Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie is metaphysical, to be sure; but it is also political. To help show this I will make sense, and show the plausibility and relevance, of what appears to be one of the most metaphysical (and bizarre) claims to be found in Hegel's political philosophy: his justification of hereditary monarchy. While among Hegel scholars Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy has been a focus of heated debate over whether Hegel is a liberal or a conservative; and has (...) recently become a focus in the debate over whether Hegel accommodated himself to the Prussian government out of fear of censorship by publishing an exoteric view endorsing hereditary monarchy that belies his �genuine�, more democratic view, to the nonspecialist Hegel's argument will seem to be of little relevance -- hereditary monarchy is not a live option for us in the 1990s. My intention in giving it serious consideration is not to have us entertain hereditary monarchy as an undeservedly neglected possibility, but rather to put the brakes on a tendency to dismiss Hegel as too much the idealist to dirty his hands with politics. (shrink)

The tensions between monarchy and republicanism are a dominant feature of Machiavelli’s political works, and both the so-called ‘monarchical’ work, The Prince, and the more overtly republican Discourses laud the benefits of republicanism and warn against relying on hereditary monarchy. This article compares Machiavelli’s proposals, advanced in 1520, for a mixed constitution for the city of Florence with those of his younger compatriot, Donato Giannotti, who became secretary to the Ten in the last Florentine republican government of (...) 1527-30. As the historical context changed, and Florence progressed from republic to absolutist duchy under the later Medici, Giannotti was exiled from the city and the article examines how his proposed reforms of 1528 and then his major work, Della republica fiorentina, drafted and redrafted between 1531 and 1538 as the politics of Florence changed, reinforce and expand Machiavelli’s views of politico vivere in a republican polity like Florence whose constitution was being dramatically rewritten. (shrink)

This volume in the Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes contains A dialogue between a philosopher and a student, of the common laws of England, edited by Alan Cromartie, supplemented by the important fragment on the issue of regal succession, 'Questions relative to Hereditary Right', discovered and edited by Quentin Skinner. The former work is the last of Hobbes's major political writings. As a critique of common law by a great philosopher, it should be essential reading for (...) anybody interested in English political thought or legal theory. Although it was written when Hobbes was at least eighty, it is a lively piece of work that goes beyond a recapitulation of earlier Hobbesian doctrines, not least in applying his central ideas to the details of the English constitution. This edition supplies the extensive annotation on matters of legal and historical detail that is required by non-specialist readers; it also assists students by offering cross-references to other treatises. Cromartie's introduction is an authoritative account of seventeenth-century thinking about the common law and of Hobbes's shifting attitudes towards it. It has often been suspected that the book was motivated by fear of being burned for heresy. Cromartie disentangles the complex evidence that documents this fear's development, and shows why the philosopher's acute anxieties eventually led him to write a legal treatise. In clarifying these questions, the edition casts fresh light upon his attitude to law and sovereignty. The second piece takes the form of a question put to Hobbes about the right of succession under hereditary monarchies, together with Hobbes's response. The question is in the handwriting of the fourth Earl of Devonshire, the son of the third Earl, whom Hobbes had tutored in the 1630s. He asks Hobbes whether an heir can be excluded if he is incapable of protecting his prospective subjects. The question of 'exclusion' became the most burning issue in English politics in the course of 1679, when a bill to exclude the future James II was introduced into the House of Commons. Hobbes answers with a robust defence of hereditary right, in the course of which he also makes some important general observations about the concept of a right. The manuscript is also of special interest as it constitutes Hobbes's last word on politics. It was almost certainly written in the summer of 1679, less than six months before Hobbes's death. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the European debate on commercial nobility at the beginning of the Seven Years War in the light of the intense reform debates over French absolutism in the 1730s and 1740s and Montesquieu's rigid refutation of noble trade in The Spirit of the Laws. In early 1756, Montesquieu's position against noble trade had come under severe attack by Gabriel François Coyer's Noblesse Commerçante. Claiming that the royal absolutist system had transformed the nobles into an idle class (...) without any political, economic, or military function that stood in sharp contrast to the dynamism of modern commercial society, Coyer perceived noble enterprises in maritime, wholesale, and even retail trade as a necessary means to help France compete with commercially more advanced states such as England and Holland. Coyer's pamphlet roused heated controversies in Paris and beyond and soon engaged the leading minds of the time in debates over the actual and desired role of the hereditary aristocracy in monarchies. Coyer's strongest opponents, like the Chevalier d’Arc, vehemently defended Montesquieu's contention that the upkeep of the non-commercial status of the nobility was a political necessity. Yet they, too, conceded that the nobility had to undergo severe reforms not to hamper France's military standing and future economic success. The article finally turns to Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, the most interesting commentator on the debate in Germany, who, by October 1756, had translated Coyer's and d’Arc's texts into German and written an own treatise on the same issue. Justi's pamphlet reveals that his political theory was deeply shaped by the debate and thus disproves the long-held assumption in the literature that German cameralism, with Justi as its main representative, was an allegedly isolated current of thought that neither received significant external influences, nor exerted any considerable impact beyond the boundaries of the Germanic world. (shrink)

This is the first ever English rendition of the classic statement of divine right absolutism, published in 1707. Jacques-Benigne Bossuet argues in the Politics that a general society of the entire human race, governed by Christian charity, has given way (after the Fall) to the necessity of politcs, law, and absolute hereditary monarchy. That monarchy - seen as natural, universal and divinely ordained (beginning with David and Solomon) is defended in the first half of the book. The (...) last part, added soon before Bossuet's death, goes on to take up the rights of the Church, the distinction between absolutism and arbitrariness, and causes of just war. Patrick Riley has provided full supporting materials including a chronology, guide to further reading, and a lucid introduction placing Bossuet in his historical and intellectual context. (shrink)

1. IntroductionIn February 2019, the film Black Panther was awarded three Oscars in Los Angeles. Some reviewers embraced it for its anti-racist message against the resurgence of racism under U.S. president Donald Trump.1 It tells the story of a black hero who tries to steer the development of an ethnically pure, isolationist hereditary monarchy in Africa. The imaginary state of Wakanda, which presents itself to the rest of the world as a third-world country, has highly developed technologies at (...) its disposal–at the same time, one recalls archaic African myths there.2. (shrink)

This volume in the Clarendon Edition of the Works of Thomas Hobbes contains A dialogue between a philosopher and a student, of the common laws of England, edited by Alan Cromartie, supplemented by the important fragment on the issue of regal succession, 'Questions relative to Hereditary Right', discovered and edited by Quentin Skinner. The former work is the last of Hobbes's major political writings. As a critique of common law by a great philosopher, it should be essential reading for (...) anybody interested in English political thought or legal theory. Although it was written when Hobbes was at least eighty, it is a lively piece of work that goes beyond a recapitulation of earlier Hobbesian doctrines, not least in applying his central ideas to the details of the English constitution. This edition supplies the extensive annotation on matters of legal and historical detail that is required by non-specialist readers; it also assists students by offering cross-references to other treatises. Cromartie's introduction is an authoritative account of seventeenth-century thinking about the common law and of Hobbes's shifting attitudes towards it. It has often been suspected that the book was motivated by fear of being burned for heresy. Cromartie disentangles the complex evidence that documents this fear's development, and shows why the philosopher's acute anxieties eventually led him to write a legal treatise. In clarifying these questions, the edition casts fresh light upon his attitude to law and sovereignty. The second piece takes the form of a question put to Hobbes about the right of succession under hereditary monarchies, together with Hobbes's response. The question is in the handwriting of the fourth Earl of Devonshire, the son of the third Earl, whom Hobbes had tutored in the 1630s. He asks Hobbes whether an heir can be excluded if he is incapable of protecting his prospective subjects. The question of 'exclusion' became the most burning issue in English politics in the course of 1679, when a bill to exclude the future James II was introduced into the House of Commons. Hobbes answers with a robust defence of hereditary right, in the course of which he also makes some important general observations about the concept of a right. The manuscript is also of special interest as it constitutes Hobbes's last word on politics. It was almost certainly written in the summer of 1679, less than six months before Hobbes's death. (shrink)

Lysander, who defeated Athens in 404 BC, polarized not only Greece, but also Sparta, where his room for maneuver was sometimes extended, and sometimes curtailed by the political bodies and protagonists. In the Gerousia Lysander’s supporters were mostly in the majority and made sure that his opponents were convicted and that he himself was protected from lawsuits and penalties. Perhaps these Gerontes not only stood behind Lysander’s imperialist post-war order, but also behind his plan to make the kingship elective. This (...) collaboration would be astonishing because the Gerousia has been considered as conservative since antiquity; but it would be perhaps less a sign of audacity than of a will to create. The extent of the resistance to such a policy can be gauged from the pamphlet of King Pausanias, which can be understood as a knee-jerk defense of the hereditary monarchy. (shrink)

This essay argues that More’s Epigrammata contains a coherent political theory that is inspired by ancient Roman republicanism. More defines “liberty” as the people’s willing obedience to virtuous leaders who rule for the common good, and he claims that popular opinion is the source of legitimacy rather than divine sanction. In doing so, More critiques the Tudor regime and presents an alternative theory of kingship based on his understanding of liberty. However, More also criticizes hereditary monarchy as such (...) and explicitly prefers a republican regime of elected men who share authority among equal peers. This republican regime more effectively promotes the common good, but it depends upon virtue in the rulers and in the citizens. More’s satirical epigrams on virtue and vice are part of his political teaching insofar as they establish his conception of citizen virtue, which supports his republicanism. (shrink)

Despite an efflorescence of historical scholarship on the theme of monarchy in nineteenth-century Britain, the views of the great Victorian man of letters Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) in this regard have been explored only in fragmentary and incomplete fashion. The present article aims to offer a comprehensive survey of Carlyle's thought regarding monarchy, arguing that on the whole, Carlyle was strongly and consistently opposed to monarchy on the hereditary principle, claiming that this had become an absurd anachronism (...) in the modern (democratic) world. Instead, Carlyle strongly and consistently promoted a merit-based aristocracy of talent, in which the ‘best’ man would rule, regardless of heredity or social origin. Indeed, in his historical writings, he was quite prepared to endorse regicide as a means to replacing inept hereditary monarchs with low-born men of destiny such as Oliver Cromwell. Although Carlyle refrained from publicly demanding the abolition of the monarchy in contemporary Britain, his private correspondence and conversation were replete with sneers and snide asides regarding Queen Victoria and her predecessors. (shrink)

The idea that a republic is the only legitimate form of government and that non-elective monarchy and hereditary political privileges are by definition illegitimate is an artifact of late eighteenth century republicanism, though it has roots in the “godly republics” of the seventeenth century. It presupposes understanding a republic to be a non-monarchical form of government. The latter definition is a discursive practice that goes back only to the fifteenth century and is not found in Roman or medieval (...) sources. This article explains how the definition emerged in Renaissance Italy. (shrink)

In the 1860s and 1870s, the feudal monarchy of the Tokugawa shogunate, which had ruled Japan for over two centuries, was overthrown, and the entire political order it had commanded was dismantled. This immense political transformation, comparable in its results to the great social revolutions of the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries in the West, was distinctive for lacking a major role for mass political mobilization. Since popular political action was decisive elsewhere for both providing the force for social revolutions (...) to defeat old regimes and for pushing revolutionary leaders to more radical policies, the Meiji Restoration’s combination of revolutionary outcomes with conservative personnel and means is puzzling. This article argues that previous accounts fail to explain why a group of relatively low-status samurai—administrative functionaries with some hereditary political privileges but in fact little secure power within the old regime—was able to overcome far more deeply entrenched political actors. To explain this, it is necessary to distinguish clearly between two political processes: the long-standing political relations of feudal monarchy and magnate lords and the unprecedented emergence of independent samurai political action and organizations cutting across domain boundaries. It was the interaction of these two processes that produced the overthrow of the Tokugawa and enabled the revolutionary outcomes that followed it. This article’s revised explanation of the Meiji Restoration clearly places it within the same theoretical parameters as the major revolutions of the seventeenth century and later. (shrink)

This paper introduces the reconstitutor as a comprehensive unit of heredity within the context of evolutionary research. A reconstitutor is the structure resulting from a set of relationships between different elements or processes that are actively involved in the recreation of a specific phenotypic variant in each generation regardless of the biomolecular basis of the elements or whether they stand in a continuous line of ancestry. Firstly, we justify the necessity of introducing the reconstitutor by showing the limitations of other (...) evolutionary conceptions of the unit of heredity, such as the replicator, the reproducer, and the Darwinian individual. We argue that these conceptions are based on the requirement of lineage formation, which we argue to be unnecessary for the existence of evolutionary heredity. In the second part, we introduce the reconstitutor, which we base on the concept of Stability of Traits, and illustrate how it covers cases of hereditary phenomena not covered by the previous accounts. Secondly, we illustrate how the reconstitutor could serve as a platform to rethink ecological inheritance and other forms of inheritance that have been recently introduced under the song/singer model of evolution. (shrink)

Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth by a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative democracy, such as basic moral equality, dignity and desert. Simply put, the monarchs (and their family) are treated as morally superior to ordinary citizens and as a result ordinary citizens are treated in an unfair and undignified manner. For example, monarchs are respected, enjoy dignity, (...) income, opportunity, public office and exalted social status just because of their inherited office, which is due to the mere historical accident of family lineage. Hence, we have good moral reason to abolish monarchy. Finally, I briefly reply to the pragmatic argument for constitutional monarchy, namely, the argument that monarchy can be allowed to play a largely ceremonial role in the context of democracy because it is beneficial for the function of society. As I argue, societies run by presidential democracies can function equally well and, what is more, no matter what the pragmatic reasons for constitutional monarchy are, we still have stronger moral reasons against it. Therefore, it should be abolished. (shrink)

In the first part of this text, the author attempts to demonstrate that sacral kingship might, in anthropological terms, be regarded an Elementary Form of socio-political life; not an autonomous elementary form, but one falling under the category of rulership. The reference to the anthropological notion of Elementary Forms renders virtually irrelevant the rigidity with which categorical distinctions are made between polytheistic and monotheistic kingship, as well as any civilisational divisions that might be imagined between Orient and Occident. The second (...) part of the text provides an illustration of these presuppositions, the author taking several examples from the history of monarchy – both in the Western World and in the Arab World. (shrink)

In this paper we study essential hereditary undecidability. Theories with this property are a convenient tool to prove undecidability of other theories. The paper develops the basic facts concerning essentially hereditary undecidability and provides salient examples, like a construction of essentially hereditarily undecidable theories due to Hanf and an example of a rather natural essentially hereditarily undecidable theory strictly below. We discuss the (non-)interaction of essential hereditary undecidability with recursive boolean isomorphism. We develop a reduction relation essential (...) tolerance, or, in the converse direction, lax interpretability that interacts in a good way with essential hereditary undecidability. We introduce the class of $$\Sigma ^0_1$$ Σ 1 0 -friendly theories and show that $$\Sigma ^0_1$$ Σ 1 0 -friendliness is sufficient but not necessary for essential hereditary undecidability. Finally, we adapt an argument due to Pakhomov, Murwanashyaka and Visser to show that there is no interpretability minimal essentially hereditarily undecidable theory. (shrink)

Monarchy is liberalism’s little secret. Given the number of articles and books appearing every year dealing with liberal democracy as the hallmark of contemporary Western societies, it is astonishing that monarchy is rarely ever mentioned despite the fact that monarchy, and not a republic, is the constitutional form of quite a number of Western liberal states. I argue that considering the political reality of the established monarchies in Europe leads into a dilemma: either contemporary liberalism is not (...) the kind of theory it claims to be or it has to reconsider its central tenets. In conclusion, I show that the dilemma cannot be solved or avoided but needs to be embraced by conceiving liberalism not as a applied moral theory but as a political theory that leaves room for various symbolic self-understandings and acknowledges the crooked timber of historical realities. (shrink)

From one of the world's most celebrated moral philosophers comes a thorough examination of the current American political crisis and recommendations for how to mend a divided country.

A type-structure of partial effective functionals over the natural numbers, based on a canonical enumeration of the partial recursive functions, is developed. These partial functionals, defined by a direct elementary technique, turn out to be the computable elements of the hereditary continuous partial objects; moreover, there is a commutative system of enumerations of any given type by any type below (relative numberings). By this and by results in [1] and [2], the Kleene-Kreisel countable functionals and the hereditary effective (...) operations (HEO) are easily characterized. (shrink)

Controversy has long surrounded the complex relationship between King Victor Emmanuel III and the dictator Benito Mussolini in Fascist Italy. It is clear that the king played decisive roles in bringing Mussolini to power in 1922 and in removing him in 1943. In between, the two coexisted as Italy became a ‘dyarchy’, with two foci of power. The presence of the monarchy at once checked Fascist radicalism and persuaded many conservatives to adhere to the regime. Thanks especially to the (...) monarchy, the innovative thrust of Fascism was channelled in certain delimited directions, toward a statist economy, for example. Still, the relationship between the crown and Mussolini was often rocky, though the king’s reluctance did not prevent alliance with Nazi Germany, anti-Semitism, and war. Tensions were largely papered over by rhetoric and myth-making, as if the elements of Fascism fit together neatly. Despite his opposition to certain particulars, Victor Emmanuel identified with the overall Fascist project to some extent, and he worried that outright opposition to the regime would jeopardize the monarchy. But as the Second World War went badly for Italy, the king finally deposed Mussolini. Nevertheless, Italy soon voted to eliminate the monarchy, discredited by its association with fascism. (shrink)

A pointwise version of the Howard-Bezem notion of hereditary majorization is introduced which has various advantages, and its relation to the usual notion of majorization is discussed. This pointwise majorization of primitive recursive functionals (in the sense of Gödel'sT as well as Kleene/Feferman's ) is applied to systems of intuitionistic and classical arithmetic (H andH c) in all finite types with full induction as well as to the corresponding systems with restricted inductionĤ↾ andĤ↾c.H and Ĥ↾ are closed under a (...) generalized fan-rule. For a restricted class of formulae this also holds forH c andĤ↾c.We give a new and very perspicuous proof that for each one can construct a functional such that $\tilde \Phi \alpha $ is a modulus of uniform continuity for Φ on {β1∣∧n(βn≦αn)}. Such a modulus can also be obtained by majorizing any modulus of pointwise continuity for Φ.The type structure ℳ of all pointwise majorizable set-theoretical functionals of finite type is used to give a short proof that quantifier-free “choice” with uniqueness (AC!)1,0-qf. is not provable within classical arithmetic in all finite types plus comprehension [given by the schema (C)ϱ:∨y 0ϱ∧x ϱ(yx=0⇔A(x)) for arbitraryA], dependent ω-choice and bounded choice. Furthermore ℳ separates several μ-operators. (shrink)

The Belgian Constitution of 1831 marked a decisive step in the continental evolution from Restoration constitutional monarchy, based on the monarchical principle, towards the establishment of parliamentary constitutional monarchy. At the time, the new balance of power desired by the Belgian revolutionaries was captured by the phrase ‘republican monarchy’. It is remarkable that this concept, despite being so central to the founding fathers’ deliberations, has hardly been commented upon by later historians and public lawyers. This article aims (...) to reconstruct the origin, meaning and uses of this concept in the context of the 1830 revolutionary wave. French revolutionary veteran general Lafayette was responsible for popularizing republican monarchy in the July Revolution, although the term’s origins went back to eighteenth-century debates on the reform of absolute monarchy. Lafayette used it to summarize the institutional demands of the republican movement vis-à-vis king Louis Philippe. Its transnational migration to the Belgian context subsequently entailed a shift in meaning which will be charted through an analysis of the Belgian constituent and public debates. Finally, the reasons for the concept’s sudden disappearance from the political stage will be addressed. (shrink)

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, best known for his 'Project for Perpetual Peace', in fact left a much larger and more coherent body of political and moral writing, but it has been only partially studied. This book, the first systematic exploration of his entire corpus, offers a complete re-evaluation of this important author's contributions to the Enlightenment. From the first decades of the eighteenth century, Saint-Pierre set forth a pioneering vision of politics as the harmonisation of interests, anticipating Bentham as a (...) utilitarian. He imagines replacing the system of inherited power and clientele networks, which structured Old Regime society and determined the exercise of power under absolutism, with a rationalised, meritocratic and dynamic organisation. He argued for the political values of social utility and public good to take the place of the Christian ideals of perfection and the aristocratic ideals of personal charisma. As a deist seeking to reconcile morality and religion, Saint-Pierre argued that the search for salvation through active piety must also promote social justice and beneficence--and that only the indivisible power of a rationalised monarch, informed by competent elites, could carry out the reforms necessary to yield a government which would produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Saint-Pierre, thus, provided among the first arguments for an imposed welfare state, well before the sources more frequently associated with that idea--political economists, cameralists and the physiocrats."--Pages v-vi. (shrink)

The origins of the well-known hatred for the nomen regis at Rome are in this way explained by Cicero in the De Republica, written in the late 50s b.c. Tarquinius Superbus, Rome's last king, so traumatised the Roman people that the term rex still had a potent effect almost five hundred years after his downfall. Many modern scholars would accept that the Roman hatred of kings was deep-rooted and intense, and it is often called upon to explain Roman behaviour. This (...) approach finds clear expression in the latest edition of the Cambridge Ancient History, where one scholar in his discussion of the overthrow of Tarquinius writes: ‘Forever after the Romans hated the very idea of a king’. Yet an examination of Latin writings from the Republican period, rather than confirming this, reveals much that is at odds with this interpretation of the Roman attitude towards kings and the concept of kingship. Surprisingly, even their own kings are generally treated favourably. While there is no doubt that there was hostility to kings in the first century b.c., it is necessary to reconsider its origins and nature. I wish to argue that it was neither as long-standing nor as intense as is traditionally assumed. Its origins should be sought not in the distant obscurity of the last years of the regal period, but in Rome's encounters with the hellenistic kings of the East in the second century b.c. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of hereditary G-compactness. We provide a sufficient condition for a poset to not be hereditarily G-compact, which we use to show that any linear order is not hereditarily G-compact. Assuming that a long-standing conjecture about unstable NIP theories holds, this implies that an NIP theory is hereditarily G-compact if and only if it is stable -categorical theories). We show that if G is definable over A in a hereditarily G-compact theory, then \. We also include (...) a brief survey of sufficient conditions for G-compactness, with particular focus on those which can be used to prove or disprove hereditary G-compactness for some theories. (shrink)

This article analyzes the plan to reform the monarchy penned by René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’Argenson (1694–1757), in the 1730s. D’Argenson laid out a forceful blueprint for reform that aimed to extend ‘democracy’ within the monarchy as far as possible. His plan would establish equality as a first-order political value, even if as a heuristic goal; dismantle the legacy of feudalism in France and thus reduce the power of the nobility; and institute what he called ‘popular (...) administration under the authority of the sovereign’. The reforms d’Argenson hoped to enact would be animated by political values that were frequently associated with republics in the early modern political imagination, but d’Argenson never advocated the republic as a political form. To enact such far-reaching changes, d’Argenson called on the monarchy to reform itself, to wield its sovereign authority in order to promote equality and improve the lives of the population. D’Argenson’s treatise anticipated important themes and fault lines of modern French political thought, notably the combination of strong central authority with egalitarian reform and democratic engagement. It did so, however, while remaining rooted in the problems of the Old Regime and the political-philosophical arguments of his day. (shrink)

Using a result of Gurevich and Lewis on the word problem for finite semigroups, we give short proofs that the following theories are hereditarily undecidable: (1) finite graphs of vertex-degree at most 3; (2) finite nonvoid sets with two distinguished permutations; (3) finite-dimensional vector spaces over a finite field with two distinguished endomorphisms.

ObjectiveTo elucidate the clinical, radiologic characteristics of Leber’s hereditary optic neuropathy (LHON) associated with the other diseases.Materials and methodsClinical data were retrospectively collected from hospitalized patients with LHON associated with the other diseases at the Neuro-Ophthalmology Department at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Hospital (PLAGH) from December 2014 to October 2018.ResultsA total of 13 patients, 24 eyes (10 men and 3 women; mean age, 30.69 ± 12.76 years) with LHON mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) mutations, were included in the cohort. (...) 14502(5)11778(4)11778 &11696(1)12811(1)11696(1)3460(1). One patient was positive for aquaporin-4 antibody (AQP4-Ab), and two were positive for myelin oligodendrocyte glycoprotein antibody (MOG-Ab). Three patients were associated with idiopathic optic neuritis (ON). Two patients were with compression optic neuropathy. Three patients were with the central nervous system (CNS) diseases. One patient was with proliferative diabetic retinopathy (PDR) and one with idiopathic orbital inflammatory syndrome (IOIS). At the onset, visual acuity (VA) in eighteen eyes was below 0.1, one eye was 0.5, five eyes were above 0.5, while VA in sixteen eyes was below a 0.1 outcome, three eyes experienced moderate vision loss. MRI images showed T2 lesions and enhancement in nine patients who received corticosteroids treatment; additional immune modulators treatment was performed on two patients. None of the patients had relapse during the follow-up time.ConclusionLeber’s hereditary optic neuropathy can be accompanied with multiple-related diseases, especially different subtypes of ON, which were also exhibited with IOIS and compression optic neuropathy for the first time in this cohort. This condition may be a distinct entity with an unusual clinical and therapeutic profile. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Aufsatz beleuchtet die Aktualität Hegels, indem er zeigt, dass viele systematische Theologen der Gegenwart mit Hegels Grundstruktur operieren. Die Grundstruktur besteht in der absoluten Vermittlung differenter Momente und bildet das organisierende Prinzip vieler im 20. Jahrhundert entworfenen Trinitätslehren. Da meist nicht erkannt wird, woher diese Grundstruktur stammt, kann vom »impliziten Hegelianismus« in der gegenwärtigen Theologie gesprochen werden. Es ist die These dieses Aufsatzes, dass der implizite Hegelianismus abzulehnen ist, da Hegels Grundstruktur denkerisch unhaltbar ist. Um diese These zu begründen, (...) wird zuerst Hegel selbst exegetisiert und sodann aus theologischer wie aus philosophischer Perspektive kritisiert. Danach werden die gemachten Beobachtungen für die Hermeneutik des gegenwärtigen Diskurses genutzt, indem die Trinitätslehre von Gisbert Greshake auf ihren impliziten Hegelianismus hin durchsichtig gemacht wird. Abschließend wird der Ansatz einer solchen Trinitätslehre skizziert, die durch eine zu Hegel alternative Grundstruktur geprägt ist.SummaryThis article examines the actuality of Hegel by showing that many contemporary systematic theologians work with a Hegelian basic structure. The basic structure consists in the absolute mediation of different moments and is the organizing principle of a whole number of doctrines of the trinity developed in the 20th century. Normally, these theologians are unaware of their Hegelian heritage, so that the phenomenon may be called an “implicit Hegelianism”. It is the thesis of this article that the implicit Hegelianism has to be rejected, because Hegel's basic structure is fraught with grave problems. To argue for this thesis, the article begins with an exegesis of Hegel, followed by a theological and a philosophical critique. Then these observations are used for a hermeneutics of a contemporary theologian. The doctrine of the trinity developed by Gisbert Greshake will be shown to be implicitly Hegelian and criticised accordingly. Finally, the starting point of a doctrine of the trinity will be sketched which is shaped by a alternative basic structure to the one of Hegel. (shrink)

A sample survey of 3000 Belgians shows that a large majority in both Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels is in favour of the monarchy. This support is based mainly on an attachment to tradition and a belief that the monarchy is the only institution capable of holding the nation together. Comparison with earlier research indicates that the influence of the king, as perceived by the population, has increased during the last 15 years. Older generations and catholics tend to be (...) more royalistic. Opposition against the monarchy is strongest amongst non-religious groups, younger generations, ecologists and - in Flanders - socialists and Flemish nationalists. (shrink)

An analysis of the functioning of the Dutch monarchy in the 20th century is hardly possible by lack of documents. For the study of the contacts between the Head of State and the Cabinet-ministers a scholar needs the documents from the Cabinet of the Queen and from the Royal Archives. The archives of the Cabinet of the Queen are now accessible up to the Second World War, but the Royal Archives are closed from 1898.Tbe Dutch people bas a sympathy (...) for the dynasty and by that a deduced sympathy for the monarchy.Tbere was no real criticism on the functioning of the following queens Wilhelmina, Juliana and Beatrix. Tbe Heads of State accomodated themselves to the political and social developments. By that the monarchy lengthened its life.The formation of a new Cabinet is an essential task of the Queen. Wilhelmina did not hide her personal views but respected carefully the constitutional framework and already in the beginning of this century she asked the consulted political leaders to confirm their advices by letter. The possibility to play a role seems to be more limited since 1945. (shrink)

The development of the Israelite Monarchy followed the model of a typical Syro-Hittite state and introduced a paganization into the political and social history of Israel with fateful and lasting consequences.

Beginning with a sustained analysis of Seneca's theory of monarchy in the treatise De clementia, in this text Peter Stacey traces the formative impact of ancient Roman political philosophy upon medieval and Renaissance thinking about princely government on the Italian peninsula from the time of Frederick II to the early modern period. Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance Prince offers a systematic reconstruction of the pre-humanist and humanist history of the genre of political reflection known as the mirror-for-princes tradition (...) - a tradition which, as Stacey shows, is indebted to Seneca's speculum above all other classical accounts of the virtuous prince - and culminates with a comprehensive and controversial reading of the greatest work of renaissance political theory, Machiavelli's The Prince. Peter Stacey brings to light a story which has been lost from view in recent accounts of the Renaissance debt to classical antiquity, providing a radically revisionist account of the history of the Renaissance prince. (shrink)

Plato’s references to Empedocles in the myth of the Statesman perform a crucial role in the overarching political argument of the dialogue. Empedocles conceives of the cosmos as structured like a democracy, where the constituent powers ‘rule in turn’, sharing the offices of rulership equally via a cyclical exchange of power. In a complex act of philosophical appropriation, Plato takes up Empedocles’ cosmic cycles of rule in order to ‘correct’ them: instead of a democracy in which rule is shared cyclically (...) amongst equal constituents, Plato’s cosmos undergoes cycles of the presence and absence of a single cosmic monarch who possesses ‘kingly epistēmē’. By means of a revision of Empedocles’ democratic cosmology, Plato’s richly woven myth is designed precisely to reject the appropriateness of democracy as a form of human political association and legitimate monarchy in its stead. (shrink)

A discussion of the political role of monarchs in contemporary Western Europe is complicated by three uncritical preconceptions : the traditionalist-monarchist view of Kings as transcendent sovereigns, the democratic-emancipatory view which assumes that Kings are by definition nothing but constitutional nonentities, and the media-view of members of a royal family as at one and the same time both superhuman and very human actors.A realistic analysis of the role of monarchs and monarchy focuses on at least five issues : whether (...) countries remained monarchies in the wake of democratisation because of, or notwithstanding being monarchies ; the relationship of monarchs to major social cleavages; the very real importance of Kings within the actions of the nominal Crown notwithstanding the importance of the principle of ministerial responsibility ; the inevitably personal role of Kings in the making, the crisis and the fall of cabinets ; and the unavoidable conflict between the personal rights and actions of monarchs and the limitations which constitutional monarchy implies. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the rise of ‘the breast cancer gene’ as a field of medical, cultural and personal knowledge. We address its significance in the Norwegian public health care system in relation to so-called biological citizenship in this particular national context. One of our main findings is that, despite its claims as a measure for health and disease prevention, gaining access to medical knowledge of BRCA 1/2 breast cancer gene mutations can also produce severe instability in the individuals (...) and families affected. That is, although gene testing provides modern subjects with an opportunity to foresee their biological destiny and thereby become patients in waiting, it undoubtedly also comes with difficult existential dilemmas and choices, with implications that resonate beyond the individual and into different family and love relations. By elaborating on this finding we address the question of whether the empowerment slogan, which continues to be advocated through various health, BRCA and breast cancer discourses, reinforces a naïve or an idealized notion of the actively responsible patient: resourceful enough to seek out medical expertise and gain sufficient knowledge, on which to base informed decisions, thereby reducing the future risk of developing disease. In contrast to this ideal, our Norwegian informants tell a different story, in which there is no apparent heroic mastery of genetic fates, but rather a pragmatic attitude to dealing with a dire situation over which they have little control, despite having complied with medical advice through national guidelines and follow-up procedures for BRCA 1/2 carriers. In conclusion we claim that the sense of safety that gene testing and its associated medical solutions allegedly promise to provide proved illusory. Although BRCA-testing offers the potential for protection from adverse DNA-heritage, administered through possibilities for self-monitoring and self-management of the body, the feeling of ‘being in good health’ has hardly been reinforced by the emergence of gene technology. (shrink)

Tuberculosis was clearly one of the most predominant diseases of the early twentieth century. At this time, Americans involved in the eugenics movement grew increasingly interested in methods to prevent this disease's potential hereditary spread. To do so, as this essay examines, eugenicists' attempted to shift the accepted view that tuberculosis arose from infection and contagion to a view of its heritable nature. The methods that they employed to better understand the propagation and control of tuberculosis are also discussed. (...) Finally, the essay explores the interpretative analyses of data that the Eugenics Record Office used in an attempt to convince contemporaries of the hereditary transmission of tuberculosis. (shrink)