theoretical consensus on how multinational enterprises (MNEs) should implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) to build legitimacy, particularly those operating in the smaller Asian emerging market context, where current growth in the global economy is being felt more acutely than elsewhere. This paper argues for theoretical integration of business ethics (BE) and international business (IB) research to address this concern. Hence, we explore the management of CSR strategies by MNE subsidiaries with specific interest on their proactive (...) adoption of strategic CSR to obtain legitimacy in a foreign host country. Drawing on the recent CSR literature and related theories, including stakeholder theory and institutional theory, propositions and a conceptual framework are developed and presented. The framework integrates BE and IB concepts on the different dimensions of CSR and provides a theoretical derived explanation of the process for strategic adoption of global through to more local CSR strategies by MNE subsidiaries to build legitimacy in an emerging market context. In addition, the framework provides valuable insights into the adoption of different ethical approaches or CSR strategies based on the level of ethical pressure in a host country and the degree of CSR ingrainedness in the parent company. (shrink)

Since the introduction of the concept of brain death by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death in 1968, the validity of this concept has been challenged by medical scientists, as well as by legal, philosophical, and religious scholars. In light of increased criticism of the concept of brain death, Stephen Napier, a staff ethicist at the National Catholic Bioethics Center, set out to prove that the whole-brain death criterion serves as (...) good evidence for death in the Catholic bioethical framework, on the grounds that when whole-brain death has occurred the soul has already departed from the body. Opponents have argued that (1) brain death does not disrupt the somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism and (2) clinical tests outlined in the practice guidelines for determining brain death lack sufficient power to exclude persisting function and fail to detect elements of the brain that, although currently functionless, may retain potential for recovery under conditions of optimal medical care. It is therefore possible that heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of active euthanasia and physician-assisted death, both of which, either concealed or overt, the Catholic Church opposes. (shrink)

The aesthetically optimistic view of life in the last paragraph of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species contrasts with the evidence in his autobiography of a supposed perceptive colour blindness to the magnificence of nature. Accepting the theory of evolution as one of the scientific theories that has contributed to disenchantment, my aim is to delve into the Darwinian perception of natural beauty and solve this contrast of perceptions within the framework of the Weberian concept of “disenchantment of (...) the world.” To do this, I have carried out a computer-assisted study of Darwin’s language focusing on the frequency of aesthetic-emotional and religious adjectives and adverbs in the six editions of the Origin. A semantic analysis of the lexicon shows that, although disenchanted, Darwin perceives nature as aesthetically enhanced. I arrive at the conclusion that Darwin’s alleged colour blindness does not come from a loss of his capacity to aesthetically perceive nature, but from his loss of religious belief. (shrink)

State-directed but market-oriented forms of regulation, especially environmental examples like cap-and-trade and ecological offsetting, have proliferated in the past two decades, but sociologists have been slow to theorize these broad institutional shifts. This article offers a framework for explaining these processes of regulatory marketization. First, I argue that institutions of this sort are examples of what I call command-and-commodify regulation, a mode of regulation that distinctively hybridizes economic and authoritative dimensions of power. Second, I explain how and why one (...) example of command-and-commodify regulation, species conservation banking, emerged and remained concentrated in California, but did not so easily develop in other American states. Finally, abstracting from the case, I argue that the concept of market reconstruction is useful for developing a more general theory of the ways that social conflicts and mobilization reconfigure regulatory power and thus give rise to new modes of regulation. Together, a theory of command-and-commodify regulation and market reconstruction may be useful for explaining the development of a wide variety of environmentally focused and other regulatory institutions. (shrink)

Since the manipulation of sport competitions became one of the main threats to sport integrity, both the academy and international organizations have sought to establish a coherent conceptual framework that defines what criteria determine a manipulation and what are the factors that might cause it. Although the literature has shown that the manipulation of sport competition is a multifaceted phenomenon that includes individual, relational, organizational and institutional variables, most of the authors have focused their explanations on individual factors, and (...) institutional prevention campaigns continue to understand match-fixing as a problem of moral failure of on-field sports actors. This work proposes a novel dynamic framework for analysis based on the theoretical roots on Morin’s paradigm of complexity and Archer’s critical realism. In addition to articulating the micro, meso, and macro factors together, the paper defends the idea of three conceptions of integrity, personal, competition and institutional, often operating simultaneously in the same space. Each one of these integrities, operates across individual, organizational and structural levels, acting recursively on the others, generating the gears of the global sports integrity. We then discuss the reasons, structures, opportunities and incentives that each of these integrities creates and fuels. We argue that the errors and ineffectiveness of the fight against the manipulation of sport competitions are largely due to a lack of understanding of, and appreciation for, the different conceptions of integrity and their interactions that require different approaches and differentiated public policies. We conclude with innovative possibilities for more effective policy-making processes in this space. (shrink)

Bad philosophy is responsible for the climate and nature crises, and other global problems too that threaten our future. That sounds mad, but it is true. A philosophy of science, or of theatre or life is a view about what are, or ought to be, the aims and methods of science, theatre or life. It is in this entirely legitimate sense of “philosophy” that bad philosophy is responsible for the crises we face. First, and in a blatantly obvious way, those (...) institutions, organizations, corporations, businesses, endeavours, and activities of humanity that cause the crises and global problems we face, do so because of the aims they pursue (profit perhaps, or power, or heat and light for homes), and the methods adopted in pursuit of those aims – the philosophy in other words, built into the institution, organization, business, human activities, or whatever it may be. It is the philosophy of these institutions, organizations and activities that we need to change to put a stop to, or at least lessen the severity of, the crises we face, the global problems that confront us, above all the climate and nature crises. One institution has an especially crucial role in this respect: our universities. They are dominated in a multitude of ways by a particularly disastrous philosophy, a philosophy of inquiry which may be called knowledge-inquiry. This holds that the basic aim of the university is to acquire and apply knowledge. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve social problems. But this philosophy of knowledge-inquiry is an intellectual disaster. As a result, universities are, in devastating and almost entirely unrecognized ways, humanitarian disasters too. Judged from the standpoint of helping to promote human welfare, the university shaped by the philosophy of knowledge-inquiry violates THREE of the four most elementary rules of rational problem solving conceivable in a wholesale, structural fashion, and it is this gross, wholesale, structural irrationality of the university, unnoticed by all but a few scientists and scholars, that is in part responsible for the creation of our grave global problems, and our current incapacity to learn how to solve them. The pursuit of knowledge, conducted in universities, within the framework of knowledge-inquiry over the decades and centuries, has produced much of great benefit to humanity. It has made the modern world possible. It has led to modern power production, modern industry and armaments, modern agriculture, modern hygiene and medicine, modern travel and communications, and the internet. But these very successes have also created many of our most serious current global problems: the climate crisis; the destruction of natural habitats, the catastrophic loss of wild life, and impending mass extinction of species (the nature crisis); the lethal character of modern war; the impact on the natural world of the rapid growth of the human population; the menace posed by nuclear weapons; pollution of earth, sea and air; threats to democracy caused in part by the internet and social media. All these grave global problems have been made possible by modern science and technology, pursued largely in universities within the framework of knowledge-inquiry. Nevertheless, it is not science and technology as such that are the problem, but science pursued in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental task of the university to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, so that progress may be made to a better world. Science and technology, pursued within the framework of knowledge-inquiry, create for some of us the power to act, but not the power to act wisely – not the power to learn how to resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways. For that, we need our institutions of learning, above all our universities, to take as their primary task to help humanity learn how to do it. In order to do that, the philosophy of inquiry put into practice by universities needs to be dramatically transformed. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry – a revolution in the philosophy of the university, all around the world, wherever possible, so that the basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, construed to be the capacity, active endeavour, and perhaps desire, to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom in this sense including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides, methods being dramatically modified too so as to help achieve the new academic aim. The basic task of the university would be, not to solve problems of knowledge, but rather to help people in the social world beyond the university to resolve conflicts and problems of living so that what is of value in life may be realized by everyone, insofar as that is possible. The pursuit of knowledge would be vital, but not intellectually fundamental. The intellectual and institutional revolution we so urgently need in our universities would affect every discipline and aspect of the university; it would dramatically affect both research and education, and the whole way the university is related to the rest of the social world. The revolution, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry would dramatically enhance the intellectual integrity and rationality of natural science, social inquiry, the humanities and technology, the character of these disciplines and the relationships they have with one another. University education throughout the university would be dramatically improved. And academic inquiry as a whole would do what, on the whole, it fails to do at present: it would help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational and, as a result, increasingly successful ways, progress at last being made to a genuinely good, civilized world – a world in which there is peace, justice, liberal democracy, individual freedom, education, reasonable equality, sustainable prosperity and worthwhile opportunities in life, all of these for everyone, insofar as this is possible. Why, it may be asked, has academic philosophy not noticed that we urgently need to transform the current bad philosophy of inquiry of knowledge-inquiry into the far more intellectually rigorous and humanly valuable philosophy of wisdom-inquiry, so that we can begin to do what so far we have failed to do so lamentably: learn how to avoid impending disasters, and even make progress to a better world, something that seems at present almost unthinkable given the horrors of war, poverty, political enslavement of the 20th century, and the horrors of this century so far too? The answer is that academic philosophy is in a particularly pitiful state, as philosophers themselves, are just beginning to realize and lament. That is why academic philosophers are blind to the intellectual and humanitarian disaster of the bad philosophy that dominates universities today, and inconceivable to them to them that they might have, as a disciplinary task, to ensure academic inquiry implements a good philosophy of inquiry, and advocate and argue for change if it does not. Once upon a time, in Europe at least, philosophy was an intellectual power in the world. In the 17th century it created modern science which massively increased and improved our knowledge and understanding of the world, which in turn led to the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, and the modern world. Philosophy was once so intellectually powerful and influential that it changed the course of history. But philosophy also made in the past three disastrous intellectual blunders: the post-Cartesian blunder, the post-Newtonian blunder, and the Enlightenment blunder. Never acknowledged and corrected by subsequent philosophy right down to the present, these unrecognized intellectual blunders rendered academic philosophy the esoteric, pathetic, and powerless discipline it is today, so that throughout the last century and, so far, throughout this one, academic philosophy has remained blind to the intellectual disaster of knowledge-inquiry, and thus failed entirely to take up its proper disciplinary task of warning fellow academics of the structural irrationality of the philosophy that prevails in the university, and of proposing what steps need to be taken to put things right. Instead of performing such an urgently needed philosophical task, so-called analytic philosophy was reduced to analysing the meaning of words. Since then, there has been hardly any discernible improvement, even if analysis of concepts no longer dominates the scene. Bad academic philosophy is indeed responsible for intellectual and humanitarian failures of the university. What the three past intellectual blunders of philosophy are, why their persistence so dramatically reduces academic philosophy to a triviality, and why, furthermore, this results in the failure of scientists and scholars to see what is so blatantly bad about the philosophy prevailing in universities around the world – the failure to see what so urgently needs to be done to put right what has been wrong for so long: all this is made clear in this book. A new kind of philosophy emerges during the course of the argument, critical fundamentalism, which has as its task to keep alive imaginative and critical – that is rational – thinking about our fundamental problem: How can our human world, the world we experience and live in – the world of living things, people, consciousness, free will, meaning and value – how can all of this exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? That problem encompasses all others of life, science and thought. Critical fundamentalism tries to improve answers to aspects of this problem; but it also seeks to encourage everyone to think about the problem, from time to time, and think about how it interacts, in both directions, with more urgent particular and specialized problems of life and thought. Critical fundamentalism sets out to help improve bad philosophy wherever it is to be found: in social, political, commercial, legal, financial, and international life; and especially in academia, in institutions of learning, so that they become devoted to enhancing the capacity of people to learn how to achieve what is of genuine value in this brief life of a few decades if we are fortunate. Critical fundamentalism does everything it can to bring about the revolution in our universities we so urgently need. If taken up by mainstream philosophy, it might really have an impact, and begin to transform universities for the better, in both intellectual and humanitarian terms, and thus, enable humanity to learn how, after the grim failures and horrors of the last century and this one, to make progress to a better world. -/- . (shrink)

It should be clear that Lyell's scientific contemporaries would hardly have agreed with Robert Munro's remark that Antiquity of Man created a full-fledged discipline. Only later historians have judged the work a synthesis; those closer to the discoveries and events saw it as a compilation — perhaps a “capital compilation,”95 but a compilation none the less. Its heterogeneity made it difficult to judge as a unity, and most reviewers, like Forbes, concentrated on the first part of Lyell's trilogy. The chapters (...) on glaciation were admired by Lyell's friends but had relatively little appeal to more general readers. His discussion of the species question hedged far too much to please those who accepted the cogency of Darwin's evidence and arguments. This last section of the book blatantly lacks originality or commitment and certainly has no claim to classical status in anthropology.We are left, then, with the first twelve chapters, for it was this portion that dictated the book's title and that amassed the available evidence favoring the antiquity of the human species. Did it do anything more than marshall the evidence that others had discovered? I think not. Lyell could write with style and verve. Principles of Geology is a remarkably readable book. But Antiquity is the work of a geologist, not of a systematic student of man. Despite its occasional touches of power, it never captures the freshness and immediacy of Lubbock's Pre-historic Times nor the theoretical brilliance of E. B. Tylor's Researches into the Early History of Mankind (1865).96 Antiquity utilizes little of the comparative method whereby Lyell's contemporaries used data from modern “savagery” to elaborate the possible social functions of the prehistoric remains being uncovered. It contains little social theory and has virtually no integrated framework. Even the first twelve chapters do not really hang together. As Hooker, commenting to Darwin on Lubbock's review, sadly wrote: “Lubbock in [the] N[atural] H[istory] Review, had in a note called attention to Lyell's ... ‘doing injustice’ to Prestwich & Falconer. I modified this expression ‘injustice’ in Lubbock's paper (which was friendly and apologetic). I am deeply sorry for it, but what can one do? I do think Lyell's first XII chapters a complete mess.”97 In another letter to Darwin, Hooker described this first portion of Antiquity as “confused and confusing.”98Part of the problem, of course, lay in the subject's novelty for Lyell and for most of his contemporaries. At a deeper level, however, I believe that the book accurately reflects Lyell's uncertainties about Darwin's work and its implications for man.99 Leonard Wilson's edition of Lyell's Scientific Journals provides a unique insight into Lyell's mind during the years just before he began to write Antiquity.100 Preoccupied with the human implications of evolutionary biology, Lyell was not clear how many of those implications were compatible with his deep convictions about the dignity of man's place in the cosmos. With a certain naiveté, Lyell complained in 1873 that many of his readers had failed to see the “natural connections” among the three portions of Antiquity.101 Connections could indeed be drawn between man's antiquity and his evolutionary origins; Lyell's private Scientific Journals movingly demonstrate that he was well aware of this fact. But he never fully made the connections in his published writings. Antiquity of Man is more appropriately seen as the last gasp of the heroic period in British geology than as the opening salvo in a new, post-Darwinian anthropological synthesis. Between the founding of the Geological Society of London in 1807 and the middle of the nineteenth century, geology was recognized as one of the most exciting and innovative scientific fields in Britain.102 Lyell himself had contributed much to that drama, and by the 1860's he was a public figure of venerable proportions. More then any other man he represented a geology that had extended the boundaries of process, time, and life. The fundamental achievements of Lyell and his colleagues had been assimilated into the wider Victorian consciousness, yet the earlier public debates about “genesis and geology” had left untouched in its essentials the concept of Man as a moral, responsible, created being.103Lyell never abandoned this view of his own species, and in 1863 it was a completely responsible creature which, under the weight of empirical evidence, Lyell admitted had lived on earth far longer than had previously been thought. Certainly this more generous allowance for human existence was constitutive to what Burrow calls the evolutionary social theory of midcentury Britain.104 Unlike Lyell, the younger representatives of this anthropology quietly accepted both man's antiquity and his aboriginal animality. Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology (1855), as well as the other volumes of his grand Synthetic Philosophy, presented as part of the cosmic process the development of human from prehuman beings.105 Tylor's discussion of what in his Researches (1865) he called the “gesture-language” presupposed the gradual and de novo origin of language in early human populations.106 Lubbock's young and polished mind was untroubled by the human implications of Darwin's work, and he cast his Prehistoric Times into such a perfect mold that it and its companionpiece (On the Origin of Civilization, 1870) went through seven editions each between 1865 and World War I, with their original theoretical structures intact. In a way that Lyell could not grasp, Lubbock was intrigued by questions concerning the origins of moral and religious beliefs and did not flinch at the thought of an amoral, atheistic creature as an ancestor.107 Indeed, as the German naturalist Carl Vogt pointed out in his Lectures on Man, translated into English the year after Antiquity, both Darwin's theories and the primitive flint knives of the Stone Age bore witness to a time beyond that imaginable from the condition of the lowest present-day “savage”:From such a low condition [little better than anthropomorphous apes], compared to which that of the so-called savages of the old and new world is a refined civilisation, has the human species gradually extricated itself, in a bitter struggle for existence, which it was well able to maintain, by being gifted with a larger amount of brain and intelligence than that possessed by the surrounding animal world.108The easy integration of biological and social themes was perhaps the distinguishing hallmark of Victorian anthropology of the 1850's and 1860's. After his fashion, Lyell got both themes into Antiquity, but he carefully separated them with a seven-chapter wall of glacial ice. Lyell's anthropology was not that of a thoroughgoing evolutionist like Lubbock, Tylor, or Spencer. For Lyell prehistoric man was not a product of biological evolution. Rude and superstitious he may have been, but he possessed ritual and a belief in a future state, and thus deserved “the epithet of ‘noble,’ which Dryden gave to what he seems to have pictured to himself as the primitive condition of our race: as Nature first made man/when wild in woods the noble savage ran.”109As a systematic argument, Lyell's book was at best a significant failure. As a popularization, it was a success — largely because of the personal stature of its author and the particular moment of its appearance. It helped establish the fact of man's antiquity with a wider Victorian audience, in itself no mean achievement. But Lyell was unable to exploit the fuller implications of his material in the service of a secular science of man. Ironically, he exploited only his colleagues' discoveries. Though the aging Lyell, with failing eyesight but unfailing mental powers, can still be seen as a man of considerable importance, his Antiquity belongs to the carefully circumscribed world of British geology rather than to the less disciplined world of Victorian anthropology. (shrink)

Within post - Kuhnian, philosophy of science, much effort has been devoted to issues related to conceptual change, such as incommensurability, scientific progress and realism, but mostly in terms of reference, without a fine - grained theory of scientific concepts/senses. Within the philosophy of language and of mind tradition, there is a large body of work on concepts, but the application to scientific concepts has been very tentative. The aim of this paper is to propose a general (...) framework for a theory for the individuation of scientific concepts. The general view about the individuation of concepts favored here is the possession - condition approach: to individuate a concept is to identify its possession conditions. The general metascientific tools for the analysis of scientific theories are model - theoretic, more specifically, structuralist: scientific theories, the entities to which scientifc concepts belong, are model - theoretic theory - nets. The general idea about the content of scientific concepts that inspires this proposal comes from: (i) our grandfathers’ "laws - plus - correspondence rules", (ii) Kuhns "laws applied to exemplars" views and (iii) moderate operationalism. The aim is to show that some clarification can be gained applying the possesion condition appproach to (an expansion of) these three elements using structuralist metascientific tools. First, I briefly present the two main structuralist ideas I shall use: the difference between observability and non - theoreticity, and the notion of theory - net. Second, I informally introduce the five components that come from my reading of the three traditional elements; these components are, or are not, plausible independently of how they will be integrated within a theory of concept - identity. Third, I present the kore of the theory of possession conditions for concept - identity that we shall use for the integration of such components. Finally, I propose the general traits of the possession condition that corresponds to each of these five components, I present some problems and point out some possible ways of dealing with them. (shrink)

The discussions about the reform of state-owned enterprises are so far dominated by economic and legal considerations while the ethical dimension of this highly complex problem is being barely addressed explicitly, much less developed systematically and integrated into a broader analytical framework for companies in China. This paper is a proposal to introduce this kind of ethical considerations. First, the main features of the reform of state-owned enterprises are briefly summarized and a number of critical issues are identified. (...) Second, the "balanced concept of the firm" is presented and compared with other approaches to corporate ethics in chiefly Western literature (discussions on "corporate social responsibility", the stakeholder approach, and social contract theories). Finally, the relevance of this "balanced concept of the firm" for the reform of state-owned enterprises is briefly discussed. (shrink)

In a recent Editorial, Kious et al. (2023) put forward the claim that psychiatrists should resist calls to integrate concerns about epistemic injustice into their practice as this concept not only fails to add significantly to the current professional standards but would also lead to deleterious clinical outcomes. We believe their claim is mistaken, as it arises from several misconceptions about both the nature of epistemic injustice, and its clinical relevance. First, epistemic justice is conflated with what the authors term (...) ‘a quest for social justice’ that could ‘sideline principles of good clinical reasoning’ (Kious at al 2023: 4). Second, the claim about the impracticality and/or counterproductivity of epistemic injustice as a critical tool within psychiatric practice reflects a series of misconceptions about the normative framework from which this concept derives, so the standards they evaluate it against are ill-chosen. Pace Kious at al., fostering epistemic justice in any area of knowledge and inquiry could not – unwittingly or otherwise – inhibit the consideration of relevant evidence, restrict sound argument or facilitate the casual treatment of testimonies at face value. Third and final, this claim obfuscates some immediate ways in which a focus on epistemic justice as an integral goal will strengthen psychiatric practice according to its own internal standards. (shrink)

The reconciliation of theories of concepts based on prototypes, exemplars, and theory-like structures is a longstanding problem in cognitive science. In response to this problem, researchers have recently tended to adopt either hybrid theories that combine various kinds of representational structure, or eliminative theories that replace concepts with a more finely grained taxonomy of mental representations. In this paper, we describe an alternative approach involving a single class of mental representations called “semantic pointers.” Semantic pointers are symbol-like representations (...) that result from the compression and recursive binding of perceptual, lexical, and motor representations, effectively integrating traditional connectionist and symbolic approaches. We present a computational model using semantic pointers that replicates experimental data from categorization studies involving each prior paradigm. We argue that a framework involving semantic pointers can provide a unified account of conceptual phenomena, and we compare our framework to existing alternatives in accounting for the scope, content, recursive combination, and neural implementation of concepts. (shrink)

The first United Nations Millennium Development Goal calls for a distinct reduction of worldwide poverty. It is now widely accepted that the private sector is a crucial partner in achieving this ambitious target. Building on this insight, the ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ concept provides a framework that highlights the untapped opportunities with the ‹poorest of the poor’, while at the same time acknowledging the abilities and resources of private enterprises for poverty alleviation. This article connects the idea of business (...) with the poor to sustainable development and especially to the notions of inter- and intragenerational justice. These principles of justice can be linked with the ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ approach directly through the Rawlsian principles to foster holistic thinking. On this basis, the article offers a normative-ethical reasoning of corporations’ possible responsibilities for the poorest of the poor. Today’s state of worldwide inequalities is likely to generate future tensions between the privileged western world and the uncounted mass of poor (let alone the ethical dubiousness of this status). However, it is at the same time problematic if not even impossible to improve the situation of the poor by simply copying the resource intensive western way of living to the ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ due to the limited carrying capacity of the earth. After highlighting possible moral dilemmas which may occur through such a potential trade off, this article concludes with an outlook on how the concepts ‹Bottom of the Pyramid’ and sustainable development could be combined. (shrink)

In this article, we outline a unique conceptual framework connecting legitimacy types (Suchman, 1995), theories of corporate responsibility (Brummer, 1991), and levels of organizational moral development based on Kohlberg's (1971) moral development stages. In addition, based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) categories, we found empirical support for our framework, by content analyzing Fortune 500 corporate citizenship reports from four different industries (i.e., chemicals, motor vehicle/auto parts, pharmaceutical, and utilities), at three data points (i.e., 2002, 2007, and 2012). Our (...) analysis indicates that motor vehicle/auto parts and chemicals industries are at a higher developmental level, and portray moral legitimacy along with social demandingness corporate responsibility in recent years; while the pharmaceutical and utilities sectors are at a lower developmental level, showing signs of pragmatic legitimacy, alongside classical and stakeholder corporate responsibility strategies. This article contributes to the current organizational moral development literature by developing and finding empirical support of a conceptual framework of organizational moral development, legitimacy, and corporate responsibility. In particular, our findings provide a deeper understanding of the differences in moral development levels across four focal industries over a 10‐year timespan. (shrink)

Graduate education is a critical period in shaping and fostering graduate students' awareness about the importance of responsible conduct of research and knowledge and skills in doing good science. However, there is a lack of a standard curriculum and assessment framework for graduate students in Taiwan. The aim of this study was to develop a literacy-based research integrity (RI) assessment framework, including five core RI areas: (1) basic concepts in RI, (2) RI considerations in the research procedure, (...) (3) research ethics and research subject protection, (4) publication and authorship, and (5) conflict of interest. The five areas were derived through a comprehensive review of major topics and areas covered in existing research integrity education and training programs and were rated by RI experts with adequate content validity. Test items on the five core areas were developed across three literacy levels: remembering and understanding, applying and analyzing, and evaluating and creating. Seven thousand and eighty-seven graduate-level trainees took an 18-unit RI course covering the five RI areas. Upon finishing the course, trainees completed a computer-based RI assessment randomly selected from 26 RI testing booklets. The design of test items followed the mastery-oriented assessment principles to promote trainees’ learning of RI with adaptive assessment feedback. Results showed that the items in the RI assessment had adequate discrimination and low difficulty level. Thus, the RI assessment can be used to assess a range of trainees’ RI literacy and can provide the most information in identifying trainees in need of more instruction or alternative training. The low guessing parameters also indicated the online RI assessment had an appropriate control of test exposure and cheating prevention. Higher education authorities can use this framework to assess graduate students' RI literacy based on a standard curriculum and prepare them for conversations about the responsible conduct of research for RI culture-building. (shrink)

There is growing agreement among taxonomists that species are independently evolving lineages. The central notion of this conception, evolutionary independence, is commonly operationalized by taxonomists in multiple, diverging ways. This leads to a problem of operationalization-dependency in species classification, as species delimitation is not only dependent on the properties of the investigated groups, but also on how taxonomists choose to operationalize evolutionary independence. The question then is how the operationalization-dependency of species delimitation is compatible with its (...) objectivity and reliability. In response to this problem, various taxonomists have proposed to integrate multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence for delimiting species. This paper first distinguishes between a standard and a sophisticated integrative approach to taxonomy, and argues that it is unclear how either of these can support the reliability and objectivity of species delimitation. It then draws a parallel between the measurement of physical quantities and species delimitation to argue that species delimitation can be considered objective and reliable if we understand the sophisticated integrative approach as assessing the coherence between the idealized models of multiple operationalizations of evolutionary independence. (shrink)

This chapter proposes the concept of the mindsponge and its underlying themes that explain why and how executives, managers, and corporations could replace waning values in their mindsets with those absorbed during their exposure to multicultural and global settings. It first provides a brief literature review on global mindset and cultural values, which suggests that not only can a mindset be improved, but that it is learning mechanism can also be developed. Then the chapter offers a conceptual framework, called (...) the 'mindsponge', which builds upon earlier works linking mindset to themes of multi-filtering. The process is proposed to help identify emerging values in the transition economy of Vietnam and also to reconfirm existing core values. The concept of mindsponge provides executives, managers, and organizations with not only a practical framework for improving their global mind-set by identifying and strengthening core values, but also capturing emerging opportunities. (shrink)

The zone of proximal development is defined as an overarching concept that integrates the main tenets of Vygotsky’s theory of human development. The conceptualization of the ZPD begins with its social, cultural, and historical context and traces its development as a spatial and temporal metaphor that reflects the sociogenetic root of all human mental functioning. Beyond the explication of sociogenesis, the ZPD is reconceptualized to include the notions of voice and dialogicality. The insights gained from the fields of semiotics and (...) discourse studies allow a broader understanding of the ZPD by bringing to light participant structures and institutional and historical forces that may not have been included in the dominant interpretations of the ZPD. (shrink)

New techniques for modifying the genomes of agricultural organisms create difficult ethical challenges. We provide a novel framework to replace worn-out ethical lenses relying on ‘naturalness’ and ‘crossing species lines.’ Thinking of agricultural intervention as a ‘negotiation’ of ‘integrity’ and ‘agency’ provides a flexible framework for considering techniques such as genome editing with CRISPR/Cas systems. We lay out the framework by highlighting some existing uses of integrity in environmental ethics. We also provide an example of our (...) lens at work by looking at the creation of ‘cisgenic’ potatoes to resist late potato blight. We conclude by highlighting three distinct advantages offered by the integrity framework. These include a more fitting way to look at the practice of scientific researchers, a more inclusive way to consider ethics around agriculture, and a more flexible way to provide the ethical grounds for regulation in different cultural contexts. (shrink)

The paper discusses various concepts of 'species equality' and 'species superiority' and the assumptions concerning intrinsic value on which they depend. I investigate what philosophers from the traditional deontological (Taylor and Lombardi) and utilitarian (Singer and Attfield) perspectives have meant by their claims for species equality. I attempt to provide a framework of intrinsic values that justifies one sense in which members of a species can be said to be superior to members of another (...) species. (shrink)

GraphicalThe need to encourage individuals as active change agents for sustainability transitions has led researchers across disciplines to conceptualize over 70 constructs to assess relevant dispositions to environmental protection and green consumption behaviors. The generated knowledge is, however, fragmented by an unconsolidated set of constructs developed within parallel literature streams. We, hence, use an integrative review method to capture conceptual and operational similarities and distinctiveness of constructs across disciplines in the literature, attempting to unify the knowledge base. Thereby, we identify (...) 34 conceptually distinct constructs relevant for the thematic synthesis on individual-level constructs framing contributions to environmental measures and issues. We followingly propose a taxonomy, systemizing constructs based on their concept type and contextual scope of the environmental challenge addressed. We capture these dimensions in critically assessing relevant and salient conceptual and operational features. We thus create a consolidated picture of extant constructs capturing individual-level environmental sustainability by which we intend a three-fold contribution to the interdisciplinary field. First, the taxonomy and guiding framework for the choice of constructs should assist substantive researchers in identifying appropriate constructs of interest. Second, the systematic integration of similar concepts available in parallel literature streams should assist future endeavors aiming at integrating substantive findings with regard to antecedents, consequences, and other relevant variables. Finally, the taxonomy revealed that conceptualizations mainly scatter around specific combinations of types and scopes while others remain unaddressed. Based on our critical assessment of the relevant features and resulting taxonomy, we identify avenues for future research dedicated to enhancing conceptual rigor and measurement quality in the field and introducing concepts addressing missing but potentially valuable combinations of types and scopes. We conclude that researchers engaging in the proposed avenues with conceptual, methodological, or empirical contributions should consider four critical aspects to advance knowledge accumulation and prevent fragmentation in the interdisciplinary field. We thereby hope to pave the way for a collective, interdisciplinary knowledge base of concepts used to describe and assess individual’s pro-environmental dispositions and practices of green consumption. (shrink)