Recent work in the philosophy of mathematics has suggested that mathematical structuralism is not committed to a strong form of the Identity of Indiscernibles (II). José Bermúdez demurs, and argues that a strong form of II can be warranted on structuralist grounds by countenancing identity properties, or haecceities, as legitimately structural. Typically, structuralists dismiss such properties as obviously non-structural. I will argue to the contrary that haecceities can be viewed as structural but that this concession does not warrant (...) Bermúdez’s version of II but, rather, another easily falsified version. I close with some reflections on reference vis-à-vis structurally indiscernible objects. (shrink)

I explain what haecceities are and the role they play in our thought and talk about specific individual things, whether those things are concrete or abstract. Everything that can be referred to by using a singular term has a haecceity. I distinguish between singular terms and general terms, on the one hand, and subject terms and predicate terms, on the other. I distinguish three types of sentence: singular predications; general predications; and singular quantifications. I show how singular predications can (...) be eliminated without loss of content, provided we have singular quantifications as well as general predications. This should not be confused with Quine’s “elimination of singular terms.” I say a few words about propositions. (shrink)

Haecceities are non-qualitative properties for individuation but the current theories about haecceities are still to be much more explored. This paper aims to develop a “haecceity mereology” – that is, an ontological system that understands substances as mereological combinations of haecceities and qualitative properties. In this way, the view developed is an alternative to Paul’s : 578–96; 2006. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Noûs 40 : 623–59) mereological approach. Three rules are proposed: If S is a substance, then there (...) is one and only one haecceity which is S’s qualitative part; For all the fusions with the same haecceity, at most only one of those fusions is a substance; When all the relevant elements are abundant, every element must overlap at least one substance. This is the first ontology of haecceities in the recent literature and would be a model for systematic metaphysics. (shrink)

Interactionists hold that non-spatial objects causally interact with physical objects. Interactionists have traditionally grappled with the puzzle of how such interaction is possible. More recently, Jaegwon Kim has presented interactionists with a more daunting threat: the pairing argument, which purports to refute interactionism by showing that non-spatial objects cannot stand in causal relations. After reviewing that argument, I develop a challenge to it on behalf of the interactionist. The challenge poses a dilemma: roughly, either haecceities exist or they do (...) not. I argue that the pairing argument fails in either case. While the challenge does not explain exactly how the pairing argument goes wrong, it shows that the argument fails. The challenge also explains the difficulty in pinpointing the pairing argument’s failure: exactly how the pairing argument fails depends on difficult issues concerning the nature of objects. (shrink)

This book offers an in-depth and updated examination of the nature of haecceity—that primitive entity which explains why something is distinct from other things. -/- The book begins by exploring different conceptions of haecceity throughout history. The discussion of various figures across history is important for getting clear on the nature of haecceity and its role in individuation. The next part of the book examines different views about the nature of haecceity. The author defends a view on which haecceities (...) have objects that instantiate them as constituents. Following that, the book considers arguments for and against the existence of haecceities, the epistemology of haecceity, and the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties. -/- About Haecceity will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology, logic, and history of philosophy. (shrink)

There is an extensive philosophical literature on the interrelated issues of identity, individuality, and distinguishability in quantum systems. A key consideration is whether quantum systems are subject to a strong form of individuality termed ``haecceity'' (from the Latin for ``this-ness''). I argue that the traditional, strong form of haecceity does not apply at the quantum level, but that in order to properly account for the need for symmetrization in quantum systems, a weaker kind of haecceity must be involved, which I (...) call quantum haecceity. In the process, I also question some generally accepted tenets of the current debate, such as the idea that symmetrization of states for identical quanta must be postulated and reflects permutation invariance. Instead, I note that a perturbative Hamiltonian is required for exchange effects, which suggests that the need for symmetrization arises from specific physical conditions. (shrink)

헤세이티즘은 대물 양상성, 개별 본질, 동일성 조건, 개별화, 가능성의 크기 등 여러 논 의 문맥에서 도입되었다. 각각의 문맥에 따라 헤세이티즘은 조금씩 다른 논점과 형식화로 설명되었다. 본고는 헤세이티즘이 논의되는 몇 가지 주요 논의 맥락과 그 맥락에서의 헤세 이티즘이 어떻게 이해되는지, 그리고 그 문제점을 알아볼 것이다. 그리고 이 문제들을 벗 어나는, 더 강한 버전의 헤세이티즘을 제안해 볼 것이다. 이 과정에서 기존의 관련 개념들 을 수정하게 된다. (1) 헤세이티/디스니스라는 속성을 개별자를 포함한 속성으로 특징화하 는 것에서 비환원적 비질적 속성으로 특징화하는 전환, (2) 양상적 헤세이티즘 (...) 논의에서 벗어난 비양상적 헤세이티즘 논의의 가능성, (3) 헤세이티즘과 라이프니츠의 식별불가능 자의 동일성 원리가 경쟁하지 않을 수 있는 가능성, (4) (질적 속성으로 환원되지 않는) 비환원적 동일성과 비환원적 개별성/구분성의 차이, 그리고 그에 대응하여 유일성 (uniqueness)과 단일성(singularity)의 차이, (5) 비환원적 개별성이 기존의 헤세이티즘의 문제점인 미미한 본질(trivial essence) 그리고 껍데기뿐인 가능성(empty possibility)을 어떻게 벗어나는지를 논의한다. (shrink)

Russell maintained that a person can have knowledge about a particular only if he is acquainted with some particular. In a similar vein, Chisholm has argued that a person cannot identify a particular unless he identifies some particular per se. According to Chisholm, a person identifies a particular per se just in casehe has knowledge of its haecceity or individml essence. Chisholni urges us to accept the following controversial claim concerning haecceities: none of us has knowledge of the haecceity (...) of a particular physical object or person, x, when he perceives x by means of his senses, and picks x out as that thing. However, Chisholm does not offer a compelling argument to support this claim. In this paper I aim to show that Chisholm's claim is fundamentally correct. (shrink)

Russell maintained that a person can have knowledge about a particular only if he is acquainted with some particular. In a similar vein, Chisholm has argued that a person cannot identify a particular unless he identifies some particular per se. According to Chisholm, a person identifies a particular per se just in casehe has knowledge of its haecceity or individml essence. Chisholni urges us to accept the following controversial claim concerning haecceities: none of us has knowledge of the haecceity (...) of a particular physical object or person, x, when he perceives x by means of his senses, and picks x out as that thing. However, Chisholm does not offer a compelling argument to support this claim. In this paper I aim to show that Chisholm's claim is fundamentally correct. (shrink)

In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both (...) parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on haecceity as an individual essence, haecceity as a property, the classification of properties, and thereby the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions. (shrink)

Since all properties have content, a haecceity has content, which is the individuality or identity of the entity whose haecceity it is. This, however, does not mean that a haecceity is identical with that of which it is the haecceity. This is evident in the case of the haecceity of a concrete entity, since all haecceities, being properties, are abstract, and no concrete entity is abstract. Concrete entities, however, are not the only entities that have haecceities. Every entity, (...) whether abstract or concrete, has a haecceity. No entity, however, is identical with its haecceity. The abstract entity Redness, like the concrete entity Socrates, cannot be identical with its haecceity. Just as Socrates is not identical with the property of being identical with Socrates, so also Redness is not identical with the property of being identical with Redness. (shrink)

Psychological essentialism operates in two realms that have consequences for our attitudes towards groups and individuals. Although essentialism is more familiar in the context of biological group membership, it can also be evoked when considering unique artefacts, especially when they are emotionally significant items.

Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is incompatible with our everyday or ‘classical’ intuitions about realism, not only at the microscopic level but also at the macroscopic level. The latter point is highlighted by the ‘cat paradox’ presented by Schrödinger. Since our observations are always made at the macroscopic level — even when applying the formalism to the microscopic level — the failure of classical realism at the macroscopic level is actually more fundamental and crucial.

_Haecceities: Essentialism, Identity, andion_ is an artistic and philosophical examination of the limits of Abstraction in art and of kinds of radical identity determined in the identification of those limits. Strayer’s results challenge common notions of art and identity.

This essay aims to redress the contention that epistemic possibility cannot be a guide to the principles of modal metaphysics. I introduce a novel epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics. I argue that the interaction between the two-dimensional framework and the mereological parthood relation, which is super-rigid, enables epistemic possibilities and truthmakers with regard to parthood to be a guide to its metaphysical profile. I specify, further, a two-dimensional formula encoding the relation between the epistemic possibility and verification of essential properties obtaining (...) and their metaphysical possibility or verification. I then generalize the approach to haecceitistic properties, and examine the Julius Caesar problem as a test case. (shrink)

This paper evaluates six contenders which might be invoked by essentialists in order to meet Quine’s challenge, viz., to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the crossworld identity of individuals: (i) an object’s qualitative character; (ii) matter; (iii) origins; (iv) haecceities or primitive non-qualitative thisness properties; (v) “world-indexed properties”; and (iv) individual forms. The first three candidates, I argue, fail to provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the crossworld identity of individuals; the fourth and fifth criteria (...) are open to the charge that they do not succeed in meeting Quine’s demand in an explanatorily adequate fashion. On balance, then, individual forms, or so I propose, deserve to be taken very seriously as a possible response to Quine’s challenge, especially by neo-Aristotelians who are already committed to a hylomorphic conception of composite concrete particular objects for other reasons. Theorists who also accept a non-modal conception of essence, i.e., a conception according to which essence is not reducible to modality, in addition face the further difficult task, over and above what is required to meet Quine’s challenge, of having to explain how an object’s de re modal profile in some way follows from facts about its essence. Haecceities and world-indexed properties, as I indicate, are unlikely to be of much help with respect to this second challenge, while the forms of hylomorphic compounds are in fact well-suited for this purpose. (shrink)

Hybrid contingentism combines first-order contingentism, the view that it is contingent what individuals there are, with higher-order necessitism, the view that it is non-contingent what properties and propositions there are (where these are conceived as entities in the range of appropriate higher-order quantifiers). This combination of views avoids the most delicate problems afflicting alternative contingentist positions while preserving the central contingentist claim that ordinary, concrete entities exist contingently. Despite these attractive features, hybrid contingentism is usually faced with rejection. The main (...) reason for this is an objection that crucially involves haecceitistic properties, properties such as being identical to Plato or being identical to Aristotle. The objection alleges that by accepting the necessary existence of such haecceities, hybrid contingentists incur an explanatory commitment that they are unable to discharge, namely that of explaining how it is that certain haecceities ‘lock onto’ their target individuals even when those individuals are absent. To defend hybrid contingentism against this charge, I first clarify the haecceities objection in several respects and consider, in particular, what notion of explanation the objection is operating with. After arguing that it can be fruitfully understood as a challenge to provide metaphysical grounds for certain haecceity facts, I develop a contingentist response to the objection that draws on recent work on the connection between ground and essence. (shrink)

According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...) of distinct qualitative indiscernibles. Here, the key idea appeals to a non-standard theory of haecceities as non-well-founded properties of a certain sort. I will then defend this theory from a number of objections, and finally argue that we should accept it on the basis of considerations of parsimony about the fundamental. (shrink)

This research aims to examine the concept of haecceity conceived by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari - which has started from the notion given to the concept in A Thousand Plateaus - Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2 (Mille Plateau: capitalisme et schizophrénie 2, 1980). To illustrate this concept the philosophers turned to literature, and more specifically the Proustian literature. They affirm that the haecceity concept has found in the episode with the small group (la petite bande) of girls in the seaside (...) town of Balbec - the novel by Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time (À la recherche du temps perdu, 1913-1927) ¬- its best translation: "What's a girl, what is a group of girls? Proust at least show us and for all that their individuation, collective or singular, proceeds not by subjectivity but by haecceity, pure haecceity" (A Thousand Plateaus - Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2. Translation and foreword by Brian Massumi, Minnesota Press, 1987: 271). According to the Deleuzian thought, the fundamental question of haecceity concept is concentrated in its own definition: an individuation devoid of subjectivity, foreshadowing an individual who doesn't belong to individuation anymore, but it does to singularization. This non-subjectivated affirmation is part of an innovative philosophical proposal which has its own conceptual vocabulary: haecceity will exist in a new space (not extensive), where there's no distinction between the beginning or the end; the middle is where haecceity (formed by lines and not by points) will present itself as a rhizome. This mode of impersonal individuation reveals itself as a cartography that is made by forces - longitude - and intensities - latitude. Taking the group of girls as such a composition of forces moving, we will extract Albertine Simonet from it. She has the synonym of a group, and being adopted as an intercessor, she will leave the "group by group". The trajectory of this poetic and psychosocial entity (where the concept of haecceity originates from), will support us in the examination of the mode of existence of haecceity. (shrink)

‘Facticity’ is a concept that classical phenomenologists like Heidegger use to denote the radically contingent or underivably brute conditions of intelligibility. Yet Fichte coins the term, to which he gives the opposing use of denoting unacceptably brute conditions of intelligibility. For him, radical contingency is a problem to be solved by deriving such conditions from reason. Heidegger rejects Fichte's recoil from facticity with his hermeneutics of facticity, supplanting Fichte's metaphor of our always being in reason's hand with the metaphor of (...) our always having been thrown. How does Heidegger inherit and diametrically repurpose Fichte's neologism? Whence the reversed meaning of ‘facticity’ in post-Kantian thought? The answer is Lask's doctoral thesis, which exerts an acknowledged impact on Heidegger's habilitation thesis. Lask interprets ‘facticity’ as Fichte's term for the individuality problem, that is, the resistance of the material particularity of individuals to explanation by the categories genetically deduced from reason. On his interpretation, ‘facticity’ denotes radical contingency in the guise of haecceity, that is, the brute uniqueness of individuals. Lask credits Fichte with registering the problem of individuality, which highlights the world's irreducibly precategorial character. But how is ‘facticity’ transmitted from Lask to Heidegger, given their opposing interpretations of how Fichte understands its meaning? I argue that (1) Lask misreads Fichte as a proponent of facticity, that is, one whose accommodation of radical contingency deflates the Wissenschaftslehre's systematic ambitions, and (2) Lask's misreading, without deceiving Heidegger regarding the sincerity of Fichte's ambitions, encourages Heidegger's own hermeneutics of facticity. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Mumford's Realist Lawlessness account of powers leads to ontological Holism. Consequently, this calls for a deflated conception of haecceity, intrinsicality and discreteness.

This article provides an account of the ethical issues that arise when digital technologies and online spaces are structured by Big Data algorithms. We show that although the uses of Big Data may be new, traditional theological and ethical categories are still applicable, including “the sins of the fathers” from hamartiology and the scholastic concept of haecceity. Using these resources, we map the overall ecosystem in which digital technologies are developed and used, identifying the relationships between the individuals and organizations (...) involved. We show how these relationships are often characterized by various kinds of harm. We then argue for a reorientation of the tech ecosystem toward co‐liberation—and ultimately, joy. (shrink)

Lynne Baker’s case for the incompatibility of naturalism with the first-person perspective raises a range of questions about the relationship between naturalism and the various properties involved in first-person perspectives. After arguing that non-qualitative properties—most notably, haecceities like being Lynne Baker—are ineliminably tied to first-person perspectives, this paper considers whether naturalism and non-qualitative properties are, in fact, compatible. In doing so, the discussion focus on Shamik Dasupgta’s argument against individuals and, in turn, non-qualitative properties. Several strategies for undermining Dasgupta's (...) argument are considered, drawing on de re laws and haecceitistic possibilities. Finally, an analogy is drawn between naturalism and platonism regarding mathematical entities and naturalism's parallel commitment to individuals. I conclude that naturalists are obliged to posit non-qualitative properties. (shrink)

A review of the recently published book Žižek: Paper Revolutionary by Mark Zlomislić. On its back cover, Marko Zlomislić’s book claims to offer a critique of Žižek’s work from a Franciscan perspective, drawing especially on the late medieval notion of haecceity or ‘individual thisness’. But one does not have to read far into this book to realise that Zlomislić is a lot more interested in insulting Žižek than he is in actually engaging with his thought. Zlomislić’s work is sadly lacking (...) in substance, and fails to convince not only because its explication is marred by an over-use of exaggerated ad hominems, but because Zlomislić has a limited understanding of the basic parameters of Žižek’s philosophy. The result is a poorly-structured and largely incoherent attack at a straw-man-Žižek that would fail to inform or persuade any reader with even a basic grasp of Žižek’s work. (shrink)

A long-awaited translation on the philosophical relation between technology, the individual, and milieu of the living.

What things count as individuals, and how do we individuate them? It is a classic philosophical question often tackled from the perspective of analytic metaphysics. This volume proposes that there is another channel by which to approach individuation -- from that of scientific practices. From this perspective, the question then becomes: How do scientists individuate things and, therefore, count them as individuals? This volume collects the work of philosophers of science to engage with this central philosophical conundrum from a new (...) angle, highlighting the crucial topic of experimental individuation and building upon recent, pioneering work in the philosophy of science. An introductory chapter foregrounds the problem of individuation, arguing it should be considered prior to the topic of individuality. The following chapters address individuation and individuality from a variety of perspectives, with prominent themes being the importance of experimentation, individuation as a process, and pluralism in individuation's criteria. Contributions examine individuation in a wide range of sciences, including stem cell biology, particle physics, and community ecology. Other chapters examine the metaphysics of individuation, its bearing on realism/antirealism debates, and interrogate epistemic aspects of individuation in scientific practice. In exploring individuation from the philosophy of biology, physics, and other scientific subjects, this volume ultimately argues for the possibility of several criteria of individuation, upending the tenets of traditional metaphysics. It provides insights for philosophers of science, but also for scientists interested in the conceptual foundations of their work. (shrink)

The strongest version of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles states that of necessity, there are no distinct things with all their universals in common (where such putative haecceities as being Aristotle do not count as universals: I use 'universal' rather than 'property' here and in what follows for the simple reason that 'universal' is the term of art that most safely excludes haecceities from its instances). It is commonly supposed that Max Black's famous paper 'The identity (...) of indiscernibles' (2) refutes this thesis. (Armstong's [1], chapter 9 is representative here.) Black argues ([2], p. 156) that it is perfectly possible that there be a world consisting solely of two indiscernible spheres at some distance to each other and that this world constitutes a counterexample to the principle above. The strongest version of the bundle theory of substance claims that of necessity, the substances that make up the world are bundles of universals.1 It is commonly supposed that a consequence of Black's defeat of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is that this bundle theory of substance is mistaken. (Again, Armstong's [1] is representative.) I shall argue that Black's thought experiment does not defeat the bundle theory and that, as a result, the bundle theory can be used to salvage the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. (shrink)

The identity and diversity of individual objects may be grounded or ungrounded, and intrinsic or contextual. Intrinsic individuation can be grounded in haecceities, or absolute discernibility. Contextual individuation can be grounded in relations, but this is compatible with absolute, relative or weak discernibility. Contextual individuation is compatible with the denial of haecceitism, and this is more harmonious with science. Structuralism implies contextual individuation. In mathematics contextual individuation is in general primitive. In physics contextual individuation may be grounded in relations (...) via weak discernibility. (shrink)

Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for insight into the (...) modal structure of reality. For possible world semantics, it is supposed, commits one to possibilism. In this paper I take issue with this view. To the contrary, I argue that one can take possible world semantics seriously without any commitment to possible worlds or possibilism and hence remain in full compliance with actualist scruples. Moreover, one can do so without without invoking either "ersatz" worlds or haecceities. (shrink)

Ladyman and Ross argue that quantum objects are not individuals and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory, according to which particles do have denite trajectories at all times. However, LR interpret the research by Brown et al. as implying that "raw stuff" or haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of (...) BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we note that Brown et al.'s research does not imply that haecceities are needed. Thus BT remains as a genuine option for those who seek to understand quantum particles as individuals. However, we go on to discuss some problems with BT which led Bohm and Hiley to modify it. This modified version underlines that, due to features such as context-dependence and non-locality, Bohmian particles have a very limited autonomy in situations where quantum effects are non-negligible. So while BT restores the possibility of quantum individuals, it also underlines the primacy of the whole over the autonomy of the parts. The later sections of the paper also examine the Bohm theory in the general mathematical context of symplectic geometry. This provides yet another way of understanding the subtle, holistic and dynamic nature of Bohmian individuals. We finally briefly consider Bohm's other main line of research, the "implicate order", which is in some ways similar to LR's structural realism. (shrink)

Cases of grounding failure present a puzzle for fundamental metaphysics. Typically, solutions are thought to lie either in adding ontology such as haecceities or in re‐describing the cases by means of the ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy. The controversial status of haecceities has led some to favour metaphysical indeterminacy as the way to solve the puzzle. We consider two further treatments of grounding failure each of which, we argue, is a more plausible alternative. As such, the initial dichotomy is (...) a false one, and these alternative options deserve consideration before resorting to the heavyweight machinery of metaphysical indeterminacy. -/- . (shrink)

Can different material objects have the same parts at all times at which they exist? This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against the main argument to the contrary, the ‘Indiscernibility Argument’. According to this argument, the modal supervenes on the nonmodal, since, after all, the non-modal is what grounds the modal; hence, it would be utterly mysterious if two objects sharing all parts had different essential properties. The weakness of the argument becomes apparent once we understand how the (...) modal is grounded in the nonmodal. By extending the ideas of combinatorialism so that we recombine haecceities as well as fundamental properties, we see how modal properties can be grounded in non-modal properties in a way that allows coincidence and yet also explains why there are differences in the modal properties of coinciding objects. Despite this, some de re modal facts are not grounded in the non-modal but instead are brute. However, although we cannot explain why a particular object has the basic modal properties it has, we can explain a closely related, semantic fact and, comparing the facts we can’t explain to more familiar brute facts, we understand why there should be no better explanation. As a result, we can see how coincidence is, after all, possible. (shrink)

Opponents of presentism have often argued that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes true past-tensed propositions true in a way that is compatible with her metaphysical view of time and reality. The problem is quite general and concerns not only strong truth-maker principles, but also the requirement that truth be grounded in reality. In order to meet the challenge, presentists have proposed many peculiar present aspects of the world as grounds for truths concerning the past, such as (...) uninstantiated haecceities, Meinongian non-existents, ersatz times, and dispositional and distributional properties. The main problem with all such solutions is that any explanation of what grounds a TptP that involves the past is eo ipso a better explanation than any that involves only the present. Thus, the quest for an account of grounding for TptP that is compatible with the presentist ontology and ideology is doomed to be explanatorily deficient with respect to eternalism. In a recent article, Ben Caplan and David Sanson have claimed that presentists should change their strategy and, rather than seeking for exotic grounds for TptP, should adopt a more liberal view of explanation. That is, they should allow themselves to resort to “past directed” explanations, even if they do not accept the past in their ontology and ideology. I argue that such a proposal is not compatible with the tenet that there is a substantial distinction between the ideology of such a version of presentism and that of eternalism. Therefore, the presentist cannot endorse such “deflationist” explanations as an easy way out to the problem of the grounding of TptP. (shrink)

We investigate the form of mathematical structuralism that acknowledges the existence of structures and their distinctive structural elements. This form of structuralism has been subject to criticisms recently, and our view is that the problems raised are resolved by proper, mathematics-free theoretical foundations. Starting with an axiomatic theory of abstract objects, we identify a mathematical structure as an abstract object encoding the truths of a mathematical theory. From such foundations, we derive consequences that address the main questions and issues that (...) have arisen. Namely, elements of different structures are different. A structure and its elements ontologically depend on each other. There are no haecceities and each element of a structure must be discernible within the theory. These consequences are not developed piecemeal but rather follow from our definitions of basic structuralist concepts. (shrink)

The mathematical notion of a permutation of indices in the state description admits different physical interpretations. Two main interpretations analyzed in this paper are: exchange of essences and exchange of haecceities. It is argued that adopting the essentialist approach leads to the conclusion, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that quantum particles of the same type are sometimes discernible by their properties. The indiscernibility thesis can be supported only by the alternative interpretation in terms of primitive thisness.

Jason Bowers and Meg Wallace have recently argued that those who hold that every individual instantiates a ‘haecceity’ are caught up in a Euthyphro-style dilemma when confronted with familiar cases of fission and fusion. Key to Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma are certain assumptions about the nature of metaphysical explanation and the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities. However, I argue that the dilemma only arises due to a failure to distinguish between providing a metaphysical explanation of why a fact (...) holds vs. a metaphysical explanation of what it is for a fact to hold. In the process, I also shed light on the explanatory commitments of belief in haecceities. (shrink)

This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical purposes continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the discontinuous, stochastic micro dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic quantum theory. It results from excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM) and reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic guidance law for the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian particles. On MBM, there are no continuous trajectories linking up individual configurations. Instead, individual configurations (...) are actualized independently of each other, carving out the decoherence-induced branching structure of the universal wave function. Yet, by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of the universal wave function are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. Rather, world branches, on MBM, are actualized sequentially. -/- For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM is described, and their empirical equivalence is established. I present the conditions under which MBM can be classified as a primitive ontology (PO) theory, regarded as crucial for the acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. -/- The issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious problem for his “Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM – is discussed. I argue that Barbour’s time capsule approach does not provide a satisfactory solution. In particular, his adopting a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism between brain processes and experience of macroscopic change is argued to be reasonable in light of our current best neuroscience, yet problematic for theories relying solely on time capsules, understood as highly structured, individual, internally static configurations. As a solution, I introduce worlds, and world histories, as key concepts in providing a link between MBM’s micro dynamics and macroscopic phenomena. Worlds, other than time capsules, are coarse-grained regions in phase- or configuration space, defined as sets of possible micro states satisfying a relation of sufficient similarity from a macroscopic perspective, with respect to a given micro state. Hence, worlds may overlap. -/- I argue that worlds thus construed are a reasonable option for replacing the disjoint macro regions of phase space, resulting from the usual way of partitioning phase space in the standard framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This move solves the issue of discontinuous change of macro variables upon the micro state crossing the boundary between different macro regions. -/- I adapt this move for MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics in configuration space. Issues revolving around the microscopic-macroscopic distinction, particle identity, impenetrability and haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation, etc., are discussed. I provide a detailed explanation of how overlapping worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby linking up macroscopically distinct worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism is resolved in a way that is compatible with a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism. (shrink)

That experience requires a subject is all but uncontroversial. It is surprising, then, that contemporary philosophers of mind generally focus on experiences at the expense of subjects. Herein, I argue that beyond the qualitative character of phenomenology, there is a discrete further fact—the subjective character of phenomenology—that calls out for explanation. Similar views have recently been endorsed by both Zahavi and Kriegel, but a comparison of the ways they have framed the issue suggests there are two discrete questions afoot: in (...) virtue of what does subjective phenomenology exist whatsoever, and in virtue of what might one’s subjective phenomenology differ from that of one’s perfect duplicate? The second question—that of individuative subjective phenomenology—is my primary concern, and its answer seems to me to require the invocation of haecceities: non-qualitative, non-duplicable properties that uniquely individuate objects. In other words, I suggest that the property of being the very subject that one is enters essentially into the phenomenological character of all one’s experiences. (shrink)