Politics and Modernity provides a critical review of the key interface of contemporary political theory and social theory about the questions of modernity and postmodernity. Review essays offer a broad-ranging assessment of the issues at stake in current debates. Among the works reviewed are those of William Connolly, Anthony Giddens, J[um]urgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor and Roy Bhaskar. As well as reviewing the contemporary literature, the contributors assess the historical roots of current problems in the works of (...) Nietzsche and Max Weber. (shrink)

This essay presents analogies between the development of historical writing and of physical science during the early modern period. Its necessarily spotty coverage runs from the mid sixteenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth. The analogies include arising from practical concerns; preferring material documents and experimental inquiries over texts; making use of mathematical auxiliary sciences; distinguishing between primary and secondary elements; establishing new fundamental principles; undermining the traditional world system; and devising methods to control rapidly multiplying knowledge. A (...) history of learning that meets today's standards of historical scholarship should identify and exploit such parallels, not only because of scholarly interest and responsibility, but also because an understanding of the historical importance of linkages between distant branches of learning may help redress the increasing imbalance in resources among the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities in our higher schools and universities. (shrink)

Performative methods have been part of history of science research and education for at least three decades. Understood broadly, they cover every methodology in which a historian or philosopher of science engages in embodied interaction with sources, tools and materials that do not traditionally belong to historical research, with the aim of answering a historical research question. The question no longer appears to be whether performative methods have a place within history and philosophy of science (...) research, but what their place is, could, or should be; when and how they can and cannot be used. Because although performative methods are seen as an enrichment of the field by many, their growing popularity also raises questions: what new insights and challenges has the increased use of performative methods in the history of science brought us? How has it changed the field? Should performative research methods become a mandatory part of the training of new generations of historians of science? In this special issue, historians and philosophers of science for whom performative methods play an important role in their work reflect on these questions from their own research and teaching practices. (shrink)

History and Philosophy of Science. Between Description and Construction. Taking into consideration the huge amount of programs and departments in ‘History and Philosophy of Science’ (HPS), partly including also technology and sociology of science, the rather weak theoretical conceptualization of this field seems surprising. HPS is conceived of neither as a mere addition of history of science and philosophy of science, nor as a good will parallel action. Therefore, the question arises about (...) the genuine subject and method of this trans‐ and interdisciplinary field of research and teaching. The recent postulate of an “integrated HPS” indicates the need of a closer and more intrinsic cooperation and interaction between history of science and philosophy of science (covering also the social and cultural sciences) from a theoretical and practical point of view. In addition, there should be no more privileging of any part in this joint scholarly enterprise by overcoming the context of discovery and the context of justification. Some best practices and desiderata are mentioned together with the forgotten history of the philosophy of science itself. Based on the description of the scholarly field an ideal‐typical model of HPS is offered. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 332-343, September 2022.

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 332-343, September 2022.

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

The new field of the history of knowledge is often presented as a mere expansion of the history of science. We argue that it has a greater ambition. The re‐definition of the historiographical domain of the history of knowledge urges us to ask new questions about the boundaries, hierarchies, and mutual constitution of different types of knowledge as well as the role and assessment of failure and ignorance in making knowledge. These issues have pertinence in the (...) current climate where expertise is increasingly questioned and authority seems to lose its ground. Illustrated with examples from recent historiography of the sixteenth to twentieth centuries, we indicate some fruitful new avenues for research in the history of knowledge. Taken together, we hope that they will show that the history of knowledge could build the expertise required by the challenges of twenty‐first century knowledge societies, just like the history of science, throughout its development as a discipline in the twentieth century, responded to the demands posed by science and society. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 44, Issue 4, Page 339-351, December 2021.

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

1. T. Vorträge und Diskussionen im Oktober 1968 in Fulda anlässlich des 6. Symposions der Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsgeschichte: "Der Wandel des Wissenschaftsbegriffs."--2. T. Vorträge und Diskussionen im April 1968 in Düsseldorf anlässlich des 4. wissenschaftstheoretischen Kolloquiums des Philosophischen Institutes der Universität Düsseldorf: "Begriff und Ideal der Wissenschaft in Philosophie, Einzelwissenschaft und Dokumentation.".

History of Science in History. This position paper discusses the position of history of science within the field of history and presents arguments for maintaining and expanding that position in future.

ABSTRACT This essay argues that historians of science who seek to embody our oxymoronic self-description must confront both contradictory terms that define our common enterprise—that is, both “history” and “science.” On the history/methods side, it suggests that we embrace the heterogeneity of our institutional arrangements and repudiate the homogeneous disciplinary model sometimes advocated by Thomas Kuhn and followed by art history. This implies that rather than treating the history of science as an end (...) in itself, we consider it a means to a variety of historical ends, think of ourselves as a tool-making community, and jettison moralistic assertions of scientific exceptionalism. To do so, this essay argues—on the science/subject side—that we rebrand the subject of our historical inquiry as “episcience,” a neologism that stands in relation to “science” as the new field of epigenetics does to the old genetics. Episcience encompasses both the material activities of the relevant sciences and their “surround” (environment, milieu, Umgebung) to reframe knowledge making to include the material processes that put science “in play” and make its findings matter beyond science. The essay concludes that “the history of science” is an oxymoron that makes sense to the extent that its practitioners acknowledge that the history of science is important not just because science is important, but because its history is. (shrink)

I am proposing here an examination o f the text Reading Capital, written by Louis Althusser in 1965. I will consider it as a text in the history o f philosophy. In Reading Capital Althusser explicitly asks which philosophy provides the basis, the foundation, for Marx’s scientific work? In this sense, Reading Capital is, at the same time, a text in the history o f philosophy and a text in the philosophy o f science. In research on (...) Marx’s philosophy, it becomes essential in the Althusserian argument to consider Marx’s historical position in relation to the school o f classical economy, on the one hand, and to Hegel’s philosophy, on the other. In other words, it is a matter of determining Marx ’s p o sitio n in a history of science and in a history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider the relation of history of philosophy to the history of science. I argue that though these two disciplines are naturally linked, they also have special commitments that distinguish each from the other. I begin with the history of the history of science, a discipline that was once allied with philosophy of science but that has increasingly evolved toward social history. Then I consider the debate over whether the (...) history of philosophy is essential for, or rather largely irrelevant to, contemporary “analytic” philosophy. My conclusion is that the relation of history of philosophy to philosophy is best conceived in terms of the relation of history of science to history. Finally, I consider a particular case study of the relation of history of science to history of philosophy that concerns contextualist scholarship on early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

The general post-communist perspective of historiography on the Cold War era is that the world was divided into two blocs, so different and isolated from one another that there was no interaction between them whatsoever. As revisionist literature is expanding, the uncovered data indicates a far more complex reality, with a dynamic East-West exchange of goods, money, information, human resources, and technology, be it formal or informal, official or underground, institutional or personal. The current volume History of Communism in (...) Europe: Breaking the Wall: National and Transnational Perspectives on East-European Science tries to confer more detail to this perspec­tive, by bringing together research papers that focus on the history of science during the Cold War. The articles cover a wide range of subjects, from biology to philosophy and from espionage to medical practices, all sharing an ideological context that continuously impacted and molded the professional relations among scholars from both sides of the Iron Curtain. (shrink)

An interest in global histories of science is not new. Yet the project envisioned by this Focus section is different from that pursued by natural historians and natural philosophers in the early modern age. Instead of tracing universal patterns, there is value in attending to the connections and disconnections of science on the global stage. Instead of assuming the precision of science's boundaries, historians might consider the categories of “science” and “indigenous knowledge” to have emerged from (...) globalization. New global histories of science will be characterized by critical reflection on the limits of generalization, as well as a creative adoption of new sources, methods, and chronologies, in an attempt to decenter the European history of science. Such a project holds the promise of opening up new conversations between historians, anthropologists, philosophers, and sociologists of science. It is of critical importance if the discipline is not to fragment into regional and national subfields or become dominated by structural frameworks such as imperialism. -/- . (shrink)

In recent decades, several authors have claimed that an epoch-making change in the development of science is taking place. A closer examination of this claim shows that these authors take different – and problematic – concepts of an epochal break as their points of departure. In order to facilitate an evaluation of the current development of science, I would like to propose a concept of an epochal change according to which it is not necessarily a discontinuous process that (...) typically begins in a subarea of the sciences, has far-reaching consequences for the entire system of the sciences, and can be observed by contemporaries as early as during its initial phase. Taking this concept as my point of departure, I discuss various candidates for the status of an epochal transformation in the recent development of the sciences. Although there are sound reasons to doubt that an epochal break is currently taking place, one must concede that the sciences are probably in a profound transformation, which could unfold in various directions, perhaps even leading to epoch-making new characterizations of the sciences. (shrink)

Philosophy of science and history of science both have a significant relation to science itself; but what is their relation to each other? That question has been a focal point of philosophical and historical work throughout the second half of this century. An analysis and review of the progress made in dealing with this question, and especially that made in philosophy, is the focus of this thesis. Chapter one concerns logical positivist and empiricist approaches to philosophy (...) of science, and the significance of the criticisms levelled at them by analytic epistemologists such as Willard Quine and 'historicist' philosophers, especially Thomas Kuhn. Chapter two details the attempts by Kuhn and Lakatos to integrate these historicist criticisms with historically oriented philosophy of science, in their separate attempts at providing rational explanations of historical developments. Kuhn's latest work seeks to mend fences with philosophy, but his efforts remain too closely tied to the epistemological approaches strongly criticized in his earlier work. Lakatos' treatment of history is much more subtle than most have understood it to be, but the conception of scientific rationality that arises out of it is transformed into an abstract cultural product, more reminiscent of Hegel's geist than of individual human rationality. Chapters three and four discuss the recommendations of Lakatos and Laudan to historians with regard to historiography, and the actual historiographies and philosophy of history of practicing historians and historians of science. The philosophers' contributions indicate little concern for the historians' own methods, materials, and purposes; and the historians' writings present methodologies for history of science that are independent of the normative demarcations of philosophy of science, pace Lakatos and Laudan. Chapter five develops a philosophical position that fosters a more productive engagement between philosophy and history of science, a 'methodological historicism' that embraces the possibility of an important role for social and political factors in a philosophical study of scientific development. The epistemological relativism that might accompany such a historicist position need not be the radical epistemological anarchism of Feyerabend, though it will allow for a significant underdetermination of scientific development by reason nonetheless. (shrink)

We describe here an interdisciplinary lab science course for non-majors using the history of science as a curricular guide. Our experience with diverse instructors underscores the importance of the teachers and classroom dynamics, beyond the curriculum. Moreover, the institutional political context is central: are courses for non-majors valued and is support given to instructors to innovate? Two sample projects are profiled.

Science lessons using inquiry only or history of science with inquiry were used for explicit reflective nature of science instruction for second-, third-, and fourth-grade students randomly assigned to receive one of the treatments. Students in both groups improved in their understanding of creative NOS, tentative NOS, empirical NOS, and subjective NOS as measured using VNOS-D as pre- and post-test surveys. Social and cultural context of science was not accessible for the students. Students in second, (...) third, and fourth grades were able to attain adequate views of empirical NOS, the role of observation and inference, creative and imaginative NOS, and subjective NOS. Students were not able to express adequate views of socially and culturally embedded NOS. Most gains in NOS eroded by the next school year, except for tentative NOS for both groups and creative NOS for the inquiry group. (shrink)

erkennung der Postmodernität: Hilfen für Historiker – und Historiker der Wissenschaften im Besonderen. Ausgehend von einer Unterscheidung zwischen der Postmodernit?t als einer von der Modernit?t durch eine breite Umkehr ihrer kulturellen Grundannahmen abgegrenzten historischen Ära und dem Postmodernismus – einer von den selbsternannten Postmodernisten in der frühen Postmodernität angenommenen intellektuellen Attitüde – thematisiert der Aufsatz zwei grundsätzliche Charakteristika der Postmodernität: Erstens die Umkehrung der kulturellen Rangfolge von Wissenschaft und Technik, worin Postmodernität und Postmodernismus übereinstimmen. Zweitens die Ablösung des Ideals eines (...) methodisch vorgehenden, uneigennützigen Wissenschaftlers, nicht durch ein fragmentiertes Subjekt, wie der Postmodernismus behauptet, sondern durch den einseitig interessierten Unternehmer, welcher unter Missachtung aller Regeln hartnäckig seine Eigeninteressen verfolgt. Diese Umkehr in Bedeutung und Rolle von Wissenschaft und Technologie, die um 1980 begann, ist ein Kennzeichen des Übergangs von der Modernit?t zur Postmodernität. Diese Umkehr ist primär zu erkennen als eine Ablehnung des Regelhaften, des methodischen Vorgehens – mit dem “Methodismus” als einer die Modernität auszeichnenden kulturellen Perspektive – aber auch als eine Ablehnung der Uneigennützigkeit, einer in der Modernität besonders wert geschätzten Geisteshaltung. Postmodernität konstituiert sich somit als diese Umwertung der Werte, die ihre Quelle im ich-fixierten, transgressiven und “risiko”-freudigen postmodernen Individuum und seinen anti-sozialen Annahmen in Bezug auf Persönlichkeit hat. In der Wissenschaftsgeschichte selbst findet sich daher seit circa 1980 ein entsprechender Wandel der wissenschaftlichen Aufmerksamkeit weg von der Wissenschaft und hin zur Technologie. Damit einhergeht eine erstaunliche Vermeidung sozialhistorischer Perspektivierung, wie sie sich nicht zuletzt in der Abkehr von kausalistischen “Einfluss”-Erklärungen zugunsten voluntaristischer “Ressourcen”-Erklärungen spiegelt.cognizing Postmodernity: Helps for Historians – of Science Especially. stmodernity, a historical era demarcated from modernity by a broad reversal in cultural presuppositions, is distinguished from postmodernism, an intellectual posture adopted by self-identified postmodernists early in postmodernity. Two principal features of postmodernity are addressed: first, the downgrading of science and the upgrading of technology in cultural rank – on which postmodernity and postmodernism are in accord; second, the displacement of the methodical, disinterested scientist, modernity's beau ideal, not by a fragmented subject as postmodernism claims, but by the single-minded entrepreneur, resourcefully pursuing his self-interest in disregard of all rules. The reversal in rank and role as between science and technology, setting in circa 1980, is a marker of the transition from modernity to postmodernity. That reversal is to be cognized primarily as rejection of rule-following, of proceeding methodically – ‘methodism’ being the cultural perspective that uniquely distinguished modernity – but also as rejection of disinterestedness, the quality of mind especially highly esteemed in modernity. Postmodernity is constituted by this transvaluation of values, whose well-spring is the egocentric, transgressive , postmodern personality and its anti-social presumptions regarding personhood. Within the history of science itself there has been since circa 1980 a corresponding turn of scholarly attention away from science to technology, and a growing distaste for social perspectives, reflected, i. a., in the rejection of causalist ‘influence’ explanations in favor of voluntarist ‘resource’ explanations. (shrink)

Dordrecht usw.: Springer 2013. XV, 258 S., € 107,09. ISBN 978‐94‐007‐5720‐2.

In his latest book Kritik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Criticism and the History of Science, 1988), Gunnar Andersson clarifies the logical aspects of falsification and metalogical relationships between falsification, prediction and explanation. By analyzing the case studies on which Kuhn and Feyerabend have based their arguments for the incommensurability thesis, he shows that thesis to be untenable. A decisive criticism of the "new philosophy of science" is given. In the process Popper's methodology is developed further. It is shown (...) that the "Kuhn Revolution" is indeed a pseudo-revolution. (shrink)

The article examines Thomas Kuhn's work in the history of science with special attention to its relevance to subsequent developments in social epistemology. The article begins with a discussion of Kuhn's historical work, and the so-called historical turn in philosophy of science. It then examines Kuhn's views on textbook science, followed by an analysis of Kuhn's views on the relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science. Then it discusses Kuhn's (...) contributions to our understanding of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry. Finally, it discusses his influence on the social epistemology of science and the sociology of science. (shrink)

The article introduces a special section about history of science in Central and Eastern Europe before and after the fall of Communism, and sketches a conceptual framework within which the three papers in the section can be understood together. This introduction provides information about the workshop from which the papers were recruited, and continues with more general considerations on the nationalization of scientific knowledge in the territories of the Habsburg empire and its successor states. In the second half (...) of the introduction, themes addressed by all three papers in the special section are named and discussed briefly. (shrink)

This famous book, first published in 1929 was considerably revised and enlarged in its fourth edition, which is being reprinted now.

Objective Apeiron was founded in 1966 and has developed into one of the oldest and most distinguished journals dedicated to the study of ancient philosophy, ancient science, and, in particular, of problems that concern both fields. Apeiron is committed to publishing high-quality research papers in these areas of ancient Greco-Roman intellectual history; it also welcomes submission of articles dealing with the reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition. The journal appears quarterly. Articles are (...) peer-reviewed on a double-blind basis. Topics ancient philosophy ancient science reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition Article formats Original Articles. (shrink)

According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of (...) class='Hi'>science as a graveyard of theories’ picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers’ myth. (shrink)

The increased popularity of the label "cultural" within science studies, especially in relation to "cultural studies, " invites consideration of how it is and can be used in historical work. A lot more seems now to be invested in the notion of "cultural history. " This article examines some recent historiography of science as a means of considering what counts as cultural history in that domain and attempts to coordinate it with the sociologically informed studies of (...) the past ten orfifteen years. The label "sociocultural" seems a more useful term by which to capture recent developments. (shrink)

To understand the qualities of Western civilization and its modernity, to think about the future of humanity, and to understand how modern science was gestated in Western civilization: in the author’s view, these are the most important reasons to do history of science research in China. Study of the history of Western science in China is in its infancy, and there are great deficiencies leading to its lagging behind the international world of scholarship. In this (...) situation, the most urgent task is to translate as soon as possible a batch of high quality and classic books in the field, to establish a basic academic platform for research in the history of science, and, once that foundation has been laid, to deepen our researches further. Given these considerations, this essay discusses why the author translates works on the history of science, how he chooses books for translation, and his experiences as a translator. (shrink)

This book challenges the common assumption that the predominant focus of the history of science should be the achievements of Western scientists since the so-called Scientific Revolution. The conceptual frameworks within which the members of earlier societies and of modern indigenous groups worked admittedly pose severe problems for our understanding. But rather than dismiss them on the grounds that they are incommensurable with our own and to that extent unintelligible, we should see them as offering opportunities for us (...) to revise many of our own preconceptions. We should accept that the realities to be accounted for are multi-dimensional and that all such accounts are to some extent value-laden. In the process insights from current anthropology and the study of ancient Greece and China especially are brought to bear to suggest how the remit of the history of science can be expanded to achieve a cross-cultural perspective on the problems. (shrink)