Wilson and Kass talked about their book, The ethics of human cloning, which is about the ethical debate over human cloning.

Abstract -/- In 1998, the Council for Science and Technology established the Bioethics Committee and asked its members to examine the ethical and legal aspects of human cloning. The Committee concluded in 1999 that human cloning should be prohibited, and, based on the report, the government presented a bill for the regulation of human cloning in 2000. After a debate in the Diet, the original bill was slightly modified and issued on December 6, 2000. (...) In this paper, I take a closer look at this process and discuss some of the ethical problems that were debated. Also, I make a brief analysis of the concept “the sprout of human life.” Not only people who object to human cloning, but also many of those who seek to promote research on human cloning admit that a human embryo is the sprout of human life and, hence, it should be highly respected. I also discuss the function of the language of utilitarianism, the language of skepticism, and religious language appeared in the discussion of human cloning in Japan. (shrink)

This recent study on the ethics of human cloning is a lively exchange between two articulate and well informed opponents: Leon R. Kass and James Q. Wilson. Kass is the Addie Clark Harding Professor in the Committee on Social Thought and the College of the University of Chicago. Wilson is the James A. Collins Professor of Management and Public Policy Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles.

The ethical implications of human clones have been much alluded to, but have seldom been examined with any rigour. This paper examines the possible uses and abuses of human cloning and draws out the principal ethical dimensions, both of what might be done and its meaning. The paper examines some of the major public and official responses to cloning by authorities such as President Clinton, the World Health Organisation, the European parliament, UNESCO, and others and reveals (...) their inadequacies as foundations for a coherent public policy on human cloning. The paper ends by defending a conception of reproductive rights of "procreative autonomy" which shows human cloning to be not inconsistent with human rights and dignity. (shrink)

In search of a potential problem with cloning, I investigate the phenomenon of telomere shortening which is caused by cell replication; clones created from somatic cells will have shortened telomeres and therefore reach a state of senescence more rapidly. While genetic intervention might fix this problem at some point in the future, I ask whether, absent technological advances, this biological phenomenon undermines the moral permissibility of cloning.

In search of a potential problem with cloning, I investigate the phenomenon of telomere shortening which is caused by cell replication; clones created from somatic cells will have shortened telomeres and therefore reach a state of senescence more rapidly. While genetic intervention might fix this problem at some point in the future, I ask whether, absent technological advances, this biological phenomenon undermines the moral permissibility of cloning.

In search of a potential problem with cloning, I investigate the phenomenon of telomere shortening which is caused by cell replication; clones created from somatic cells will have shortened telomeres and therefore reach a state of senescence more rapidly. While genetic intervention might fix this problem at some point in the future, I ask whether, absent technological advances, this biological phenomenon undermines the moral permissibility of cloning.

Fritz Allhoff has recently offered an extremely compelling challenge to the morality of human cloning. He argues that a biological phenomenon, that of telomere shortening, undermines the moral permissibility of human cloning. Telomere shortening is caused by cell replication, and appears to be one of the central reasons that cells and organisms age and die. Allhoff considers a thirty-year-old woman who wishes to create a genetic clone. He notes that the DNA from her cell that would (...) be used to create the clone would have shortened telomeres—as it would have gone through many generations of cell replication. As a result, the clone would begin its existence with shortened telomeres; the clone’s telomeres would be the same length as the woman’s telomeres at the time of cloning. The moral problem lies in the fact that because of shortened telomeres, the clone will senesce more rapidly as compared with noncloned organisms, and would have increased susceptibility to degenerative conditions and diseases. Allhoff then goes on to argue that earlier senescence and disease susceptibility constitute a moral ground for rejecting cloning because “the life of a clone would be worse than that of a non-clone”. This line of argument is rooted in Parfit’s The Same Number Quality Claim : “If in either of two outcomes the same number of people would ever live, it would be bad if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived”. Applying Parfit’s Q principle to cases of cloning, it could be argued that parents ought to produce children that would be maximally well off, and since clones would be worse off than children produced “normally,” it follows that parents should avoid cloning. As Allhoff puts it, “obviously sexual reproduction would not transfer shortened telomeres to offspring so, all else being equal, sexual reproduction is better than cloning ”. For this sort of line to pack any moral punch, Q must be interpreted rather strongly. (shrink)

"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

Human cloning raises the most profound questions about human nature, our faith in ourselves, and our ability to make decisions that could significantly alter the character of humanity. In this exciting and accessible book, Gregory Pence offers a candid and sometimes humorous look at the arguments for and against human cloning. Originating a human being by cloning, Pence boldly argues, should not strike fear in our hearts but should be examined as a reasonable (...) reproductive option for couples. Pence considers how popular culture has influenced the way we think about cloning, and he presents a lucid and non-technical examination of the scientific research and relevant moral issues in the cloning debate. This book is a must-read for anyone who is concerned about the impact of technology on human life and for those with interests in medical ethics, sociology, and public policy. (shrink)

The idea of splitting off cells from embryos to clone human beings sounds so bizarre and dangerous that one would think the practice should not be permitted. A closer look reveals its ethical acceptability.

Human cloning is a main focus of current bioethical discussion. Involving the self-understanding of the human species, it has become one of the most debated topics in biomedical ethics, not only on the national, but also on the international level. This book brings together articles by bioethicists from several countries who address questions of human cloning within the context of different cultural, religious and regional settings against the background of globalizing biotechnology. It explores on (...) a cross-cultural level the problems and opportunities of global bioethics. (shrink)

Human reproductive cloning has not yet resulted in any live births. There has been widespread condemnation of the practice in both the scientific world and the public sphere, and many countries explicitly outlaw the practice. Concerns about the procedure range from uncertainties about its physical safety to questions about the psychological well-being of clones. Yet, key aspects such as the philosophical implications of harm to future entities and a comparison with established reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilisation (...) are often overlooked in discussions about HRC. Furthermore, there are people who are willing to use the technology. Several scientists have been outspoken in their intent to pursue HRC. The importance of concerns about the physical safety of children created by HRC and comparisons with concerns about the safety of IVF are discussed. A model to be used to determine when it is acceptable to use HRC and other new assisted reproductive technologies, balancing reproductive freedom and safety concerns, is proposed. Justifications underpinning potential applications of HRC are discussed, and it is determined that these are highly analogous to rationalisations used to justify IVF treatment. It is concluded that people wishing to conceive using HRC should have a prima facie negative right to do so. (shrink)

Background The regulation of human cloning continues to be a significant national and international policy issue. Despite years of intense academic and public debate, there is little clarity as to the philosophical foundations for many of the emerging policy choices. The notion of "human dignity" is commonly used to justify cloning laws. The basis for this justification is that reproductive human cloning necessarily infringes notions of human dignity. Discussion The author critiques one of (...) the most commonly used ethical justifications for cloning laws – the idea that reproductive cloning necessarily infringes notions of human dignity. He points out that there is, in fact, little consensus on point and that the counter arguments are rarely reflected in formal policy. Rarely do domestic or international instruments provide an operational definition of human dignity and there is rarely an explanation of how, exactly, dignity is infringed in the context reproductive cloning. Summary It is the author's position that the lack of thoughtful analysis of the role of human dignity hurts the broader public debate about reproductive cloning, trivializes the value of human dignity as a normative principle and makes it nearly impossible to critique the actual justifications behind many of the proposed policies. (shrink)

The author, a member of the U.S.President's Council on Bioethics, discussesethical issues raised by human cloning, whetherfor purposes of bringing babies to birth or forresearch purposes. He first argues that everycloned human embryo is a new, distinct, andenduring organism, belonging to the speciesHomo sapiens, and directing its owndevelopment toward maturity. He then distinguishesbetween two types of capacities belonging toindividual organisms belonging to this species,an immediately exerciseable capacity and abasic natural capacity that develops over time. He argues that (...) it is the second type ofcapacity that is the ground for full moralrespect, and that this capacity (and itsconcomitant degree of respect) belongs tocloned human embryos no less than to adulthuman beings. He then considers and rejectscounter-arguments to his position, includingthe suggestion that the capacity of embryos isequivalent to the capacity of somatic cells,that full human rights are afforded only tohuman organisms with functioning brains, thatthe possibility of twinning diminishes themoral status of embryos, that the fact thatpeople do not typically mourn the loss of earlyembryos implies that they have a diminishedmoral status, that the fact that earlyspontaneous abortions occur frequentlydiminishes the moral status of embryos, andthat his arguments depend upon a concept ofensoulment. He concludes that if the moralstatus of cloned human embryos is equivalent tothat of adults, then public policy should bebased upon this assumption. (shrink)

This study has a twofold objective: firstly, it aims to examine the main types of argument that have been formulated against human cloning, to identify their presuppositions and to evaluate their strength; secondly, it aims to argue that the most important objections against human cloning are philosophical and religious, in particular the objection that human cloning represents a radical form of disenchantment or an abuse of rationality. The birth of a cloned mammal, a sheep (...) named Dolly, which was announced on 23 February 23 1997, began a wide public debate on the morality of human cloning. I shall try to show that this debate should not be limited only to ethical and legal considerations, since it has more profound ramifications. The science of cloning is rooted in a certain metaphysical background, which, discreetly, but firmly, accompanies its spectacular promises, and which has profound consequences on our metaphysical and religious beliefs. This background needs to be openly discussed and evaluated. Moreover, it warrants the special attention of philosophers and religious thinkers alike. . (shrink)

Those procedures which, at some future date, could constitute the operations resulting in the cloning of a human being are defined as a tool. As humans have been using tools for some two million years, sets of rules or ethics have been devised to make sure that tools are used to promote the maximum benefit and cause the minimum harm. It would, therefore, seem appropriate to consider the human cloning process as one such tool and (...) approach the ethical issues which might govern its use in a manner which has been informed by how we have approached similar instances of new tool development. In this we can be guided by a range of thought experiments and practical considerations. When we combine these two facilities we may conclude that there are some benefits to be gained by the use of the human cloning tool, while there are other aspects of the use of the tool that need to be carefully controlled and regulated. An outline of a pragmatic approach to the initial uses of the tool is described. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Human cloning has been simultaneously a running joke for massive worldwide publicity of fringe groups like the Raelians, and the core issue of an international movement at the United Nations in support of a treaty to ban the use of cloning techniques to produce a child (so called reproductive cloning). Yet, even though debates on human cloning have greatly increased since the birth of Dolly, the clone sheep, in 1997, we continue to wonder (...) whether cloning is after all any different from other methods of medically assisted reproduction, and what exactly makes cloning an ‘affront to the dignity of humans.’ Categories we adopt matter mightily as they inform but can also misinform and lead to mistaken and unproductive decisions. And thus bioethicists have a responsibility to ensure that the proper categories are used in the cloning debates and denounce those who try to win the ethical debate through well‐crafted labels rather than well‐reasoned argumentations. But it is as important for bioethicists to take a position on broad issues such as human cloning and species altering interventions. One ‘natural question’ would be, for example, should there be an international treaty to ban human reproductive cloning? (shrink)

From this collection, readers will gain a clearer picture of the history of cloning in agriculture and animal science, the various biological procedures that are encompassed by the term "cloning," the philosophical arguments in support of and opposed to cloning humans, and the considerations that should inform discussions about public policy matters related to cloning research and to human cloning itself.

The author makes a review of the different meaning of the word “clone”. He refers on the new perspectives in fertilizing human eggs with somatic nucleus in order to obtain a zygote after having removed the original nucleus. The author moreover discusses the ethical implications.

From this collection, readers will gain a clearer picture of the history of cloning in agriculture and animal science, the various biological procedures that are encompassed by the term ""cloning,"" the philosophical arguments in support of ...

In this article we argue that we have no good ethical reasons to prevent research on both, reproductive and therapeutic cloning. Our strategy is for each type of cloning research to demonstrate that no harms will occur to any person if such research goes ahead. Furthermore, we show that there is substantial interest in the continuation of this research, and the availability of reproductive human cloning technologies. We argue that satisfying these interests, in the absence of (...) any identifiable harms, would result in a positive, desirable outcome. (shrink)

In Human Cloning a panel of distinguished philosophers, medical ethicists, religious thinkers, and social critics tackle the thorny problems raised by the now real possibility of human cloning. In their wide ranging reviews, the distinguished contributors critically examine the major arguments for and against human cloning, probe the implications of such a procedure for society, and critically evaluate the "Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission." The debate includes both religious and secular (...) arguments, as well as an outline of the history of the cloning debate and a discussion of human cloning's impact on our sense of self and our beliefs about the meaning of life. (shrink)

Hailed as revolutionary, the prospect of human cloning is actually the next logical step in a series of developments in reproductive technology that began with the first test-tube baby in 1978. This book addresses the debates over cloning in the context of new reproductive technology and human embryo research. It examines the status of preimplantation embryos, the ethical issues related to cloning and embryo research, and the formulation of public policy.

Advances in cloning technology and successful cloning experiments in animals have raised concerns about the possibility of human cloning in recent years. Despite many objections, this is not only a possibility but also a reality. Human cloning is a scientific revolution. However, it also introduces the potential for physical and psychosocial harm to human beings. From this point of view, it raises profound ethical, social and health related concerns. Human cloning would (...) have an impact on the practice of nursing because it could result in the creation of new physiological and psychosocial conditions that would require nursing care. The nursing profession must therefore evaluate the ethics of human cloning, in particular the potential role of nurses. This article reviews the ethical considerations of reproductive human cloning, discusses the main reasons for concern, and reflects a nursing perspective regarding this issue. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with two questions. First, is the cloning of humans beings morally acceptable, or not? Secondly, if it is acceptable, are there any significant benefits that might result from it? I begin by drawing a distinction between two very different cases in which a human organism is cloned: the first aims at producing a mindless human organism that will serve as a living organ bank; the second, at producing a person. I then consider each (...) of these in turn. The moral issues raised by the former are the same as those raised by abortion. For this reason, I do not discuss such cloning at length - though I do indicate, very briefly, the reasons for thinking that it is not morally problematic. The rest of the essay then focuses upon the question of the moral status of cloning in cases where the goal is to produce a human person. Here I begin by distinguishing between the question of whether such cloning is in principle morally acceptable, and the question of whether its use at the present time is morally defensible. The second of these questions I consider only briefly, but I do argue that the attempt to produce persons via cloning at the present time is open to serious moral objections. I then turn to the first question, and there I argue, first, that cloning that has the goal of producing persons is not intrinsically wrong; secondly, that such cloning would have a number of potential benefits; and thirdly, that none of the objections that have been directed against this sort of cloning can be sustained. My overall conclusion, accordingly, is that both sorts of cloning are in principle morally acceptable, and potentially beneficial to society. (shrink)

This paper reports on the meeting of the Sounding Board of the EU Reprogenetics Project that was held in Budapest, Hungary, 6–9 November 2005. The Reprogenetics Project runs from 2004 until 2007 and has a brief to study the ethical aspects of human reproductive cloning and germline gene therapy. Discussions during The Budapest Meeting are reported in depth in this paper as well as the initiatives to involve the participating groups and others in ongoing collaborations with the goal (...) of forming an integrated network of European resources in the fields of ethics of science. (shrink)

Flesh of My Flesh is a collection of articles by today's most respected scientists, philosophers, bioethicists, theologians, and law professors about whether we should allow human cloning. It includes historical pieces to provide background for the current debate. Religious, philosophical, and legal points of view are all represented.

The current debate on the ethics of cloning humans is both uninspired and uninspiring. In large measure this is because of mistakes that permeate the discourse, including the mistake of thinking that cloning technology is strictly a reproductive technology when it is used to create whole beings. As a result, the challenge this technology represents regarding our understanding of ourselves and the species to which we belong typically is inappropriately downplayed or exaggerated. This has meant that important (...) (albeit disquieting) societal issues and species-type concerns have not been fully explored. This paper, intended as a corrective, suggests that we take an alternate view of human cloning as both an enhancement and a reproductive technology. This proposed shift in the framework for analysis counters the current narrow framing of the issues and introduces new questions about the prospect of modifying the species. (shrink)

The momentum of advances in biology is evident in the history of patents on life forms. As we proceed forward with greater understanding and technological control of developmental biology there will be many new and challenging dilemmas related to patenting of human parts and partial trajectories of human development. These dilemmas are already evident in the current conflict over the moral status of the early human embryo. In this essay, recent evidence from embryological studies is considered and (...) the unbroken continuity of organismal development initiated at fertilization is asserted as clear and reasonable grounds for moral standing. Within this frame of analysis, it is proposed that through a technique of Altered Nuclear Transfer, non-organismal entities might be created from which embryonic stem cells could be morally procured. Criteria for patenting of such non-organismal entities are considered. (shrink)

This paper reports on the meeting of the Sounding Board of the EU Reprogenetics Project that was held in Budapest, Hungary, 6–9 November 2005. The Reprogenetics Project runs from 2004 until 2007 and has a brief to study the ethical aspects of human reproductive cloning and germline gene therapy. Discussions during The Budapest Meeting are reported in depth in this paper as well as the initiatives to involve the participating groups and others in ongoing collaborations with the goal (...) of forming an integrated network of European resources in the fields of ethics of science. (shrink)

Since early 1997, when the creation of Dolly the sheep by somatic cell nuclear transfer was announced in Nature, numerous government reports, essays, articles and books have considered the ethical problems and policy issues surrounding human reproductive cloning. In this article, I consider what response a modern liberal society should give to the prospect of human cloning, if it became safe and practical. Some opponents of human cloning have argued that permitting it would place (...) us on a slippery slope to a repugnant future society, comparable to that portrayed in Aldous Huxley’s novel, Brave New World.I conclude that, leaving aside concerns about safety, none of the psychological or social considerations discussed in this article provides an adequate policy justification for invoking the state’s coercive powers to prevent human cloning. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss an objection to human cloning which appeals to the welfare of the child. This objection varies according to the sort of harm it is expected the clone will suffer. The three formulations of it that we will consider are: 1. Clones will be harmed by the fearful or prejudicial attitudes people may have about or towards them (H1); 2. Clones will be harmed by the demands and expectations of parents or genotype donors (H2); (...) 3. Clones will be harmed by their own awareness of their origins, for example the knowledge that the genetic donor is a stranger (H3). We will show why these three versions of the child welfare objection do not necessarily supply compelling reasons to ban human reproductive cloning. The claim that we will develop and defend in the course of our discussion is that even if it is the case that a cloned child will suffer harms of the type H1-H3, it is none the less permissible to conceive by cloning so long as these cloning-induced welfare deficits are not such as to blight the existence of the resultant child, whoever this may be. (shrink)