The editors of this unique volume have brought together 24 leading emotion theorists with a wide variety of perspectives to address 12 fundamental questions about the subject.

First Published in 1951, this outline work on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics is intended both for university students who have recently started on the subject and for any who, without having the advantage of studying it at university, wish by private reading to acquire a general idea of its nature. The book deals with all the main questions arising within the field in so far as they can be stated and discussed profitably and simply. The topics discussed (...) include the place of reason in knowledge and life, the possibility of knowledge beyond sense-experience, the theory of perception, the relation of body and mind, alleged philosophical implications of recent scientific doctrines, the problem of evil and the existence of God. (shrink)

Asking the question “Why is there something instead of nothing?” almost always inspires a reaction of awe or wonder. This emotional response is both appropriate and desirable, whether or not a legitimate answer to the question is obtainable. The question is deep, and the fact about which it asks is impossible to explain by citing some other fact or some antecedent condition. In this paper I consider several possible responses, including a rejection of the question as meaningless, positions that posit (...) the existence of a necessary being, and teleological explanations that posit the instantiation of value in the world. It is argued that each of these positions is either an unacceptable response or fails to diminish our sense of awe at the existence of the world. (shrink)

Asking the question “Why is there something instead of nothing?” almost always inspires a reaction of awe or wonder. This emotional response is both appropriate and desirable, whether or not a legitimate answer to the question is obtainable. The question is deep, and the fact about which it asks is impossible to explain by citing some other fact or some antecedent condition. In this paper I consider several possible responses, including a rejection of the question as meaningless, positions that posit (...) the existence of a necessary being, and teleological explanations that posit the instantiation of value in the world. It is argued that each of these positions is either an unacceptable response or fails to diminish our sense of awe at the existence of the world. (shrink)

First Published in 1951, this outline work on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics in intended both for university students who have recently started on the subject and for any who, without having the advantage of studying it at University, wish by private reading to acquire a general idea of its nature. The book deals with all the main questions arising within the field in so far as they can be stated and discussed profitably and simply. The topics discussed (...) include the place of reason in knowledge and life, the possibility of knowledge beyond sense-experiene, the theory of perception, the relation of body and mind, alleged philosophical implications of recent scientific doctrines, the problem of evil and the existence of God. (shrink)

First Published in 1951, this outline work on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics is intended both for university students who have recently started on the subject and for any who, without having the advantage of studying it at ...

Are the characteristics and relationships among spatio-temporal entities "real" or are they simply conventional terms that note similarities among things in the world but lack any reality of their own? Or if they are real, what sort of reality do they have? Do we live in a world of causes and effects, or is this relation a useful contrivance for our convenience? What is the nature of this "I" that we invoke when referring to ourselves? Is it body? Mind? Both? (...) Neither? And once its nature is understood, what can be said of the choices it makes? Are they really ours, freely made by an independent will? Or is each choice determined more by the internal makeup of the "I" we happen to be and the social/environmental circumstances in which this "I" finds itself, rather than by any act of will? But if each of us "could not have chosen otherwise" than we have, are we no better than the machines we construct? Then again, maybe some of our more advanced machines should be considered conscious entities? Introduction to Metaphysics: The Fundamental Questions presents these and other intriguing questions, many of which have challenged philosophers from antiquity to the present in their efforts to speculate on the nature of what is real. Often filled with twists and turns, dark corners and hidden recesses, this journey of discovery is an exciting excursion into the depths of human understanding. As guides for this intellectual journey editor Andrew Schoedinger has chosen an impressive array of creative and thought-provoking philosophers: Peter Abelard, Aristotle, Renford Bambrough, George Berkeley, Joseph Butler, Rudolf Carnap, Roderick Chisholm, R.G. Collingwood, Arthur Danto, Donald Davidson, Rene Descartes, C.J. Ducasse, Alvin I. Goldman, Keith Gunderson, David Hume, John Locke, Alasdair MacIntyre, A.I. Melden, John Stuart Mill, D.F. Pears, Hilary Putnam, Anthony Quinton, Bertrand Russell, Michael Scriven, Sydney Shoemaker, P. F. Strawson, Richard Taylor, and others. This volume is a unique invitation to join a distinguished group of theorists as they tackle tough questions concerning the existence of universals, the nature of causation, understanding personal identity, the tangled web of free will, and the challenges posed by the advent of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

My title echoes Levinas' 1951 “Is ontology fundamental?” – a seminal piece that paved the way for his justly famous Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. I suggest that the characteristically enthusiastic, uncritical reception of these works may not be due primarily to their originality and sheer intellectual brilliance, but rather to something in Levinas' position that deeply resonates with the spirit of our times and our preoccupation with the fate of “the Other.” My claim, however, is that (...) accepting a Levinassian ethics, in which the Other has priority over the self, comes at too high a price, for it implies definitions of otherness and selfhood that fail to address precisely the problems that prompted preoccupation with otherness in the first place. I suggest that our struggles with racism, sexism, cultural bias point to frictions in (inter-)subjectivity that are inappropriately ethicized when treated, ala Levinas, simply as examples of an unwillingness to open up to the Other. In Levinas' universe, it is impossible not to hear the Other's appeal, but I argue that this view ignores the existence of a dimension of selfhood that cannot be absorbed into intersubjectivity. A metaphysical loneliness is thus implied here that our age seems unwilling to bear, preferring to cover it up with an ethics that makes us always responsible – that is, in response, connected to the Other. I develop this criticism by analyzing what I call a non-privative notion of irresponsibility whose roots are neither ethical nor ontological. (shrink)

The History of Psychology: Fundamental Questions provides significant excerpts from the philosophers, theologians, and scientists who contributed to the development of psychology. It also includes more recent works covering issues and ideas in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Extensively classroom-tested, this anthology addresses a comprehensive range of topics, yet is suitable for use as a core text or as a supplement in a single-semester course on the history of psychology. The History of Psychology offers selections from: · Aristotle · (...) St. Thomas Aquinas · Rene Descartes · John Locke · Immanuel Kant · Hermann Ebbinghaus · Charles Darwin · Margaret Floy Washburn · Wilhelm Wundt · Jean Piaget · B.F. Skinner · Noam Chomsky and many others. The readings encourage students to consider the foundations of psychology and the questions that led to its emergence as a distinct discipline. Going beyond the presentation and defense of a particular point of view, this collection gives students the opportunity to consider the fundamental questions of psychology. The book is organized into nine thematic sections that are presented chronologically. Each section includes works that cohere thematically to encourage discussion, highlight related topics, and stimulate the classic and more current debates within the field of psychology. Every reading is preceded by a brief biography of the author and a note about his or her range of interests and influence. Featuring original works from some of the most important figures in the history of psychology, The History of Psychology is ideal for undergraduate and graduate courses on history and systems in psychology and philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

It is questions that children need to do higher-order thinking in a community of inquiry. There, more fundamental questions should be asked with some efforts to understand clearly and analyze the given texts. The initial questions should be elaborated into more fundamental ones through dialogues and discussions, and the process may be changed by the given conditions and contexts. In this paper, I show by some real cases how teachers can help children make more (...) class='Hi'>fundamental questions in a community of inquiry. (shrink)

Many of the things we do in social and political philosophy, whether normative or critical, presuppose some understanding and evaluation of agency. To have a clear idea of our normative or critical enterprise, the underlying account of agency needs spelling out. This article begins with a descriptive account: human agency consists in power (or causal efficacy) organized as subjectivity (or selfhood), and such organization takes place through attributions of power informed by values. Some such descriptive account is useful for understanding (...) and comparing forms of agency. But as we move beyond it to construct an evaluative account of agency, we face problems that are symptomatic of our social and political condition. While quantitative assessment of agency does not work, qualitative assessment seems out of place in our modern world of pluralism and yet is unavoidable for those who, like Habermas, take issue with such phenomena as colonization of the lifeworld. © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (shrink)

Many of the things we do in social and political philosophy, whether normative or critical, presuppose some understanding and evaluation of agency. To have a clear idea of our normative or critical enterprise, the underlying account of agency needs spelling out. This article begins with a descriptive account: human agency consists in power (or causal efficacy) organized as subjectivity (or selfhood), and such organization takes place through attributions of power informed by values. Some such descriptive account is useful for understanding (...) and comparing forms of agency. But as we move beyond it to construct an evaluative account of agency, we face problems that are symptomatic of our social and political condition. While quantitative assessment of agency does not work, qualitative assessment seems out of place in our modern world of pluralism and yet is unavoidable for those who, like Habermas, take issue with such phenomena as colonization of the lifeworld. (shrink)

Wolfgang Huber is Germany's most important theological ethicist, and this is a translation of his 2013 book published with CH Beck. Acknowledging our pluralistic world, Huber analyzes twenty ethical issues that emerge during the course of our lives: the future of the family, genetic handicaps and genetic enhancement, combatting global hunger and poverty, environmental degradation, religious freedom, the right to health, the expanding influence of the media, the true purpose of business, what we owe our descendants, global conflict and war (...) and peace, the role of science, extending life and accepting death, and so on. In each chapter he provides a concrete example showing the relevance of the fundamental ethical question, then explains how one can think through possible responses and reactions. Huber is firmly within the Protestant tradition and takes philosophical cues from Kant. As such, he emphasizes the connections between personal, professional, and institutional ethics and demonstrates how human relationships lie at the center of our ethical lives. His aim is to articulate a theology of what he calls "responsible freedom" that transcends individualistic self-realization and includes communal obligations. (shrink)

Beginning with a reconsideration of what the school is and has been, this paper explores the idea of the school to come. Emphasizing the governmental role of education in modernity, I offer a line of thinking that calls into question the assumption of both the school and education as possible conduits for either democracy or social justice. Drawing on Derrida’s spectral ontology I argue that any automatic correlation of education with democracy is misguided: especially within redemptive discourses that seek to (...) liberate education from its present enclosure. This rereading of the field of education in the light of an account of the fundamental ontology of its key institution problematizes all rhetorics of education as social salvation. Education, it proposes, cannot be conceived as the ideal soul of a corrupted or as yet defective body, the school. Education—having taken on the character of an ontotheological principle—has become a governmental instrument as much as its specific institutions. This ontological condition can be understood within various accounts of the nature of contemporaneity. This paper considers the monstrous proposal that education be abandoned as the grounds for social, ethical and cultural redemption. The good news is that this abandonment opens the possibility for thinking beyond education, a beyond that is also beyond the strictures of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the (...) concept individual intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence. (shrink)

The effects of climate change will be felt far into the future, long after currently living people have stopped existing. A popular way of understanding what this means ethically is to conceptualize the issue in terms of intergenerational justice: currently living people have duties of justice toward future generations to not wrongfully harm them, or duties to reduce the risk of violating the rights future people will have when they exist. In this article I show that this depends on assumptions (...) about the existence, identity, and number of future people. I argue for the relevance and importance of ethically investigating these assumptions; in particular of asking: should humanity continue to exist? I argue that this ethical investigation is necessary to properly and fully understand the ethical challenges that climate change creates. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno asked in 1968: What is the fundamental question of the present structure of society? Do we live in late capitalism or an industrial society? In today’s society, we can reformulate this question: What is the fundamental question of the present structure of society? Do we live in capitalism or an information society? This article deals with these questions. A typology of information society theories is presented. Radical discontinuous information society theories, sceptical views and continuous (...) information society theories are distinguished. Second, an alternative concept that is grounded in Hegelian philosophy and Marxist political economy is presented. The basic argument is that the emergence of transnational informational capitalism is a transformational sublation, but not a radical one, and that informational capitalism is just one of the forms of capitalism that co-exist today. There is a unity of diversity of capitalism(s). (shrink)

Problem: The task of developing an ethics for the media according to constructivist principles is heavily loaded in two respects. On the one hand, critics of constructivism insist that this discourse generally legitimates forgery, arbitrariness, and laissez-faire -- a hotchpotch of facts and fictions; on the other, constructivists protest that their very school of thought inspires the maximum measure of personal responsibility and ethical-moral sensibility. Method: Taking as its point of departure a media falsification scandal that received wide publicity in (...) Germany, this article seeks to outline some of the fundamental questions of a constructivist media ethics. The close scrutiny of the scandal involving the interview fabricator, Tom Kummer, leads the author to identify three fundamental questions of a constructivist media ethics: (1) the question of autonomy; (2) the question of fact and fiction; (3) the question of responsibility. These questions are discussed at length, and with particular attention to the current debates regarding the ethics of media and communication studies. Findings: The author is able to show that constructivist premises and postulates will certainly help to create ethical-moral sensibility, but cannot supply, as immediate derivatives of constructivist epistemology, programmes for action or concrete regulations of behaviour that can be implemented step by step. For an ethics of the media, constructivism can thus primarily provide meta-reflections and meta-rules. (shrink)

This article addresses the fundamental issues about sovereignty and an ethical polity that the event of September 11th has brought to a crisis. It examines the geography of power that has become more visible as the USA sets about ensuring that the new world order that has been emerging with neo-liberalism and corporate capitalism is protected from challenges of any kind. It argues that the state of emergency has become chronic, making possible the enactment of exceptional measures that threaten (...) the basic principles underlying democracy and liberty. Terror is becoming a universal tool to compel compliance with a global form of neo-feudalism. It questions the way in which Islamic fundamentalism is being used as ideological cover to legitimate another fundamentalism, namely neo-liberalism. The article opens up aspects of fundamentalism to an analysis that explores the interconnections between onto-logical lack, violence, surplus terror and the unpresentable in the discourse constitutive of authority. It also examines the exceptional status and character of the USA in the history of modernity, particularly with regard to its militarism. It calls for a critique of the present that recognizes that the current forms of totalitarianism eliminate the possibility of just forms of sociality emerging. (shrink)